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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Athenians to the Mclians 
416·5 DC: 
"As/or us, even assuming Ihal our 
empire does come to an end, we 
are not despondent about what 
would happen next. One Is nol so 
much /rlghtened 0/ being 
conquered by a power which rules 
over others, as Sparta does (not 
that we are concerned with Sparta 
now), as o/whal would happen If a 
ruling power Is attacked and 
de/eo ted by Its own subjects. So 
far as this point IJ concerned, you 
can leave it 10 UJ lo/ace the risks 
Involved. What we shall do now IJ 
10 Jhow ),OU that It IJ lor the good 
0/ our own empire that we are here 
and It is lor the preservation 0/ 
your city that we shall say what we 
are going to Jay. We do not want 
all)' Irouble in bringing ),ou Into 
our empire, and we want you to be 
spared lor the good both 0/ 
yourselves and 0/ ourselves. 
Thucydldes, V:9 . 
Life is a combination of moments and details, different for every individual. My life, 
in a mysterious and appealing way, was always strongly linked with Cyprus, even if the 
roots of my family tree have never reached the fertile grounds of Aphrodite's island. 
Fate brought my parents together in a classical concert dedicated to the Enosis cause, 
therefore quite frequently my father used to say to me that I have Vivaldi's passion and 
the irrationality of the Nationalist slogans of that era to thank for my existence. When 
Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974, I was only 19 days old, and though still 
innocent of the political complexities of the Greco-Turkish relations, I played a decisive 
role in determining the fate of my family. A law of the ruling Greek military junta 
exempted every father with an infant less than 30 days old from military duties in case 
of war. Therefore, my father was not called to go to Cyprus, unlike his two brothers 
who were both killed serving their country. I was named after one of them, and I can 
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still recall that the only story able to put me in bed during my early childhood was about 
the day that my two uncles left for the Cypriot front. Nevertheless, that was long ago. 
Cyprus, for me, was just another topic for lively discussions with my friends during my 
undergraduate years, and empty philosophical debates concerning the nature of the 
Cypriot question and possible solutions, until I saw a live television coverage of a Greek 
Cypriot, of my age, climbing the flagstaff of a Turkish Cypriot check-point, aiming to 
lower the Turkish flag. This young man was killed instantly by Turkish Cypriot bullets. 
At that moment, four years ago, I realized that there are still people who are ready to 
sacrifice themselves for an island that has sought peace of mind since the dawn of 
history. 
This is neither a study of British foreign policy in Cyprus nor of the Enosis1 
movement, but of a combination of the above factors, aiming to examine the reasons 
that led to the Zurich-London agreement and signalled the end of colonisation and the 
defeat of the Enosis movement in Cyprus. This task will be accomplished by examining 
the diplomatic history of that time, both in Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, interviewing key actors, and researching diplomatic archives and 
relevant secondary sources. I will provide more specific details concerning the 
methodology of this thesis in due course. 
The end of the Cold War caused considerable changes in the geostrategic equilibrium 
of the globe. History, religion, cultures, people; they are relevant again breaking free 
from the repetitious ideological and economic confrontation of the two superpowers that 
transformed the world into two opposed camps. Globalization is the new trend, and the 
Internet [sic] is the vehicle that eradicates national frontiers and cultural barriers. 
According to the spirit of the time, all the burdens of the past must be left out from 
the new chapter of our race, including the political ones that caused such considerable 
pain and grief to millions of our co-travellers in the labyrinth of history. Politicians, old 
enemies in the game of dominance, share the same table, and the people, obedient 
pawns in the game of self-destruction, are shaking their hands and re-evaluating their 
mistakes. Cyprus, the cradle of the goddess of beauty Aphrodite, could not escape the 
order of the time. A new wind of hope is blowing above the island of the Eastern 
Mediterranean, a fresh breeze that takes away the echo from the voice of the ghosts of 
the past and creates new expectations for re-conciliation and peaceful co-existence. 
I Enosis: Unification in Greek. The Enosis movement, as it will be presented in this thesis, was the 
Greek Cypriot policy since 1878 that demanded the unification of Cyprus with continental Greece. 
During this thesis I will make use of the Greek word, since it is widely used by Western academics in 
such a great extent that it seized a place in the Western political vocabulary. 
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The tourist who visits Cyprus will be amazed by the natural beauties of the island and 
by the kindness and hospitality of its people. However, if he searches a little bit deeper, 
he will soon realize that the island is sick and that all the "doctors" that tried to prevent 
the inevitable simply failed. The island has a malignant tumor in its lungs, a fatal 
disease that threatens the very existence of Cyprus. As the tourist enters the old section 
of Nicosia, he will be able to admire the neo-classic architecture of the houses with the 
big balconies, and the narrow streets that form a pleasant labyrinth in the heart of this 
aged city. Suddenly, though, the tourist will realize that Nicosia is not like any other 
city that he may have visited before, that the picturesque labyrinth of the old section of 
the city suddenly ends and that soldiers and blockades prevent the continuation of his 
relaxing walk among buildings and memories of another era. The reason for the 
unpleasant halt is because the tourist will have arrived at the end, not of the island, but 
of the Cypriot Republic. Naturally, curiosity will prevail over anger and 
disappointment, and he will come closer to the barricades. The soldiers will smile at 
him and they will ask if he wants to climb a ladder to the top level of the barricades, in 
order to see the rest of the city through the specially designed binoculars. If the tourist 
accepts that tempting offer, he will soon find himself looking to the other section of the 
city: he will notice that there arc soldiers there as well, but with different helmets, and 
he will probably hear the voice of a young officer saying to him that this is the 
neighborhood in which his father was raised but he can not visit it because now the 
Turkish Cypriots are holding it. From the top level of the barricades the tourist would 
observe the capital of the so-called Turkish Cypriot Republic of Northern Cyprus, the 
other half of Nicosia, a no-go area for almost every visitor.2 
It is a great mystery how such a small territory as Cyprus has given rise to such pain 
and blood through the centuries: how such a beautiful island can arouse the most 
destructive instincts of the human being. Nevertheless, on 20 July 1974, five days after 
the overthrow of Makarios by the Athenian junta and the establishment of a puppet-
regime under the leadership of the Greek Cypriot Nikos Samson, Turkey invaded 
Cyprus, and by August had occupied 40% of the island and turned 200,000 Greek 
Cypriots into homeless refugees. This resulted in the partition of Cyprus into a Greek 
Cypriot state in the South and a Turkish Cypriot regime in the North, not recognized by 
any state of the world except Turkey. Since then, hundreds of thousands of pages have 
been dedicated to Cyprus, putting the island of the Eastern Mediterranean in the central 
2 The Republic of Cyprus forbids entrance to everyone that has visited the so-called Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus and whose passport has a stamp of the Turkish Cypriot regime. 
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focus of the academic world. Historians, International Relations theorists, economists 
and world-known reporters tried to analyse the past of the island, drew conclusions 
about the Turkish invasion in 1974, and attempted to predict, within the methodological 
framework of science, the future of the island. So what is the aim of this particular 
study, and is it possible to find a space for itself among the vast bibliography 
concerning Cyprus? 
This thesis will cover the period from the end of the Second World War until the 
Zurich-London agreement. It does not aim to serve either the British historiography, or 
the Greek one. My final aim is to link the two above sections with this study, to draw 
common conclusions for both countries, and create a common and accessible base of 
knowledge concerning the Cypriot question for the future generations of Britain and 
Greece. In addition, this study is not aiming to efface all the previous written works 
concerning the Cypriot question and re-write history from the beginning. However, it 
will seek to keep a critical eye, attempting to clarify every dark comer of that period, 
and to introduce new facts and pieces of evidence that will complete the gigantic puzzle 
of the Cypriot question. The main question that I will seek to address and answer is: 
What were the factors that brought about the Zurich-London agreement and signalled 
the end of the Enosis movement in Cyprus? In other words, what was the contribution 
of the internal and external factors of the Cypriot question towards its final outcome? 
This question will apply to every chapter of this thesis and I will attempt to analyse with 
a great detail the positive or negative influence of the Enosis movement towards the 
Cypriot question.3 Nevertheless, this is not going to be the only question that this thesis 
will seek to answer. Every chapter will set a series of questions that will be linked with 
the aforementioned one, directly or indirectly. 
In this paragraph I intend to give a short summary of every chapter of this thesis, as 
well as the questions that each chapter will seek to answer. Chapter II will introduce the 
reader to the historic past of the island, investigate the diplomatic background which led 
to the Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1878 over Cyprus' fate, and will also review the 
reactions of the Cypriot population towards the British establishment from 1878 until 
l It is important to note here the methodological mistake that Greek and Western Europeans commonly 
commit in discussing the Enosis movement. It is quite common to identify EOKA with the Enosis 
movement in Cyprus. However, this constitutes a methodological inaccuracy. The Enosis movement 
dates back to 1878, while EOKA appeared in the Cypriot political spectrum in 1955. EOKA was the 
military wing of the Enosis movement. To suggest that it exclusively represented the anti-colonial 
movement in Cyprus is like suggesting that ELAS (National People's Liberation Army) exclusively 
represented the Greek resistance movement during the Axis occupation in Greece - ELAS was the 
military wing orEAM (National Liberation Front), or that IRA (Irish Republican Army) exclusively 
represents the anti-British front in Northern Ireland (IRA is the military wing of Sinn Fein). 
s 
the end of the 1930s. However, the main task of this chapter will be to identify the birth 
of Nationalism in Cyprus, and analyse the main reasons for the occurrence of this 
development. The main question that this chapter will seek to answer is: To what extent 
has the British administration encouraged and legitimized the national division of the 
Greek and the Turkish communities inside the Cypriot framework, and for what 
purpose? Chapter III will cover the period from the early days of the Second World 
War untill the Plebiscite of January 1950, and the first Greek Cypriot attempt to 
internationalize the Cypriot question. The main questions that this chapter will seek to 
answer are: From which perspective did the British establishment embrace and 
encourage the formation of AKEL? What was the main result that derived from the 
formation of AKEL, for the Cypriot political framework? Why did the post-Second 
World War modus vivendi influence the modification of British colonial policy in 
Cyprus? To what extent has the Greek Civil War influenced the official line of Athens 
towards the Enosis demands of the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy? What were the main 
reasons for the collapse of the Consultative Assembly of 1948 and what was its impact 
on the political developments in Cyprus? Chapter IV will cover the period from the 
appearance of Makarios III as a decisive factor in Cypriot affairs to the Ninth Session of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept-Dec 1954). This chapter will be 
divided in two equal parts. The first part will examine Makarios' entry in the Cypriot 
political arena as the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of the island, his plans for the re-
organization of the Greek Cypriot community according to the demands of the Enosis' 
movement and his methods towards the internationalization of the Cypriot question. 
Additionally, the first part of this chapter will review the diplomatic situation between 
Greece and Britain over the Cypriot issue, as well as the geostrategic and political 
developments that occurred during that time for the aforementioned countries and 
influenced their approaches to the Cypriot question. The main question that the first 
part will answer is: Under which circumstances and under the influence of which factors 
did the Cypriot question become an international issue of the United Nations? 
Secondary questions that will be answered are: How can the initially negative attitude of 
the Greek government, towards Makarios' demands to take the Cypriot question to the 
United Nations, be justified in accordance with the diplomatic aims of Athens during 
that time? Why did Britain decide to turn down the Greek proposals for bipartite 
negotiations over Cyprus? To what extent did the Suez Treaty influence the British line 
towards the Cypriot question? The second part of this chapter will be a detailed 
analysis of the Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United concerning the 
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Greek appeal for Cyprus. The legal and diplomatic arguments of Britain, Greece and 
Turkey will be presented and examined, while an overall evaluation of the Ninth 
Assembly will be presented for all three countries. The questions that the second part 
will answer are: What are the theoretical complications of the terms self-government 
and self-determination within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations? 
What were the legal obligations that derived from the Lausanne Treaty for Britain, 
Greece, and Turkey concerning Cyprus? How can the role of the United States 
concerning the final outcome of the Greek appeal in the United Nations be justified 
within the geostrategic framework of the Cold War? Which factors influenced Athens 
to apply to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and was 
that a positive or negative decision? Chapter V will review the appearance of the Greek 
Cypriot guerilla group, EOKA, in Cyprus. The aim of this chapter will be to contribute 
to the above analysis by adding new evidence for EOKA, that will shed light on the 
dark comers of that period. This chapter will approach the process of EOKA's 
formation, covering the period from EOKA's first action until the beginning of the 
Tripartite Conference in London, on July 1955. The main questions that this chapter 
will seek to answer are: Why was EOKA's formation a negative development for the 
Enosis movement and for the inter-communal unity of the island? Why did the British 
side not protect peace and order in Cyprus by arresting Grivas and preventing the 
formation of EOKA? What were the geostrategic gains for London in allowing Grivas 
and EOKA to establish themselves in the Cypriot political arena and, most importantly 
in the Greek Cypriot mentality? Chapter VI will examine the so-called Tripartite 
Conference in London, (29 August-7 September 1955), and its diplomatic results 
concerning the Cypriot question. Additionally, it will evaluate the influence of the 
Conference upon the diplomatic relations of Britain, Greece and Turkey. The main 
questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: What was the extent of the 
American influence on the Tripartite Conference? How can the Greek acceptance of the 
British invitation in London be justified? To what extent has the evacuation of the 
British military base from Suez and the protection of the Middle East oil resources 
influenced British policy towards the Cypriot question? What were the main reasons 
for the failure of the Tripartite Conference? What were the main factors that influenced 
Turkish policy concerning Cyprus? Chapter VII will review the period from the direct 
diplomatic negotiations between the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios and the 
governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, until Makarios' arrest and exile in Seychelles, on 
9 March 1956. Through the chapter a detailed analysis of the talks will be presented, 
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examining the diplomatic arguments of the two sides, as well as their intentions 
concerning the fate of the Cypriot question, and the internal and external political 
developments that resulted in Makarios' arrest and exile. The main task of this chapter 
is to evaluate Harding's constitutional proposals and assess the reasons for the Greek 
Cypriot refusal to accept them. Secondary questions that this chapter will seek to 
answer are: How was the decision of Athens to appeal again to the UN justified within 
the framework of Greece's internal situation during that time? Why did the American 
position towards Harding's proposals change? What were the main reasons that 
influenced London to order Makarios' arrest and exile? Chapter VIII will examine the 
constitutional proposals of Lord Radcliffe concerning the Cypriot question, and their 
final outcome. It will analyse the diplomatic background that led to Lord Radcliffe's 
dispatch to Cyprus and the constitutional proposals of the British side. It will also 
present the political and diplomatic situation in the Middle East during that time, and 
will attempt to link it with the internal developments in Cyprus. Finally, this chapter 
will evaluate the outcome of Lord Radcliffe's proposals for the course of the Cypriot 
question. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Was London 
truly motivated to resolve the Cypriot crisis by sending Lord Radcliffe to the island? 
Why did Athens decide to turn down Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals? 
Secondary questions that this chapter will seck to answer are: Why did London turn 
down Averofs proposals concerning the Cypriot question? What was the Greek role 
during the Suez crisis and how did this influence the British attitude towards the Cypriot 
question? Why was the idea of partition negative for the peace and unity of Cyprus? 
Chapter IX will examine the period from Makarios' liberation from Seychelles to the 
introduction of Foot's and Macmillan's proposals, concerning the finding of a solution 
to the Cypriot question. It will present the diplomatic background of Makarios' 
liberation from the place of his exile, attempting to analyse the reasons that forced 
London to modify its policy towards Makarios' isolation from the Cypriot political 
arena. In addition, this chapter will consider Foot's and Macmillan's plans concerning 
the Cypriot question, by evaluating their context, as well as their final outcome and 
influence on the internal political scene of Cyprus. The main questions that this chapter 
will seek to answer are: How can the researcher evaluate Foot's-Macmillan's plan 
concerning the Cypriot question? How can Athens' attitude towards Foot's proposals 
be justified? Under what circumstances did London decide to present Macmillan's 
proposals concerning the Cypriot question? Secondary questions that will be presented 
in this chapter are: Under what circumstances did London decide on Makarios' release 
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from Seychelles? Why did the US support the Greek initiative that resulted in 
Makarios' release? What was the political significance of Harding's replacement by 
Foot in Cyprus? Chapter X will examine the period from the announcement of 
Makarios' plan concerning the independence of Cyprus until the final agreement of all 
the involved sides, embodied in the Zurich-London agreement. This chapter will 
analyse the diplomatic background of the complicated negotiations concerning the 
future of Cyprus, and will examine the final outcome of the Zurich-London agreement 
by assessing its context. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: 
What was the diplomatic importance of Makarios' proposal concerning an independent 
Cyprus? What were the reasons that persuaded both Athens and Ankara to come to 
negotiations concerning the Cypriot question? What were the reasons that made 
Makarios reluctant to recognize the Zurich-London agreement and how were those 
hesitations bypassed? What was the Zurich-London agreement? Chapter XI will be the 
concluding chapter of this thesis. It will seek to assess the contribution of internal and 
external factors which influenced the Cypriot question, in order to answer the main 
question of this thesis: What were the factors that brought about the Zurich-London 
agreement and signalled the end of the Enosis movement in Cyprus? In addition, this 
chapter will assess the importance of the Zurich-London agreement and will answer the 
following questions: Which side benefited the most from the Zurich-London 
agreement? Did the Zurich-London agreement have the capacity to last permanently? 
There are a number of possible methodological approaches towards an explanation of 
the Cyprus question and its solution. A theoretical approach, for example, could seek to 
place this question in a structural context and explain the course of diplomacy and 
negotiation within the framework of realism. Alternatively, a colligation would trace 
the long sequence of events leading to the de-colonisation process, which in tum 
explains the British willingness to relinquish control over the island. 
However, neither of these approaches would be appropriate for this particular 
enquiry. It is concerned with a unique event, that is the achievement of a particular 
settlement the Zurich-London agreement through a process of negotiation and the 
conciliation (and manipulation) of the contending parties. It is true that that while 
unique it shares many of the characteristics of post-colonial conflict and ethnic 
divisions. An attempt has been made to place the Cyprus question within this context. 
It is not, however, a case study, nor is this question treated as explicable within a 
colligatory sequence of changes. It is contended that individuals are central to an 
explanation and that decision and action should be related to the reasoning of the main 
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actors. The methodology of this thesis is based on an analysis which is historical but in 
a particular sense. It seeks to establish the interplay of circumstances and reasons from 
the point of view of the actor. Evidence of this reasoning and the interpretation of 
primary sources together with interviews are central to the thesis. 
This points to interpretation as the basic form of explanation and its truth conditions 
depend on the evidence. Clearly there may be a variety of interpretations based on the 
same evidence but the best interpretation is one which fits the evidence most closely 
and does not substitute opinion for it. The process by which the Zurich- London 
agreement was achieved is a contingent one and dependent on changing assessments as 
well as circumstances. This thesis seeks to explain why perceptions changed and the 
ultimate compromise was achieved. 
Despite the vast bibliography that already exists concerning the Cypriot question, 
still, I faced notable difficulties in collecting all the necessary sources. One of the main 
problems was the fact that my knowledge concerning the Turkish language is limited. 
Therefore, it was impossible to search the Turkish archives or even to read a selected 
bibliography of secondary sources in Turkish. Nevertheless, my lack of knowledge 
concerning the Turkish language does not decrease the academic validity of this study. 
Whenever it was necessary to identify various elements of the Turkish foreign policy 
concerning Cyprus I made use of either British and American primary sources, or 
Turkish secondary sources translated to English. In addition, my poor knowledge of the 
Turkish language was balanced by my detailed understanding of Ottoman and Turkish 
history, and in particular the Greco-Turkish relations from 19th century until this day. 
Another great problem for the writing of this thesis was the considerable lack of Greek 
primary sources. According to a law issued immediately after the restoration of 
democracy in Greece in 1974, all the significant documents of the state, especially those 
about the Greek Foreign relations and policies, are inaccessible to the public for 50 
years. However, I overcame this obstacle by interviewing key figures of the Greek 
political world and by making an extending use of memoirs and diaries. Throughout 
this thesis, I made use of British and American primary sources such as the House of 
Commons Debates and the Foreign Relations of the United States, in an attempt not to 
introduce but to establish accessible British and American primary sources as a part of 
the Greek historiography as well. On the other hand, it was a great pleasure for me to 
introduce for the first time in the British historiography three memoirs of great 
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importance, K. Karamanlis' memoirs and E.Averof-Tositsas'4, the legacies of two of the 
most important politicians of Greece in the 20th century, and N Kranidiotis', Makarios' 
closest associate and one of the most important Greek Cypriots of his generation. In 
addition, a great number of secondary sources will be presented in this thesis, both 
British and Greek, linking this thesis with previous attempts to examine the Cypriot 
question of Enosis. 
The structure of this study is a historic narration, with the eleven chapters arranged in 
a chronological order, the sections of each chapter represents thematic and analytical 
approaches of the facts and the incidents that led to the Zurich-London agreement. This 
was a conscious choice made for a number of reasons. Revisionist scholars accuse their 
traditionalist colleagues of inadequate theoretical basis, only to receive the counter-
charge that revisionists lack academic solidity.5 This study attempts to cut across these 
mutual recriminations by way of employing what is good in both schools, whilst 
avoiding their more obvious failings. On the other hand, this study, in so far as it can 
lay any claim to a theoretical basis, has been supplemented by the consultation of 
virtually all sources pertinent to the subject. It is hoped that this will assist in eschewing 
detenninistic interpretations and tackling the most unwelcome difficulty besetting the 
study of recent and controversial historical phenomena. However, most of all this study 
has the aim to separate, through the historical analysis, the analytical "what happened 
and why", from the emotive and judgmental "who was right and who was wrong". 
Machiavelli instructed Rafaello Girolami that: 
1I ... occasionally words must serve to veil the facts. But this 
must happen in such a way that no one becomes aware of it,' or, 
if it should be noticed, excuses must be at hand, to be produced 
immediately. ,,6 
Ultimately, everything depends on whether one can defy these instructions. 
4 E. Averof.Tositsas' memoirs were published in the United Sates under the title Lost Opportunities: The 
Cyprus Question 1950·1963. (New York. 1986). The American edition, however, is more a selection 
than a full publication of Tositsas' memoirs, excluding large parts of the original document. The 
American edition is based mainly on what the author had to say about the American involvement in the 
Cypriot question, therefore during this thesis I made use of the original Greek text. 
'See: RJ. Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War, (princeton, 1973) and W.F. Kimball, 
The Cold War warmed oyer, (American IIistorical Review, 1974), vol. 79, p.p. 1119-36. 
6 Quoted by A. Kosteler, Darkness at Noon, (London, 1987), p. 135. 
11 
CHAPTER II 
CYPRUS THROUGH THE CENTURIES: FROM TilE ACIIEAN SETTI_ERS 
TO THE BRITISH LION. 
The Athrnlans to the Mellans 
"The standard of justice depends 
on the equality ojpower to compel 
and." the strong do what they have 
the power to do and the weak 
accept what they have to accept. " 
Thucydldes, V:89. 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the foundations for the rest of this thesis. It 
will attempt to introduce the reader to the historic perplexities of Cyprus by 
investigating the diplomatic background which led to the Anglo-Turkish agreement over 
the fate of the island, and the first period of British rule in the island. It will also review 
the reactions of the Cypriot population towards this. However, the main interests of this 
chapter are: to identify the birth of Nationalism in the Cypriot framework; to examine 
the main reasons for the occurrence of this development; and, in an attempt to separate 
history from national propaganda, to answer the question: To what extcnt has the British 
administration encouraged and legitimizcd the national division of the two communities 
inside the Cypriot framework and for what purpose? 
Cyprus lies in the Northeastern comer of the Mediterranean Sea with an area of 9,251 
square kilometers. It played a vital role in the geo-strategic equilibrium of the region 
during the early days of the Cold War as a bulwark against Soviet penetration in the 
Middle East. Cyprus, after 1954, became the new home for MI6's regional base, 
controlling MI6 stations at Beirut, Tel Aviv, Amman, Jeddah, Baghdad, Tehran, Basra, 
Damascus, Cairo and Port Said, while the British air bases in the island could be used as 
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the nucleus of Western defence in case of a Soviet invasion in the Middle East. l 
Geographically, it belongs to the Asian continent. Its distance from the Minor Asia 
coast is 43 miles (Cape of Kormakiti-Amamur), and from the Syrian coast, 76 miles. It 
is 255 miles from Egypt (Lamaca's port- Port Said), and 200 miles from Crete.2 Since 
the dawn of history the island's rich deposits of copper and timber attracted settlers and 
invaders from neighbouring areas. According to archaeological records the first settlers 
in Cyprus were the Acheans, coming from Pelloponesos at the beginning of the 12th 
century BC after the fall of Troy. At the end of the 8th century the victorious campaigns 
of Saragon II, King of Assyria, brought Cyprus within his control. In 583 BC, the 
founder of the Persian Empire, Cyrus the Elder, established his rule in the island, while 
in 478 BC, the Greek allied fleet, under Pausanias' command, restored Cyprus to the 
free Greek world. During the reign of Alexander the Great Cyprus became an important 
naval base of the Macedonian Empire, and in 58 BC, the island had been incorporated in 
the Roman Empire as a part of the province of CHicia under the proconsul Cornelius 
Lentulus Spinther. In 395 AD, Cyprus became part of the Byzantine Empire. In 1191, 
the English King, Richard Coeur-de-Lion, captured the island but in 1192 he sold it to 
the Latin dynasty of the House of Lusignan at the price of 100,000 gold Byzantine 
besants. In 1489, the Venetian Republic annexed the island and in 1571 the Ottoman 
Muzzafer Pasha captured Nicosia, bringing Cyprus under Ottoman contro1.3 
The capture of Nicosia by Muzzafer Pasha signalled the end of a long period of Frank 
and Venetian presence in Cyprus. A detailed research of the new social and political 
facts that the new rulers of Cyprus introduced, in an attempt to remove the already 
established socio-economic feudal system from the Cypriot mentality, is of great 
importance in order to understand and analyse the appearance and development of 
Nationalism in Cyprus. The Ottoman Empire had been organized in self-governed 
religious communities (Millets), under the leadership of the clerical hierarchy. This 
particular system offered Ottoman subjects a relatively high amount of religious and 
cultural freedom, while it accepted the presence, inside the Ottoman framework, of 
different nationalities. The principal element of unity inside the Millets was religion. 
I For more concerning MI6 presence in the island see: N. West, The Friends, (London, 1988), p. 70. For 
more concerning the role of the airfields of Cyprus in the case ofa Soviet invasion in the Middle East see: 
B. O'Malley & I. Craig. The Cyprus Conspiracy: America. Espiona~e and the Turkish Inyasion. (London. 
1999), p.p. 6-7. 
2 Great Greek Encyclopaedia. (Athens. 1961), vol. IV, p. 405. 
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National identity took a secondary role, with insignificant influence, and was mainly 
adopted by the Ottoman state for the accomplishment of communal unity and 
disciplined administrational function.4 The above model of governing was introduced 
in Cyprus, as well. The island that for so many centuries witnessed a great number of 
invasions and settlements, by various national, racial, and religious groups, was divided 
in two Millets: The Muslim and the Christian/Orthodox (Rum Millet).s The Ottoman 
administration system influenced the sociological orientation of the island. Under the 
Ottomans the Cypriot society had its bases in the terms "family" and "village". Outside 
the theoretical framework of those two terms, any other identification was valid 
according to religion. This can be easily identified by the official and unofficial 
censuses of that period, which classified the population according to religious beliefs, 
without even the vaguest reference to terms of national division.6 The two Millets, 
during the early period of the Ottoman era in Cyprus, passed through stages of peaceful 
co-existence and conflict, aiming not to question the Ottoman rule with the adoption of 
a national revolt, but to improve their socio-economic standards.' In terms of social 
class, the two Millets were not internally homogeneous, which created explosive 
conditions and class animosity between members of the same religious group. The 
equal amount, in a proportional base, of Muslims and Christians in every class category, 
from the landless farmers to the Cypriot aristocracy, resulted in common class efforts to 
secure or to protect social rights. Class issues lay behind every revolt in Cyprus during 
that timeS and the notion of national identity was a vague terminology with no valid 
importance inside the Ottoman framework. 
The Ottoman system of Millet functioned with no special problems till the end of the 
18th century, when the religious differences of the Ottoman subjects began to adopt a 
nationalist character. The pioneers of this development were members of the elite 
Greek-speaking community of the Ottoman empire, who became the leading elements 
3 For more concerning the early Cypriot history see: Sir G.lIill, A History of Cyprus. (Cambridge. 1940, 
1948). vol. I-III, A. Agelides. Cyprus; A Chronograph of Pillage and Strucgle from the Ancient Times 
until the Invasion. (Athens, 1996) . 
.. K. Karpat, Ethnicity and Community and the Rise of Modern Nations in the Ottoman State. in (Actes du 
II Congress International des Etudes du Sud-East Europeen). (Athens, 1978). vol. II. p. 11 S. 
5 D. Alastos. Cyprus in Jlistory. A Survey of5.0QO Years, (London, 1976), p. 262. 
6 T. Papadopoulos, Social and IIistQrical Data on Population. 1570-1881, (Cyprus Research Centre. 
Nicosia, 1965), p. 6. 
7 H. Luke, A Portrait of Appreciatjon, (London. 1965), p. 79. 
8 For common revolts of Muslim and Christian villagers against their co-religious landowners and the 
clergy, and the continuous revolts of the Cypriot aristocracy against the Sultan in Costantinople see: 11.0. 
Purcell. ~, (New York. 1989). pp.189-192. 
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of the Ottoman merchant class by exploiting the religious, political, and economic 
tolerance of the Sublime Porte. The Greek-speaking population had managed to secure 
a greater deal of autonomous administration from the Sultan than other Balkan peoples, 
such as the Serbs or the Bulgarians. This gave them the opportunity to develop a strong 
common link and to ascend the Ottoman social scale, which led them to become the key 
figures of the naval trade and diplomacy inside the Ottoman framework. As A. 
Vakalopoulos, the notable Greek historian, once stated: 
"The Greeks were the main reason for the establishment of 
capitalism as an economic model in the unenlightened 
Ottoman Empire,,9 
while the distinguished academic B. Lewis supports the view that in the late seventeenth 
century the Phanariot Greeks, thanks to their monopoly of the knowledge of Western 
languages, managed to be the only official interpreters of the Ottoman state in dealing 
with foreign embassies. lo 
The economic influence of those people was notable. However, their political 
influence was insignificant and limited, due to the administration system of Millet. 
Therefore, they tried to emphasize the religious, cultural and linguistic similarities that 
they had with other Ottoman citizens, in order to create and develop a national 
movement. The main explanation for the rise of nationalism in the Ottoman framework 
can be found in the revolutionary preaching of the French Revolution for the need of the 
adoption of a class, as well as a national identity; the American Revolution; and the 
failure of the Ottoman administrative system to deal successfully with corruption and 
social inequality in the vast setting of the Empire}l Nevertheless, the Greek War of 
Independence in 1821, the expression of the need for the adoption of a national identity 
by the Greek-speaking Ottoman community, managed to liberate only an insignificant 
part of the historic Greek area. The Greece that emerged from the revolt was a truncated 
state of some 800,000 inhabitants, while 2.4 million Greek-speaking people remained 
under Ottoman rule. This was a virtual guarantee that Greek foreign policy would be 
irredentist. The result of the "non-completed" revolution was the expression of national 
9 Quoted by G. Castellan, Historie des Dalkans, (Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1991), p. 360. 
10 D. Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Tyrkey, (London, 1967), p. 62. 
II For more concerning the origins of the Greek War ofIndependence see: N. Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire 
and Islamic Tradition, (New York, 1972), pp. 214-48. See also M. Glenny, The Dalkans 1804-1999: 
Nationalism. War and the Great Powers, (London, 1999), pp. 22-39. 
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bitterness through the adoption of Nationalism and its spiritual product, the Great Idea. 
The main aim of the Great Idea was the restoration of the Byzantine (Greek Orthodox) 
Empire from Anatolia to Corfu, and from Cyprus to the northern frontiers of 
Macedonia. The Greek national idea appeared for the first time in Cyprus when the 
Christian population of the island tried to assist the revolutionary attempts of their co-
religious brothers in continental Greece. The Ottomans tried with an immediate and 
violent response to discourage the Christian population from transferring the 
revolutionary climate of continental Greece into the Cypriot framework. Therefore, on 
9/21 July 1821 the Christian population of Cyprus experienced the notorious Ottoman 
method of containment. An extended description of those days is given by the 
prominent French intellectual and painter, Lacroix. 
" ... Kuchuk Mehmed persists in inventing a plot, persuades 
the Grand Vezir of its reality: he, being perhaps a party to 
the stratagem, allows the Governor to make an example by 
the severe punishment of the leaders (prominent members of 
the Greek Cypriot society). Free to act, Kuchuk Mehmed on 
July 9, 1821, orders the arrest of the Archbishop (Kyprianos) 
and the other three bishops. They were taken to the Seral, 
and were scarcely inside before they were murdered by the 
janissaries... The gates of the palace were open, and the 
bleeding corpses thrown into the square. This was signal for 
a general massacre. The convent of Phaneromene was at 
once occupied. and the priest strangled. I was told... that 
before killing them the Turks, with a wild refinement of 
vengeance, saddled the priests, as they would their horses, 
breaking their teeth to force the bits into their mouth, and 
making them caper under their spurs. The Greek houses 
were giving over to pillage, massacres began again in all the 
districts of the island. and confiscationfollowed massacre. ,,12 
Nevertheless, despite the decisiveness that the Ottomans demonstrated and the era of 
terror that followed for the Christians of Cyprus, the first base for the flourishing of 
nationalism inside the Cypriot framework was an unalterable fact. The Christians began 
12 Sir II. Luke, Cyprus under the Turks: 1571·1878 • (London, 1969), pp. 131·32. 
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to see the Ottomans as national tyrants and turned their faces to the newly founded 
Greek state seeking protection and a place of reference with which to identify 
themselves. 
After March 1829, when the Great Powers recognized the independence of the Greek 
State, riots began to challenge Turkish authority in Cyprus. The Ottoman Empire, after 
three centuries of glory and triumphs, began to collapse and the Greek Cypriots found 
the opportunity to demand the unification of the island with the newly founded Greek 
State. Nationalism was well established in the Greek Cypriot mentality, however, the 
strategic position that the island held in the Eastern Mediterranean made that unification 
unattainable. Instead, the fading of the red crescent in Cyprus attracted the interest of 
the Great Powers of the time, who were ready to duel for the inclusion of Cyprus in their 
opulent collection of colonies. Characteristically, S. N. Phrankoudes, the French consul 
in Cyprus, in his letter of 15 March 1831 to the French Ministry of War and Foreign 
Affairs is clearly stating that the Cypriots were all longing for their island to be taken by 
France, and his successors, from time to time, suggested that annexation by France " 
would be a sovereign cure for the island's troubles. ,,13 In 1845, there were rumors that 
Cyprus was to be ceded to Great Britain as compensation for having expelled the 
Egyptians from Syria and re-united the province to the Ottoman Empire. The proposal 
for annexing Cyprus, extremely popular among diplomatic circles in England, came to 
nothing owing to strong reactions from the rest of the Great Powers, but led Disraeli to 
declare in 1847 that "the English want Cyprus and they will take it as compensation" 
and "the English will not do the business of the Turks againfor nothing.,,14 Disracli's 
words, as we will see later on, fixed the boundaries of British foreign policy concerning 
the British role and attitude towards the Cypriot question. In 1849 came Germany's tum 
to express her interest in Cyprus. Prince Chlodwig Von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, a 
German diplomat and (later on) Imperial Chancellor, had on 1 November 1848 been 
appointed Imperial administrator at the courts of Rome, Florence and Athens. Arriving 
in Athens in December, he was sent on a voyage in the Archipelago and the Levant in a 
British gunboat. During the cruise he visited Rhodes, Crete and Cyprus and in 18 
January, 1849, in his official report, he wrote: 
J3 Cypriot Chronicles, (Larnaca, 1930), vol. VIII, pp. 126-27. 
14 J.lIeadlam, W. Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History, (London, 1930), pp. 203·07, see also D.E. 
Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention policy of 1878 ,(Cambridge, 1934), Harvard Historical 
Studies, no. 38. 
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"Germany should take advantage of the weakness of the 
Ottoman power to acquire these islands by peaceful means ... 
and of the three I consider Cyprus best adapted for German 
colonization. A secret agent should be sent out at once to 
make a report on the geology,' it would show that the Cyprus 
market would justify Germany in taking the necessary steps 
in the Porte ,,/s 
France could not exclude herself from the diplomatic game, concerning Cyprus' fate. 
R,H, Lang in his article "Cyprus" in Macmillan's Magazine (1878) wrote: 
"There can be no doubt that Napoleon III seriously thought 
of Cyprus and recognized it as an important observatory over 
the provinces of Turkey in Asia and Africa. Hence, the 
valuable researches of Af.A Gaudry, made and published in 
extend for the Emperor, and hence the hope prematurely 
expressed by that distinguished traveler in a communication 
to the "Revue des Deux Afondes", many years ago that 
Cyprus would soon come under the beneficent influence 0/ 
the French civilization. " 
Despite the secret diplomacy concerning the fate of Cyprus by all the major European 
powers of the time, the decisive step for the island towards its place in history was a 
revolutionary incident in the north Balkans. In early May 1876 the rising of comitadjis 
(Bulgarian nationalist guerillas) occurred in Bulgaria. As an answer the panicked 
Ottoman Empire let loose against the Bulgarian population the armed irregulars, known 
as Bashi-Bazaks, well known for their savageness and barbarity. Through May and 
June, the Ottoman irregulars committed appalling massacres, in which both sexes and 
all ages suffered. The murder of over 12,000 Christians, and the fact that no Turk was 
punished, aroused a storm of protest in Britain and France and the immediate diplomatic 
reaction of Russia.16 The Crimean War was not a distant memory for Russia, and since 
the Tsar regarded himself as the champion of all the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, 
a new war between Turkey and Russia, a clear threat to the sensitive balance of power in 
I' Cypriot Chronicles, (Larnaca, 1932), vol. X, pp.241-45. 
16 R. W. Seton-Watson. Britain in Europe. 1789-1914 ; A Survey of Foreign Policy, (Cambridge, 1937). 
p.519. 
,-
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the Mediterranean, seemed inevitable. Nevertheless, Britain made a last attempt 
towards peace. Therefore, during November 1876 Lord Derby, a prominent member of 
the Conservative Party and Prime Minister in 1825, proposed a European conference at 
Constantinople to impose reforms on the Turks, due to their attitude towards the 
Bulgarian population. The Conference opened on the 23 rd of December and from the 
first moment proved to be a diplomatic parody. The Sultan and his advisers, relying 
upon the European differences and conflicting military interests, were determined not to 
yield to their demands. The European powers proposed a system of local self-
government for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria, a scheme which aimed at 
pacification in the Balkans and the moral satisfaction of Russia, and on the other hand to 
maintain the Ottoman Turkey as a decisive factor of stability in the Balkans, able to 
resist Russian expansionism. However, the Ottoman side rejected that proposal and 
declared that it was a disgraceful plan aiming to destroy Turkey, and proposed an 
alternative scheme of domestic reforms.17 The Ottoman side was convinced that once 
more Britain, for the sake of the Straits, would not allow Russia to declare war against 
her. However, this time the Ottomans were isolated. Tsar Alexander II was determined 
not to repeat the mistakes of the Crimean War and fight the Ottoman Empire with the 
rest of the European Powers against him. Therefore, due to secret diplomacy, he 
succeeded in securing the benevolent neutrality of Austria-Hungary in a possible Russo-
Turkish war by promising to agree to a future annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina inside 
the Austro-Hungarian framework. Britain, on the other hand, mainly because of the 
widespread anti-Turkish feeling back home and not wishing to incapacitate the already 
disturbed Holy Alliance, decided not to stand by the Turkish side yet. However, as a 
condition for her neutrality she proposed to Russia two conditions. The first was that 
Russia had to recognize Britain's policy in Suez and Egypt, and the second was that 
Russia was not allowed to attack Constantinople. The Conference failed in its mission 
to maintain peace and order and on April 24 1877, Russian troops crossed the European 
and Asiatic frontiers of Turkey. The fourth and last Russo-Turkish war of the century 
had started. As was expected the Russian advancement against Turkey was rapid, but 
no diplomat expected the arrival of the Tsarist army, on January 20 1878, in Adrianople. 
The capture of Adrianople put under considerable threat the safety of the capital of the 
Ottoman Empire, the city of the cities, Constantinople. A possible advancement of the 
17 For more about the Constantinople Conference see: E. Anastasiou, The last phase of the Ottoman 
Empire, (Athens,1969), pp.210-34. 
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Russian troops to the City would have meant the immediate capture of the Straits and 
the extinction of the British plans, concerning their unquestionable superiority in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Since the early days of the 18th century the main aim of British 
foreign policy in the Mediterranean was to keep Russia isolated from it. A potential 
capture of the Straits by the Tsar would have meant not only the entrance of Russia in 
the region as a key factor, not only the challenge to the British naval trade supremacy, 
but also the evolution of a new threat, due to the geographical position of the Straits, to 
the so called Jewel of the Empire, India. The prospect of the Russian arrival in the 
Mediterranean and the British reaction split the Cabinet in London. A small team under 
Disraeli's influence supported the view that Britain should intervene in favour of the 
Ottomans. But the absolute majority declared their opposition to aiding the Sublime 
Porte and threatened to resign if they were overruled. The spirit among the British 
political circles and the seriousness of the situation during that time forced Queen 
Victoria to issue a memorandum on January 11, 1878, which was addressed to her 
Cabinet the following day. 
"The state of the Eastern question has become most serious 
and events are following each other with such rapidity and 
developing such fearful proportions, that what was decided 
even two or three days ago seems no longer of much avail. 
The news of the surrender of the Turkish army at Shipka 
yesterday and of the intention not to defend Andrianople 
today show that Constantinople may be attacked very soon, 
and if there is a panic, not defended/ We must therefore, 
stand by what we have always declared, that any advance on 
Constantinople would free us from our position of neutrality. 
Were these mere empty words? lfso, England must abdicate 
her position and retire from having any longer any voice in 
the Councils of Europe and sink down to a third-rate power! 
But the Queen feels sure that there is not one amongst her 
Ministers who, whatever their individual feelings for Turkey 
and against war may be, would wish us not to support the 
honour and dignity of Great Britain ... There is not a moment 
to be lost or the whole of our policy of centuries, of our 
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honour as a great European Power will have received an 
irreparable blow ... ,,18 
Victoria's memorandum managed to re-unite the Conservative Cabinet, therefore the 
parliament was asked for and voted six millions pounds for armaments. Britain was not 
the only power that expressed her surprise and anxiety concerning the Russian victories. 
Austria-Hungary, expelled from the north of Italy in 1866, had looked since then upon 
the western half of the Balkan Peninsula as her sphere of influence. As mentioned 
above, the Emperor Francis Joseph had promised his neutrality during the war at his 
meeting with the Tsar at Reichstadt on July 8, 1876, on condition that the occupation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina should be his reward. Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian side 
feared these conditions would not be kept by the victorious Russians, who in an 
analogous case would have been accused of betraying the case of the Slavs. The 
Austro-Hungarians decided to act rapidly, therefore while the ambassador in 
Constantinople reassured the Sultan that in the case of Russian troops arriving outside 
the gates of the Ottoman capital the Austro-Hungarian army would invade Russia, the 
ambassador in London declared the full support of his country towards the Dritish plans 
of stopping the Russian aggression. 19 Suddenly, Russia had to face an undesirable 
situation, finding herself isolated against the rest of the European Powers. The 
diplomatic pressure upon Tsar Alexander II and the remembrance of the Crimean war, 
led to the signature of a peace treaty between Russia and Turkey at San Stefano on 
March 8, 1878.20 According to the treaty, Montenegro, Serbia and Romania obtained 
their independence, while a large part of Turkish Armenia, including Kars and Datum, 
was also assigned to Russia. The Treaty of San Stefano brought peace in the Dalkans 
and Constantinople remained under Ottoman control, satisfying the Western plans. 
Russia, however, was the country that gained the most. The annexation of a large part 
of Armenia put Turkish security under a constant threat, since in a case of a new war the 
Russian troops could have been outside Constantinople's gates very shortly. Britain was 
alarmed by the new developments in the geostrategic arena, and the government was 
planning its answer. On March 27, Lord Derby wrote in his diary: 
18 G. E. Buckle, The Life ofDen;amin DisraelL Earl ofDeaconsUeld, (London, 1920), vol. VI, pp. 218-
19. 
19 E. Foteinopoulos, The Second Period oCthe Dark Years; The European Diplomacy in the 19th Century. 
(Thessaloniki,1951), vol. II, p. 330. 
20 R. C. K. Ensor, England: 1870-1914, (Oxford, 1936), p.48. 
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" Cabinet at 12, sat only till 1; but the business done was 
important both nationally and to me in particular. Lord B. 
[Disraeli] addressed us in a set speech, to the effect that we 
must now decide our policy,· that our objects have been the 
maintenance of the Empire, and of peace ... that our attempts 
to be moderate and neutral have only lessened our influence, 
and caused our power not to be believed in ... An emergency 
had arisen; every state must now look to its own resources,' 
the balance of power in the Mediterranean was destroyed 
He proposed to issue a proclamation declaring emergency, to 
put a force in the field, and Simultaneously to send an 
expedition from India to occupy Cyprus and Scanderoon. 
Thus, the effect of the Armenian conquests would be 
neutralized. the influence of England in the Persian Gulf 
would be maintained and we should hold posts which are the 
key of Asia. ,,21 
Disraeli knew that Russia was not in a state to fight another war at this time, and this 
was the decisive factor, which determined the British stance. In a case of war with 
Great Britain and a more than certain defeat, Russia would have had to withdraw from 
the Balkans and abandon the gains of San Stefano. Therefore, when the Indian troops 
began to arrive at Malta, before the end of May, the Tsarist government decided that she 
had no other choice than to sit at the negotiating table. The result of the diplomatic 
negotiations between Lord Salisbury and the Russian representative Count Schuvaloff 
was the Protocol of London (30 May, 1878) which put the Treaty of San Stefano under a 
general reconsideration and proposed the meeting of all the European Powers in Berlin 
for the final settlement of the diplomatic dispute between them and Russia.22 Britain, 
however, did not stop there. In order to face the new geostrategic balance of power in 
the Mediterranean, she searched for a new base of influence in the area. As seen, since 
the early days of the 19th century Cyprus had attracted British attention, thus in the 
background of the Anglo-Russian negotiations, Britain put pressure upon the Sultan to 
cede the island. In return Britain was determined to sign a defensive alliance with the 
21 B. E. Buckle. op. cit.. p. 266. 
22 I. O. Katapodis. Four Centuries ofDip\omatic Action in Europe: 1648-1959. (Athens. 1996). pp. 424 
- 25. 
22 
Porte, which could guarantee Asiatic Turkey against a future Russian invasion. Earlier 
on May 5, B. Disraeli wrote to Queen Victoria analyzing the benefits of such an 
agreement. 
"If Cyprus be conceded to your Majesty by the Porte and 
England, at the same time, enters into a defensive alliance 
with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian 
invasion, the power of England in the Afedilerranean will be 
absolutely increased in that region and your Majesty's Indian 
Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the key of 
Western Asia. ,,23 
On May 23 he continued, trying to persuade his Queen of the validity of his plans: 
"No delay can be permitted in the negotiations with the 
Porte. We shall offer a guarantee, a British guarantee, of all 
the Asiatic provinces to Turkey and Rumelia in Europe, this 
or any portion of Turkey in Europe is not to be guaranteed. 
The result, if all be carried as planned, into effect will be that 
Turkey will still be an independent power with large 
possessions and resources. She will be as independent, and 
more powerful, than the Scandinavian Kingdoms, and now, 
under the protection of England, will be the most effective 
and indeed only possible barrier against an aggressive 
Russia.,,24 
A definitive proposal in this sense was sent to the Sultan on May 24, but as this 
coincided with an abortive conspiracy against his life, which led to a series of 
ministerial changes, it was not until June 4 that Sir H. Layard, the British Ambassador at 
Porte, could obtain the Sultan's signature, concerning the Defensive Alliance between 
Britain and Turkey. The signature of the Alliance opened the road for the final 
settlement of the British demands about Cyprus. Nevertheless, while the Congress was 
in progress and during the secret negotiations about Cyprus, which lasted a month (13 
June-I3 July), the Sultan had second thoughts as to the surrender of the island to Britain. 
23 B. E. Buckle, op. cit., p. 291. 
24 B. E. Buckle, op. cit., pp. 293-94. 
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The Sultan's hesitation to hand Cyprus to Britain should be examined within the 
Ottoman social and political framework of the time. The constitutional unlimited and 
unquestionable power that the Sultan had held since the formation of the Ottoman State 
was now being challenged by a newly established social movement, the Young 
Ottomans. The nationalist principles that characterized the new movement and its 
increasing influence inside the wider framework of the Ottoman middle class, forced 
the Sultan to reconsider his decision relating to Cyprus, fearing a possible social 
uprising organized by the Young Ottomans.2S However, the British side overcame those 
hesitations with a severe telegram, threatening the Sultan that they would support 
Bismarck's proposals that Thessaly, Epirus and Crete should be given to Greece if 
Turkey would not hand Cyprus to Britain.26 Britain's counteraction resulted in the 
signature of a secret agreement, known as Cyprus Convention, on July 13 which fixed 
the terms for the abdication of Cyprus to Britain. Cyprus did not become a part of the 
British Empire at once. The island was rented to Britain at the annual price of 93,000 
pounds, an arrangement which lasted until 1914, the beginning of the World War 1.27 
The secret agreement between Britain and Turkey became known to the rest of the Great 
Powers towards the end of the Congress of Berlin. The news of the surrender of Cyprus 
had an impressive impact among the rest of the Great Powers, but France was the most 
alarmed of all. While France had strong economic interests in the Porte, as one of the 
main creditors of the Ottoman Empire, she had equally strong geostrategic interests in 
the Eastern Mediterranean as a naval power, and could not come to terms with the fact 
that the Cyprus Convention threatened to transform the Mediterranean Sea into a British 
lake. Nevertheless, a diplomatic crisis had been avoided by the British promise, through 
the Marquis of Salisbury to the French Foreign Minister Waddington, that in the event 
of a French occupation of Tunis Britain would remain silent.28 The Congress of Berlin 
put an end to Russian expansion in the Balkan peninsula and to the Tsar's plans for the 
establishment of Russia in the Mediterranean Sea. It was a notable British diplomatic 
victory, since the Russian army had to evacuate the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire was 
saved and maintained its role as a bulwark against Russian aggression, and Britain 
strengthened her position in the Eastern Mediterranean by the cession of Cyprus. While 
2' For more concerning the appearance and influence of the Young Ottomans see: S. Mardin, The Genesis 
of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study jn the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas. (Princeton, 1962). 
26 II, Papageorgikos, The Role of Secret Diplomacy in the Geostrategic Transformation of the 
Mediterranean Nations, (Thessaloniki, 1981), p. 79. 
27 For more concerning the legal implications of the issue, concerning International Law see, 
L.F.L Oppenheim, International Law, (London, 1928), 4th ed., vol. I, p. 363. 
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the Russian bear returned home defeated, the British lion found a new kingdom over 
which to exercise its mighty rule. 
During the afternoon of 4th July, the British Rear Admiral of the Channel Squadron, 
Lord J. Hay, received a classified telegram which instructed him to leave at once from 
the Cretan port of Sud a and sail to CypruS.29 On July 10, Lord Hay landed in the port of 
Lamaca without facing any opposition from the local guard. The next day a British 
battleship sailed into Lamaca, carrying the British diplomat W. Baring and his Turkish 
counterpart Sami Efendi. The two diplomats presented the General Commander of 
Cyprus, Peshim Pasha, with the document, signed by the Sultan himself, that officially 
gave Britain the right to occupy the island. In this peaceful way, Cyprus passed under 
British rule and the Union Jack flew for the first time in Nicosia on July 14. Within five 
days the British flag hoisted in the two other major cities of the island, Larnaca and 
Famagusta, while on July 17, 400 Indian troops from Malta were disembarked at 
Lamaca.3o The British arrival in Cyprus was welcomed by the majority of the Cypriot 
population. The Muslims saw the British arrival as an opportunity for economic 
prosperity and security, away from the corrupt Ottoman system. The Greek-Cypriots 
welcomed the British occupation as the final step to be taken towards the long desired 
unification of the island with Greece. The pro-Greek British attitude during the Greek 
War of Independence and the arrival of a Christian governor after centuries of 
Mohammedanism, convinced the Greek-Cypriots that the period of oppression and 
national humiliation had ended. The same attitude had been maintained by the Greek 
government in Athens. During the Congress of Berlin, Greek diplomats were convinced 
that Britain would demand Crete instead of Cyprus from Turkey. For that reason they 
welcomed the British arrival in Cyprus, expecting Britain to support their demands for 
unification of Crete with the metropolitan centre. In addition, the Greek side expected 
that the arrival of Britain in Cyprus would eventually lead to the cession of the island to 
Greece, as happened to the islands of the Ionian Sea with the Treaty of London on 
March, 1864. The spirit and the Greek Cypriots' expectations for their future, can be 
reviewed in the welcoming speech of Kyprianos, the Bishop of Kition, during the hoist 
of the British flag in Larnaca: 
28 II. Papageorgikos, op. cit., p. 81. 
29 Sir R. Storrs&B. J. O'Brien, The Handbook of Cyprus • (London, 1930), p. 28. 
30 Daily News, 20 July, 1878, p. 5. 
25 
"We accept the change of government inasmuch as we trust 
that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian 
islands, to be united with mother Greece, with which it is 
naturally connected. ,,31 
However, the plans of the High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Cyprus, 
Sir Gamet Wolsely2, did not include the unification of Cyprus with Greece. The 
refusal of the British authorities to work towards future Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, 
in order to satisfy the persistent demands of the majority of the Cypriot population, the 
Greek Cypriots, opened a Pandora's box from the early days of the British presence on 
the island. 
One of the first actions that Sir. O. Wolsely had to take was the establishment of the 
British presence in Cyprus, as well as the re-organization of the administrative, 
educational and economic life of the island. Therefore, during his first public 
proclamation to the Cypriot people, he declared his intention to assist the augmentation 
of the local agriculture and trade, according to the standards that had been established in 
the rest of the British Colonies. One of the first preoccupations of the new 
establishment was to re-organize the administrative system of the island, in order to 
achieve a tranquil and successful transition from the old regime to the newly 
established. The British Administration was divided into 3 Councils with the High 
Commissioner at the head of each of them. First of all, the Legislative Council, where 
the High Commissioner was the President. The other official members were British 
citizens, of which there could not be more than 8, and 4 local citizens were unofficial 
members, appointed by the High Commissioner for a two-year period.33 The structure of 
the Legislative Council was preserved until 1882, when London offered a Colonial 
Constitution to the Cypriot population, which partially altered the status and the 
structure of the Legislative Council. According to Article 3 of the new Constitution, the 
High Commissioner legislated for matters of peace, public order, and administration 
with the acquiescence of the Legislative Council. According to article 6, the Legislative 
Council was constituted by 18 members (12 elected and 6 appointed). According to 
article 10, 3 of the elected members of the Legislative Council were to be Muslims and 
31 Sir R. Storrs, Qrientations, (London, 1943), def. ed., p.465. 
32 British officer with Irish origins. He reached the rank of Field Marshal and later received the title of 
Viscount. A man with great experience in Colonial administration and head of the II.M.Q Army of Egypt. 
33 F. Zanetos, The History of the Island of Cyprus from 1878 since Today. (Larnaca, 1911), vo!. II, p. 74. 
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9 non-Muslims, representing the Christian population of the island (Orthodox, Catholic, 
Gregorian etc). Additionally, the High Commissioner was the head of the 
Administrative Council, which regulated the central and provincial administration of the 
island. The other members of the Administrative Council were the Colonial Secretary, 
the Orthodox Archbishop, 2 Christian and 2 Muslim members. The island was divided 
into 6 Districts (Nicosia, Larnaca, Famagusta, Paphos, Limassol, Kyrenia) and their 
Commissioners were appointed directly by the High Commisioner.34 Last but not least, 
the High Commissioner was the Head of the Executive Council, which was composed 
of administrative, military and magisterial members. The role of this Council was 
strictly advisory and it was limited only to matters of high importance.35 
British involvement in the function and the structure of the judicial system was 
regarded as extremely successful. The new establishment indicated from the early days 
of its arrival that it was prepared to give all its attention to the modernization of the 
judicial system. Therefore, one of the first actions of the Legislative Council was the 
establishment of a High Court of Justice.36 This body was composed of the High 
Commissioner, the Judicial Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioners. The 
competence of the High Court was both penal and civil, applying to every person and 
every case, except those that according to the Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1878 were 
within the competence of the Ottoman local CourtS.37 However, the ordinance for the 
establishment of a High Court in Cyprus was not strictly limited to organizational 
matters. It went further, by introducing a set of basic civil liberties that had been 
systematically violated during the Ottoman era, such as: 
• The presentation of the defendant for trial within 48 hours of the arrest. 
• A prohibition against torture, threats and promises to the defendant during the 
interrogation. 
• The right of the defendant to remain silent during the proceedings.38 
The High Court tried according to the Statue Law of England, while the Islamic courts 
continued to try according to the Ottoman Law, but only religious cases concerning the 
Muslim population. However, after a short period of time, it became obvious that the 
34 L. Loukaidis, The Administratiye System in Cyprus: J 878-J 955. ,(Nicosia, 1986), pp. 67-68. 
35 S. Papageorgiou, The First Period of the British Domination in Cyprus:1878-1914, (Athens, 1996), p. 
130. 
36 Parliamentary Papers, [Cyprus 2229], Ordinance 1789 for the establishment ora High Court ofJustice. 
37 See article 1 of the accession of the Treaty concerning the preservation of the Muslim Religious Courts. 
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High Court by itself could not guarantee the improvement of the Judicial system, 
according to the wishes of the new establishment. Therefore, in 1882 a Royal decree 
established: 
• a Supreme Court with the Chief Justice as its head. This Court had the jurisdiction of 
a penal and civil court of appeal. 
• 6 Assize Courts, one in each district, with unlimited penal jurisdiction. 
• 6 District Courts with limited penal jurisdiction and unlimited civil jurisdiction. The 
District courts comprised a President [British citizen] and two members [a Muslim and 
a Christian]. 
• 6 Magisterial Courts with limited penal and civil jurisdiction. 
• Village Judge Courts with limited civil jurisdiction.39 
Another area of high importance for the new establishment was the structure and the 
re-organization of Cypriot education. The Ottoman rule in the island, although 
anachronistic, was not as much suppressive as in other areas of the Empire, concerning 
the sphere of education. According to the following table of the number of Christian 
and Muslim schools in 18784°, it becomes obvious that the Greek population enjoyed 
the same educational rights as the Muslim citizens, and some districts had a larger 
number of Christian than Muslim schools. 
DISTRICT CHRISTIAN 
NICOSIA 21 
LARNACA 8 
LIMASSOL 20 
FAMAGUSTA 12 
38 Parliamentary Papers, [Cyprus 2229], op. cit. 
39 Sir R. Storrs, opt. cit., pp. 116-117. 
40 S. Papageorgiou, op. cit., p. 182. 
MUSLIM 
28 
8 
4 
12 
28 
KYRENIA 8 5 
PAPHOS 12 12 
In 1880, the Anglican vicar J. Spencer, prominent member of the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel, was appointed by the High Commissioner as the Head of the 
Educational Council of Cyprus. Both the Commissioner and Spencer wished to 
introduce the English educational system in Cyprus as a political measure, in order to 
limit the strong influence of the Orthodox Church in the Christian schools and create a 
pro-English feeling among the younger ages. However, London did not agree with the 
cultural imperialistic plans of the Cypriot establishment. According to the Secretary of 
the Colonies, Lord Kimberley, the introduction of the English language as the official 
language of Cypriot education would have created a strong anti-British feeling among 
the local population. Instead, the British Minister ordered Spencer to maintain the 
Hellenic nature of the educati~n in the Greek schools, urging the Anglican priest to 
respect the rich cultural heritage of Ancient Greece and the high level of cultural 
progress that Greece achieved after the liberation from the Ottoman yoke.41 In general, 
during the first period of British rule Cyprus witnessed a golden era concerning cultural 
and educational growth. New schools were opened, even in small villages, and more 
students attended their classes. The following tables from the official census of 1911 
show that the British establishment elevated the educational standards of the island to a 
remarkably satisfactory leve1.42 
PRIMARY CITIES VILLAGES 11RIVATE 
SCHOOLS 
GREEK 21 401 4 
CYPRIOT 
TURKISH 14 174 6 
CYPRIOT 
41 C.W.J. Orr, Cyprus under British Rule, (London, 1972), p. 123. 
42 Blue Book [Island of Cyprus], (Nicosia, 1915), Census 1911, 
TOTAL 
426 
194 
29 
-~-~~~--,-~-~-~--~-- ----- ----~-~~---- -~--
ARMENIAN 4 1 5 
--~~- -- ----~-------
CATHOLIC 6 
TABLE OF TIU~ TOTAL NllMBER OF STllDENTS OF PRIMARY 
EDllCATION 
SCHOOLS Cl'rIES PRIVATE TOTAL 
MALE MALE MALE NllMBER 
FEMALE FEMAI,E FEMALE MALE 
FEMAI,E 
GREEKS 2,267 - 2,153 17,350 -7,937 160 - 53 19,')57-10,145 
TllRKISH 6H3 - 643 2,H70 - 1,()53 413 - 63 
AI~MENIANS 59 - 49 59-49 
CATHOLIC 200 .. 3 
Ilowever, the liheral spirit that the British estahlishment displayed, hy allowing the 
(ireek and the Turkish population to preserve their educatiollal heritage, had t\-vo 
negative points for the future historic developments in the island. !-'irst of aiL hy 
allowing the Orthodox Church to maintain its dominant position in the (ireek schools 
and hy preserving and glorifying (,reck heritage and history, the British estahlishment 
created, unintentionally, strong centres of nationalistic propaganda Itl!' thc caUSl' or 
Enosis. On the other hand, the separation of (ireck and Turkish students and their 
different educational evolution laid the foundation Itl!' the lack or communicatioll allll 
understanding hetween the two communities. which was to he dramatically ampli lied 
during the lirst halfofthe 20th century, 
--
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On the other hand, from the early days of the British establishment in Cyprus the new 
regime showed its interest in the re-organization of the economic life of the island. 
However, it just partly modified the old Ottoman taxation system, mainly because it did 
not want an open confrontation with the Cypriot upper class, who had every reason to 
oppose any tax alterations. For that reason it just banned the old Latin tax for 
commercial transactions, known as "Verghi Temettu", and the Ottoman tax for the 
military expenses of the Empire.44 Nonetheless, the British establishment introduced a 
new tax, that generated a lot of bitter reactions from the local population. Because of 
the fact that Britain had to pay to the Ottoman Empire the annual amount of 92,799 
pounds, the Cypriot establishment decided to introduce a heavy tax in order to raise this 
amount, known as the Subordination Tax. This decision put a heavy financial burden 
upon the local population, since the economic capacity of the Cypriots was extremely 
limited due to the lack of economic growth from the previous regime. Nevertheless, the 
new establishment made positive steps towards enhancing the infrastructure and the 
economic life of the island. In 1878, there was only a primitive carriage-way linking 
Nicosia with Larnaca. In 1898, the construction of a road network was completed that 
linked even the most isolated villages with the main Cypriot cities. The roads that were 
constructed during that period were supported by a modem bridge network, and the 
Cypriot road network became the most advanced in the Mediterranean and in the Middle 
East.4s In 1905, a railway line between Nicosia and Famaghusta was opened (37 miles) 
and Nicosia-Morfou (14 miles), which in 1915 was extended to Evrichou (76 miles). 
The above innovations resulted in the substantial growth of agricultural production and 
agricultural exports. This can be seen in the following table that indicates Cypriot 
agricultural exports to the West and the wider area of the Eastern Mediterranean. 
RAISINS 10,815 cwt. (1878) 23,586 cwt. (1897) 
DARLEY 130,555 cwt. (1878) 952,000 cwt. (1890) 
OATS 90,050 cwt. (1878) 185,015 cwt. (1895) 
43 In the Catholic Schools students from other denominations, such as Anglicans or Methodists, were 
studying as well. 
44 S. Papageorgiou, op. cit., p. 156. 
4' Until 1878, there were no bridges in Cyprus. In 1914. there were about 2.000 wooden, stone or iron 
bridges. For more see: Sir R. Storrs&D. J. O' Drien, op. cit., pp. 201·03. 
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WHEAT 5,410 cwt. (1878) 517,081 cwt. (1890) 
LEATHER 161 cwt. (1878) 2,119 cwt. (1881) 
SILK 261 cwt. (1878) 1,069 cwt. (1896) 
KOUMANTARIA (Local 3,780 GALLONS (1878) 136,887 GALLONS 
Alcoholic Drink) (1887) 
WINE 1,010,000 GALLONS 1,576,000 GALLONS 
(1878) (1896) 
WOOL 2,693 cwt. (1878) 4,446 cwt. (1886) 
Table created by data from cwt.= Hundred Weight. 1 1 Gallon = 4.5 litres. 
the annual Handbook of the cwt.= 40 Oke. 1 Oke = 
Island of C~rus. 1,280 gr. 
Nevertheless, despite the notable changes that the new establishment put in action in 
order to limit any social or communal disorder, it was mainly responsible for the 
accommodation and strengthening of nationalism inside the Cypriot framework. As 
seen, the national division that occurred in every aspect of the new administration 
resulted in the collapse of the notion of the religious group and the development of a 
national awareness. This in tum resulted in the construction of a new political system 
with nationalism as the basic foundation.46 The main representatives of Greek 
nationalism in Cyprus were the Orthodox Church and the influential merchant and land-
owning class, as well as new scientists and intellectuals. The Orthodox Church saw the 
arrival of the British administration in the island as the end of a series of significant 
privileges that it enjoyed under the Ottomans. The British side refused to recognize the 
political leading role of the Orthodox Church (the introduction of the Legislative 
Council was a successful move towards reducing the political power of the Orthodox 
46 W. Barham, Enosis: From Ethnic Communalism to Greek Nationalism. 1878-1955. (Columbia Univ. 
1982), p. 99. 
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Church) and at the same time it reviewed the tax-free system for the vast lands of the 
monasteries and their religious treasures. The Orthodox Church, a respected and 
powerful institution during the Ottoman era both at the political and religious level, felt 
threatened and after a short period of re-organization it undertook the leading role in the 
Enosis movement. The Greek Cypriot merchants and great landowners followed a 
similar route. While this class asked for a greater deal of political liberalization, it still 
refused to accept any social reform that threatened its ability to control and manipulate 
the lower classes, especially the agrarian. Therefore, by adopting the slogan of Enosis it 
tried to strengthen its political influence, to establish its presence in the higher political 
posts, and achieve the continuation of its economic prosperity. On the other hand, by 
transmitting the ideals of Enosis to the lower classes it had the opportunity to divert the 
latter's attention from the social problems that were tormenting them and avoid any 
. public revolt that could alter the sociological equilibrium of Cyprus. The rise of 
nationalism in Cyprus did not effect any considerable change in the social scale of the 
island. The old aristocracy fought fervently to maintain the old social equilibrium of the 
Ottoman era, in an attempt to preserve their wealth and power. It is a fact that the 
nationalist and anti-colonial movement in Cyprus did not attract all those liberal and 
progressive elements as did other movements of the same nature, such as in India, and it 
was always led by reactionary groups with oligarchic socio-political sentiments and 
interests. Therefore the national awareness of the Christian population of Cyprus was 
not followed by the social and economic progression of the vast majority of the Cypriot 
population. Another reason for the strengthening of nationalism in Cyprus was the 
British educational structure. As mentioned earlier the establishment of two different 
educational programs for the Muslims and the Christians of Cyprus supported the 
polarization of the two communities and the development of two different cultures and 
approaches to the common history of the island. As A. Pollis quite rightly states: 
"The Muslim and Orthodox youth were learning to speak 
different languages, different history and different Ideologies. 
For the Orthodox community the transition from a non-
political religious group to a political nationalist entity was 
easier since the Greek Orthodox religion is strongly linked 
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and in a lot of cases legitimizes the concept of Greek 
nationalism,,47 
In addition, as noted, during the Ottoman era the two important factors for the 
communal unity of the Cypriots were the family and the village. However, the new 
educational system played a significant role in ending the previous communal unity by 
reducing the actual number of mixed villages. In a lot of cases the members of a 
minority group in a village were moving, mainly for reasons that concerned their 
children's education, to villages where their nationality was the majority. In this fertile 
ground for the growth of nationalism, the connection of the Orthodox Christians with 
the Greek flag was a foreseeable development. The Christians of Cyprus, in an attempt 
to meet the challenge of nationalism, linked their existence with the past. For centuries 
slaves, living under totalitarian regimes in conditions of political, economic and social 
humiliation, they felt secure in the indulgence of a vague but glorified past. They placed 
themselves into the framework of a "pure" ancient race and adopted, with gratitude and 
fanaticism, the theory of a common cultural and historic continuation with the people in 
continental Greece. For centuries pariahs and bastards, they eventually acquired 
prestigious and racial "pure" ancestors. As Issacs points out: 
" ... from the point of racial apotheosis, mythology, identity, 
psychological security and preposterous deceit ... nothing can 
be compared with pan-Hellenism. ,,48 
On the other hand, the establishment of the British administration in the island 
brought a dramatic change in the Muslim mentality. Until 1878, the Muslim element 
was the dominant group in Cypriot politics and administration. However, after 1878 
they were forced to co-exist with the Christian element inside a new framework, a so-
called constitutional equality. This fact led the Muslim population to a historic 
scepticism, since the constitutional equality was jeopardized by the numerical and 
economic superiority of the Greek Cypriots. The choices that the Muslims had inside 
the new Cypriot equilibrium were limited. A small amount of them, mainly members of 
the Ottoman aristocracy, decided to emigrate to the Ottoman mainland, refusing to come 
47 Quoted by A. Pollis, Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism: Determinants of Ethnic ConDict in Cyprus, in 
P. Worsley-P, Kitromilides [ed.], Small States in the Modem World. Ihe Conditjons o(Survjyal, 
(Nicosia, 1979), p. 48. 
48 Quoted by I. Nairn, Cyprus and the Iheory of Nationalism, in P. Worsley-P, Kitromilides [ed.], op. 
cit., p.32. 
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to terms with the new reality. On the other hand, the main part of the Muslim 
population that remained in Cyprus was forced to develop an extraordinary amount of 
political obedience to the new establishment. A characteristic account comes from a 
Muslim memorandum to the Minister of Colonies Lord Kimberley (5/4/1881): 
"We, the Muslims, according to our religious doctrines 
consider as unscrupulous and reactionary any community 
that through a revolutionary nature and with false arguments 
is distressing the Government that owns to her absolute 
obedience .. 49 
During the first period of the British establishment in Cyprus, the Muslim decision 
for absolute political obedience to the new administration was based upon various 
factors. The growth of nationalism inside the Greek Cypriot framework did not have the 
same influence inside the Muslim. The Ottoman Empire was the womb that gave birth 
to all the modem Balkan and Middle-East states. However, the dominant Ottoman class 
with political and economic influence remained hemmed in an Empire with a non-
national ideology, a super state that was only unified by Islam. Therefore, the absence 
of a national centre, a country, was the main reason why the Muslim population of 
Cyprus delayed in developing a national (Turkish) identity. Another reason for this was 
the absence of a national orientation to the Muslim educational system, that until 1923, 
was strictly focused upon the analysis of Koran and the teaching of the Arab language. 
The establishment of Enosis in the Greek Cypriot mentality, on the one hand, and the 
British arrival in Cyprus, on the other, set the Muslim community a basic question: 
either to live under British control or to accept its incorporation within the Greek state. 
The answer to the above dilemma was easy and well expected. As the dominant 
members of a strong Empire, the Muslims, through the centuries, had developed an 
elitist mentality, and the fact that they would live in a province under the political 
control of their former subjects convinced them to rally to the British establishment. 
Another reason for this decision was the fact that the Muslim population of Cyprus did 
not trust Greek Cypriot intentions. The lack of trust and the development of an 
antipathy for the Greek Cypriots can be fully revealed in the following Muslim 
memorandum to Lord Kimberley (19/7/1881): 
49 C.W.J. Orr, op cit., p. 164. 
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"No community can enjoy the basic values of security, life, 
property, and honour under the Greek administration due to 
the national vanity concerning the honorary achievements of 
their ancestors ... especially the Muslims who are the subjects 
of their national revenge [for 400 years of the Ottoman 
yoke].so 
It is important to note here that the allegations of the above memorandum are not totally 
unfounded. After 1878, the Greek Cypriot community denied the granting of equal 
political rights to the Muslims, and their actions aimed at the administrative and 
financial disconnection of the Muslims from the Cypriot reality. The Greek Cypriot 
majority dealt with the Muslim minority as a "negative necessity" and regarded its 
existence on Cypriot soil as "historic misfortune", that they had to neutralize since they 
did not have the means or the will to incorporate them inside the Greek Cypriot 
environment. The Greek Cypriot feelings can be fully revealed in a memorandum to the 
undersecretary of the colonies W. Churchill (1907). According to the memorandum, the 
Muslim minority opposed the recognition and realization of the Greek Cypriot's 
national aspirations, operating under the influence of religious and not national motives. 
However, due to its limited numerical capacity the Muslim minority did not have the 
power to contradict the fate of Cyprus or have any involvement in the cultural and 
economic advancement of Cyprus. As the memorandum concluded: 
"Trade, Sciences, Art, Literature, Industry, and any other 
factor that can be linked with the cultural and economic 
advancement of the island is a Greek Cypriot activity. ,,5/ 
Despite the fact that the official position of the British was not to recognize any 
national group, they adopted the Ottoman system of separating the Cypriot population 
into Muslims and non-Muslimss2, still they seemed to accept the Hellenic nature of the 
Cypriot Christians in their private conversations and their memoirs. As Sir R. Storrs 
[Governor of Cyprus 1927-1932] confessed in his memoirs: 
"The Greekness of Cypriots is in my opinion indisputable. 
Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmentation of 
'0 S. Prasinos, Nationalism and Hypocrisy in the Balkan peninsula, (Athens, 1990), p. 241. 
'I Quoted by S. Prasinos, op. cit, p. 246. 
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cephalic indices. A man is of the race of which he 
passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny 
that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-
feeling, Greek as much as the French Canadian is French-
speaking, French-thinking, French{eeling and French. ,,53 
while Gladstone, the British Premier who never hid his pro-Hellenic feelings, once 
stated that: 
"The bulk of people of Cyprus are Greeks,' and rely upon it 
that if matters continue as they are ... instead of earning, even 
by the benefits you may confer upon them, for less earning by 
ordinances such as I have described, gratitude and 
attachment in the form of a disposition 10 continue in 
political connection with you, the more you improve their 
conditions, the quicker will be the development of this strong 
sentiment of nationality, and the more earnest the desire of 
the Greeks of Cyprus to be united with thefree Greeks of the 
rest of the world ,,54 
The legitimization of the Greek-Cypriot nationalism by the British officials also 
influenced the attitude of the establishment towards the Enosis movement. During the 
first period of British dominance in Cyprus (1878-1914), the establishment did not 
attempt to eliminate Greek-Cypriot nationalism, as it was expressed through the Enosis 
slogan. On the contrary, it welcomed and accommodated this in an attempt to develop a 
status of "sui-generis II with the biggest and most influential part of the Cypriot 
population, the Greek Cypriot community. However, at the same time it appeared to 
understand the Muslim fears for a Greek-Cypriot dominance in the Cypriot arena and in 
every opportunity declared its commitment to protect and to elevate the Muslim role 
inside the Cypriot framework.5s The British attitude should not perplex the researcher. 
It was the application of the traditional British policy of divide and rule on Cypriot soil. 
The enlargement of Greek nationalism made the Muslims come closer to the British 
52 See the official demographic catalogues in the Blue Books for Cyprus of that period. 
53 Sir R. Storrs, op. cit., pp. 469-70. 
54 Daily News, 16 September 1880. p. 2.4 
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administration and tum against their old neighbours, while the Muslim attitude outraged 
the Greek Cypriots and forced even the most moderates figures to develop an anti-
Muslim stance. By that, the British establishment managed to come closer to both 
communities, in different ways and avoided the development of a unified anti-colonial 
front and placed itself in the centre of the Cypriot political arena as the only factor 
offering peace, security and stability on a deeply polarized island. However, the well-
planned British scheme failed in one point: to identify the intensity of the Enosis 
movement and control the strengthening of Greek Cypriot nationalism. The British 
failure resulted in the augmentation of an explosive situation in Cyprus, created mainly 
by the Greek Cypriot community, that placed the two communities against each other 
and laid the foundations for the creation of Greek and Turkish guerilla movements after 
1955. 
From 1878, the Greek Cypriots presented their new rulers with two demands. The 
first, as has already been mentioned, was Enosis with Greece. The second was the right 
of self-government. The first demand could not be satisfied for two reasons. First of 
all, Britain was not willing to hand Cyprus to Greece, especially after the diplomatic 
guarantees to Turkey and France, and thus put under threat her policy in the 
Mediterranean. Second, Britain could not permit the unification of the island with 
Greece because, technically, Cyprus still belonged to the Ottoman Empire. However, 
the British understood that good relations between them and the Greek Cypriots would 
prove helpful for a peaceful and better administration of the island, therefore London 
decided to satisfy, partly, the second demand of the Greek side concerning the 
development of a Cypriot self-government body. As mentioned, in 1882 a constitution 
was granted to Cyprus, which permitted the creation of a Legislative Council. 
Nevertheless, the structure of the Legislative Council was arranged in such a way that 
the Greek Cypriot members did not have any real power. According to it, the nine 
elected Christian members of the Council could be outvoted by the High Commissioner 
and the six ex-officio members with the aid of the three Muslim elected members, who 
represented 19.4% of the Cypriot population.s6 In reality, the Legislative Council was 
under direct British control. In almost every case the Turkish members voted in favour 
of the British proposals, as mentioned above after 1821 the relations between the two 
communities had been characterized by hate and fear, and in the rare case that the votes 
56 W. Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors; 1801-1927, (Cambridge, 1936), p.469. 
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were equal then the vote of the governor was the decisive one. This British artifice led 
the Greek Cypriot community to alter its attitude towards its liberators from the 
Ottoman yoke. A characteristic incident that occurred in 1887 reveals the revision of 
the Greek Cypriot mentality. The celebration of the Queen's Jubilee in 1887 was meant 
to be held in a festive atmosphere in Cyprus, and was to be regarded as a research 
concerning the popularity of the new regime. Nevertheless, the celebrations were 
boycotted by the Greek Cypriots. In six hundred Orthodox Churches the clergy spoke 
for union with Greece, and sport meetings were organized by the Church, at the same 
time as the British festivities, so the arrangements of the governor failed due to lack of 
attendance. 
The demands for Enosis escalated towards the end of 1898, when news arrived in the 
island that Crete, after a long and bloody uprising, was freed from the Turkish yoke and 
had been placed under a Greek High Commissioner. To make things worse, the Greek 
High Commissioner was appointed by the four Protecting Powers, Britain, France, Italy 
and Russia. The Cretan incident convinced the Greek Cypriots that the long desired 
Enosis with Greece would be realized only by sword. Therefore, in November 1898, the 
Patriotic League, "Patriotiki Omada", was formed in Athens. It aimed to organise an 
uprising in Cyprus. It has to be noted that the Patriotic League did not find enough 
space to flourish inside the Greek Cypriot framework, mainly because the Greek 
Cypriots were still in favour of peaceful negotiations with the British side, thus the 
actions of the League were limited to revolutionary pamphlets and speeches, that did not 
provoke a British reaction. With the arrival of the new century, no considerable change 
had occurred affecting the unification issue in Cyprus. The British continued to face the 
Greek Cypriot demands for unification with apathy, fortifying denials with the argument 
that Cyprus did not belong to Britain and was still under Ottoman proprietorship, while 
the Greek Cypriot side continued with a remarkable persistence to demand Enosis. 
However, in 1902, for the first time since 1887, the Turkish Cypriot community become 
actively involved in the question of the unification with Greece. Meetings started to 
take place in houses of distinguished members of the Turkish Cypriot community, 
aiming to declare their support to the British presence in the island, and to organize their 
defence in the event of a Greek uprising. In one of those meetings, 600 signatures were 
collected declaring the devotion of the Turkish Cypriot to the Queen and the British 
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governor in Cyprus57, and a telegram had been sent to the British High Commissioner 
by Ahmed Rashid, ex-member of the Cypriot Legislative Council, declaring that 
Muslims were against the idea of unification and their "deliverance to the hands o/wild 
beasts. ,,58 According to the Turkish Cypriot side, if Britain were to abandon Cyprus, the 
island had to be returned to Turkey. 
While the two communities were seizing any available opportunity to declare their 
deep differences, they had one thing in common. They were both accusing the British 
authorities of favouritism for the opposite side. On the one hand, the Greek Cypriots 
were convinced that the British occupation was a political plot of London and 
Constantinople against Hellenism. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot side was 
accusing the High Commissioner of a provocative tolerance towards the Greek Cypriot 
activities and suspected an Anglo-Greek secret agreement about Cyprus' fate. 
Nevertheless, both sides failed to comprehend that British policy in Cyprus had been 
determined by one single element: the geostrategic interests of a Great Power in the 
region of the Eastern Mediterranean. The British side demonstrated its apparent interest 
in Cyprus during the disturbances of May-June 1912. The !talo-Turkish war of 1911-
1912 was not without its repercussions in Cyprus. The Turkish defeat in Tripoli by the 
Italian troops was celebrated by the Greek Cypriots in Limassol as a Greek victory. The 
Turks were insulted and retaliated. The police had to fire on the rioters and troops were 
called out on May 27 to quell the disturbances. The casualties were 5 killed and 80 
wounded, while a detachment of the 2nd Battalion of the Devonshire Regiment (2 
officers and 95 men) was landed at Famagusta on June 1, in order to preserve the peace 
in the city.59 The message to every side was clear. Britain was ready to mobilize its 
forces at any time and under any circumstances, in order to protect its authority in the 
island. 
Further steps were to be taken for the protection of the British interests in the Eastern 
Mediterranean during 1914, but this time Cyprus was to be offered in return for other 
services. The assassination of Francis Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo, the 
capital of Bosnia, led to the end of the Bismarckian peace between Britain and 
Germany. Once again the strategic position of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean 
proved to be negative for the Greek Cypriot aspirations affecting the Enosis issue. The 
" Colonial Office Papers, 30 June 1902, 67/131. 
58 Colonial Office Papers, 23 June 1902, 67/131. 
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island was officially annexed to Britain on November 5, 1914 in order that Cyprus 
should be protected against a German invasion or a possible involvement of Turkey in 
the war on the side of the Central Powers. The British act was interpreted differently by 
the brilliant leader of the Greek Liberal Party, E. Venizelos. The Cretan politician saw 
the incorporation of Cyprus as a strategic decision of Lloyd George in order to free 
Britain from the terms of the Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1878 and to promise the 
island to Greece in return for the active involvement of the latter on the Allied side in 
the war. On November 14, in an interview to the daily Eleflheria, Venizelos stated: 
" .. . the annexation of Cyprus must be characterized as the 
last stage towards the national restoration of this great 
Greek island, and according to accurate information on the 
possession of this government, it may be considered that the 
unification of Cyprus with its mother Greece will be realized 
in the near future,,60 
Once again, the instinct of the experienced politician proved to be accurate. On October 
18, 1915 Sir F. Elliot made an official proposal to the Greek government, which 
guaranteed the unification of Cyprus with Greece on the condition that the Athenian 
government should fulfill her obligations towards Serbia. According to the Greco-
Serbian Treaty, June 1913, Greece had to aid Serbia in a case of a Bulgarian attack. A 
Greek attack against Bulgaria would have meant the end of the nation's neutrality and 
the involvement of Greece in the war on the Allied side.61 Nevertheless, the British 
diplomatic trick to force Greece against the Central Powers proved to be fruitless. 
Zaimes' Cabinet and the pro-German palace were unwilling to renounce Greece's 
neutrality and take action against Bulgaria. As a consequence within few days the 
British offer lapsed and Greece lost a golden opportunity to settle the Cyprus issue once 
and for all. Britain on the other hand, missed the opportunity for an honourable and 
well calculated disengagement from Cyprus. Such a disengagement would not have 
altered the geostrategic status quo in the province and could not threaten the British 
position as the leading nation in the Mediterranean, since Greece was her most loyal ally 
in the region. 
'9 The Times. 3 June 1912. p. 6. 
60 Venizelos Papers. 350. (14 November, 1914). Interview with L. Papadirnitriou editor ofEleftheria. 
61 A. Tiynbee. Cyprus. The Dritish Empire and Greece. (London. 1931). p.p. 358-59. 
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The Greek refusal to enter the war led Britain to harden its attitude towards the 
Enosis demands. In May 1916, Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot agreement. 
The agreement pronounced that: 
". .. in virtue of the geographic and strategic position of the 
island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British 
government agrees not to open any negotiations for the 
cession or alienation of the said island of Cyprus without the 
previous consent of the French government. ,,62 
The Sykes-Picot agreement had been decided by the British side on two grounds. On 
the one hand, it was a movement of good will towards France, aiming to strengthen the 
unity of the Entente. On the other hand, it was a diplomatic decision in order to relieve 
the Greek Cypriot pressure, which had been aggravated after 1914. The official 
annexation of Cyprus by Britain and the end of the rental status left London with no 
excuses and deepened the break in the relations between the rulers and the subjects. In 
addition, the agreement was a obvious warning to Athens that her hesitations, about 
which side she should choose, would lead to similar agreements in the future, touching 
other territories in which Greece had declared her apparent interest, such as Thrace or 
the Ionian coasts of West em Asia Minor. 
The endorsement of the Sykes-Picot agreement did not terminate the Greek Cypriot 
demands for Enosis. On the contrary, the signature of the agreement outraged the Greek 
Cypriots and, during that period, protests against the British authorities became more 
systematic than ever. The pressure upon the British side intended to prove to the 
authorities, that whatever the effort and the persistency in keeping Cyprus under their 
influence, the Greek Cypriots would not rest until the final satisfaction of their demand. 
As A. Theodotou, a Greek Cypriot intellectual and editor of the daily Phones tis Kyprou, 
Cyprus' voices, wrote in an article on November 4, 1917: 
"We will continue [for the Enosis] until the time for 
surrendering our souls to God will come. And after us our 
children will continue the holy duty. We will become a 
poisonous thorn in the British side until they will be 
62 H. Papageorgikos, op. cit., p. 119. 
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exhausted and return back home. We are not going to be a 
new India for the British Lords. ,,63 
In the meanwhile, the Great War reached its final stage. Greece, after a period of 
internal disturbances, which resulted in the exile of King Constantine and the formation 
of a government by E. Venizelos, joined the Entente and attacked Bulgaria during June 
1917. The end of the Greek neutrality led to the defeat of the Central Powers in the 
Balkans, a decisive victory for the Allied forces, which hastened the end of the War and 
the final defeat of Germany and her allies. After peace was restored the decision as to 
what should happen to Cyprus lay in the hands of the British premier Lloyd George, a 
personal friend ofVenizelos and a committed supporter of Greece. The two men agreed 
that Greece's role after the Great War should be more decisive than before, when 
Greece was just a second class power in the Balkans. The transformation of Greece to a 
great regional power would be proved helpful for Britain's search for a new ally in the 
region, one that would be powerful enough to protect Britain's interests in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, after the sound collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Venizelos realized that 
the ground was prepared, and on December 30, 1918 he submitted to the Allied Powers 
the complete and formal statement of the Greek territorial claims. It was a pamphlet 
entitled "Greece Before the Peace Congress", which established the territorial demands 
of Greece including Epirus, Thrace, Western Asia Minor and Cyprus. However, while 
Venizelos demanded the annexation of all the above territories, he only made a vague 
proposal for an Enosis of Cyprus with Greece.64 Venizelos' attitude should not be 
misread as a lack of interest concerning Cyprus, but as a brilliant political decision, 
aiming to fulfil the Greek political appeals and satisfy the Greek Cypriot demands as 
well. A few days before the submission of the Greek territorial claims, Lloyd George 
confessed to the Greek Premier that he would like to have his name linked with Cyprus 
as Gladstone's was with the Ionian islands.6s Venizelos regarded Lloyd George's words 
as an unofficial agreement between gentlemen and he decided to put all his pressure 
upon Asia Minor, Thrace and Epirus, while he tried, in order not to provoke a 
diplomatic crisis among the Entente members, to persuade the Allies that Cyprus was 
not in the front-line for Greece. The experienced politician was rightly convinced that 
France and Italy would react strongly to a possible unification of Cyprus with Greece. 
63 Phones tis Kyprou, 4 November, 1917, pp. 1.2. 
64 For full text see: E.K. Venizelos, Greece Defore the Peace Congress, (London, 1919). 
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Such a development, in accordance with the satisfaction of the Greek demands about 
Thrace, Epirus and West Asia Minor, would have created an extremely powerful nation 
in the Mediterranean that could challenge their geostrategic interests and future plans for 
the region. Having that in mind, Venizelos chose to move behind the curtains and after 
a series of secret negotiations with the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community, he 
encouraged them to heighten their struggle. As P. Antoniou, a Greek Cypriot doctor and 
member of the Legislative Council wrote in his unpublished diary on February 21, 1919: 
" ... then he looked us in the eyes and with a trembling voice 
he said. liMy friends, I can feel your desire to be free. I can 
understand your national passion for Enosis with the 
Motherland. After all I am a Cretan and we experienced the 
same troubles. But do notfear. The British Premier wants to 
settle the Cypriot question and he told me that he will assist 
us. Britain will stand by our side as she did many times in 
the past. Continue your efforts with great strength. The 
moment that we are waiting is closer that ever. se any 
necessary means but avoid actions of violence. The English 
are benevolent race but they can be cruel when they are 
challenged. " 
Venizelos' words, relating to the British nature, turned out to be predictive as the 
development of the Cypriot question reveals during the 50's. 
The Greek Cypriot leaders followed Venizelo's instructions, thus on March S, 1919 
they addressed to the House of Commons, the government and the Press a 
memorandum, titled "The Cypriotes Appeal to the British Nation." According to that, 
the Cypriot population declared itself grateful to Britain for having freed Cyprus forty 
years ago from the oppressive Turkish yoke, but warned that the union with Greece was 
not to be exchanged with any other consideration, "either in the form of autonomous 
government, or of material progress under foreign administrations. ,,66 The appeal was 
welcomed in Britain causing the immediate reaction of Lloyd George, who in a letter to 
E.Venizelos on 30 March wrote: 
66 The Times, 15 March, 1919, p. 12. 
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" ... 1 am convinced that the Cyprus question will be solved 
and a new era will begin between the two nations. Let 
Cyprus be the token of a long and prosperous alliance in the 
Eastern Mediterranean ... ,,67 
However, the Cypriot question was not to be solved yet. The Turkish Cypriot side 
counter-attacked. Disturbances were provoked in Cyprus and incidents of attacks 
against Greek Cypriot houses were reported. In London, on the other hand, the strong 
Muslim League and its famous leader the Aga Khan, provided the government on July 
25 with a memo protesting against the Greek expansionism "in an island which 
historically and geographically was linked with Turkey. ,,68 Faced with a possible 
confrontation with the Muslim front, Britain decided to turn down once again the Greek 
Cypriot demands. Britain feared that a possible dispute with the Muslim Front would 
lead to a series of revolts in her Islamic colonies, supported by the powerful Aga Khan 
who during the past and in critical moments had bolstered British interests, especially in 
the Arab world. Britain was not willing to loose such a valuable ally, therefore the 
Government decided to decline the Greek Cypriot demands using as an official excuse 
the uncertainty of the situation in the Middle East, which was in transition after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Greece was to be satisfied with the granting of Thrace 
and West Asia Minor. Once again the demands and the right of the Greek Cypriots 
were ignored in favour of diplomatic calculations. 
A new era began for the Cypriot question after the Greek landing in Smyrna, during 
the first quarter of May 1919. As is natural, from the first moment the Greek Cypriots 
supported the Greek landing in the Ionian coasts of West Asia Minor. Committees were 
formed in the island for the financial support of the Greek troops, while over 1,000 men 
aged from 18 to 40 joined the Greek army as volunteers.69 The last fact has a 
considerable significance for the Enosis concept. The attempt aimed to prove, first to 
Britain and then to the other powers of the Entente, that Cyprus was an integral part of 
Greece, even though beyond the official Greek frontiers. On the other hand, it aimed to 
proclaim to the Greek government itself that the island was relevant to the great 
67 Venizelos Papers, 464, (30 March 1919), Letter of Lloyd George to Venizelos about the Cypriot appeal 
on 5 March 1919. 
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moments of Hellenic history. Nevertheless, the disaster faced by the Greek army in 
Asia Minor, which culminated on 10 September 1922, caused the Cypriot enthusiasm 
for union with Greece to cool for a time. Greece was humiliated in Asia Minor by 
Kemal's troops, had been abandoned by her great ally, Britain, and faced the possibility 
of bankruptcy due to the arrival in the country of hundreds of thousands of Greeks and 
Armenians who were forced to abandon their homes, due to Kemal's plan for the 
creation of a new Turkey free from ethnic minorities. Greece had to struggle for her 
existence as a nation, therefore it was beyond her powers, now more than ever, either to 
support or to work towards the final settlement of the Cypriot question. In Cyprus, the 
Greek defeat effected a radical change to the Greek Cypriot approach to Enosis. Under 
the present circumstances unification with the wounded Greek nation would have been 
impossible. 
On the other hand, Cyprus had to remain the poisonous thorn in the British side, 
waiting a more convenient time in the future, regarding its fate. Therefore, the 
restlessness now found fertile ground to grow in the Greek Cypriot demands for 
substantial constitutional liberties. The adoption of the new policy resulted in the 
presentation of a memorandum on December 3, 1922, which did not omit the demand 
for Union, but instead stated that until the arrival of that moment, self-government or 
extended constitutional powers should be granted to the Greek Cypriot population.7o 
However, the British position was not to change under any pressure. The issue of the 
right of self-determination had been rejected from the first moment. If Britain had 
allowed that it was more than possible that a bloody Civil War would have started 
between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, and British interests in the island would 
have been put under threat. Britain's fears were well founded. After the collapse of the 
Greek army in Asia Minor, the Turkish Cypriot adopted an extremely aggressive attitude 
towards the Greek Cypriots and they were preparing themselves for a military 
confrontation with their compatriots in the event that Cyprus' status was to change. On 
the other hand, the British authorities were not willing to grant any constitutional 
powers to the Cypriots mainly because, until that moment, plans for the eradication of 
the Enosis movement in the island had failed. Therefore, they could not trust the 
governing of Cyprus to people who were not willing to accept British rule and work for 
the protection of British interests. Especially after the collapse of the British plans for 
69 Official Archives of the Greek Royal Army: 1900 - 1940, vol. XI, 345/6/890. 
70 I. G. Katapodis, op. cit., p. 623. 
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the birth of a powerful Greek state in the Eastern Mediterranean and the formation of 
modem Turkey, which during World War I fought Britain, Cyprus was a valuable asset 
for the maintenance of British dominance in the region. Cyprus was a precious card for 
Britain in the new era that rose after the end of the World War I and she was not willing 
to jeopardize the advantage that the geostrategic position of the island offered. For all 
of the above reasons, during the signing of the peace treaty between Greece and Turkey 
in Lausanne on July 24, 1923 Britain forced Turkey to resign from every right that she 
had upon Cyprus according to the Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1878. In article 20 of 
the treaty Turkey recognized the annexation of Cyprus by Britain and resigned from 
every right concerning the island.71 The last detail is extremely important and future 
chapters will review the diplomatic importance of the above article and its contribution 
to the shaping of Cyprus' fate. 
The British refusal to accept or even to negotiate the Greek Cypriot demands created 
an explosive situation in the political life of the island. The crisis reached its climax on 
October 18 1931, when the Legislative Council gathered to vote for a new taxation law. 
The Greek members voted against it and a Turkish representative, unexpectedly, 
followed the Greek line. The taxation law was outvoted but then the British governor 
imposed the outvoted law as an administrative measure, challenging the majority and 
the role of the Legislative Council. The reactions were rapid. The Greek members of 
the Legislative Council resigned and, as a protest, on October 21 a great crowd was 
gathered in the central square of Nicosia to demonstrate their disapproval to the British 
authorities. Speeches were addressed to the protesters urging a general uprising. At the 
end of the gathering D. Kykkotis, a well-known and popular priest, took a Greek flag in 
his hands, kissed it and declared revolution. The British authorities who were watching 
carefully intervened and tried to confiscate the flag and arrest the priest. The crowd 
regarded it as a national insult and attacked the policemen. Soon enough the riot spread 
out to the whole of the city and the Government House was burnt down. The riots 
ended with the decisive intervention of the British army but the still smoking wreck of 
the Government House marked a new era for the British presence in the island. Until 
that moment the British attitude in Cyprus was as liberal as it could be comparing it 
with the attitude of other European Powers in their colonies, i.e. France in Algeria and 
Spain in Morocco. However, the next day a special law was imposed in Cyprus and a 
71 Treaty of Lausanne, Article 20 (Cmd. 1929, No 16, 1923 ). 
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large number of Greek Cypriots were either imprisoned or sent to exile, among them the 
Bishops of Kition, Nicodemos, and Kyrenia, and prominent members of the Greek 
Cypriot society such as, Savas Loizides and Alexis Kyrou. Moreover, the Legislative 
Council was abolished, the Constitution was suspended, and censorship was imposed on 
the Cypriot Press.72 There is no accurate record concerning the precise number of the 
dead and the wounded during the night of the riots, but the news created a great impact 
among the Greek Cypriots in the whole of the island and in Athens. The news of the 
death of many Greek Cypriots alienated the Greek population and violent incidents 
occurred outside the British Embassy, while 3,000 people gathered outside the 
Parliament demanding revenge and shouting anti-British slogans. In an event of a 
diplomatic crisis between Britain and Greece, Venizelos did his best to please Greece's 
major ally. He announced that the Hellenic government could not interfere in a question 
which was an internal affair of Great Britain. He continued that there was no Cyprus 
question between the British and Greek governments and he expressed his sorrow for 
the attitude of his compatriots.73 Venizelos' statement determined the new attitude of 
Greece towards the Cypriot question: non-intervention. As will be seen later on, after 
the end of the World War II the doctrine of non - interference became an official line 
for the Greek Foreign Office, and established the disbelief and the detestation of the 
Greek Cypriots towards the Greek politicians. That was one of the major reasons for the 
later formation of paramilitary units on the island. 
Venizelos' attitude satisfied the British side and helped the de-escalation of the crisis. 
Until the beginning of the War World II, no incident of organized unrest had been 
reported on the island. The establishment of Metaxas' fascist regime in Athens during 
the summer of 1936 (August 4) and his undemocratic methods of governing, made 
Greek Cypriots re-consider their desire for unification under the above preconditions. 
Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots decided to unite their forces with Britain and the rest of 
the democratic world, unlike the Turkish Cypriots who kept a strict neutrality following 
the example of Turkey, for the defeat of Nazism and Fascism during the World War II. 
A Times' report from the island in 1939 illustrates the spirit of that time in Cyprus: 
"". the allegation that the island is seething with unrest is 
not even near the truth ... There is no doubt that the loyalty of 
72 Sir R. Storrs, op. cit., (London, 1943), p.p. 507-09. 
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the islanders to Great Britain is much stronger than in 
1932 ... they would unquestionably prefer our rule to that of 
any other country for there is no conscription and taxation is 
low.,,74 
However, even if the British side hastened to celebrate its policy's victory in Cyprus, 
the Greek Cypriots did not forget their national aim. The years that followed the end of 
World War II witnessed the everlasting Greek Cypriot desire for national vindication. 
73 Venizelos Papers 1012 (23 October. 1931), Venizelos statement to all the Greek and British 
newspapers. See also The Times, 24 October 1931. p.7. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FIRST SIGN: THE ROUTE TO TIlE PLEBISCITE OF 1950. 
"AI/or the gods, /I seemed to be the same thing 
whether one worshipped them or not, when one 
saw Ihe good and Ihe bad dying 
Indlscrlmlnalely" 
Thucydldcl, II: 53. 
This chapter will cover the period from the early days of the Second World War until 
the Plebiscite of January 1950, and the first Greek Cypriot attempt to internationalize 
the Cypriot question. Throughout this chapter the crucial changes that occurred in the 
Cypriot political spectrum during the Second World War will be reviewed. The reasons 
for the transformation of British foreign policy towards her colonies after the end of the 
Second World War will also be inspected, and its consequences for the Cypriot 
question. Additionally this chapter will approach the Plebiscite of January 1950 and its 
international impact, especially in Greece and Britain. The main questions that this 
chapter will seek to answer are: Under which perspective did the British establishment 
embrace and encourage the formation of AKEL? What was the main result that derived 
from the formation of AKEL, for the Cypriot political framework? Why did the post-
Second World War modus vivendi influence the modification of British colonial policy 
in Cyprus? To what extent has the Greek Civil War influenced the Greek official line 
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towards the Enosis movement? What were the main reasons for the collapse of the 
Consultative Assembly of 1948 and what was its impact on the political developments 
in Cyprus? 
The German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and the Italian seizure of 
Albania in the following month prompted Britain to accept a substantial military 
commitment to Europe by confronting Hitler's Germany. Although the Cyprus 
Regiment was formed in the early 40's by British initiative, the response was at first 
poor. The silent hostility towards the British authorities of the Greek Cypriot side and 
the apathy of the Turkish Cypriot side, resulted in a coolness of the local population 
towards the British recruiting plans. On the one hand, the formation of the Cypriot 
Regiment had been approached by the Greek Cypriots as another British plot for the 
extinction of the Enosis movement. l On the other hand, for the Turkish Cypriots the 
formation of the Cypriot Regiment was a clear British attempt to prove to the rest of the 
world that the Turkish Cypriots were unanimously anglicized and were not influenced 
by the foreign policy of Ankara.2 Nevertheless, the negative attitude of the Greek-
Cypriot population towards the British recruiting efforts changed radically after the 
commencement of the Greco-Italian War. Driven by his aspirations for an independent 
Mediterranean and Balkan policy for Italy, Mussolini attacked Greece on 28 October 
1940. The invasion turned sour for Mussolini as the outnumbered Greek army halted 
the Italian advance and launched a successful counter attack deep into Albanian 
territory. For fear of provoking Hitler, in January 1941 Metaxas declined an offer by 
Churchill to commit British troops to Greece, but his death at the end of the month and 
the tightening German grip on the Balkans forced the Greeks to change their minds. A 
British expeditionary force of 57,000 men was sent to Greece, signaling the entry of 
Greece into the war against Hitler on Britain's side. It is estimated that over 30,000 
Greek Cypriots fought side by side with British troops in Crete (the Cypriot Regiment 
lost 2,300 men during the 30 days of warfare there), Egypt, Libya, in the Italian front of 
Casino and even in the Battle of Britain.3 
I As the daily Greek Cypriot Alithia wrote in April 20, 1940 (pp. 1·2) "the Cypriot Regiment Is another 
British trick to prove to the rest of the world that there is not such an issue as the unification of Cyprus 
with Greece and that the locals are fighting side by side with the colonial powers, demonstrating their 
loyalfeelings to the British Crown." 
2 For more concerning Turkish neutrality during the Second World War, see: W. L. Cleveland, A IJjstoO' 
of the Modem Middle East, (Oxford, 1994), p.p. 178·79. 
3 E, Averof-Tositsas, A StoO' of Missed Opportunities; The Cypriot Ouestion 1950 -1963, vo1.I, p. 14. 
See also D. Alastos, Cynrus; Past and Future, (Committee for Cyprus Affairs, London, 1943), pp. 62-66. 
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The entrance of Greece into the war on the British side against Germany heralded a 
considerable modification to the British policy concerning the Cypriot question, at both 
the domestic and international levels. After the Italian invasion of Greece in October 
1940, large posters decorated the streets of Lamaca, Famagusta, Nicosia, Limassol and 
Paphos, written in Greek, calling the Greek Cypriots to ''fight/or Greece and Freedom", 
and the British establishment allowed the Greek Cypriots to decorate the balconies of 
their houses with the Greek flag, an illegal action since the disturbances of 1931. Acts 
like that and speeches, such as W. Churchill's message to the Greek Prime Minister on 
the anniversary of the Italian attack on Greece received great attention in the Greek and 
Greek Cypriot press. The British Premier stated that: 
"Their [the Greek people] martyrdom will be 
avenged by the Pan-Hellenic Army of liberalion. 
The unity of all her sons and daughters behind their 
King and Government in the cause of their Fatherland 
will bring its sure reward',4 
This created a common feeling among Greeks and Greek Cypriots, that if the Allies 
were successful, then Enosis with Greece would follow as a matter of course. However, 
the British colonial line, that Cyprus was a valuable asset of the Empire, had not 
changed. The pro-Greek acts of the Foreign Office and of Downing St. were simply 
empty words, aiming to raise the morale of the Greek Cypriot community and not to 
promise anything for the future. The fact that Britain was not willing to grant Cyprus to 
Greece, can be revealed by her refusal to associate Cyprus with anything from 
metropolitan Greece during the whole course of the War. When in May 1941 the Greek 
government of Tsouderos was seeking a new shelter after the German invasion in Crete, 
Cyprus was mentioned as a sufficient refuge by the Greek side. Britain refused on the 
basis that such a development could be used by Turkey as an excuse in order to place 
herself on the Axis' side. However, after the Lausanne Treaty (Nov.1922-Jan. 1923) 
Turkey did not have any legitimate interest upon Cyprus' fate, while on the other hand, 
Turkey had not shown any interest regarding island's status quo since January 1923. In 
addition, throughout the war, Britain never allowed Greek troops to be stationed in 
.. The Times, 28 Oct 1941, p.S. 
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Cyprus, Greek refugees aiming to escape the Nazis' suppression were allowed to enter 
Syria or Palestine but not Cyprus, even if the latter could be reached more easily.s 
Despite the fact that British foreign policy towards Cyprus did not change, her 
internal colonial policy became one of wartime liberalism. This can be fully justified by 
the geostrategic equilibrium of that time. After the total collapse of the French forces 
and until the American entrance on the Allied side (Dec. 1941). Britain was the only 
major power against the united Axis forces in Western Europe. Thus, it would have 
proven extremely difficult for her wartime efforts if she had been obliged to face an 
internal opposition front within her empire. For that reason, especially after the Italian 
invasion in Greece, constitutional reforms were introduced in the Cypriot political 
arena. In 1941 the decision to restore municipal elections was announced, while the 
trade union movement was also given official encouragement by the setting up of the 
first Labour department and the enactment of the Trade Unions and Trades Disputes 
Law on the pattern of legislation in Britain. The same year the Cypriots formed PTUC6 
with 3,854 Greek and Turkish Cypriot members. However, the most important political 
development was the formation of AKEL in 19417 at Skarinou village.8 The new party 
was formed by Socialists and Communists under the common leadership of the ex-
Secretary General of KKK, Ploutis Servas and the Secretary-General of EKK, 
Giannakos Pantelidis. The nature of the new party was anti-colonial but its major 
concern and task was to defend and represent the Cypriot proletariat. AKEL's 
manifesto defined the party as Marxist-Leninist, moving within the framework of 
proletariat internationalism and operating in favour of a socialist society. It is essential 
to note here that the British authorities welcomed and encouraged the formation of 
AKEL for two main reasons. First of all, during that time Moscow and London were 
fighting on the same side, so the allowance and toleration of a left party within the 
framework of the Empire was a goodwill gesture, aiming to strengthen the unity of the 
two major European anti-Nazi powers. The second reason is that the views of AKEL 
about international solidarity, and their anti-nationalist slogans, were viewed by the 
British authorities as a healthy antidote to the nationalist politicians backed by the 
, A. Xydis, Politics: Cyprus, (Athens, 1992), p. 24. 
6 P. Loizou, The Labour Movement in Cyprus, (Nicosia, 1987), vol. II, p p. 123-26 
7 From October 1941 onwards, political meetings were re-allowed in Cyprus. As seen in previous chapter 
after the disturbances of 1931 special illiberal laws had been introduced in Cyprus aiming to jeopardize 
the Enosist movement. 
S II. K. Gia11ouridis, The Political Parties in Cyprus. (Athens, 1990). vol. II, p. 165. See also T. W. 
Adams, The Communist Party of Cyprus, (Stanford, 1971), p. 23. 
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Church and their inflexible attitude of "Enosis and nothing but Enosis". Nevertheless, 
an important detail, not mentioned in any Greek or British source, is that Mr Pantelidis 
had been pre-chosen by the British authorities as the only left political figure in Cyprus 
who could guarantee the party's non-subjugation to the mighty Soviet Union. As he 
remembers: 
"I was relaxing in my father's home at Lapithos when the 
doorbell rang. It was late at night so I was not sure if I 
should answer the door since times were peculiar and you 
could not trust anyone ... 1 opened the door and I saw Sir 
Campbell Woolley [the governor of Cyprus] and another tall 
man with Mediterranean features. The unknown man 
introduced himself as Mr. Smith and I realized that he did not 
want to reveal his real name ... 1 noticed that his accent was 
Oxfordian. Sir Campbell said to me that Afr. Smith wanted to 
have a word with me in private, so I led him to my father's 
study room. At first he said to me that the authorities knew 
about my attempts to re-establish the Communist Party and 
they did not object the idea, as long as I was to be the central 
figure. After that he offered me money to assist, as he said, 
my endeavours. I denied the offer and I said to him that I 
was just a soldier of the International Social movement and 
that the leadership of the new party would be decided by the 
first plenary session. lie smiled and he said that he already 
knew the outcome. The British wanted me to be the leader of 
AKEL because they knew that I was an anti-Stalinist and I 
would oppose to any attempt of the Soviet nion to control 
the party. The main concern for them was to keep Stalin's 
influence away from the internal affairs of the empire ... ,,9 
However, the birth of AKEL put considerable pressure on the nationalist circles of the 
Greek Cypriot community and the Orthodox Church. They considered AKEL to be a 
9 Personal interview with Mr. O. Pantelidis during July 1998 in Nicosia. 
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threat to their political dominance in the Cypriot political arena.10 Therefore, the 
nationalists, with the moral and financial support of the Church, formed KEK in 1942 
under the leadership of a well known. and popular political figure, Themistoklis 
Dervis.11 Unlike AKEL, the new party did not present an ideological manifesto and its 
only aim was to confront the Communist threat and to continue the struggle for Enosis. 
Open confrontation between the two political foundations soon developed. In 1943 the 
Greek trade unions split into nationalist and left-wing groups. As its third conference 
held in Limassol PTUC declared itself to be an inseparable part of AKEL 12 KEK 
blamed AKEL for manipulation of the workers and for a short period of time bloody 
clashes took place inside factories between supporters of the two sides. The situation 
was so explosive that the authorities were forced to postpone the municipal elections for 
few months. AKEL's effort to monopolize the trade union movement led to the 
formation of a small right wing union, SEK, under the leadership of Michael Pissas. 
Nevertheless, SEK never gained considerable power and its pro-bourgeois attitude led to 
the unbounded dominance of the left-wing PTUe During the same year, for the first 
time the Turkish Cypriot side took a political initiative in order to face the Enosist 
movement and the rise of the left, which threatened the deeply religious and introvert 
community. The new political foundation was named KATAK13, under the prominent 
Turkish Cypriot Dr. Kutchuk. The formation of the Turkish party signalled the 
awakening of the political instinct and the need for organized representation of the 
Turkish Cypriot community. The appearance of AKEL in the Cypriot political spectrum 
forced every other side, Right-wing Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to escape 
from their political stagnation and re-organize themselves in order to face the new 
challenge. This political awakening, as will be seen later on, gave a new moral boost to 
the Cypriot anti-colonial movement and deeply influenced the methods of the Greek 
Cypriot leadership to re-introduce the Enosis issue after a long period (since 1931) of 
awkward silence and political introversion. 
According to the spirit of that time, the municipal elections of March 1943 were held 
in a climate of undoubted democratic procedures and civilized political debates. The 
10 It has to be noted here that the fears of the Nationalist Cypriot circles and the Church were not 
unfounded. From 1941 until 1945 AKEL had 5,000 organized party members, while inside the Trade 
Unions its power rose to 11,000 out of 13,000 workers in total. For more sec KKE Official Archives, A 
Short Investigation upon Cyprus and AKEL. case 371, files, 14120121 
11 II. K. Giallouridis, op. cit., p. 166. 
12 Dept of Labour, Annual Report, (Nicosia, 1944), p. 10. 
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British establishment showed a meritorious political toleration, by giving the candidates 
the opportunity to advance the cause of Enosis. It must be noted that both KEK and 
AKEL made use of a pro-Enosist rhetoric, proving that apart from the Greek Cypriot 
left-wing intelligentsia, the rest of the Greek Cypriot community, irrespective of their 
political preferences, favoured of the concept of Enosis. As Pantelidis remembered: 
"The illiterate worker who came to our pre-election 
congregations did not and could not understand the Marxist 
Leninist rhetoric. He wanted to hear revolutionary slogans 
against the bourgeois class and pro-Enosist slogans that 
would make him/eel proud to be Greek. I believe that during 
those years AKEL was one 0/ the most radical and 
revolutionary left parties in Europe, with the largest number 
of Nationalist supporters,,14 
In order to face the nationalist coalition of EKE, AKEL formed a coalition with the 
leftist group PESP. AKEL's great appeal to the masses, mainly due to the Socialist and 
pro-Enos is slogans, and EKE's failure to propose effective social reforms, led to the 
triumphant victory of the Left in the four main cities of the island, establishing AKEL as 
the main political power in Cyprus. IS The British side was fully satisfied by the results, 
viewing AKEL's electoral victory as a personal success, which could isolate and 
gradually eradicate the nationalist movement. Characteristically Sir C. Campbell 
Woolley sent a personal telegram to G. Pantelidis congratulating him for his party's 
great appeal to the Cypriot people, claiming that the municipal elections of '43 could be 
a new beginning for the island's fate. 16 However, the British side incorrectly interpreted 
AKEL's victory. The victory of the left did not necessarily meant the abandonment of 
the Enosis ideals. It was more a protest vote against the Greek Cypriot upper class than 
an acceptance of the Marxist axiom "Proletarians have no country". For that reason 
some British political figures, who had an absolute lack of knowledge of the Cypriot 
situation, committed the grave mistake, judging by the electoral results, of challenging 
13 An Investigation into Matters Concerning and Affecting the Turkish Community in Cyprus: Interim 
Report of the Committee on Turkish Mairs, (Cyprus Government Printing Office, 1949). 
14 Personal interview with Mr. G. Pantelidis during July 1998 in Nicosia. 
I' AKEL's representatives elected were: Nicosia: loannis Kliridis, Limassol : Ploutis Servas, Famagusta: 
Adamantios Adamantos, Larnaca: Gianakos Pantelidis. See I. MHos & T. Kyprianidis, The Cypriot 
Question after the Second World War. The Greek and Greek Cypriot Strategy, Thesis (Athens, Oct-Dec 
1988), vol. 2S, pp. 29 - 42. 
16 Personal interview with Mr. G. Pantelidis during July 1998 in Nicosia. 
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the national feelings of the Greek Cypriots. Thus, when Lord Faringdon stated inside 
the House of Lords that: 
"Although it is true that the majority of the population of 
Cyprus speak Greek, Cyprus was not, as your Lordships will 
be aware, really a part of the ancient classical Greek world-
that is to say, it was a part of the world, but not in any sense 
part of the Greek world ... Greece which, as I say, is not truly 
the mother country of the Cypriots, and which is also a 
country from which they could obtain no possible 
advantages" I 7 
this angered the Greek Cypriot population, in general, and jeopardized the local British 
efforts to take advantage of the electoral results and implement the well-known doctrine 
of divide and rule inside the Greek Cypriot community. 
Nevertheless, the liberal reforms of the British authorities and the realization of the 
municipal elections proved negative for the existing regime. The Greek Cypriots could 
organize public meetings and speak freely again about their everlasting desire for Enosis 
with Greece. On the other hand, AKEL's formation did not contribute to the isolation 
of nationalist ideas concerning Enosis, since in many cases AKEL, through its anti-
colonial principles, proved to be more radical even than the Church. At the same time, 
the rise of the left in the island led to the creation of another front as dangerous as the 
Enosis issue. AKEL was the only legal Communist party in the wider area of the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East during the war, and one of the most powerful ones. 
This gave it the freedom to put pressure upon the British government for social reforms 
and the elevation of living standards on the island, which were extremely low due to 
economic depression caused by the war. After 1943 and until the end of the war, 
military force was twice used to deal with disturbances in the island. Incidents of unrest 
entered daily Cypriot life. The most serious one took place on March 25, 1945. The 
authorities had given permission for celebration of the Greek Independence Day. Riots 
broke out in Nicosia, while the police tried to stop an AKEL march heading to the 
Government House. Police's intervention resulted in 40 dead and 350 wounded. 18 
17l1ouse of Lord Debates, 31 March 1943, vol. 126, col. 1024. 
11 K. Tsoukalas, La GreQue Tragedie • (Paris. 1968), Sixth ed., p. 74. 
57 
Britain had to reconsider the Cypriot question in order to preserve law and order in the 
island. 
However, during that time Cyprus was not the only riddle for Britain. The end of the 
Second World War brought fundamental transformations to the balance of power in the 
global spectrum. Instead of Germany challenging the British Empire, a new equilibrium 
of power was constructed with the USSR challenging the USA 19 The Soviet Union, 
which in the past represented a great ideological threat for the Western world, was 
holding the position of a great military power at the end of the war. The Red Army, 
which liberated the whole of Eastern and Central Europe, was the first army that entered 
Berlin, and played one of the leading roles in the Nazi's defeat. On the other hand, the 
American force contributed a lot to the defeat of the Axis forces. American troops were 
welcomed everywhere as the great liberators and the American economy was at a higher 
level than ever before, as the main ammunition and food supplier for the Allied army. 
Nevertheless, the situation was not idyllic for Britain. The end of the Second World 
War found Britain maintaining a massive military force in the whole of the world, 
especially in the Middle East. In 1945 the British Army consisted of five million men, 
while four million held non combatant posts.20 With the end of the Second World War 
Britain had to decide about her position in the new balance of power. The great social 
and economic problems facing home, mainly due to the titanic British efforts to face the 
German forces, were calling for an immediate solution. As Woodhouse mentions, the 
British policy of that time had to find an equilibrium between two conflicting 
necessities; economic reconstruction in the domestic sphere and the accomplishment of 
her duties as a great power in the global political arena.21 The British White Paper for 
Defence in 1946 proposed the immediate need for reduction of the British military 
force. That simply meant that Britain was adopting a new foreign and colonial policy, 
since her internal problems were forcing the state to approach the post-war reality by 
abandoning the old military and diplomatic doctrines. According to the White Paper the 
number of military personnel had to be reduced to 1,100,000 men by the end of '46, 
with further reductions thereafter,22 The transformation of the British mentality can be 
fully revealed in the White Book for Defence in 1948, in which Britain re-defined her 
overseas colonies, abandoning the term Empire and adopting the term 
19 P.J. Taylor, Britain and the Cold War. 1945 as Geopolitical Transition, (London, 1990), p. 17. 
20 C.W. Woodhouse, British Foreign Policy Since the Second World War, (London, 1961), p. 77. 
21 ibid, p. 77 
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Commonwealth?3 Nevertheless, British moderate views for the Empire could not refer 
to the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus in particular. After the British evacuation 
from India, the Foreign Office continued to regard the Eastern Mediterranean as a top 
priority region for the British geostrategic interests. This can be explained by the fact 
that through the maintenance of British control in the area, London could preserve and 
safeguard links with other countries of the Commonwealth, where she had vital strategic 
and economic interests. The need for the safeguarding of the communication routes 
with the rest of the Commonwealth had been emphasised successfully inside the House 
of Commons by a well-known member of the hard-liners of the Conservative Party. As 
Mr. Maitland said: 
" ... II is nol only a queslion of oil ... Inward bound there are 
Indian manganese and tin,' Malayan tin, bauxite and rubber; 
Australian wheat, zinc and wool,' Pakistani jute and colton: 
East African chrome and Indonesian rubber ... Then there are 
the Burmese rice, Mauritian sugar and soon outward bound 
there is our own exporl of capital goods of one kind and 
another. Metal goods and cars, capital goods for Australia, 
India, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. II is commerce on 
which we live and on which our capacity to deal with 
inflation depends. Protection of that commerce is vital and 
critical to our national policy ... To protect our sea lanes in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, we simply must be in Cyprus. ,,24 
In addition, the region of the Eastern Mediterranean remained strategically important for 
Britain mainly because of the oil resources of the Middle East. Accepting the fact that 
oil was one of the mainstays of the British economy, the Middle East oil resources were 
the main suppliers for Britain and the rest of Western Europe. Britain could keep the 
Middle Eastern oil resources under close surveillance by maintaining its presence in 
Cyprus. Additionally, the awakening of Arab nationalism, after the end of the Second 
World War, just strengthened the British urge to focus on Cyprus as the only secure 
bastion of her interests in the region. However, the main reason for British persistence 
in keeping Cyprus under British control was to avoid the unpleasant process of rapid de-
22 C.W. Woodhouse, op.cit., pp. 77-78. 
23 C.W. Woodhouse, op.cit., p.79. 
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colonisation in the rest of the British colonies. India's independence in 1947 was 
viewed by many of the British colonies as a brilliant example to follow. Nevertheless, 
despite the peaceful withdrawal of the British forces from India the strategic and 
psychological consequences of the loss of the "Jewel of the Empire" were enormous. 
Strategists from Wellington to Attlee's chiefs-of-staff agreed, and the latter feared that 
Britain's future as a world power would be in jeopardy without India's reserve of 
manpower, which had proved so vital in two world wars and sundry smaller imperial 
campaigns throughout the Middle East, East Africa and the Far East.2s Although the 
British officials, and in particular the ruling Labour party, had come to terms with the 
idea that de-colonisation was a political necessity, they still desired to proceed to this 
gradually, in their own time and agenda. With that, they wanted to preserve British 
geostrategic interests in the global spectrum and at the same give the British public time 
to come to terms with the idea that the Empire was no more. Therefore, if they were to 
accept the Greek Cypriot demand for Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, they would create a 
dangerous example for other British colonies with the same separatist aspirations. As 
Sir Arthur Dawe, the Deputy Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office stated: 
"If we handed over Cyprus it would result in a clamour for 
the handing over of other colonial territory, e.g. the Falkland 
Islands, Hong Kong. etc. ,,26 
The end of the war found Cyprus in a state of alert. The realization of the municipal 
elections of 1943, the return of the exiled leaders of the disturbances of '31, and the 
defeat of the Axis forces, created the feeling among Greek Cypriots that the decisive 
moment concerning the national vindication had arrived. The Greek Cypriots, unaware 
of the new post-war reality, strongly believed that their war efforts on the Allied side 
would be rewarded. However, their Enosis demands were ignored again during the 
Paris Peace Conference (July-October 1946), where the Dodecanese (a group of twelve 
islands situated in the southeast Aegean) passed under Greek control but Cyprus was not 
even mentioned during the official negotiations.27 The Dodecanese issue had some 
similarities with the Cypriot question. Until the end of the Second World War it was an 
Italian dominion while the majority of the population was Greek. In addition those 
24 Patrick Maitland: House of Commons. (July 15, 1957), vo1.573, co1.848-85 1. 
25 J. Lawrence, The Rise and Fall ofthe British Empire. (London. 1998), p. 556. 
26 F.O Papers 371155761, 12 Sept. 1946. 
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islands were close to the Turkish coast of Ionia and were under Turkish occupation until 
Italians arrived. However, things were much simpler for the Dodecanese. The twelve 
islands were not close to the oil resources of the Middle East, their geostrategic position 
could not cause problems to Turkey, and in addition, the islands did not have a 
numerous Turkish population which could oppose the Enosis with Greece. 
Furthermore, the Cypriot question was not even mentioned by the Greek side for reasons 
that can be justified by the internal situation in the country. Since Greece had been 
liberated from the German-Italian-Dulgarian yoke during April 1944, a great 
antagonism had arisen between the royalists and the Communists. During the 
occupation, the Communists formed the backbone of the resistance, while the majority 
of the royalist side collaborated with the invaders. After the end of the Second World 
War, KKE demanded, as a reward, a place in the first coalition government, as had 
happened in Italy, and refused to accept the return of the King without holding a 
plebiscite first. The Greek Communist Party, mainly because of its own isolationist 
mistakes and the inflexible attitude of the royalists, chose the solution of the armed 
confrontation, leading the country to a civil war. Dritain's main concern was to keep her 
loyal ally in the Western camp, therefore, during those critical moments, she supported 
the royalist side by providing economic aid to the royalist troops.28 In 1946, the Greek 
Civil War was at a critical turning point and Greece did not want to discontent her main 
ally by raising the Cypriot question in an International summit. Once again, Cyprus had 
been sacrificed on the altar of secret diplomacy by the same country. that was looked 
upon as a loving mother. 
The Greek failure to represent the Greek Cypriot demands did not make the latter 
abandon their everlasting ambitions for Enosis. At the end of December 1946, a 
representative delegation, composed of members of the left and the right (such as the 
Dishop of Paphos Leontios, and I. Klerides KC) left for Athens. Their prime aim was to 
put pressure upon the Greek government, and remind her of her national duty, as the 
metropolitan centre ~f Hellenism, concerning the Cypriot question. The presence of the 
Greek Cypriot delegation in Athens was an embarrassment to the Greek government but 
27 The official cession of Dodecanese took place on March 8, 1948. For more concerning the issue see J. 
Huntzinger, Europe of the Past. the Present and the Future, (Athens, 1978), vol. II, p.p. 357 - 62. 
28 The bibliography concerning the British attitude during the Greek Civil War is vast. However, a 
valuable source for this period, which deals quite successfully with the complexities of the issue, can be 
found in D.H. Close, The Greek Cjyjl War. 1943-1950: Studies of Polarization, (London, 1993). See also 
the detailed study ofB. Kontis, The Anglo-American Policy and the Greek issue:1945-1949, 
(Thessaloniki, 1984). 
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a source of enthusiasm to the press and the public. Except for some empty words of 
admiration about their national devotion and endurance, the delegation failed to achieve 
a definite promise of diplomatic support.29 The Greek government could not abandon 
the policy of non-intervention concerning the Cypriot question and argue with her 
valuable ally and champion, especially during that particular period when the 
Communist guerillas were in control of the most parts of central and north Greece. 
Despite the negative development, the Greek Cypriot delegation was prepared to send a 
clear message to all sides. Therefore, the next station was London. The Prime Minister, 
Clement AttIee, refused to see them, but on February 7, 1947, they presented the 
Colonial Secretary, Creech Jones, with a memorandum concerning their position 
towards the Cypriot status quo.30 The memorandum stated the case for Enosis and 
suggested that the Turkish minority could be fully safeguarded inside the Greek 
framework. C. Jones made it clear yet again that no change in the island's status was 
contemplated. The timing of the rejection of the Greek Cypriot proposals, in such a 
definite way, proved to be unlucky since a new governor was ready to come to Cyprus. 
Lord Winster arrived in Cyprus on March 27, 1947. As has already been mentioned, 
Britain's emergence from the Second World War forced the officials in the Foreign 
Office to re-consider their policies in Cyprus. The new geo-strategic facts that rose 
from the ruins of the Second World War were calling for a more liberal policy-line in 
the island. Therefore, the new governor had the special task of negotiating with the 
Greek Cypriots for the introduction of a new constitution, that would bridge the gap 
between the British and the Greek Cypriot side, and silence the reactionary forces that 
were promoting the Enosis cause by accusing the British establishment of illiberal 
methods of governing. However, the Greek Cypriots, mainly due to the British attitude 
one month earlier in London, developed a hostile atmosphere to the newly arrived 
Governor. The Church Council ordered a boycott of the reception for the new 
Governor, and AKEL organized a general union strike demanding the end of the 
colonial era in Cyprus?l Lord Winster, an experienced politician, in order to reverse the 
negative Greek Cypriot attitude towards him, invited the municipalities and the Press on 
July 9 to nominate representatives for a Consultative Assembly, which would make 
recommendations on the type of constitution to be adopted, so that the Cypriots might 
29 Eleftheria, 30 Dec, 1946, p. 2. 
30 The Times, 8 February, 1947, p. 4. 
31 I. Milios & T. Kyprianidis, op. cit., pp. 45-70. 
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playa greater part in the island's internal affairs.32 It was an excellent political move 
which aimed to smash the unity of the Greek Cypriots, stressing the deep difference 
between the inflexibility of the Greek Cypriot Right and the flexibility of the Left. 
While the first side declared that any negotiations with the British side would have been 
an act of treason for the ultimate national cause, the second viewed the negotiations as a 
decisive step towards control of the power and the gradual realization of self-
determination and unification with Greece. The Church rejected the negotiation 
proposals and accused AKEL of being members of the British Intelligence. AKEL 
responded to the nationalist accusations, blaming the Church leadership as an anti-
communist organization which was sabotaging the efforts for Enosis.33 On July 12, 
Archbishop Leontios, in an open letter to the Cypriot people, urged them to resist the 
British and Communist plans, while AKEL decided on July 20 to participate in the 
Consultative Assembly. In that schizophrenic atmosphere, on July 26 Leontios died. 
Macarios II took his place on December 27. Because of Leontios' death the meeting of 
the Consultative Assembly had been postponed until May 7, 1948, when a new Cypriot 
Constitution had been proposed by the British authorities. The new Constitution 
proposed the formation of a Legislative Council with 4 appointed and 22 elected 
members. From the 22 elected members, 18 would have bcen Greeks and 4 Turkish. 
According to the British proposals, the Legislative Council did not have the right to vote 
on the colonial status quo of the island, monetary issues, defence, international affairs, 
minority issues, or constitutional issues, without the Governor's permission. In 
addition, an Executive Council was proposed with 4 official and 4 unofficial members, 
3 Greeks and 1 Turkish, as the Governor's advisory body.34 There is no doubt that the 
British proposals could have brought considerable benefits to the Greek Cypriot side. 
For the first time the Greek Cypriots had the advantage of the absolute majority inside 
the Legislative Council, and even if the new Constitution was deeply pro-colonial, it 
gave the Greek Cypriots the opportunity to influence the colonial authorities and 
gradually lead the island, as had happened in other British colonies, to a self 
determining status. Eventually the British proposals were turned down and a historic 
opportunity for both Britain and Cyprus to take a decisive step towards the final 
settlement of the Cypriot question was lost. The reasons for this historic failure can be 
found in the Cypriot Orthodox Church and the Greek Communist Party. As mentioned 
31 O. Kirk, The Middle East. 1945 - 1950, (London, 1954), p. 175. 
33 N. Kranidiotis, Dimcult Years. (Athens, 1981), pp. 24 - 25. 
34 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 7-14 1948, p. 9438. 
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in chapter I, the influence of the Orthodox Church upon the Greek Cypriot population 
was unquestionably extensive. Thus, by using her close links with civil society, the 
Orthodox Church, through the newly elected Archbishop Makarios II, managed to tum 
the masses against AKEL. As G. Pantelidis argued: 
"During the days of the Consultative Assembly, the hostility 
of the Greek Cypriots towards us was great even inside 
AKEL 's ranks. Archbishop Makarios II was a great orator 
and eventually wefound ourselves with our backs to the wall. 
We had two choices. Either to accept the British proposals 
and to annihilate our electoral power, or to abandon the 
Assembly and harm the efforts lor a satisfactory solution 
concerning the Cypriot status quo. " 
The leadership of AKEL was faced with a historic dilemma, but a letter that arrived 
from Greece made things simpler for them. As Pantelidis continues: 
" ... However, a letter arrived from Greece convincing us of 
what we should decide. The leiter was from the General 
Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, Nikos Zahariadis. 
He was urging us to abandon the negotiations and work 
towards the Enosis with Greece. lie said that it was our 
national duty not to collaborate with the forces of 
Imperialism. We did not have any other choice. N. 
Zahariadis was a legendary figure lor the International 
Communist movement, and the leader of the guerilla troops 
that werefightingfor a Socialist Greece. We did not have the 
moral strength to reject his suggestions . .. ,,35 
It must be noted here, that this was the first time that the Greek Communist Party had 
intervened in the Cypriot question. Some historians who examined Zahariadis' letter to 
AKEL insist that Zahariadis was Stalin's messenger, connecting that with the Soviet 
expansionist plans in the Eastern Mediterranean. According to those historians, Stalin's 
intention towards Cyprus was to place the island under Soviet influence, fulfilling the 
35 Personal interview with Mr. O. Pantelidis in Nicosia during July 1998. 
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Soviet desire for a power base in the Mediterranean.36 However, it would be a great 
mistake to accept the above view. It is well proven that after the Percentages Agreement 
on the Balkans37 and Yalta's agreement, Stalin did not doubt the English dominance in 
Greece and Cyprus. For that reason he did not assist the Greek Communists' guerillas 
during the Greek Civil War, even if he had been asked to by the Greek Communist 
leadership. In addition, it must not be forgotten that during that time, Stalin's main task 
was to secure Eastern Europe in the Soviet camp. Looking closely at Zahariadis' 
memoirs, it becomes obvious that the Secretary-General of the Communist Party was in 
favour of the collapse of the negotiations, insisting that Britain could not maintain two 
open fronts at the same time both in Greece and Cyprus. According to his calculations, 
if Britain had to choose between Greece and Cyprus, she would prefer the second giving 
the Communist guerillas the opportunity to win the war and establish their dominance 
over the first. Zahariadis' letter was a primitive effort of an mediocre leader to create 
social unrest in Cyprus, in order to divert the British attention from the Greek Civil War 
theatre to Aphrodite's island. History, as Herodotus said, does not repeat itself. Thus a 
golden opportunity had been lost for the island and its people for a gradual improvement 
of the political conditions, which could have led to the final settlement of the Cypriot 
question. Once more, Cyprus had been sacrificed to political necessities in order to 
support a cause that was irrelevant to the anti-colonial movement on the island. 
The impact of the collapse of the Consultative Assembly was as great for the British 
side. As the result of the fiasco of the Consultative Assembly, the Greek Cypriot 
nationalist side gained great advantage, not through an enlightened policy of their own, 
but because of the British miscalculations and the Communists' mistakes. AKEL, 
trying to preserve its unity, altered its anti-nationalist policy and tried to bridge the gap 
between itself and the Church. The British authorities acted irrationally, panicked at the 
prospect of an alliance between the Church and the Communists, and on January 24, 
1949, through a special issue of the official Government's Gazette, threatened the 
Cypriots that in any case of disturbances the illiberal laws of 1931 would be enforced.38 
The British warnings provoked the Greek Cypriot feelings, and resulted in the 
36 For more concerning that view which, unfortunately, had been adopted by many Greek politicians of the 
old guard, see D. Dimitrakos, Kostas Mjtsotakis. A Political DiQl:raphy. (Athens, 1989), vol. I, pp. 441 -
47. 
37 On the evening of9 October 1944, Stalin and Churchill met in Moscow. The meeting concluded the 
notorious Percentages Agreement on the Balkans, which granted Britain 90% dominance in Greece at the 
price of an equal percentage for Stalin in Romania. 
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invigoration of the Enosist movement. In addition, as a result of the British 
provocation, the moderate leadership of AKEL was forced to surrender power as an 
admittance of their mistake in negotiating with the Imperialists, and a new leadership 
arrived with strong pro-Enosist ideas.39 Ezekias Papaioannou, a prominent Communist 
figure and a member of the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War, 
emerged as the new leader of AKEL, while a new political council was formed 
consisting of the leaders of the Trade Unions, such as Andreas Ziatridis, Alexandros 
Fantis, Savas Ioannou, Georgios Hristodoulidis and Pavlos Georgiou. From the first day 
in office the new leadership confirmed its intentions with the release of a leaflet, 
blaming the previous administration for political mistakes and demanding Enosis with 
Greece.40 Now Britain had to face a powerful nationalist coalition, consisting of the 
Church, the Communists and the Right-wing parties. The failure of the British policy to 
maintain the rivalry between the Left and the Right in Cyprus was taken as Lord 
Winster's personal defeat, thus on May 10, 1949, Sir Andrew Barkworth Wright 
replaced him as governor of Cyprus. 
The arrival of the new Governor found Cyprus in an electoral fever. The new 
municipal elections were in the centre of the Cypriot concern, and the new arrival did 
not create a sound impact. The result of the municipal elections showed the 
transformation of the Greek Cypriot attitude towards the extreme ideas of the nationalist 
side. The nationalists managed to elect T. Dervis in Nicosia, C. Galatopoulos in Paphos 
and H. Dimitriadis in Famagusta, while in the rest of the Cypriot cities the Left managed 
to elect their representatives with reduced majorities.41 The results of the municipal 
elections was the final blow for the already few moderate figures inside the Greek 
Cypriot framework who were in favour of political negotiations with the British 
authorities. The Greek Cypriots, tired of their long and fruitless struggle about their 
national vindication, wanted more radical approaches that could persuade the British 
authorities to abandon the island. In that particular moment the Orthodox Church 
manifested its great influence upon the Greek Cypriots and proposed a Plebiscite about 
the Enosis issue. The idea of holding a plebiscite in Cyprus had been mentioned several 
times since the war. Platts-Mills, a spokesman for the left-wing Cypriots, had raised 
31 Cypriot Government Gazette, 24 January 1949, Nicosia. A full text can still be found in the University 
of Cyprus archives in Nicosia, 
39N Kr 'd" . 3S 
. am lobs, op. CIt., p. . 
40 Personal interview with Mr. O. Pantelidis in Nicosia during July 1998. 
41 11. K. Giallouridis, op. cit .. , p. 179. 
66 
the question in the House of Commons on July 7, 1948, with no further effect 
whatsoever.42 One month after Wright's arrival, AKEL, in an attempt to establish itself 
as an Enosist sympathizer, seized the initiative with an appeal to the Church to co-
operate in sending a joint memorandum and an all party delegation to the United 
Nations. The invitation was rebuffed, not because of the blind hostility of the Church 
towards the Communists as some Greek historians elaimed, but because of the political 
situation that had been established at internationalleve1.43 
The main preoccupation of the Church was to keep the Cypriot question away from 
the new reality that was rising in the global arena, the Cold War reality. A joint Cypriot 
delegation to the United Nations, consisting of Communists and Right wingers, would 
have embarrassed the right-wing government in Greece and made the major anti-
Communist forces, such as USA or France suspicious. However, AKEL's proposal 
forced the Church to take the initiative, fearing that a delay could drive the Greek 
Cypriots against her. Therefore, on December 5th the Ethnarchy Council decided to 
hold the plebiscite on January 15, 1950 unless the Government in the meantime held its 
own referendum. On December 12, the Archbishop asked the Governor to do so. He 
wrote that during seventy-one years of British rule, the Cypriots had never stopped 
demanding the island's national restoration through union with Greece and that Great 
Britain was disregarding the island's Hellenic character and the principle of self-
detennination.44 The British side kept its nerve, and on December 17, the Governor 
wrote to the Archbishop commenting on his use of the word "plebiscite" 
"Mass petitions of this character have been organized in 
Cyprus on various occasions in the past, but I know of no 
instance in which the Government was concerned except to 
receive them,' and I can conceive of no circumstances in 
which the Government could be associated with their 
promotion. ,,45 
The Turkish Cypriots grew increasingly uneasy at these developments. Thousands of 
Turks held a rally in Nicosia on December 12, and adopted a five-point resolution, 
42 Platts-Mills: Bouse of Commons, July 7 1948, vol. 453, col. 365-66. 
43 For more concerning the above view see: AE. Rokopoulos, Reli~jon and rropa~anda jn Modem 
Greece, (Athens, 1984), vol. III, pp. 217-21. 
44 Cyprus Mail, 20 December 1949, pp. 1-2. 
45 ibid. 
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protesting against Enosis. Its authors claimed that Enosis would bring economic ruin, 
racial and social disorders and would eventually lead Cyprus to a civil bloodshed. 
Stressing that a plebiscite was pointless, they reaffirmed that the continuation of the 
status quo was essential for the protection of the minorities and the preservation of 
peace. If Britain wanted to abandon Cyprus, they added, then it should be returned to 
Turkey, the only Near Eastern country capable of defending it. Finally they authorized 
Dr. Kutchuk to submit the resolution to the UN, the British Colonial and Foreign 
Secretaries, and to the various political parties and associations in Britain and Turkey.46 
By that, the Turkish side excluded herself from the plebiscite, and at the same time 
outraged the Greek Cypriot side with her historic inaccuracies concerning Turkish rights 
upon Cyprus. 
The news for the forthcoming plebiscite in Cyprus raised national enthusiasm in 
Greece. The Greek newspapers dedicated full pages to the Cypriot question, praising 
the leadership of the Orthodox Church for its initiative. Nevertheless, the Greek 
government did not react in the same way. After a sudden visit of the British 
Ambassador in Athens to the house of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, P. Pipinelis, the 
official spokesman of the Greek Foreign Office stated that: 
"The Plebiscite in Cyprus is being held by irresponsible 
people. nder the present circumstances, initiatives like that, 
could be destructive for the Greek interests. 47 
It is more than obvious that the above declaration was made under British pressure and 
is indicative of the extent of foreign involvement in the internal Greek affairs, a fact 
which proved to be catastrophic for Enosis, as will be seen in the following chapters. 
Despite the Athenian response, the plebiscite was held, in an atmosphere of general 
enthusiasm, on January 15, 1950. The voting was not to be secret, since the Greek 
Cypriots had to sign in an open book under the label Enosis or non-Enosis. Of course 
this method is beyond any democratic procedure, but it is important to note that the 
Plebiscite was unofficial and the Church did not have the means to provide every 
isolated village with electoral polls. At the same time, it was a tactical movement of the 
46 Cyprus Mail, 13 December 1949, p. 3, 
47N Kr 'd" , 41 , am lobs, op, CIt., p. . 
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Church in order to put pressure upon the moderates to vote in favour of Enosis. N. 
Kranidiotis provides a lyrical description of that historic day: 
"The night before snow had covered Nicosia, Limassol and 
Paphos, giving a sign of purity to the national effort. [Snow 
is quite unique for Cyprus, due to the island's tropical 
climate, so one can imagine its impact on the Greek Cypriot 
mentality]. I had the supervision of a group of villages, 
south and south-east of Nicosia. I can not forget the emotion 
and the national pride of the villagers from Latsion, Pera 
Horiou, Nisou, Idalioll and Lympion, who were coming 
dressed in full fig, in order to sign the Enosis petition. As 
long as I live, I will not forget that scene. ,,48 
On January 29, an encyclical signed by all the Cypriot bishops announced a 95.7 percent 
vote in favour of Enosis.49 It must be noted here, that all the Greek Cypriots who held 
civil service positions were not allowed to vote by the British authorities, since they 
were under oath of allegiance to the British Crown. The Archbishop challenged the 
Cyprus government either to accept the results or else conduct its own plebiscite, and 
received the customary reply that the subject was closed. The Plebiscite was a personal 
victory of the Greek Orthodox Church, which managed to put under its own influence 
over the Communists and proclaim itself the champion of the Greek Cypriot demands 
for national vindication. The Plebiscite was the first step, a ticket towards the 
internationalization of the Cypriot issue. On February 14, the Ethnarchy Council 
announced its intention to promote the cause in Greece, Great Britain and the US on the 
basis of the plebiscite results. The Akkelists also decided to campaign abroad but their 
representatives, Adamos Adamantos, Ezekias Papaioannou and Evodoros Ioannides, 
could not as Communists get visas for Greece or the United States, so their efforts were 
restricted in Britain and countries behind the Iron Curtain. In Athens, the delegation 
met the Greek Prime Minister, Nikolaos Plastiras. The Greek Premier refused to accept 
the plebiscite results and stated that the Greek government would negotiate with Britain 
on Cyprus, when the circumstances were in favour of Enosis. The Greek Prime 
Minister, a true patriot and a prominent military figure, had no other choice. Greece, 
48 ibid., pp. 41-42. 
49 Cyprus Mail, 29 January 1950. 
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after a catastrophic occupation and a disastrous Civil War, had neither the economic 
nor the political means to confront Britain at an international level about the Cypriot 
question. As Plastiras wrote in his memoirs: 
"I heard the cries of our enslaved brothers but I could do 
nothing. It was in our best interest not to confront London in 
such a serious matter, as Cyprus. We had 10 wail and hope 
that one day Cyprus will not serve the British interests any 
more ... "so 
The Cypriot delegation reached England in August. The Cypriot nationalists had a 
direct link with Classical scholars and Romantics, versed in the Byronic tradition, and 
with the British Parliament through the Socialists. Members of Parliament, such as 
Kenneth Robinson and Lena Jeger, and prominent Socialist sympathizers including Tom 
Driberg, Woodrow Wyatt and Philip Noel Baker, were ready to put themselves at the 
service of Enosis.S1 Therefore, the Cyprus case was assured of press publicity. 
However, that was not enough. The Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, refused to see 
the Cypriot delegation, stating that it would have been pointless to hear their requests 
concerning a subject which did not exist. 
The next move was towards the United States. The US was important, first as a 
source of funds and secondly for its inherent anti-colonialism, which could be exploited 
to sway international opinion. The Greek Americans, concentrated largely in New York 
State, Illinois, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, were geographically well placed to 
work on American public opinion.s2 Many of them were wealthy and influential, while 
many Greek Americans held posts in the administration, in the Attorney-General's 
Office, the United Nations Secretariat in New York etc.53 The delegation, which arrived 
in the US early in September, lost no time in depositing the plebiscite signatures at the 
United Nations Headquarters. The acknowledgement sent by the Public Information 
Office was encouraging but misleading. This stated that the plebiscite results would be 
brought before the Secretary-General for any action which he might consider desirable: 
.50 N. Plastiras, My Life as a Soldier and as a Politician i Memoirs, (Athens, 1966), Limited edition for 
Plastiras' personal friends, p. 322, 
.51 See Greek Bulletin (Greek Infonnation Office, Greek Embassy, London), 14 August 1950 . 
.52 For more concerning the geographic position and the influence of the Greek minority in the United 
States see: F. J. Brown & J. S. Roucek. Our Ethnic MinQrities, (New York. 1939) 
.53 F.II. Walton, A State Within A State: The Greek Nation Within the American Federal Framework, 
(Massachusetts, 1974), p.259. 
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however, it refused to clarify whether the latter was willing to raise the Cypriot question 
in the next UN assembly. The Greek Cypriot delegation worked tirelessly interviewing 
the delegations of the member states. The spokesman for the British delegation gave the 
customary reply that no change in the island's sovereignty was contemplated. Mr. 
Cabot Lodge, on behalf of the Americans, was reported to have assured them that the 
documents would receive the most careful consideration. Sweden's delegate stated 
categorically that his country could not support the Cypriot case, giving as a reason the 
non-intervention clause in the UN Charter.54 Many delegates proclaimed full support 
for self-determination, shifting responsibility onto the Greek government, stating that 
their attitude would be determined by the course it adopted. Afghanistan promised help 
and the anti-colonial powers, such as India, gave unqualified support.55 Nevertheless, 
the outcome of the visit to the United Nations was on the whole disappointing. Ignorant 
of procedures, the Cypriots found that without a member state to sponsor them, since as 
noted Greece denied any association with the delegation, no progress could be made in 
raising the Cyprus question. 
The Western states' behaviour aimed to clip the Cypriot wings and force them to 
return back to their island. Despite the fact they succeeded in sending back the 
delegation, they did not manage to persuade the Greek Cypriots that their struggle was 
in vain. As will be seen in the next chapter new forces appeared in the Cypriot political 
spectrum, full of moral strength, determined to lift up the banner of Enosis and continue 
the national cause. 
54 T. Saloutos, The Real Problem of Cyprus, The Yale Review, June 1952, vol. 43, No 4. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF TilE CYPRIOT QUESTION: 
FROM AN INTERNAL ISSUE TO TilE UNITED NATIONS. 
The Athenians to the Mellans 
"/1 Is a general and necessary law 
0/ nature 10 rule wha/ever one 
can." 
Thucydldel I V: 105 
This chapter will cover the period from the appearance of Makarios III as a decisive 
factor in the Cypriot affairs to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (September-December 1954). It will be divided in two equal parts. The first 
part will examine Makarios' entry in the Cypriot political arena as the Greek Orthodox 
Archbishop of the island, his plans for the re-organization of the Greek Cypriot 
community according to the demands of the Enosis movement, and his methods towards 
the internationalization of the Cypriot question. Additionally, the first part of this 
chapter will review the diplomatic situation between Greece and Britain over the 
Cypriot issue, as well as the geostrategic and political developments that occurred 
during that time for the aforementioned countries and influenced their approaches to the 
Cypriot question. The main question that the first part of this chapter will answer is: 
Under which circumstances and under the influence of which factors did the Cypriot 
question became an international issue of the United Nations? Secondary questions that 
will be answered are: How can the negative attitude of the Greek government, at first, 
towards Makarios' demands to take the Cypriot question to the United Nations be 
justified in accordance with the diplomatic aims of Athens during that time? Why did 
Britain decide to tum down the Greek proposals for bipartite negotiations over Cyprus? 
To what extent did the Suez Treaty influence the British line towards the Cypriot 
question? The second part of this chapter will be a detailed analysis of the Ninth 
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Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the Greek appeal for 
Cyprus. The legal and diplomatic arguments of Britain, Greece and Turkey will be 
presented and examined in the second part, while an overall evaluation of the Ninth 
Assembly will be presented for all three countries. The questions that the second part 
will answer are: What are the theoretical complications of the terms "self-government" 
and "self-determination" within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations? 
What were the legal obligations that derived from the Lausanne Treaty for Britain, 
Greece and Turkey concerning Cyprus? How can the role of the United States 
concerning the final outcome of the Greek appeal in the United Nations be justified 
within the geostrategic framework of the Cold War? Which factors influenced Athens 
to apply to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and was 
that a positive or a negative decision? 
Tiberius Claudius Drusus Nero Germanicus, best known as Claudius the Stammerer, 
the Roman Emperor and notable historian, said that history's best acquaintance is the 
unexpected. In the Cypriot case the occurrence of the unexpected played a significant 
role, by giving the opportunity for new forces to enter the political arena. On June 28, 
1950, the charismatic yet old Makarios II died at the age of 80. As mentioned in 
previous chapters the Orthodox Church in Cyprus was the most powerful institution, 
therefore the vacant place of the Archbishopric throne attracted the interest of many 
candidates. The two main contestants for the Archbishopric throne were the Bishop of 
Kyrenia, Kyprianos, and the Bishop of Kition, Makarios. Both were fervent supporters 
of the slogan "Enosis and nothing but Enosis" and were well known among the Greek 
Cypriot circles for their anti~ommunist feelings. The extreme-right lobbied hard in 
support of the Bishop of Kyrenia, while AKEL supported Kyprianos as well, despite his 
anti~ommunist feelings, regarding him as a figure who could be easier to 
outmanoeuvre than the formidable young Bishop of Kition. However, Makarios had 
made an impact on many Greek Cypriots with his youth, his energy, his charismatic 
personality and his educational status.1 Makarios' early role as a Bishop of Kition was 
mainly concentrated on issues such as education and the appeal of the Orthodox Church 
to young Greek Cypriots. Under his supervision, in 1949, the Cypriot Church began to 
publish a monthly magazine, "Greek Cyprus", while he re-wrote the religious course 
1 Makarios graduated from the Theological School of the University of Athens, was enrolled in the Law 
School of the University of Athens and commenced post-graduate studies in the Methodist Theological 
College at the University of Boston, Massachusetts in the field of religious sociology. During those times 
only a few had the opportunity to commence undergraduate studies, so the cosmopolitan post-graduate 
Makarios charmed the poorly educated Greek Cypriots. 
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books for the Greek Cypriot Gymnasium.2 In due course the Greek Cypriots chose their 
local representatives, who then nominated delegates to sit with the bishops and abbots 
on the electoral board. Makarios' personality played an important role in the 
Archbishopric elections, therefore on October 18, 1950, the Bishop of Kitium was 
elected Archbishop as Makarios III, by a majority of 97 per cent.3 So, at the age of 
thirty-seven, Makarios became the spiritual leader of a small but powerful Church and 
the political leader of the absolute majority of the island. From the first day in office, 
Makarios exposed his cards. At his enthronement speech he proclaimed that he would 
fight, however long and difficult the struggle, for the national rehabilitation of Cyprus 
through the desired union with Greece. 
Archbishop Makarios saw two important tasks ahead of him at the beginning of his 
reign. The first was to consolidate the power of the Nationalists, the second to 
internationalize the Cypriot question, so that it was no longer a domestic issue between 
the Greek Cypriots and Britain. In order to fulfill his first objective, Makarios had to re-
organize the Greek Cypriot Council, known as Ethnarchy. The Greek Cypriot 
Ethnarchy was the political organization of the Greek Cypriot community, established 
in the late 19th century after the arrival of Britain in the island. The primary aim of the 
Ethnarchy was to coordinate and promote Enosis. It also represented the Greek Cypriot 
community in secondary political and economic issues, such as taxation, education, 
trade, etc. The Orthodox Church held the main influence inside the Ethnarchy, while 
prominent members of the Greek Cypriot community were also included. For example, 
some of the Ethnarchy's members of 1948, excluding the Orthodox intelligentsia of the 
island, were: Z. Rossides, lawyer, B. Markidis, journalist and publisher of the "Ethnos" 
newspaper, K. Spyridakis, head of school of the Pangyprian Gymnasium, S. Hristidis, 
lawyer, D. Stavrinides, publisher of "Eleftheria" newspaper, and T. Dervis, president of 
KEK.4 Makarios did nothing to modify the political orientation of the Ethnarchy. The 
Council remained loyal to its political past as the front line of the Enosis movement. 
The newly elected Archbishop wished to intensify its political force and establish it as 
the only and most dynamic element of the anti-colonial front in the island. The 
character of the Council became even more right-wing extremist, while Makarios 
demonstrated his ambitions for the Ethnarchy by excluding from it all the moderates 
2 E. Flogeros, Makarjos; A political Leader, (Nicosia, 1983), pp. 45-47. 
311.D Purcell, ~. (London, 1989), p. 252. See also E. Averof - Tositsas, A Story ofMjssed 
Opportunities; The Cypriot Question. 1950 -1963, (Athens, 1982.), vol. I, p.29. 
4 N. Kranidiotis, Difficult Years; Cyprus 1950-1960, (Athens, 1981), p. 28. 
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and left-wing figures, such as O. Xontosidas, D. Kosdites and K. Fliaros. O. Pantelidis 
remembers: 
"I met Makarios for the first time back in 1945. I was 
impressed by his appearance, he looked like a Byzantine 
Emperor, and by his way of speaking ... When he excluded all 
AKEL's members form the Ethnarchy Council, everybody was 
surprised but me. I knew his commitment to the political 
demise of AKEL In an emergency meeting the leadership of the 
party decided to open a front against the new enemy. However, 
when they tried to organize a general strike, they failed. The 
Trade Unions, an area where we had absolute dominance, 
betrayed us. The people adored Makarios, looking upon him as 
the only champion of their national dreams. Makarios had the 
absolute majority of the Greek Cypriots and he knew II. 
Otherwise he would not have dared to question AKEL 's right to 
represent its voters in the Council. ,,5 
Despite his despotic decision to exclude AKEL from the front line of the Cypriot 
political spectrum, Makarios gave a new quality to the Ethnarchy Council and its 
members now included, apart from the bishops and abbots, most of the leading right-
wing politicians, lawyers, journalists and scholars. In this, he wanted to ensure the 
nationalist character of the Council, and to improve its intellectual nature. During the 
early days of Makarios in office he appointed N. Kranidiotis6 as the secretary-general of 
the Ethnarchy, and V. Papalios7, S. Zosimos8, A. Vlontos9 as ex-officio members, 
enlarging the intellectual capacity of the Ethnarchic Council that until that time was 
dominated by wealthy but not enlightened figures. In the meantime, Makarios began to 
strengthen the Church's influence over other nationalist organizations. For that reason 
he used all his influence to appoint Michael Pissas, a close friend of his, as secretary-
general of SEK and Socrates Loizides as secretary-general of PEK. In that way, 
Makarios wanted to control the nationalist Trade Unions, to assist them in order to gain 
more strength than the Left, and finally to establish close contacts with the Trade Union 
'Personal interview with Mr. O. Pantelidis during July 1998. Nicosia. 
6 A prominent intellectual and a skillful diplomat with studies in Harvard. 
7 A well known painter and later head of the department of Modem Art in the Faculty of Arts of the 
University of Athens. 
8 A well known architect and poet. I1is intellectual work had been recognized by the Academy of Athens 
which had given him the title ofuFree Philosopher". 
9 Well known Political philosopher and later on Dean of the graduate school of Politics and International 
Affairs of the University of Athens. 
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movement in Greece, which was purely right-wing and nationalistic after the 
Communist defeat in the Greek Civil War. Nevertheless, Makarios knew that all his 
efforts to secure the Church's dominance would be fruitless if he did not construct 
strong nationalist foundations within the framework of the Greek Cypriot society: in 
other words, establish a youth movement which would continue the difficult and long 
struggle for national vindication. Thus, in 1951, a few months after his enthronement, 
he founded PEON. It drew its members from the top classes of the Greek gymnasium 
and from young workers of the same age. to PEON's mission was to inculcate pride in 
being Greek and to sharpen the desire for Enosis. At the same time, the purpose of the 
youth movement was to combat AKEL's influence, which before PEON.'s appearance 
was extremely popular among young Greek Cypriots. It must be noted here that the 
success of the youth movement exceeded every expectation, and a few years later many 
members of PEON joined the military guerilla group EOKA. In addition, Makarios' 
plans did not exclude the female part of the Greek Cypriot youth. Therefore, he 
personally organized OXEN, an organization which succeeded in bringing Greek 
Cypriot women, for the first time, to the front line of the Enosis cause, as equal 
members with the men. In such a short time Makarios managed to monopolize the 
Cypriot political arena, giving the other powers inside Cyprus (AKEL, the British 
authorities and the Turkish Cypriots) no space to develop their own policies. AKEL, 
after the changes in its leadership and the defeat of the Communist Party in the Greek 
Civil War, was trapped inside the paranoia of the first years of the Cold War. AKEL's 
new leadership failed in keeping the party away from the Soviet influence, a 
development which did not please the majority of the party's followers and the British 
authorities. As mentioned previously chapters, the ideology of the Greek Cypriot 
Communists was totally different to that of their Western comrades, giving greater 
importance to their national vindication than the establishment of the proletarian 
dictatorship.ll On the other hand, after the failure of the proposed constitution in 1948, 
the British authorities kept a low profile in an attempt to avoid giving the Nationalists a 
new moral victory, allowing their opponents to develop their policies without 
confrontation. Last but not least, Makarios' appearance in the Cypriot political 
spectrum brought the Turkish Cypriot side to a state of alert. Their response, however, 
was of no importance, limiting actions to peaceful rallies and to protesting articles in the 
10 For more concerning the PEON movement see the only book that deals with the Organization from 
inside: P. Vlastos, The Best Years oCour Liyes: PEON and Enosis. (Nicosia, 1980). 
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minority newspapers. Without any doubt, Makarios was the dominant figure in Cypriot 
political life, always one step ahead of his opponents. 
However, Makarios' main aim was the internationalization of the Cypriot question. 
As is natural, his first attempt took place in Athens on March 1951. In the Greek capital 
he had many official meetings with the Greek monarch, Pavlos, the Prime Minister and 
son of the great Cretan politician, Sofoklis Venizelos, the Greek Archbishop, Spyridon 
and with other members of the Greek political scene. Makarios had only one demand. 
He asked for Greek support in the United Nations, if Britain persisted in her refusal to 
negotiate with Greece about Cyprus' fate. S. Venizelos, a clever politician, understood 
that he could not tum down Makarios' demands as easily as previous Greek premiers 
had turned down the latter's predecessors. From the first day that Makarios arrived in 
Athens the national press dedicated full pages to him, calling him the saviour of the 
enslaved island, while student rallies were organized outside his hotel calling for Enosis 
and nothing but Enosis. Venizelos reached the conclusion that he could not jeopardize 
the position of his newly elected government by opposing public feeling. Therefore, he 
decided to call an urgent meeting, including the leaders of the opposition, in order to 
reach for a common decision about the Greek attitude towards Makarios' proposals. On 
March 21, he invited to the Premier's residence P. Kanc1opoulos, K. Maniadakis, G. 
Papandreou, N. Plastiras, A. Svolos, I. Sofianopoulos, S. Stefanopoulos, K. Tsaldaris 
and E. Tsouderos, in order to hear their views about the Cypriot question. II During the 
meeting a great quarrel occurred between S. Stefanopoulos, the leader of the extreme 
right, and A. Svolos, a prominent figure of the Socialist Democrats. While the former 
was seeking immediate action in support of the Greek Cypriot demands, the latter 
insisted that such a development would jeopardize attempts to win Cyprus' self-
determination and would lead the island to a catastrophic Civil War. The meeting 
decided that Greece would propose a bipartite conference with Britain, in order to 
support the Greek Cypriot demands of Enosis. In addition, the Greek side was willing 
to offer Britain, as compensation in the case of Cyprus' unification with Greece, 
locations on the island and in the rest of the country that could be used as military bases. 
However, the meeting decided that Greece could not support a Greek Cypriot appeal to 
the United Nations, because such a development could jeopardize the friendly relations 
between the two countries. As the official document states: 
\I We can find greater ideological similarities of AKEL's supporters to the nationalist left beliefs of the 
Irish Republican Army and the preaching of 110 Chi Min, than to the internationalism of the Greek, 
French and Italian Communist parties. 
12 Official Archives of the Hellenic Ministry ofInternal Affairs, no. 5678, col. 3451. 
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"The meeting decided that the timing for the expression of the 
Greek support to the Cypriot appeal to the United Nations is 
not right, and such an action should be postponedfor thefuture 
since it could be harmful for the sterling relations between 
Greece and Britain. The government will exercise her 
influence over the Cypriot Ethnarchy in order to avoid an 
appeal to the United Nations ... The government may support 
such an initiative in the future, but only if other vital Greek 
interests would not be imperilled by such an action. ,,13 
It was also decided to send official representations to London, the British Foreign 
Office and the British Embassy in Athens, informing the British side of their decisions 
and plans. It must be noted here that the representation's document ended with a plea: 
" at least give a vague promise, which 
will calm the spirits both in Cyprus and 
Greece. ,,14 
The Greek government maintained a moderate attitude. However its effort did not 
receive the right response from the British side. London's attitude was negative, 
leaving the government of a friendly nation exposed in the eyes of its people. A 
characteristic incident illustrates this. During November 1951, Eden was in Athens and 
the Greek government saw that as a great opportunity to resolve the Cypriot question 
within the framework of the Anglo-Greek friendship. A meeting was arranged between 
Eden and Averof on the 26 of the month at the residence of the British Ambassador in 
Athens. During the meeting Averofstated: 
"The Greek people are fond of Britain and the Greek 
government wishes to be by Britain's side, as a loyal aUy, for 
ever. During the past the Greek government dealt with the 
Cypriot issue in such a way that the Anglo-Greek friendship 
would not be harmed But now the issue is fired up. Something 
has to be done. Greece is ready to offer Britain some of the 
best strategic locations in the Mediterranean if London decides 
to offer Cyprus the right of self-determination. If again this is 
13 Official Archives of the Ilellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21 March 195 I. Meeting of the Greek 
Eoliticalleaders in the Premier Residence. vol. XXI. col. 1245-47. 
4 E. Averof - Tositsas, op. cit., p. 32. 
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impossible, at least the two sides have to reach a common 
agreement, which will satisfy them both. " 
Nevertheless, Eden had only one answer: 
"The British Empire is notfor sale ... In every country the government has 
to stand the pressure... The issue is not only closed but does not exist 
either and if I had known that we would speak about fictional issues I 
would have not accepted the invitation. "IS 
The explanation for the moderate attitude of the Greek government during those 
times lies in the Greek attempts to enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Greece 
saw NATO as a powerful shield against her internal and external problems. There was 
always the possibility ofa resurgence ofthe Civil War, since the exiled leadership of the 
Communist Party still spoke of a war that did not end, while Greece was surrounded by 
hostile nations of the Eastern block, which, except for Yugoslavia, did not recognize the 
status of the King and the government. Therefore, since the signature of the Treaty of 
Washington in April 1949 and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
Greece began a diplomatic race in order to incorporate herself into the Western 
defensive framework. Since Britain, the closest ally of the United States in Europe, was 
one of the leading nations in NATO, Greece did not want to provoke her by raising the 
Cypriot question in the United Nations. Britain's refusal, on the other hand, to assist the 
moderate and clearly pro-British proposals of the Greek government, can be explained 
by the position that Turkey held in the British plans during the first period of the Cold 
War. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the Turkish state 
(a personal creation of Kemal Attaturk) the country had been ruled by a dictatorial 
government of the Republican Party. During May 1950, the first free elections took 
place in Turkey, an historic development which transformed the political scene by 
giving power to A. Menderes and his Democratic Party. The transition of the Turkish 
political life from a dictatorial to a multi-party system was one of the most radical but 
peaceful revolutions in global parliamentary history. From the first day in office the 
newly elected Turkish government was supported by the United States. Turkey's 
geographical position, sharing common borders with the Soviet Union and the Arab 
world, made the political and military circles of the White House regard Attaturk's 
country as their most important ally in the region. Since the end of the Second World 
War and the establishment of Cold War in the geostrategic equilibrium of the global 
political scale, the US had searched for a useful ally in the Middle East that would be 
IS E. Averof - Tositsas., op. cit., pp. 38 - 9. 
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able to influence and control the Arab world in favour of the West, assist and support 
the newly founded state of Israel16, and function as a natural barrier between the Soviet 
Union and the naval trade routes of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey was able to 
fulfill all the above tasks and successfully play the role of Western agent in the Near 
East, therefore the US was prepared to support and assist its regional protege. As the 
Turkish scholar Nuri Eren argues: 
"Since President Truman, the United States 
stood by the Turkish side more than any other 
power in the international spectrum"I' 
However, the US was not the only Western power that was favourably inclined 
towards Turkey. Traditionally, the Conservative party had a positive attitude towards 
the Ottoman Empire and, later on, Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey's geographic 
position made the Foreign Office regard the former as a decisive factor for Middle East 
security and capable guardian of its interests in the region. Britain's main aspiration 
was to use Turkey as a link between the Western and the Arab world, making use of the 
common religion, cultural and historic past that the Turkish and the Arabs shared. By 
that Britain was hoping that the Middle East oil resources, vital for the survival of the 
Western world in general and for Britain in particular, would remain under her control. 
A characteristic British view concerning Turkey's role in the region during that time can 
be found in Bickham Sweet-Escott's programme in the BBC: 
"Turkish diplomacy was considerably successful in the region 
... During autumn Turkey succeeded in signing an allied pact 
with Pakistan, which resulted in the strengthening of the links 
between Pakistan and the Western world. A month ago Turkey 
signed an alliance pact with Iraq ... and it is more than certain 
that in the near future Iran, Lebanon and Jordan willfollow.,,18 
Turkey turned out to be the most valuable ally for Britain in the region during the first 
years of the Cold War. As Eden wrote in his memoirs: 
" I consider our alliance with Turkey as the major 
preoccupation of our policy in that part of the world. ,,19 
Therefore, Britain did not want to jeopardize her friendly relations with Turkey by even 
showing sympathy to the Greek proposals about the fate of Cyprus However, the 
16 Turkey was one of the first nations worldwide that recognized the Israeli State in 1949. 
17 N. Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow, (New York, 1963), p. 237. 
18 D. Sweet-Escott, Turkey'S Key Position in the Middle East, (The Listener, 17 March 1955), vol. LIII, 
no. 13S9,pp.4S9-460. 
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British side committed a grave mistake by not considering the Greek proposals, forcing, 
as will be seen later, the Greek government to abandon her moderate views and adopt 
more radical ones. 
Back in 1952, Makarios adopted a new strategy in order to achieve the 
internationalization of the Cypriot question. Since the Western world was trapped 
inside the narrow logic of the Cold War, Makarios decided to approach the Arab world 
instead. That decision can be explained by bearing in mind two important factors: the 
increasing influence of the Arab world in the global political spectrum, due to the oil 
sources of the Middle East; and Arab anti-colonial feelings since, during the past, Arabs 
had also experienced British rule. During May Makarios visited Egypt, Lebanon and 
Syria.2o Apart from making contact with the Greek and other Christian Orthodox 
communities in those countries, Makarios began to lobby Arab politicians and 
journalists, promoting the Greek Cypriot struggle. In spite of the fact that the result of 
Makarios' visit was not as sound as he hoped, mainly due to the fact that during that 
particular time the Arab world had to face great internal problems with the emergence 
of the modem state of Israel, these were still the first soundings of what was beginning 
to emerge as the "Third World", that grouping of non-aligned countries on which he 
afterwards came to rely so much for support. His trip helped Makarios to assess the 
internal situation in the Middle East and draw vital conclusions for the intensification of 
the Greek Cypriot diplomatic race for the cause of Enos is. As he wrote in his memoirs: 
"The Middle East is inflames. The officials that I met with did 
not want to admit it but it is common knowledge that the Arabs 
would not allow and could not permit the establishment o/their 
traditional enemy, Israel. in the region... I am more than 
certain that the explosive situation there will force the British 
to adjust their geostrategic plans in the region. Now it is the 
right time lor us to open another diplomatic /ront and make 
London/eel even more vulnerable. ,,21 
In order to put more pressure on the Greek government, Makarios visited Athens again 
in June of the same year. He asked to see S. Venizelos again, in order to inform him 
about his trip in the Arab countries and to persuade the Cretan politician to make an 
19 Sir A. Eden, Full Circle, (London, 1960). p. 44. 
20 It is important to note here the strong anti-Turkish feelings of those countries, a well rooted animosity 
which goes back in history and continues even today. Nowadays Syria is the main ally of Greece in the 
region, forming an anti-Turkish coalition at the heart of the Turkish sphere ofinlluence, while Egypt 
maintains a cautious position towards Turkish offers of economic and military consortium. 
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appeal to the United Nations about the Cypriot question. However, soon enough the 
meeting turned to a serious quarrel. During April 1956, in a speech inside the Greek 
parliament S. Venizelos gave a detailed account of his meeting with Makarios: 
"I have to admit that in 1951 as a president of the 
government, I refused to appeal to the United Nations in 
favour of Enosis. In 1952, I refused again. As a result of my 
attitude, Makarios threatened me that he would report me to 
the Greek people for negligence towards Enosis. My answer 
was that he was free to act as he thought was right, but he had 
no right to manipulate theforeign affairs of Greece. ,,22 
It was the first blow that occurred in the relations between the Greek state and 
Makarios. In the years that followed Makarios repeatedly accused the Greek politicians 
of ignorance and lack of interest about Cyprus, and the Greek governments accused 
Makarios of arrogance and interference in the internal affairs of the state. Makarios had 
meetings with other important elements of political life in Greece, however the most 
important one was with E. Averof-Tositsas. The experienced politician tried to calm 
the Cypriot Archbishop through an analysis of the Greek situation. He spoke about the 
titanic effort of the country to heal the wounds from the destructive Civil War of 46-49, 
and he also stated that neither the national stand nor the national existence of the Greek 
Cypriots was in danger from the Dritish authorities. Cyprus had to wait her turn. 
A verof explained to Makarios that the main preoccupation of the Greek government 
during that time was to feed the hungry, shelter the homeless and raise the living 
standards of the population. On top of that, Averof stated that the Greek government 
could not do anything that could harm the existence of the Greek minority in 
Constantinople, since Turkey was ready to exercise force if Greece decided to wound 
the sensitive Greco-Turkish alliance by raising the Cypriot issue. As will be seen later 
on Averofs words were prophetic and the Greeks in Constantinople suffered a lot from 
Turkish brutality. Makarios' response took Averofby surprise. As he confessed in his 
memoirs: 
" ... and the representative o/God upon the earth answered me 
that national issues have greater importance than the social ones 
and that the Greeks in Constantinople were doomed in an unavoidable 
21 Ministry oflntemal Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios and his Struccle: Memoirs. 
(Nicosia, 1984), vol. I, no. 4590, p. 490. 
22 Official Records of the Parliament ofIIellenes, (25 Apri11956), Sofoklis Venizelos' speech about the 
Cypriot question, vol. XII, col. 459-60. 
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way.,,23 
The above discussion between the Greek politician and the Greek Cypriot Archbishop 
shows the different ways in which both Greeks and Greek Cypriots were approaching 
the same issue. While Greece was paying greater importance to other topics, taking for 
granted Greek Cypriot patience, Makarios was putting the Cypriot question in the front 
line in a 19th century nationalist style, failing to link the Cypriot question with the 
international status quo. The miscalculated approach both of Greece and Makarios 
resulted in an open confrontation, a development which divided the Greeks and the 
Greek Cypriots and gave Britain the opportunity, as will be seen later on, to continue 
her non-negotiation policy concerning the Cypriot question. 
The refusal of the Greek government to assist the Greek Cypriot efforts resulted in 
the alteration of Makarios' policy, a development which was beneficial for the British 
side. On June 28, 1953, after the rejection of Makarios' proposal to organize a rally in 
the Stadium of Nicosia by the British authorities, a mass meeting was organized in the 
Church of Phaneromeni. In front of a large audience Makarios gave a patriotic speech, 
informing the Greek Cypriots of the course of the Enosis issue. However, the main 
point of Makarios' speech was an open accusation of the Greek government, and for the 
first time ever a suggestion of continuing the struggle drawing a line independent of the 
official one of the Greek state. During the speech Makarios stated: 
1/ ... We will fUlfill what the Greek government hesitates to 
do. We will apply to the United Nations, by using our 
own influence... After all, we are not under the control 
of the Greek government ... but we believe on our own 
dreams for the fulfillment of our national duty and we 
depend upon our own efforts in the internal of Cyprus. 
United under the Enosis flag, we will continue our 
struggle night and day by using any mean, awaiting for 
the moment that we will be united with the beloved 
motherland. ,,24 
It was the first time a Greek Cypriot leader had suggested that the Cypriot question 
could be presented in the international arena as an internal issue of the island, and it was 
the first time that a Greek Cypriot leader had the power to keep the government of 
Athens away from the policy planning. Makarios' speech, for the first time in public, 
23 E. Averof - Tositsas, op. cit., p.35. 
24 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 82 - 3. 
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questioned the cornerstone of the Hellenic unity over the Cypriot question, giving the 
British side the opportunity to solidify, even more, her attitude towards the Greek 
Cypriots' demands. In that electric atmosphere, on August 10, Makarios asked the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the Greek Cypriot demand for self-
determination in the Eighth Session of the General Assembly of the Organization. The 
Greek government remained loyal to her wish for bipartite negotiations with Britain, 
therefore when the issue appeared during the Session the Greek representative stated: 
"The Cypriot question cannot be included with the 
other issues of this Session ... usually no-one appeals 
to a court or to an international organization, withoutfirst 
giving an opportunity for direct diplomatic negotiations." 
However, the Greek representative continued giving a clear warning to the British side: 
"The door will be always openfor us to appear 
in front of a judge, in the case that the procedure 
of the friendly negotiations turned Ollt to be fruitless. ,,2S 
The Greek government was faced with a diplomatic dilemma. On the one hand, she had 
to preserve the traditional diplomatic Anglo-Greek friendship, but on the other hand she 
had to defend the unity of Hellenism. Makarios' threats for an independent line and the 
Greek Cypriot appeal to the United Nations, persuaded Athens about the seriousness of 
the situation in Aphrodite's island, conveying the message that Greek Cypriot patience 
was extremely limited. Makarios' first attempt to internationalize the Cypriot question 
failed. However, it sent a clear message to every implicated side that this was the 
commencement of a long struggle. 
In the meantime, the tactics of the Greek government had no results. London, yet 
again, dealt with the Greek invitations for amicable talks with total complacency. 
Returning from an informal trip, Eden arrived in Athens. The Greek Premier of that 
time, A. Papagos, expressed his desire to meet with the British politician. Papagos was 
the Commander in Chief of the Greek army during the Greco-Italian war of 1940-41, 
and his reputation as a brave soldier forced Eden, as a sign of respect and admiration, to 
invite him to the Ambassadorial residence. A lot of things have been said about that 
meeting: that Eden was looking outside the window playing nervously with his fingers, 
and that Papagos left saying that everyone who served in the Greek army had seen only 
the backs of the opponents who were fleeing the battle. However, this belongs to the 
sphere of fiction and was mainly used, by Greek newspapers in order to raise their daily 
25 Kyrou: General Assembly, Eight Session, 439 th Plenary Meeting, September 21,1953. 
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circulation26• Papagos gave a detailed account of the events of that night in his speech 
in the Greek Parliament on February 7, 1955: 
"On December 22, 1953 I went to the British Embassy 
in order to meet Mr. Eden, whom I knew since the war 
[the Second World War]. During the meeting the British 
Ambassador was there as well. At the beginning Mr. Eden 
invited me to London on behalf of his government. After that 
we spoke about the Cypriot question. Ifully developed the sensitivity 
of the issue and I spoke about the difficult position of the Greek 
government, after Makarios' speech in Phaneromeni and the Cypriot 
appeal to the United Nations. I also spoke about the need of a 
solution of the Cypriot question through bipartite negotiations 
between Greece and Britain. Mr. Eden heard me carefully and after 
a while he said to me that for the British government there is no 
Cypriot question neither now nor in the future. I answered him that 
under that allitude the Greek government will alter her policy and 
will make use of her legitimate right to protect her national interests." 
However, the Greek government still hoped for a British sign of goodwill. For that 
reason she did not take any diplomatic steps towards the Cypriot question yet. 
However, British inflexibility and arrogance forced Athens to abandon her moderate 
stance. Papagos, in the same speech in the Greek Parliament, justified his decision: 
"After some time, when Afr. Eden had re-assumed his position in 
the Foreign Office [Eden visited Greece in order to recover after a 
serious operation] I called the British Ambassador and I said to 
him that I accept to visit London, after the official invitation of the 
British government, if the Cypriot question would have been 
among the remaining issues for discussion. A possible refusal of 
the British to discuss about Cyprus would have forced me to reject 
the invitation. The British ambassador informed Eden of my terms 
and after few days he gave me a telegram from him saying that he 
hoped to meet me in London, and he would have been really sorry 
26 For days the main political newspapers in Greece claimed to be providing a detailed account, of the 
unknown details of the meeting. Without any doubt the researcher should not pay attention to that 
promotional trick and should make use of the official archives. The credibility of the Greek newspapers 
during that time was below average nnd written works that fortify their argumentation by using the above 
sources, such as F.D. Athanasoulas, The Greek Prime Ministers after the end of the Second World War. 
(Larissa, 1984}, lack a scientific approach. 
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if the Cypriot question would have stopped me from going to 
Britain but he was not willing to modify his position. After that 
fellow members of the Parliament I decided to appeal to the 
United Nations, on behaljofCyprus,,27 
However, the reasons that forced the Greek government to appeal to the United Nations 
cannot be limited to Eden's refusal to negotiate. Greek public opinion could not accept 
the hesitation of the Greek government in support of their compatriots in Cyprus. Only 
in 1953, 9 students had been killed during extensive student demonstrations outside the 
Parliament House and the British Embassy, by armed policemen.28 A detailed account 
of the electric atmosphere in Greece during that time can be found in T. Anthem's article 
in the Contemporary Review: 
"The bloody student demonstrations in Athens, Thessaloniki 
and Cyprus, the breaking of the windows of the British 
Consulate in Rhodes ... all of the events are clearly showing that 
the Greek emotions are ready to explode and that the 
traditional Anglo-Greekfriendship, lastingfrom Lord Byron, is 
under a hard testing. ,,29 
The situation was extremely serious and the Greek government feared that she did not 
have the power to control the reaction of the masses, especially after the dynamic 
entrance of the Unified Democratic Left (EDA) in the Cypriot question. EDA was the 
only legal left-wing party in the Greek political arena, which had been controlled by the 
exiled leadership of KKE from the Eastern block. EDA's pro-Enosis position alarmed 
the right-wing government, which was convinced that further delay of action would 
force the electorate to tum towards EDA in order to appease its patriotic fever.3o 
Another reason that influenced Papagos to resort to the United Nations was the judgment 
of Greek diplomatic circles, who until this point were against such a movement, that the 
United Nations would accept the Greek appeal. According to their theory, a propitious 
decision of the United Nations on the Greek Cypriot demands would have forced 
Britain to modify her strategy. However, the diplomatic arguments lacked in realism, as 
27 Official Records of the Parliament ofIlellenes, vol. X, col. 345, (7 February, 1955), Papagos' speech 
about the Greek appeal to the United Nations on behalf of Cyprus. See also The Times, 8 February 1955, 
g.9. 
8 K. Tsoukalas, La Gregue Tragedie, (Paris, 1968), p. 78. 
29 T. Anthem, The Cyprus Challenge. (The Contemporary Review, July 1954), no. 1063. p. 16. 
30 The above theory should not be taken as another schizophrenic conspiracy theory of the Greek Right. 
In the elections of 1958 EDA seized the second position in the Greek Parliament, 9 years after the end of 
the Civil War and the sound defeat of the Communist guerillas. One of the main reasons for the 
spectacular appeal of ED A to the Greek electorate was her pro-Enosis position. 
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will be seen later on. They were giving greater importance to the United Nations than 
they should have, since they insisted that a possible pro-Cypriot decision would have 
forced Britain to modify her entire policy in a region that was vital for her geostrategic 
interests. The Greek decision was a grave mistake. By proposing an appeal to the 
United Nations, the Greek side jeopardized her own efforts to keep the Cypriot question 
inside the Anglo-Greek framework, offering Turkey the opportunity to develop her 
views concerning the Cypriot question in front of an international audience. 
Britain's reaction to the Greek initiative was immediate, yet she did not abandon her 
inflexible approach. The secret hopes of the Greek side that the Conservative 
government of London would modify her attitude, given the possibility of a discussion 
about Cyprus' fate in the General Assembly of the United Nations, turned out to be 
erroneous. On July 28, 1954, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs Mr. H. 
Hopkinson (later Lord Colyton) informed the House of Commons that his government 
decided to offer Cyprus a modified version of the constitution of '48, which was to be 
introduced as the first step in associating the people of Cyprus with the management of 
their own affairs. He continued by clarifying that no change of sovereignty was 
contemplated concerning the island's fate.31 His statement aroused no comment. It was 
only after some blundering but persistent questioning from the deputy leader of the 
Labour opposition, Mr. J. Griffiths, as to whether the Cypriots would eventually have 
the right to decide their own future, that Hopkinson gave an extreme answer: 
" ... Afy statement has made it quite clear that there can be no 
question of any change of sovereignty in Cyprus ... it has always 
been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in 
the Commonwealth which. owing to their particular 
circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent. ,,31 
Hopkinson's words resulted in cries of disavowal, coming even from the Conservative 
benches. The Minister understood his diplomatic slip and he tried to rectify his 
statement: 
"/ am not going as far as that this afternoon, but / have said 
that the question of the abrogation of British sovereignty 
cannot arise-the British sovereignty will remain. ,,33 
Despite Hopkinson's effort to ameliorate his statement, he never succeeded in erasing 
the negative impact of his undiplomatic statement concerning Cyprus' future. 
31 II. Hopkinson: House of Commons, 28 July 1954, vol. 531, no. 158, col. 504. 
32H. Hopkinson, op. cit., col. 507·08. 
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Hopkinson's words became known in Greece and Cyprus, during a sensitive period for 
Britain in that area, raising a storm of protests both from prominent and ordinary 
citizens. Hopkinson's notorious "never" not only infuriated the Greeks but split the 
Government and opposition in Britain after years of bipartisan policy over the Cypriot 
question. A number of MPs from all the parties were concerned at the Government's 
flat refusal to negotiate with the moderate Greek side about Cyprus. Britain was soon 
going to be arraigned before the United Nations for refusing self determination to a 
small territory, after she had granted India its freedom and begun to dismantle her 
Empire. As A. Bevan said in the heated exchanges that followed Hopkinson's 
statement: 
"If we are leaving Egyptfor the reasons that we all know about 
and if we are to take up residence in Cyprus, surely it is the 
duty of the Government so to adjust their policy as to produce 
as friendly an atmosphere as possible In Cyprus. Instead, what 
have they done? The Afinister of State for Colonial Affairs 
bluntly tells the Cypriots that they can only get their own way 
by doing what the Egyptians have done. ,,)4 
For many experts dealing with the Cypriot issue, Hopkinson's statement was the 
main reason for the appearance, after few months, of the Greek Cypriot guerilla group, 
EOKA, in the island. Without any doubt this is an exaggeration. Nevertheless, 
Hopkinson's statement gave the Greek Cypriot nationalist side the opportunity to justify 
her acts of violence, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
As mentioned above, Hopkinson announced the issue of a new constitution for 
Cyprus. Under the new constitution a new Legislative body would have been formed, 
with official and appointed members, who would have been the majority, as well as 
elected ones. On the other hand, according to the new constitution a number of 
unofficial members of the Executive Council would have assumed the management of 
the new ministries.3s The new constitution was not completed yet, therefore a series of 
points were unsettled and vague. For example, it was still unknown what kind of 
ministries would have been founded, as well as the powers of the new Ministers towards 
the Cypriot government. However, the only clear indication of the proposed 
constitution was that the elected members in the Legislative Council would have been 
the minority, a development that for the Greek Cypriots was a step back from the 
33 H. Hopkinson, op. cit., col. 508. 
34 A. Bevan, op. cit., col. 565-66. 
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proposed constitution of 1948 and even more so from the political situation in the island 
before 1931. On the one hand, the political line of the Conservative government 
towards the Cypriot question was unrealistic. Instead of trying to calm the Greek 
Cypriot side by modifying her internal policy, she proposed a constitution that was 
provoking the majority of the Cypriot population. Nevertheless, the unrealistic British 
policy was not unjustifiable either. The total domination of the Greek Cypriot 
nationalist side in the political spectrum of the island, and Makarios' inflexibility of 
"Enosis and nothing but Enosis" left no space for conciliation to the British side. The 
Greek Cypriots had already turned down the constitution of 1948, and there was no 
indication that they would have accepted another, even if more favourable than the old 
one. In fact, it was more than clear that the Greek Cypriots, during that period, were not 
interested in the concept of self-determination. Makarios' influence was paramount so 
that only Enosis was acceptable to the Greek Cypriots. However, the most important 
reason for the continuation of London's non-negotiation policy with the Greek 
government concerning Cyprus was the signature of the Suez Treaty on July 27, 1954, 
just one day before Hopkinson's "never" in the House of Commons. According to the 
treaty, Britain had to withdraw her troops from Egypt within twenty months from the 
signature.36 After the loss of Suez, Cyprus was the only valuable altcrnative solution 
for the British geostrategic interests in the region. As a mattcr of fact, the day after the 
signature of the Suez Treaty British troops, previously stationed in Suez, began to arrive 
in Cyprus. Cyprus became the life-jacket of British foreign policy in the Middle East 
and the Eastern Mediterranean, and the British troops, who were in retreat in that 
region, found a secure shelter to take refuge in. Characteristically, the political journal" 
The New Statement and Nation" wrote of the move of the British troops from Suez to 
Cyprus: 
"Even if the Tories lost the battle o/Suez, it seems to win 
a brilliant victory in Cyprus. After British Imperialism was 
superseded, violently, by Palestine, Persia and Egypt, and right 
now is facing a new threat in Iraq, it decided to commit an emergency 
landing in the Greek island [ Cyprus ].,,37 
The news of the signature of the Suez Treaty had a negative impact for the Conservative 
government among British diplomatic and military circles. Britain always regarded 
Suez's military base as an asset of valuable importance and Churchill, during the past, 
3' Hopkinson: op cit., col. 50S. 
36 House of Commons, 28 July 1954, vol. 531, col. 497. 
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had repeatedly stated the importance of the above location for the survival and the 
continuation of the empire. However, Churchill, in an attempt to justify to the British 
people the foreign line of his government concerning Suez, admitted inside the House 
of Commons that the signature of the Treaty was "absolutely necessary. ,,38 
Nevertheless, the explanations that Churchill gave were not satisfactory for the British 
people, who day by day were seeing traditional British spheres of influence fade away 
from the British framework. The Observer, in a characteristic way, gave a detailed 
account of the impact of the signature ofthe Suez treaty in Britain: 
"The Conservative government, headed by Sir Winston, 
gave its consent to the evacuation of Suez, but many members 
of the party expressed their opposition to the above decision. 
The majority of them voted infavour of the settlement only because 
it had been supported by Sir Winston. ,,39 
In the discussion that took place inside the House of Commons, Churchill's government 
faced strong criticisms from members of its party. A characteristic statement came from 
Captain Waterhouse, which reveals the feelings of his colleagues as well. He said: 
"I and my friends [sic] hadfeared that there would be a sell-
out. This is not a sell-out. It is a give-away. Instead of having 
physical control ofa great base, instead of having troops on the 
major waterway of the world, we have got this piece of paper in 
our hands. It is indeed a hard day for anybody on this side of 
the House [the Tory benches] to have to sit and support this 
Government which has as we believe, not taken a wise decision 
on the Suez canal,,40 
As is understandable, it would have been impossible for the Conservative government 
to modify her policy about Cyprus at that particular moment. Apart from the fact that 
Cyprus could guarantee the British presence in the region, it could also be used, as a 
territorial substitute in order to regularize the situation inside the party. 
The months that followed Hopkinson's statement in the House of Commons 
established a new reality in Cyprus. Makarios called the Greek Cypriots to oppose the 
"new British plo!", while at the same time he protested to the Secretary-General of the 
37 The New Statement and Nation, Out of Suez and jnto Cyprus, 7 August 1954. 
38 Churchill: House of Commons, 28 July 1954, vol. 531, no. 158, col. 499. 
39 The Observer, How it Happened, (13 January 1957). 
40 Captain Waterhouse: House of Commons, 29 July 1954, vol. 531, col. 739. 
90 
United Nations against the arrival of British troops from the military base of Suez.41 
Bloody riots took place in every great Cypriot city between the police and Greek 
Cypriots, while in many cases the army had to intervene to restrain the rioters. The 
seriousness of the situation forced the British government on the island to commit a 
momentous mistake, which brought the island back to the dark period of 1931. On 2 
August, the Cyprus government announced the enforcement of the sedition laws of 
1931. Under the above laws every action that aimed to modify the existing status quo 
on the island was illega1.42 In an emergency meeting the Ethnarchy decided to react by 
asking the Greek government to refer to the issue in the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, and by organizing a general strike in all the main cities of the island on August 
12. As a result new riots erupted in every comer of the island. The police were stoned 
and in Limassol three youths were wounded when British troops opened fire to disperse 
a rioting crowd. Cyprus had its new martyrs. 
On August 16, under the influence of the electrified atmosphere in Cyprus, Greece 
asked for the Cyprus question to be put on the agenda for the United Nations' Ninth 
General Assembly, under the heading" Application ... of the principle of equal rights 
and self determination of peoples in the case of the population of Cyprus".43 In an 
explanatory document that followed the Greek application, Papagos stated that the 
population of the island had been Greek for thousands of years. He based his statement 
upon an extended demographic survey, as well as an historic account of the Greek 
Cypriot efforts for Enosis with Greece. He also referred to Hopkinson's "never" and he 
compared the British attitude concerning the Cypriot question with the Greek efforts to 
find a common and honourable settlement acceptable to both sides. Finally, he justified 
the Greek appeal by emphasising the fact that the absolute majority of the Cypriot 
population had repeatedly expressed the wish for Enosis with Greece.44 It must be 
noted here that the Greek appeal was based upon article 1, paragraph 2 of the" Charter 
of the United Nations", which establishes the right of the peoples to self-determination. 
As article 1 states: 
"The purposes of the United Nations are ... 
to develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
41 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 120. 
42 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 121. 
43 General Assembly, Ninth Session, Agenda item 62, Annexes, Document N2703. 
44 ibid. 
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other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace ,,45 
However, Cyprus was a colony, or as the Charter of the United Nations indicated "a 
non-self-governing territory". The Charter refers especially to the non-self-governing 
countries in chapter XI. In particular, article 73 specifies the duties of the members of 
the United Nations, that have or assume responsibilities for the administration of 
territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. 
Among other legal obligations the members have to: 
" ... develop self-government, to take due account 
of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist 
them in the progressive development of their free political 
institutions, according to the particular circumstances of 
each territory and its people and their varying stages of 
advancement.,,46 
However, what is the exact meaning of self-government? Global history presents a lot 
of cases where the aforementioned issue has been identified with terms such as self-
determination or independence, while in other cases the same term has been used in 
order to describe the internal political system, having no relation to the international 
status quo of that non self-governing territory. The Charter of the United Nations offers 
no help as to the explanation of the complexities of the concept. As seen, according to 
the Charter every territory under the control of another country, yet outside her national 
frontiers, is a non self-governing one. Therefore, simple logic leads to the conclusion 
that every self-governing country is also independent. However, at the same time the 
Charter stresses the duty of every member state to develop the concept of self-
government within every non-self-governing state under its control. The terminology 
of the Charter of the United Nations is vague concerning the above concept, which gave 
the ruling countries an opportunity to delay the development of self-government, by 
using their opposition to a fully independence status quo as an excuse, while a different 
approach to the same concept gave the enslaved people the impression that self-
government would lead, eventually, to full independence.47 Characteristically, in the 
Cypriot case the two main British parties gave different interpretations to the concept of 
self government, creating a great controversy within the official foreign line of the state. 
While the Conservative party was in favour of the development of self-government in 
4' Charter of the United Nations, article I, paragraph 2. 
46 Chapter of the United Nations, article 73, paragraph 6. 
47 For more concerning the complexities of the issue see: J. Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self-
Government, (London, 1960), pp. 75-l11 and ll3·165. 
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the interior of Cyprus, the Labour party gave a broader meaning to the term, identifying 
it with full independence. 
As is becoming obvious from the foregoing discussion, the great difficulty of the 
issue can be focused on the two following questions: What is the definition of self-
determination, and who can claim that right? As noted, the Charter of the United 
Nations clearly speaks of the right of the peoples to self-government. However, a 
broader interpretation of that principle can justify the right of self determination of a 
minority within other minorities, until the point that every parish or every house can 
decide freely which country it wants to belong to, or even declare sovereignty.48 Yet 
the above conclusion cannot represent the spirit of the United Nations for the re-
enforcement of global peace and order. Rivlin, in an attempt to answer the question of 
who has the right to self-determination, cites Baron's definition: 
" ... every national and cultural group of people 
that is forming the majority in a territory, has the 
right to establish an independent state. ,,49 
However, while theoretically the above definition offers a solution, within the academic 
framework of International Relations, this is still an Idealist view, failing to approach 
the topic by not considering the implications to the foreign policy of the great colonial 
powers. Therefore, Rivlin opposes Daron's interpretation by stating that" there is no 
agreement of where the line should be drawn"so, meaning that the decision of a state to 
grant the right of self-determination to the people of a territory cannot be regulated by 
any legal procedure, but only by the particular circumstances of every case. The Greek 
appeal to the United Nations about the Cypriot question had been made in terms of a 
vague appeal to self determination, which gave Turkey and Britain the opportunity, as 
will be seen, to discredit the Greek arguments. 
During the talks before the General Committee of the United Nations, both Greece 
and Britain presented a series of arguments, in favour and against the presentation of the 
Cypriot question to the General Assembly. The Greek delegation, in order to support its 
appeal, referred to article 10 of the Charter of the United Nations. The above article 
clearly states that: 
"The General Assembly may discuss any questions 
or any matters within the scope of the present Charter 
48 A. Ross, Constitution of the United Nations; Analysis o(Structure and Function, 
(New York, 1950), p. 135. 
49 B. Rivlin, Self-Determination and Dependent Areas, (International Conciliation, January 1955), no. 
501, p. 199. 
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or relating to the powers andfunctions of any organs, 
provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided 
in article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of 
the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any 
such questions or matters. "SI 
The Greek side supported the view that the Cypriot question fell within the scope of the 
Charter, and for that reason it had to be included in the discussions of the Ninth Session. 
The Greek delegation also used article 14, which states: 
" Subject to the provisions of article 12, the General 
Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful 
adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which 
it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly 
relations among nations, including situations resullingfrom 
a violation of the provisions of the present Charter selling 
forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nalions"S2 
The Greek delegation claimed that the above article could be implemented in the 
Cypriot case, since the British government was not willing to recommend any measures 
for the peaceful adjustment of the Cypriot question.s3 
On the other hand, the British side based its argument upon the principle of domestic 
jurisdiction, in order to confront the Greek appeal. According to the British side a 
discussion of the Cypriot question in the General Assembly of the United Nations was 
in violation of article 2, paragraph 7, which clearly states that: 
" Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in mailers which are essential 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any Slate or shall require the 
Members to submit such mailers to selliement under the present 
Charter ... " 
According to the British representative in the United Nations, S. Lloyd, the British 
presence in Cyprus had been internationally recognized, therefore the discussion of 
Cyprus' fate in the General Assembly was violating article 2, and was an infringement 
of the spirit of the United Nations.s4 The British argument was supported by the 
Turkish delegation. The Turkish representative, S. Sarper, declared that his government 
50 B. Rivlin, op. cit., p. 200. 
51 Charter of the United Nations, article 10. 
52 Charter of the United Nations, article 14. 
53 Kyrou: Gen. Ass. Ninth Session, General Committee, 93 rd meeting. September 23, 1954. 
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regarded the governing of Cyprus as an internal issue of the United Kingdom, and 
according to article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, the United Nations had no 
authorization to intervene. As Sarper concluded "The United Nations had been 
established in order to maintain peace and protect the independence of its members."ss 
Another argument of the British side against the discussion of the Cypriot question in 
the General Assembly were the legal obligations deriving from the Lausanne Treaty. 
The Treaty recognized British dominance in Cyprus and had been signed by Greece as 
well.s6 The discussion of the Greek appeal in the United Nations would have been a 
violation of the principle of non-revision of past treaties. Therefore, the British side 
declared its opposition to the presentation of the Greek appeal in the General Assembly, 
on the basis that this would allowed every member nation to ask for the revision of a 
treaty that it recognised in the past.S7 By accusing the Greek side for not respecting 
international treaties and the international law, the British delegation tried to discredit 
the Greek integrity and present the Greek appeal as a threat to the international order. 
The Greek response to the British argument was immediate. It declared that through its 
appeal, the Athenian government did not want to revise the Lausanne Treaty or to 
determine, unilaterally, the future of Cyprus. The Greek Foreign Minister, S. 
Stefanopoulos, said in response to the British accusations: 
"Greece never tried to prove the Greek nature of Cyprus, 
neither askedfor the devolution of mastership [of the island]. 
Greece appealedfor thefreedom and the right of self-determination 
for the people of Cyprus. The Greek appeal aims to [sic] the abolition 
of the colonial status from a territory that is inhabited by Greeks. 
We are asking no more from the Assembly than the attribution of 
the right of freedom to Greeks ,,58 
After that, the Greek side tried to discredit the British argument concerning the 
Lausanne Treaty. For the Greek side the above Treaty could not be used as an obstacle 
for the discussion of the Cypriot question in the United Nations, since according to 
article 103 of the Charter: 
"In the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the Members of the United Nations under the present 
Charter and their obligations under any other international 
54 Lloyd: Gen. Ass. Ninth Session, 477 th Plenary Meeting, Sept 24, 1954. 
" Sarper: Gen. Ass. Ninth Session, 477th Plenary Meeting. Sept 24, 1954. 
56 See Lausanne Treaty, article 20. 
'7 Lloyd: Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, Gen. Com., 93rd meeting. Sept 23, 1954. 
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agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail. ,,59 
On the other hand, the Greek side insisted that many articles of the Lausanne Treaty 
were bipartite agreements between the Allied powers and Turkey. Therefore, according 
to the Greek arguments Greece had signed a treaty that included Turkey's recognition of 
the annexation of Cyprus by Britain, but she had never accepted the above recognition 
as an agreement between her and Britain. Nevertheless, once again the Greek argument 
was opposed by the Turkish delegation. The Turkish representative, referring to the 
Lausanne Treaty, contradicted the Greek statement concerning the bipartite nature of the 
Treaty, by stressing the fact that Greece was a fervent supporter of the annexation of 
Cyprus by Britain. 60 
As becomes obvious from the above arguments, Britain, by using various diplomatic 
means, tried to prove to the General Committee that Greece, against every international 
law, was trying to place Cyprus under her dominance. On the other hand, Greece, 
responding to those accusations by presenting her arguments, declared that its appeal 
was simply giving voice to the legitimate demands of the Cypriot people. The 
researcher can assert the validity of the arguments of both sides, since they are both 
covered by the Charter of the United Nations. From the one side, article 1, paragraph 2 
in co-operation with article 73 introduces the principle that the demands of non-self -
governing territories should be taken into account by the United Nations and arc subject 
of international interest. Therefore, one can assume that the Charter gave Cyprus every 
right to demand its self-determination. Nevertheless, Cyprus was not an independent 
state, therefore it could not be a member of the United Nations. The Cypriot demand 
for self-determination had to be presented in the General Assembly by an independent 
member-state. From this one can justify the view that the Greek appeal was just giving 
voice to the Cypriot demands, functioning inside the legal framework of the Charter of 
the United Nations. However, the British argument should not be ignored. It was 
common knowledge that behind the Cypriot demand for self-determination was the 
vivid desire of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis. Therefore, the Cypriot question was not 
58 Stefanopoulos: Gen.Ass., Ninth Session, 477th Plenary Meeting, Sept 24, 1954. 
'9 Kyrou: Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, 750th meeting, December 14, 1954. 
60 Sarper: Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, 750th meeting, December 14, 1954. It must be said here that the 
Turkish statement is utterly valid. As seen in a previous chapter the Greek side supported and welcomed 
the annexation of Cyprus by Britain. However, what the Turkish representative, intentionally, failed to 
refer to, is the fact that Greece evaluated the annexation of Cyprus by Britain as the final step towards the 
unification of the island with her, and not as a step concerning international recognition by the British 
Empire. 
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only a case for self-determination, but at the same time an Anglo-Greek confrontation 
concerning a territory which was under British dominance. 
The debate between the British and the Greek delegations continued beyond the legal 
arguments. The British side continuously declared to the General Assembly, that 
Cyprus was a vital element for the successful fulfillment of the British military 
obligations in the area of the Middle East. As the British representative mentioned: 
"Cyprus is a military necessity for us, ifwe want 
to pursue our military obligations. The power 
of our country in that part of the world is still one of 
the main bulwarks of global peace. We have diplomatic 
obligations towards the Arab nations. We are interested 
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's southern flank 
and in Turkey's and even Greece's defence. We have great 
responsibilities that derive from the Charter. Cyprus is 
of great importance for us, in order to carry out our 
responsibilities" 
The experienced diplomat tried to anticipate Greek opposition to the above argument by 
mentioning the Greek offer of military bases in Cyprus to Britain, in the event that 
Britain would have agreed to end its dominance over the island. I Ie continued by 
stating: 
" .. . as I mentioned yesterday, under the present circumstances 
there cannot be another solution than the absolute dominance ... 
the rental periods are expiring, the treaties can not be satisfactory 
implemented and the Greek governments, as other governments, are 
changing,,61 
The Greek side did not try to oppose the above view. After all, Greece belonged to the 
Western camp and it could not confront the security arguments of one of the main 
Western powers, especially inside the United Nations where countries of the opposite 
camp were witnessing the discussion. It just tried, by using Hitler's example62, to 
present the view that Cyprus did not hold a position of great geostratcgic importance. 
The question that derives from the above argument is: What was more important? The 
British geostrategic interests, on the one side, or the will of the majority of the people 
61 Lloyd: Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, 477lh plenary meeting, September 24, 1954. 
62 The Greek side mentioned that the fact that llitler did not attack Cyprus during the Second World War 
proves that the island does not hold a key position in the geostrategic global arena. As a matter offact 
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living in that territory? An attempt to answer such a question will lack scientific 
validity. However, it must be noted that from a legal point of view the British 
arguments were inconsistent with the spirit of the Charter, especially during a period of 
peace, such as this one. 
Another British argument against the Greek appeal was the Turkish minority in 
Cyprus. As already mentioned in previous chapters, 100,000 Turks were in Cyprus and 
constituted 18% of the local population. The British side used the existence of the 
Turkish minority in Cyprus as an argument against the implementation of the principle 
of self-determination on the island. The Turkish Cypriots opposed the Greek appeal to 
the United Nations by organizing huge protest marches in the great Cypriot cities, while 
in Constantinople and Ankara the Greek Embassies had been stoned by Turkish 
students, as an action of solidarity towards their compatriots in Cyprus. The above 
situation was used by the British side as a diplomatic card in the discussions. As the 
British representative said: 
"The Turkish speaking Cypriots, who are Afuslims 
are opposing the possibility of unification of Cyprus 
with Greece... Until now Cyprus had not witnessed 
any kind of inter-communal conflict. The Turkish Cypriots 
constitute a solid Muslim society, with their own mufti [priest] 
their own religious institutes andfunds. II [the Turkish Cypriot 
community] has a great role in the development of the economic 
life of the island ... As I said, until now, there were no inter 
communal conflicts in the island. So maybe now the Assembly 
wants to create them by discussing that issue... I call for every 
country that in the past experienced inter-communal disturbances 
to think hard concerning the Cypriot case,,63 
The Greek side responded to the British argument by referring to the Turkish minority 
in Western Thrace. According to the Greek side the Turkish minority was enjoying the 
principle of absolute equality and its relation with the Greek citizens were in complete 
harmony.64 The Greek side continued by emphasising the fact that the Turkish minority 
Hitler considered the ports of Piraeus and Alexandria as far more important naval bases for the 
domination of the German navy in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
63 Lloyd: Gen.Ass, Ninth Session, 477th plenary meeting. September 24. 1954. 
64 It is important to mention here that the above statement is not a diplomatic exaggeration. but a valid 
statement. The Turkish minority of West em Thrace. since the Lausanne Treaty. had been used by the 
Greek government as a negotiation card for the establishment of better relations with the Turkish state. 
herefore. the living and political conditions of the Turkish minority were of a high standard. a fact that 
changed duing the establishment of the military dictatorship in Greece in 1967. 
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in Cyprus had nothing to be afraid of, and that the issue of self-determination would be 
a beneficial development, not only for the Greek citizens of the island but for the whole 
of the local population.6s Nevertheless, the Greek argument was opposed, again, by the 
Turkish side. The Turkish representative, taking for granted the opposition of the 
100,000 Turkish Cypriots to the Enosis, stated that the fact that the Greek Cypriots were 
the majority in the island was not enough to justify such a radical alteration to Cypriot 
status quo. There are certain difficulties that arise by approaching the above 
conclusions. On the one hand, the Greek side had a great diplomatic advantage by 
controlling the 80 per cent of the Cypriot population. The General Assembly, through 
Resolution 637, had adopted the majority principle as a legitimate means of exercising 
the right of self determination.66 However, despite the fact that the above principle is 
fully recognized by the United Nations, it cannot be applied in every case, especially in 
territories with conflicting populations. Despite the fact that the Greek side supported 
the view that Greeks and Turkish could peacefully co-exist together,67 no-one could 
predict the outcome of such a development. Therefore, the British argument that in 
cases like the Cypriot question the majority principle should not count more than the 
feelings of both sides was accurate, since the willingness of the Turkish Cypriots to 
adopt every means in order to oppose a possible change to their territory'S status quo 
was a clear threat to the region's peace and order. 
The outcome of the discussions was a setback for the Greek government. The 
General Assembly, on December 17, issued a text which among other things stated: 
"The General Assembly considering thatfor the 
time being it does not appear appropriate to adopt a 
resolution on the question of Cyprus, decided not to 
discuss any further the issue ... ,,68 
Fifty nations voted in favour of the text to none, with eight abstentions. The British and 
Turkish delegates stressed that their support for the resolution did not imply that they 
recognized the competence of the U.N to deal with Cyprus on any future occasion. The 
6' Kyrou: Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, 750'h meeting, December 14, 1954. 
66 Resolution 637 (VII), Gen. Ass., Seventh Session, 403rd plenary meeting, December 16, 1952. 
67 There is a great conflict among the Greek academia concerning the above issue. The majority accept 
the Greek delegation's statement for peaceful co-existence between the Greek and the Turkish community 
in Cyprus. However, they are failing to separate a diplomatic statement from an historic fact. As seen, 
until now the differences between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots were deep and well rooted in the 
island's past. Therefore, it would have been a immense mistake for someone to positively claim that a 
possible evacuation of the British troops from Cyprus could not have resulted in an eruption ofhate until 
the point ofa civil war. Unfortunately, both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, until that 
point, had given various proofs of their pure nationalist nature, an attitude that could not guarantee the 
preservation of peace and order on the island. 
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Greek side, that voted in favour of the text,justified her attitude by stating that the text's 
insertion" for the time being" meant that the above statement was just a postponement 
and not a final decision for Cyprus' fate. However, it was a pure diplomatic defeat for 
the government of Athens. Two factors played the most important role in the failure of 
the Greek appeal: the attitude of the United States and Turkey. As The Times quite 
rightly wrote: 
"A resounding moral victory was scored by the United 
Kingdom, with substantial support from Turkey and the United 
States ... ,,69 
Until April 1954, the American attitude, although neutral, was encouraging the 
moderate attitude of the Athenian government. However, when the State Department 
was informed about the Greek intention to appeal to the United Nation concerning the 
Cypriot question, it expressed its opposition to such an initiative. The Greek side, 
knowing that another postponement of its appeal to the United Nations would have 
created an explosive situation in the internal politics of the country, ignored the 
American warnings and tried to secure American neutrality. According to Kyrou, on 16 
September the State Department reassured the Greek government that she did not intend 
to support any side during the discussions in the United Nations.7o Indeed, during the 
discussions about whether or not the Greek appeal could be put on the agenda for the 
United Nation's Ninth General Assembly, the American delegation kept a neutral 
position by not participating in any of the debates. However, when the issue was put on 
the agenda the United States maintained a pro-British position, influencing the attitude 
of the whole of the Western world. Greek historiography fails to identify the reasons 
that led the United States to adopt such a pro-British attitude. However, the answer to 
that question can be found into the Cold War framework. First of all, one of the major 
American concerns was to preserve the unity of the Southeastern flank of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. By voting in favour of Cypriot self-determination, it would 
automatically not be considering the Lausanne Treaty to be valid. Such a development 
would have given a legitimate right to Turkey to seek new negotiations concerning the 
status quo of the islands of the Aegean Sea and of Western Thrace. Greece would have 
never accepted such a development and a new Greco-Turkish war would surely have 
occurred, jeopardizing the American efforts for economic and political rehabilitation of 
the two main Balkan nations as bulwarks against Soviet expansionism, while on the 
68 Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, Agenda item 62, Annexes, Document NResolutionl292. 
69 The Times, December 16, 1954, p. 8. 
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other hand it would have wounded NATO's image in the rest of the world. In addition, 
the geostrategic importance of Cyprus did not allow America to support the evacuation 
of the British troops that were stationed there. The maintenance of the British presence 
in Cyprus was an unquestionable bastion, according to the American side, against 
Soviet expansionism to the region of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey played an 
equal important role in the failure of the Greek appeal. In an expert way the British side 
presented arguments such as the Turkish minority issue and the Lausanne Treaty that 
offered a great opportunity to Turkey to present herself as a third, decisive factor for the 
shaping of Cyprus' future. On the other hand, the Turkish delegation supported every 
British argument, forming a powerful coalition with Britain that was really hard for the 
Greek side to bypass. 
The end of the Ninth Session of the General Assembly found Britain in a stronger 
position, than before. She succeeded in attracting American support and securing her 
position as a decisive factor of stability in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean, 
while she re-enforced her diplomatic relations with Turkey. On the other side, Greece 
found herself in a worse position than before. She had been abandoned even by the 
United States, while her diplomatic relations with Turkey became even worse, opening 
another diplomatic front for the Athenian government. As an evaluation of the Greek 
appeal to the United Nations it can be said that it was one of the main mistakes of Greek 
diplomacy since the formation of the Greek state. The appeal gave Britain the 
opportunity to develop her arguments against the Greek Cypriot demands in front of an 
international audience, while it jeopardized any future Greek intention for the beginning 
of bipartite talks with London concerning Cyprus' fate. On the other hand, the Greek 
government, quite irresponsibly, gave a brilliant opportunity to Turkey to enter the 
Cypriot question as a decisive and equally important power, an opportunity that was not 
wasted as will be seen in future chapters. Without any doubt, it was a weighty error of 
Athens, however it would be a methodological mistake to blame only Papagos and his 
cabinet. Theoretically, the elected government of a nation should have the moral 
strength to rise above the circumstances and maintain its calm, no matter what. 
Nevertheless, in many cases theory differs from reality. Only 5 years after the end of 
the Civil War, Greece was struggling to stand on her own feet again. By October 1953 
the cost of living was 115 times higher than that of the prewar years, while no less than 
70 A. Kyrou, The Greek Foreign Policy, (Athens, 1955), p. 278. 
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1,000,000 Greeks were believed to be one step from starvation.'1 At the same time, by 
September 1954, more than 200,000 Greeks were either in prison or in exile within the 
Greek perimeter due to their pro-left beliefs and action, while until 1962 the Greek 
courts continued to try Communists and Socialist according to the emergency 
legislation of 1947-49.72 While Papagos' government had the special task of healing 
the social and political wounds of the Civil War, at the same time it had to resolve a 
diplomatic crisis concerning Cyprus. The nationalist and irresponsible attitude of 
Makarios, who was ignorant of the diplomatic situation of that time and applied 
considerable pressure upon Athens by using ethical rhetoric and political threats; the 
reckless stance of the parties of the opposition who manipUlated the Cypriot question 
and turned the public opinion against Papagos for their own political benefit; and the 
British refusal to assist Papagos' moderate policy concerning the Cypriot question, all 
created such a pressurizing situation that the only visible exit for Athens seemed to be 
New York. As K. Karamanlis confessed to N. Kranidiotis during a private talk: 
"it is more than certain that when Papagos decided to 
internationalize the Cypriot question, he did not predict 
the tremendous consequences ofsuch an actionfor theforeign 
relations of the country ... The provocative British attitude and 
the pressure from the Greek people, both in Greece and Cyprus, can 
partly justify it, but as a political decision it was unfortunate ,,73 
However, what the British failed to understand was the strength of the Greek Cypriot 
desire to be unified with Greece. The failure of the diplomatic discussions persuaded 
the Greek Cypriots that there was only one solution left for the accomplishment of their 
national vindication: violence and murder. 
71 A. Dimitriadis, The Incurable Trauma: Greece aller the end of the Civil War. (Thessaloniki, 1978), pp. 
79-82. 
72 According the emergency legislation of 1947-49 Socialists nod Communists were regarded by the state 
as traitors nod they had either to sign a petition declaring their loyalty to the King or to face life 
imprisonment. If there were proofs that a person fought during the Civil War with the Communist side 
then he could face the death penalty by a firing squad. No Socialist or Communist, even ifhe had signed 
the petition, could be hired in the Public Sector, while he did not have the right to leave the country under 
noy circumstances. 
73 N Kr 'd" . 72 
. am lolls, op, CIt., p. . 
~~.' .... \ '., ..,.., , ......... 
102 
CHAPTER V 
THE BEGINNING OF THE TROUBLES: THE FORMATION OF EOKA AND 
THE BRITISH NON-INTERVENTION. 
The l\Ielians to the Athenians 
HW, see Ihal ),OU have come 
prepared 10 Judge the arguments 
)'ourselveJ ... 1/ we surrender, Ihen 
01/ our hope l.r losl 01 once, 
whereas as long as WI remain In 
acllon, Ihe" l.r still a hope thai we 
ma)/ yel stand uprlgh, . .. 
Thucydldes, V:86. 101, 111, 
This chapter will explain the appearance and significance of the Greek Cypriot 
guerilla group EOKA in Cyprus. A great number of researchers both in Greece and 
England have dealt analytically with this issue providing us with a detailed examination 
of the historic route of EOKA through the stormy period of 1955-1960. Nevertheless, 
the aim of this chapter is to contribute to the above analysis by adding new evidence 
concerning EOKA, especially the issue of British surveillance and penetration into the 
organization. This chapter will approach the process of EOKA's formation, covering 
the period from EOKA's first action until the beginning of the Tripartite Conference in 
London, on 11 July 1955. However, the primary focus of this chapter is not to give a 
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detailed account of EOKA's guerilla action or of its internal organization1, but to 
question the views of the majority of Greek academics, who approach the appearance of 
EOKA as a progressive factor and an anti-colonial phenomenon. According to them, 
the strategic abilities of the leader of EOKA, General G. Grivas, the bravery of EOKA's 
fighters and, most important, the success ofEOKA in keeping the British Intelligence in 
absolute darkness concerning the organization, forced the British side to move towards 
the final solution of the Cypriot question. Based on their views, this settlement would 
have been delayed indefinitely without the catalytic appearance of Grivas and his 
fighters. Through the use of primary sources and a series of personal interviews with 
key actors of that time, I will attempt to show that EOKA had a negative influence 
upon the Cypriot question. I will seek to approach and analyse the plans of the British 
Intelligence, which was aware of EOKA's plot and actions from the very first moment 
and sought to manipulate the organization for London's geostrategic and political 
interests. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Why was 
EOKA's formation a negative development for the Enosis movement and for the inter-
communal unity of the island? Why did the British side not protect peace and order in 
Cyprus by arresting Grivas and preventing the formation of EOKA? What were the 
geo-strategic gains for London in allowing Grivas and EOKA to establish themselves in 
the Cypriot political arena and, more importantly in the Greek Cypriot mentality? 
In the early hours of 1 April 1955, a series of bomb explosions occurred all over 
Cyprus. It was not an irrational act of some irresponsible youths. On the contrary, it 
was the maiden action of a newly founded underground organization, called EOKA, 
against the British authorities in Cyprus. The next day the island was full of leaflets 
proclaiming that with God's help and the support of all the forces of Hellenism, the 
struggle to throw off the British yoke had now begun.2 Warnings under the same 
signature were sent to the police advising them on pain of execution not to interfere 
with EOKA's activities. It was not a hoax. It was a reality intended to playa historic 
role in the Cypriot drama, affecting not only the lives of the inhabitants of the island, 
but the diplomatic relations of Greece, Turkey and Britain. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the idea of the creation of a military group which 
would fight for the Enosis of Cyprus with Greece was an old one. The formation of the 
Patriotic League in 1898 and E. Venizelos' rejection of the proposals of a team of 
I For more concerning this aspect see: The Memoirs of General Griyas, ed. by C. Foley, (London, 1964) 
and N. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Reyolt: An Account of the Struc~le for Union with Greece, (London. 
1978). 
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young officers who asked his permission for the creation of a guerilla movement in 
Cyprus (1921), justifying his decision by saying that Greece could not afford to provoke 
British wrath at that time, visibly show that the inspiration for the violent overthrow of 
the British establishment from Cyprus was well established in the minds of the Greek 
and Greek Cypriot extremists. The turbulent years, on the political and social level, that 
followed Metaxas' dictatorship and the Axis occupation in Greece, did not allow those 
intemperate ideas to be developed: however, they were not forgotten. After the end of 
the Greek Civil War, leading members of the Greek extreme right began once more to 
prepare the ground for a guerilla confrontation with Britain in Cyprus. The most active 
was G. Grivas, the leader of the notorious military group "X" which played an 
important role in the defeat of the Communist guerillas during the battle of Athens in 
December 1944.3 G. Grivas was born in Cyprus in the village of Trikomo on 23 May 
1898. At the age of 18 he joined the Military Academy of Athens and participated in 
the Asia Minor campaign and the Greco-Italian war, gaining fame and medals for his 
bravery and his undoubted strategic and leadership skills. However, after the defeat of 
the Greek army by the German troops and the capture of Athens, Grivas, a fervent pro-
German and a fanatic anti - communist, formed the secret organization "X" and tried to 
approach the Axis powers in order to offer his services against the Greek Resistance 
movement that had been dominated by the Communists. According to Professor H. 
Fleischer, "X" avoided the stigma of the traitor because of a lack of German interest. 
As Professor Fleischer states, in 1943 the leader of "X" Colonel Grivas, offered the 
services of his group to the Occupational forces stressing his Anglophobia and his 
strong anti-Communist beliefs. Nevertheless, the German General Staff answered that 
it could not speak with a chief of brigands, since the Colonel was unimportant4 
Grivas and his organization gained importance after the liberation of Greece from the 
Axis powers and during its co-operation with the British forces against the Greek 
Communists. During that period Grivas' military group had been transformed from an 
insignificant paramilitary organization into a well established private army, due to the 
recruiting of royalists, supporters of Metaxas' fascist regime and collaborators of the 
Nazis during the years of the Axis occupation. According to a secret report of the 
British Military Intelligence (MI3), during March 1946 the allocation of the "X" forces 
2 For full text see: General G. Grivas. The Memoirs of General Griyas , ed. by Charles Foley, (London. 
1964), p.208. . 
3 The battle of Athens is one of the most important and tragic moments of Greek history, mainly because 
its legacy set the foundations for the outbreak of the Civil War two years later. For more concerning the 
Battle of Athens see: L. Baerentzen, The Demonstrations in Synta~ma Square on Sunday the 3rd of 
December. 1944, (Scandinavian Studies in Modem Greek 2, 1978), pp. 3-52. 
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were: 13,000 in Pelloponesos, 10,000 in Thrace and Macedonia, and 20,000 in central 
Greece.s In only a few years time, due to the "X" cruelty against individuallefi-wing 
citizens and even whole villages, G. Grivas managed to become the most hated extreme 
right-wing personality for the Greek Communists and an unethical and opportunist 
figure for the British authorities. Characteristically, Major C. Woodhouse, who led the 
British sabotage expeditions in Greece during the Axis occupation, wrote in his 
memoirs that the "X" action could only be compared with the notorious Ku Klux Klan.6 
Grivas had never hidden his political aspirations. He was an ambitious man, 
therefore he tried to enter the Parliament by using his influence and notoriety as the 
leader of the "X" and his anti-<:ommunist action during the battle of Athens. However, 
Grivas failed to persuade the Greek electorate of his abilities, and as a result, at the 
election of3l March 1946 his party, X-KEA, received only 0.080% of the votes all over 
the country. He did not accept his sound political failure. He believed that he was the 
victim of a political plot and he decided to gain fame and glory by searching for another 
field of honour. According to Mr. Andrianos Promelctitos, Grivas' close associate 
during the Axis occupation and a candidate member of the Parliament with Grivas' 
party in the constituency of Halandri: 
"We were hearing the results together on the radio 
in my house in Halandri and the news was not so good. 
During the night Giorgos {Grivas] kept drinking a lot. It was 
unusualfor him because he was always Spartan infood and alcohol 
but it was obvious that he was really depressed... I remember when 
he turned to me and wilh his eyes full of tears he told me II I had been 
abandoned by everyone but I still have not been beaten. There is 
always Cyprus and one day all of those who let me down will 
call me hero. History still has an empty page for me ... ,,7 
In that way the notorious leader of the "X", well known both to the British and to Greek 
Communists, turned to his place of origin searching for a new field of glory. 
After his electoral failure Grivas began to meet with members of the Cypriot and the 
Greek extreme right, moving towards the creation of a guerilla group in Cyprus that 
could challenge the British presence in the island. Therefore, as written in his memoirs, 
after some meetings with the Greek diplomat A. Kyrou and the Cypriot lawyer and 
4 H. Fleischer, Greece puring 1940=1950, (Athens, 1988). p. 92. 
5 R. Heinz, The British Interyention in Greece, (Athens. 1997), p. 452. 
6 C.M. Woodhouse, Apple of Pis cord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in their International Settinl: 
(London, 1948), p. 57. 
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prominent member of the Greek Cypriot right H. Papadopoulos, he decided to visit the 
Chief of the General Staff General G. Kosmas in order to inform him of his intentions. 
As Grivas continues, General Kosmas invited him on 27 January 1951 declaring his full 
support for his plans.s However, during that period Grivas was not the only one who 
was working towards the formation of a guerilla army in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot 
Right was extremely suspicious of the electoral influence of AKEL and did not 
particularly welcome the ideological deviation of the party towards a pro-Enosis 
standpoint. The Cypriot right was afraid that AKEL was getting prepared for the 
synthesis of a guerilla army in order to liberate the island from the British presence. In 
such a case, the Right was fearful that AKEL would monopolize the national struggle of 
the Greek Cypriots for Enosis, as the Communists did during the Axis occupation in 
Greece, aiming to eliminate any other opponent in the Cypriot political spectrum. 
However, as Mr. G. Pantelidis confessed: 
" The reactionary forces of the Church and the bourgeoisie class 
could not apprehend the nationalistlurn of AKEL. They 
could not understand that it was simply a strategic decision in order 
to maintain its electoral influence. They believed thaI we were 
considering the commencement of an armed struggle in Cyprus and Ihey 
were anxious that they might be left out of the course of the Cypriot 
question. However, as a party we neither had the means nor the desire to 
complicate further the obscure situation of the Cypriot case, at this 
particular moment ... ,,9 
Therefore, in order to control the political developments, the Greek Cypriot Right was 
prompted to start preparations for an armed uprising in the island through the Secretary-
General of PEK, S. Loizidis. Loizidis was one of the leading figures of the Cypriot 
Right and had close links with the powerful Orthodox Church on the island. In 1950, 
because of his unionist activity, he was forced by the British authorities to abandon 
Cyprus. However, before his departure, Loizidis met Makarios, then Bishop of Kition, 
in order to discuss the possibilities of an armed uprising against the British in Cyprus. 
Makarios gave him his approval, directing him to establish in Athens a preparatory 
committee that would move towards the creation of a liberation front in Cyprus. lO 
7 Personal interview with Mr. Andrianos Promeletios in Athens during December 1998. 
8 The Memoirs of General Griyas ,op. cit., p. 13. 
9 Personal interview with O. Pantelidis during July 1998, Nicosia. 
10 Historic Encyclopedia of Cyprus, (Nicosia, 1983), vol. X, p. 363. 
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As soon as Loizidis arrived in Athens, he came in contact with the well known 
academics of that time, G. Konidiaris and D. Vezanis. Both belonged to the extreme 
right, while Vezanis was an old comrade of Grivas in "X" during the Axis occupation, 
specializing in intelligence. I I When Makarios visited Athens during March 1951 as the 
Cypriot Archbishop, he met S. Loizidis in the well-known hotel "Grand Britannia" and 
they discussed the prerequisites for the organization of a liberation movement in 
CypruS.12 Loizides informed Makarios of his connections and secured the agreement of 
the latter to approach G. Stratos, former Minister of War in Tsaldaris' government and 
one of the closest associates of the Greek monarch, Georgios II. Stratos accepted 
Loizidis' proposal to participate in the committee for the liberation of Cyprus, and on 
his own suggestion Grivas, the colonel H. Alexopoulos, the lawyer A. Avgikos, the 
craftsman H. Tsatsomoiros and the railway official D. Stavropoulos were approached as 
well.13 The first meeting of all the participants took place in the famous Athenian cafe 
named Tsitsas, still favourable to students and politicians, placed in Panepistimiou St. 
with an exceptional view of the Parthenon.14 There under the shadow of Gladstone's 
statue, Grivas' initiation ceremony to the Liberation Committee was successfully 
concluded. One of the most urgent problems concerned the financing of the struggle. 
Despite the fact that all the members of the committee were prominent members of the 
Athenian society with great financial power, it was still impossible for them to maintain 
such a costly campaign. Therefore, with Makarios' permission, the members of the 
Committee began to search for economic contributors among the Greek upper class. S. 
Loizides approached the well-known ship owner A. Onasis and his cousin-in-Iaw S. 
Niarchos. Both were strong supporters of the Right and committed patriots. Onasis 
was especially well known for his anti-British feelings, mainly due to his place of 
origin IS. They both promised to assist the creation of a guerilla movement in Cyprus. It 
was impossible to find reliable evidence of the actual amount that Onasis and Niarchos 
donated to EOKA. However, in Onasis' interview for Greek National Television it 
became obvious that he firmly supported EOKA, without asking for anything in return. 
As he said: 
"First of all and above all is God and country, and everybody 
has the duty to serve them both as much as he can. I never hid 
11 C. Foley & I.W. Scobie. The Struggle for Cyprys, (Stanford. 1975). p. IS. 
12 S. Loizidis. Hapless Cyprus, (Athens. 1980). p. 96. 
13 The Memoirs of General Griyas, op. cit., p.20. 
14 C. Foley & W. I. Scobie. op. cit.. p. 10. 
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the fact that / am Greek and my country comes first even before 
family and money. / supported and / will continue to support 
every effort for the greatness of my country, on a cultural, 
economic, political and military level, and as / have proven in 
the past / will never hesitate to offer even my selffor a national 
cause... After all a man with no patriotism is a man with no 
identity." I 6 
Another businessman that Loizides approached was A. Bodosakis. Bodosakis was the 
owner of an ammunition factory and was the main supplier of the Greek army. 
Bodosakis agreed to contribute to the establishment of an anti-colonial struggle in 
Cyprus, and he became the main supplier to EOKA of ammunitions, guns and explosive 
substances. It has to be noted here that Bodosakis played, successfully, the role of the 
double agent. While he was assisting Grivas' and his comrades, he established strong 
links with London and with the British embassy in Athens. In the public eye Dodosakis 
appeared to be against Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, and he was offering his advice to 
the British side about the best ways to deal with the Greek Cypriot demands. 
Characteristically, the British ambassador of that time in Athens, J. Young, sent a secret 
memo to London about Bodosakis, praising the virtues of the Greek businessman. As he 
said: 
" ... / add that everything that Bodosakis says is valuable. lie 
does not appear much in the front line of public life, but still he 
has a great influence over many people, and he is one of the 
few Greeks who are against the Enosis. ,,17 
On 6 June 1951, Makarios and Grivas met in the house ofStratos in order to discuss 
the following steps of the Committee. Makarios already knew Grivas since the dark 
years of the Axis occupation in Greece. The Cypriot Archbishop, a young priest at that 
time, had close relations with Z. Valvis, the political consultant of Grivas in the "X". 
Through Valvis the two men came in contact and positive feelings were induced by 
both sides. ls Makarios favoured Grivas' anti-communist ideas and action and Grivas 
appreciated his young but well educated compatriot. Their affinity was so good, that in 
1946 Makarios published some of his articles in the "X" news sheet, attacking 
1$ Onasis was born in the Greek island ofTenedos. Ilowever, under the Lausanne Treaty this island was 
given to Turkey together with Imbros. Onasis never forgot that and he held the Dritish side responsible 
for the fate of his island. 
16 Written Archives of the Hellenic Radio & Television: Onasis interview, 23 June 1972. 
17 M. Drousiotis, EOKA: The park Side. (Athens, 1998) p. 73. 
18 C. Foley & W.1. Scobie, op. cit., p. 7. 
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Communism from a Christian viewpoint.19 Due to their personal relationship, Makarios 
did not have any objection regarding the appointment of Grivas as the military leader of 
a future guerilla group on Cyprus. During the meeting at Stratos' residence it was 
decided that it was essential for Grivas to visit Cyprus in order to inspect the situation 
and infer conclusions for the emergence of a guerilla movement in the island. Thus, on 
5 July, Grivas left the port of Piraeus, taking his wife Kiki with him to avoid raising 
suspicions. However, what Greek and British scholars fail to consider, concerning 
Grivas' first visit to Cyprus, is the fact that he applied for a visa from the British 
Embassy in Athens. This was likely to have raised suspicions since the British were 
aware of his paramilitary past. Contrary to the mainstream view of the Greek academia 
concerning Grivas' success in manipulating the authorities, from the first moment that 
he arrived in Cyprus he had been followed by members of the British Intelligence. This 
can be confirmed by two factors. Firstly, the firm refusal of the British Embassy in 
Athens to grant my request to study their records concerning Grivas' visa application 
for his trip to Cyprus20, and secondly, the personal confession of Mr. A. Hatziandrcou, a 
Greek Cypriot permanent resident of Athens, who during that time was driving his 
father's taxi in Nicosia. In a personal interview he said: 
"During that period [summer of 51] I was driving my father's taxi 
in Nicosia due to an accident that he had ... I had been approached 
by an Englishman and he asked to rent me and my taxi for 3 hours 
every day. He said to me that he was suspecting his wife and he wanted to 
follow her without raising any suspicions ... 1 accepted the offer and during 
the first days we were just driving around Nicosia's main streets. 
However, one day the Englishman told me to stop the car and he started 
to take photos of a middle-aged man with a thick moustache. He later told 
me that he was the lover of his wife ... However, after some years I 
understood that the supposed lover that we werefollowing was G. Grivas.,,21 
As soon as Grivas arrived in Cyprus he began to visit the mountainous country, 
learning the nature of the Cypriot landscape and the material conditions for establishing 
guerilla warfare in the Cypriot perimeter. On 3 August Grivas met Makarios in Nicosia 
in order to inform him about the results of his reconnaissance. As Grivas wrote in his 
memoirs, during the meeting he realized that the Archbishop had grave doubts 
19 C. Foley & W. I. Scobie. OPt cit., p. 8. 
20 It has to be noted here that every Embassy keeps records of all the visa applications received. as well as 
comments concerning each individual applicant. 
21 Personal interview with Mr. Andreas lIatziandreou in Athens during January 1999. 
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concerning Grivas' report.22 It is obvious that Grivas through his memoirs tried to 
accuse Makarios of faint-heartedness, however it would have been a great mistake if the 
assessment of Makarios' role in the Cypriot question during that time was based only on 
Grivas' personal judgement.23 Makarios, due to the fact that he was not a natural-born 
warlord but a spiritual as well as the political leader of the Greek Cypriots, felt a great 
responsibility for the fate of his people. 
Despite the negative aspects of his meeting with Makarios, Grivas returned to Athens 
in order to conclude his plans for the creation of a secret organization in Cyprus, which 
would be patterned upon "X". On July 1952, Makarios visited Athens in order to put 
pressure upon the Greek government concerning the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis. 
Makarios' visit gave the Liberation Committee the opportunity to hold a meeting in D. 
Venzanis'residence. Apart from Makarios and the host, the other participants were: G. 
Grivas, G. Stratos, the Major-General of the Greek army N. Papadopoulos, Colonel S. 
Alexopoulos, Professor G. Konidiaris, Loizidis brothers, the lawyer A. Avgikos, I 
Tsatsomoiros and D. Stavropoulos,24 During the meeting Grivas, as the military leader, 
informed the Committee of his plans that involved the armed uprising against the 
British forces through the creation of a guerilla group. Makarios, again, showed his 
doubts about the realization of such a plan. Makarios, during that period, was still in 
favour of a peaceful settlement of the Cypriot question and for that reason he informed 
the rest of the members of the Liberation Committee to wait for the results of his 
meetings with the Greek officials. However, as mentioned in a previous chapter the 
Greek government was reluctant to confront Britain during that period, mainly due to 
the country's NATO application. A characteristic event that underlines the Greek 
unwillingness to confront Britain concerning Cyprus, occurred during a meeting 
between Makarios and the Greek Premier, N. Plastiras, when the latter answered 
Makarios' demands for his support for the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis: 
" Listen your excel/ency. If you were coming to my 
humble residence and you were asking me to go and 
fight for Cyprus, I would have gone because I am a 
soldier. However, you are coming to the office of the 
Prime Minister of the Greeks andyou are asking me 
22 The Memoirs of General Griyas, op. cit., p.17. 
23 One of the main mistakes of the Greek scholars who are dealing with Cyprus is the absolute trust in 
Grivas' personal judgements concerning other personalities that played an important role in the course of 
the Cypriot question. As E. Tositsas Averof says in his memoirs A Story of Missed Opportunities; The 
Cypriot question 1950-1963. Grivas' memoirs are lacking in objective judgement, therefore it should be 
used by every researcher as an accurate chronological diary of the events and not as a credible source. 
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to burn Greece without serving Cyprus. For that reason I 
am asking to reconsider your position. ,,2j 
The Liberation Committee met for a second time on 21 July in S. Loizidis' residence. 
The second meeting gave Makarios an opportunity to inform the other members of the 
hesitations of the Greek government to support the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis. 
After a long discussion until the early hours, the Committee decided to pursue the 
preparations for the beginning of the armed struggle on the island. Hence, two 
committees were set up, a military and a political one, to study the practical problems of 
starting the uprising. It was also decided that Stratos, in Makarios' absence, would 
preside over both committees and coordinate their efforts.26 
On 3 October 1952, Grivas made his second trip to Cyprus and he had a series of 
meetings with Makarios in order to discuss the strategy and the methods of the struggle. 
Makarios brought Grivas in contact with the leaders of the youth organizations that 
were under the influence of the Church, so in that way the first cell of the committee 
had been formed in Cyprus. The people that Grivas met were, S. Poskotis from PEON, 
P. Papagathagelou from OXEN and A. Azinas from PEK Those people had been given 
the task of propagandizing in favour of the armed struggle among the Greek Cypriot 
youth, as well as of finding young volunteers from their organizations who were willing 
to become guerillas for the cause. On 25 February 1953, Grivas returned to Athens and 
began to provide guns from the stock of the "X", which he donated to the new 
organization.27 However, on 10 March, Makarios, returning from the headquarters of 
the United Nations, stopped in Athens in order to meet Grivas. The Archbishop had 
been informed about Grivas' initiative in providing guns and he asked to see the colonel 
as soon as possible. The two men met in S. Loizidis' apartment in the center of Athens 
and Makarios expressed his disagreement with Grivas' desire to send guns to Cyprus. 
The Archbishop was against any form of bloodshed and he insisted that the actions of 
the guerilla group should be limited only to sabotage operations. Grivas, on the other 
hand, insisted on guerilla warfare, as the only effective way of challenging the British 
authority in Cyprus. In the end, Makarios, by using his authority as the leading figure 
of the Committee, imposed his views and Grivas promised that he would follow them. 
As Makarios states concerning that meeting: 
24M D .. . 52 
. rouslOtts, op. CIt., p. . 
2'E. Tositsas Averof, op. cit., vol. I, p. 96. 
26 C. Foley & W.I. Scobie, op. cit., p.p. 15-16. 
27 The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p. 19. That fact is another prooffor the nature of the "X" as a 
paramilitary extreme right wing group even after the end of the Greek Civil War. According to special 
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"I said they could only fight back in self-defence 
if they found themselves in difficulties. I said that 
Grivas must take his orders from me as the Ethnarch 
and leader of the political struggle. We would discuss 
everything, but I would have the final word. He promised 
this, and obeyed/or as long as I was in Cyprus. ,,28 
Makarios was determined not to lose the control and the leadership of the Committee. 
Therefore, on 7 June he sent Azinas to Athens, in order to organize the first 
consignment to Cyprus. Azinas had strict orders from Makarios to send only sabotage 
materials and to inform Grivas that no-one from Greece should arrive in Cyprus yet.29 
In the early days of January 1954 the Liberation Committee decided that action in 
Cyprus should begin, since diplomacy had failed due to the British inflexibility towards 
the Greek demands for a final settlement of the Cypriot question. With Makarios' 
economic assistance the preparations for the sending of explosives and a small amount 
of guns began. The leadership of the first expedition was given to Admiral Sakelarios, a 
well-known hero of the Second World War and a strong Anglophile. During the war he 
had served with the commander of the British navy in the Mediterranean, Admiral J. 
Cunningham, and had been decorated with the KCB, the highest British honour ever 
given to a Greek officer. On 20 March the caique "Sirina" left from Lavrio, a port 
outside of Athens, carrying 34 pistols with 656 rounds, 4 Steiger automatics with 4,000 
rounds, 4,000 rounds of 9mm ammunition, 350 kilos of dynamite, 300 lb of Nobel 808 
explosives, 100 mines, 300 hand grenades, 700 canisters of fulminate of mercury, 100 
smoke bombs, 1,100 metres of slow burning fuse, and 120 coloured flarcs.30 The 
caique reached Cyprus on 25 March and its load was collected by Azinas' team. The 
next problem that had to be faced was the arrival of Grivas in Cyprus for the beginning 
of the armed struggle. On June 1954, Grivas requested, for the second time, a visa 
permit in order to travel to Cyprus. His application was forwarded, first, to Nicosia and 
then to the headquarters of the Intelligence Service in London. The Intelligence Service 
collected all the information from Grivas' first two visits to the island and even located 
a small group of Greek Cypriots preparing for a revolt against the British government. 
The British embassy in Athens was informed of all of the above and Grivas' application 
was refused. Byford-Jones, who gave the above information, criticized the decision of 
agreements after the end of the Greek Civil War (spring of 1949) all the paramilitary groups that 
developed an anti-communist action had to hand in their guns and ammunitions. 
28 C. Foley & W. I. Scobie, op. cit., p. 20. 
29 The Memoirs of General Griyas tOp. cit., p. 20. 
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the British government as a major mistake, because if it had issued Grivas' visa, it could 
have had him under surveillance from his first moment in Cyprus, so four years of terror 
and murder could have been avoided.31 However, as will be argued later on, the British 
did have Grivas under close surveillance and knew all his moves from the first moment 
that he stepped onto Cyprus. 
On 9 October, Grivas met Makarios and urged him to allow him to arrive in Cyprus. 
Makarios had still great misgivings, but he was eventually convinced since Grivas 
promised that he would accept his command and not take any initiative towards the 
commencement of the operations. Grivas, since he did not have a visa permit, decided 
to enter Cyprus clandestinely. On 27 October, Grivas, accompanied by S. Loizides, 
arrived in Rhodes. The plan was to reach Cyprus by caique, but the weather was really 
bad and they waited on the island for more than a week. Nevertheless, on 10 November 
after two stormy days at sea they reached the island and met Azinas, who hid them for 
few days in his uncle's house in Chlorakas. After a few days, Grivas arrived in Nicosia 
in order to organize the armed struggle. In Nicosia, Grivas formed three groups of six 
men each and began to train them in sabotage actions. Among those men were P. 
Georgatzis, M. Drakos, S. Lenas, G. Drousiotis, E. Evagelakis and O. Afksentiou. All 
those young men played a leading role in EOKA's struggle later on. One of Grivas' 
first associates in Nicosia was P. Papadopoulos, the secretary general of PEO. 
Papadopoulos found a secure house for Grivas to stay in and bought a car for Grivas', 
using Union money.32 In that way, Grivas claimed, the first resistance cell was created 
in Nicosia in complete secrecy. 
However, the truth was completely different. The British Intelligence was aware of 
Grivas' moves from his first day on the island, as well as the names of his close 
associates. As P. Stokkos, a Greek Cypriot policeman, confessed to Makarios after 
1960: 
" It was late autumn J 954 and I was working 
in police headquarters at the Special Branch 
when I noticed a circular about the presence 0/ 
Grivas in Cyprus. According to that circular, Grivas 
was hiding in the monastery 0/ "Mesa Potamou U in the 
province o/Saitta and was organizing a liberation movement. ,,33 
30 The Memoirs of General Griyas. op. cit., p. 23. 
31 W. Byford-Jones, Griyas and the Story ofEOKA, (London, 1959), p. 47. 
32M D .. . 63 
. rOUslotls, op. CIt., p. . 
33MD" . 62 
. rOUslotls, op. Cit, p. . 
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What Stokkos told Makarios was not a product of his imagination. As soon as Grivas 
arrived in Cyprus, the British side began to organize an infonnation network in order to 
discover his moves. During that time, Philip Tei, a special agent of the Minister of the 
State for Colonies, arrived on the island in order to re-organize the structure of the 
Special Branch.34 In addition, on 1 January 1955, Dr. Satcliff, a member of the 
Intelligence Service, arrived on Cyprus to lecture SO Cypriot policeman in guerilla 
warfare methods.3s The British side not only knew that Grivas had arrived in Cyprus, 
but they were following his steps in great detail, since an agent of the Intelligent Service 
was among Grivas' closer associates. This man was P. Papadopoulos, who later left 
Cyprus in 1956 when his double role was revealed. As mentioned, it was Papadopoulos 
who rented a house for Grivas in Nicosia, and also bought him a car and became his 
personal driver. It was Papadopoulos who drove Grivas to Kakopetria, when the latter 
decided to hide in the mountains because he was feeling insecure in Nicosia, and 
Papadopoulos was the man to whom Grivas gave his diary and documents of EOKA, 
which fell into British hands.36 The conclusion is that Grivas was exposed and could be 
arrested whenever the British authorities desired. A possible arrest of Grivas would not 
create a diplomatic incident with Greece, since the Liberation Committee did not have 
any support from the Greek state, nor could it provoke a series of revolts from the Grcek 
Cypriot community of the island, since Grivas' plans were known only to a handful of 
men. So why was Grivas not arrested? Why did the British not prevent the fonnation 
of EOKA? Why did the British not protect peace and order in the island? Those 
questions will be answered later on in this chapter. 
On 31 January 1955, Makarios invited Grivas to Nicosia in order to discuss the 
opening of the struggle. Makarios was disappointed by the collapse of the Greek appeal 
in the United Nations and he decided that the only solution for the Cypriot question was 
to begin limited sabotage guerilla actions against British targets on the island. Makarios 
believed that through this fonn of struggle the British side would be forcibly persuaded 
to evacuate Cyprus. The two men met in Kykos' Mctohi and Makarios gave his 
pennission for the beginning of EOKA's actions. The Archbishop insisted that he did 
not want any victims from the attacks and approved only sabotage actions against 
34 The Special Branch of the Police was responsible for the information section, under the authority of 
MIS which was responsible for issues ofintemal security of the state. In Cyprus the Special Branch was 
dealing mostly with the local Communist party. However, after the beginning of EOKA's struggle it was 
redeployed and began to gather information for the actions of the organization. 
35M D .. . 87 
. rouslOtls, Opt Cit., p. • 
36 The Memoirs of General Griyas, Opt cit., p. 127. 
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military targets.37 The first action of EOKA had been set for 25 March38 but because 
this particular night would have been bright, due to the full moon, it was decided to 
commence the struggle on 1 April. Despite the attempts of Makarios' biographers to 
present this decision as a result of a long prepared research of the Archbishop 
concerning the geostrategic and political factors of the Cypriot question, it was one of 
his gravest mistakes in his career as the leader of the Greek Cypriot community in the 
island. The conditions for the beginning of such a stratagem during that period were the 
worse possible. Cyprus during that period was more useful to the British than ever. On 
the south coast of the island, the British had began to build new military bases in order 
to balance the loss of the Suez. It was an ambitious plan involving the building of a 
spacious cantonment at Dhekelia, 7 miles east of Larnaca, where some 5,000 troops 
would be accommodated, and the construction of a large airfield at Akrotiri (near 
Limassol) by the Royal Air Force.39 In addition, Greece, as a Western protectorate had 
neither the means nor the will to support such a struggle. Furthermore, the size and the 
landscape of the island were not suitable for the establishment of a long guerilla war. 
Cyprus had neither high mountains nor vast forests, to allow guerilla forces to hide, nor 
unlimited natural resources to support the movement. Additionally, another negative 
factor for the beginning of the struggle was the small number of EOKA's volunteers. 
Despite the fact that nowadays almost everybody in Cyprus claims to be an EOKA 
guerilla, the real number of EOKA fighters never exceeded 300, most of them still 
students in the last classes of the Gymnasium. This force was able to cause minor 
problems for the British establishment, but it was impossible to force an empire with a 
well trained and well equipped army to retreat. On 1 Decemb~r 1954 the first elements 
of the Middle East Land Forces and the Middle East Air Force moved from the Suez 
Canal Zone to Cyprus. During that time the British garrison in Cyprus amounted to 
about 4,000 soldiers, while Griva's men had to face not only the British but also 2,324 
men of the Regular Cypriot Police Force; and 1,770 men belonging to the Auxiliary 
Police and Special Constables, the majority of whom were Turkish Cypriots.4o In 
addition, the guerilla endeavor had been organized by the Church and extreme right 
wing elements and had a clear chauvinist and anti-Communist nature. The Communists 
37 Terrorism jn Cyprus; Griyas' Diary, ed. by the II.M'S Government Printing Office, (Nicosia, 1957), p. 
11. 
38 For Greek history this particular day has an exceptional significance, since on 25 March 1821 the 
Greek War ofIndependence against the Ottoman Empire began from the monastery of Agia Lavra in 
Pelloponesos. 
39 The total expenditure of the various projects amounted to 40-50 million pounds. For more see: II.M. 
Stationery Office: Colonial Reports, Cyprus 1955, (London, 1956), pp. 8-9. 
40 The Government of Cyprus (July 1958) quoted by N. Crawshaw, op. cit., Appendices 5. 
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had been excluded from it, and it was clear that it was not the intention of the Liberation 
Committee to organize a massive anti-colonial guerilla movement. Thus, the Greek 
Cypriot Communists and the Turkish Cypriots that represented more than 50% of the 
total popUlation had been regarded as enemies of the cause from the beginning. The 
nationalist elements that organized the struggle regarded the Communists and the 
Turkish community as greater enemies than the British. Another of Makarios' great 
mistakes was the selection of Grivas as the military leader of the cause. Grivas 
represented the greatest threat to the Cypriot Communists, due to his role during the 
Greek Civil War, while, due to his nationalist feelings and his anti-Turkish convictions, 
as a fervent devotee of the Great Idea, it was inevitable that the two communities would 
be brought in conflict. For all the above reasons, the anti-colonial struggle was 
beginning with the worst omens and was to divide the local population, thus it was 
doomed to failure. When I asked the ex-secretary general of the Greek Communist 
Party, G. Farakos, to evaluate the appearance ofEOKA in the Cypriot spectrum he said: 
"The main mistake of Makarios and Grivas was that 
they left the Communists out of the struggle. Cyprus' 
fate would have been completely different if the colonial 
authorities had toface a unitedfront, instead ofa handful of 
men and children ... Global history shows that every guerilla 
movement that did not appeal to the masses, was predestined to 
defeat. Consider Che Guevara and his revolutionary attempt in 
Bolivia ... In general I believe that Afakarios and Grivas managed to 
divide the Greek Cypriots and demolished the Enosis movement that 
had a great appeal both to the Nationalists and Communists ... 41 
After Makarios gave Grivas the green light, the latter began his search for targets in 
every main Cypriot city. He appointed as heads of the operation M. Drakos in Nicosia, 
G. Afxentiou in Famagusta, S. Poskotis in Larnaca and N. Petropouleas in Limassol. 
Grivas' intention was to attack, at the same time, all the main cities of the island, in 
order to arouse fear in the British and raise Greek Cypriot morale. Drakos' group had 
as its target the Government radio station in Nicosia, Haralabos Mouskos' group had to 
raid the Secreteriat in Nicosia, and Christakis Eleftheriou had to sabotage Wolseley 
baracks, also in the Cypriot capital. However, the results of EOKA's first attack were, 
at least, unsatisfactory. Except for the attacks in Nicosia, the operations in every other 
41 Personal interview with the ex-Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party, Mr. Grigoris Farakos, 
in Athens during August 1998. 
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Cypriot town failed completely. In Famagusta, the police discovered a car containing 
explosives and EOKA's pamphlets. At the same time Afxentiou's identity had been 
revealed and a reward offered for his arrest. In Lamaca, Poskotis' group had to attack 
the Courts, the Commissioner's Office and Police HQ, however the explosion at the 
local police station caused only minor damage, and the police arrested Poskotis and two 
of his comrades. In Limassol, Petropouleas' group had to bomb the two main police 
stations and dynamite the Episkopi power plant, but several members of the group were 
arrested. Ironically, the only casualty from EOKA's operations was an EOKA guerilla, 
Pantelis Modestos, who was electrocuted in Famagusta while attempting to cut the 
electricity supply.42 The results of EOKA's first attack reveal the lack of co-ordination 
and experience of its members in guerilla sabotage actions. So, how can anyone claim, 
especially since the British knew of Grivas' moves, that the powerful British military 
machine could not have stopped E.O.K.A right at the beginning and before its first 
attack? The answer can be detected in the British geostrategic plans for the Eastern 
Mediterranean and for Cyprus itself. 
The British authorities could have arrested Grivas and his associates from the first 
day of the colonel's arrival. However, such a development would not have brought 
them any diplomatic gain, whereas the formation of EOKA could have proven useful to 
the establishment. Since the arrival of Makarios in the Cypriot political spectrum, and 
the transition of AKEL's policy towards a more nationalist stand, concerning the 
Enosis, the British, from the first time since 1878, had to face a united front with the 
same aspirations towards the Cypriot question. Grivas' arrival and the formation of 
EOKA, due to his inflexibility towards the Communists, was the best guarantee that the 
Enosis' united front would come to an end. However, the most important gain for 
British foreign policy was that EOKA could facilitate the entrance of Turkey into the 
Cypriot question. As seen in previous chapters, during the early period of the Cold War 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey became a valuable ally for British interests in the 
Middle East. That alliance had been sealed during the Ninth General Assembly of the 
United Nations, when the Greek appeal in favour of Cyprus collapsed in front of the 
united Anglo-Turkish diplomatic front. After the failure of the Greek appeal in the 
United Nations, the Foreign Office had clear indications that Greece would attempt to 
appeal again. Therefore, Britain wanted to secure Turkish support, knowing that 
diplomatic alliances can be modified within a day, by giving Turkey the opportunity to 
enter the Cypriot question as an equal power with Greece. Cyprus, due to its 
42 The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p. 33. 
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geographic position, was valuable for the Turkish aspirations to dominate the 
geostrategic area of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. In such a 
development Greece would have reacted strongly, causing a diplomatic incident and 
threatening the unity of the Southern flank. of NATO, since according to the Lausanne 
Treaty (1923) article 16, Turkey had abandoned every sovereign right upon Cyprus. 
However, the formation of EOKA and the beginning of its actions could give Turkey 
the legitimate right to enter the Cypriot question in order to protect the Turkish 
minority. It follows from all this that, Britain would not have gained from arresting 
Grivas and closing EOKA's chapter. On the contrary, she could gain a lot from EOKA 
in the diplomatic field. 
As a matter of fact, from 1 April and onwards the British government began a 
diplomatic race in order to include Turkey in the Cypriot question. On 30 June, the 
British Premier revealed to the House of Commons that his government had sent the 
following invitation to the Greek and the Turkish governments: 
"Her Majesty's Government have been giving 
further consideration to the strategic and other problems 
affecting alike the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. They consider that the association of 
the 3 countries in that area based on mutual confidence is 
essential to their common interests. lIer Afajesty's Government 
accordingly invite the Greek and the Turkish Governments to 
send representatives to confer with them in London at an early 
date on political and defence questions, which affect the Eastern 
Mediterranean including Cyprus,,4) 
As is clear from the text of the invitation, except the Cypriot question, other issues 
would have been discussed at that meeting as well. However, as will be seen in the 
following chapter, the only discussions that were held concerned Cyprus and no other 
regional issue. It can be speculated that the invitation had been formulated in such a 
way that Greece would not oppose the Turkish invitation. As was expected the Turkish 
side could not throwaway such a great opportunity, therefore after two days she 
declared that she accepted the invitation. The Greek side, on the other hand, hesitated to 
accept it. Athens was afraid that the Foreign Office would come up with a new plan in 
order to postpone the Greek appeal to the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the United Nations, 
therefore the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs asked their British counterparts to 
43 A. Eden: House of Commons, 30 June 1955, vol. 543, col. 51t. 
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hasten the date of the conference.44 However, things were not as simple as the Greek 
diplomats thought. What the Greek diplomats did not consider was the inclusion of 
Turkey in the conference. They presumed that the conference had been decided under 
the shadow of the eruption of violence in Cyprus and that it indicated the abandonment 
of the British inflexibility towards the Cypriot question.4S Many Greek and Greek 
Cypriot scholars accuse Papagos of political naivety, since he did not oppose the 
participation of Turkey in the conference.46 In order to establish their hypothesis they 
make use ofPapagos' statement the day before the commencement of the Conference in 
London. As Papagos said concerning Turkey's inclusion in the Conference: 
"We do not consider the preservation of the Greco·Turkish 
friendship incompatible with a satisfactory solution 
for the Cypriot question. Quite on the contrary, I am confident that the 
sell/ement of this question will strengthen even more the existing 
bonds between our two countries. ,,47 
However, the truth is that the Greek Premier had no choice but to accept Turkish 
inclusion in the talks concerning Cyprus. Once again the Foreign Office had set up a 
successful diplomatic trap for Papagos and his government. If Papagos turned down the 
British invitation, then Greece would have been exposed at an international level as the 
only element that was in favour of the continuation of the troubles in Cyprus. Such a 
development would have been extremely negative for a future Greek appeal in the 
United Nations. The country would have carried the stigma of political inflexibility in a 
crisis in the interior politics of another member of the United Nations, while Greece 
could also have been accused by the international community as the instigator of the 
troubles. On the other hand, Greece could not ask for the exclusion of Turkey from the 
Conference, especially after a bomb attack ofEOKA in the Turkish sector of Nicosia in 
June, since the Turkish minority was under a real threat due to Grivas' guerillas and, in 
accordance with international law, Turkey had the legitimate right to protect its minority 
through diplomacy. Greece had no choice but to accept the invitation, despite 
Makarios' strong objections and the criticisms of the opposition. Papagos was trapped 
in a diplomatic labyrinth, and a new chapter opened for Cyprus, but this time with the 
44 A. Eden, Full Circle, (London, 1960), p. 398 . 
• , ibid. p. 398. 
46 Many go as far as to accuse Papagos, one of the most honest and patriotic Greek Premiers, of treachery. 
For more concerning the issue see: A. Poulos, The Darkest Page in the Modem Greek I Ii story: Papat;:os 
and the Tripartite Conference in London" Notebooks of Political Dialogue, Research and Analysis, 
(Athens, 1995), vol. 36 pp. 89·139. See also D. Linardos, rapagos' Goyernment: A Place in History? op. 
cit., pp. 48·64. 
47 The Times, 29 August 1955, p. 7. 
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entrance of a new factor, Turkey. Despite the criticisms of Papagos, those really 
responsible for this negative tum of the Cypriot question were Makarios and Grivas. 
With their anachronistic 19th century nationalism, they managed to expose the Greek 
Cypriot demands for Enosis and leave Greece with no choice but to accept the well-
planned British proposition. The All Fools Day of 1955 turned out to be a great reverse 
for the Greek Cypriot dream of Enosis. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE IN LONDON: THE CHRONICLE OF A 
FOREGONE CONCLUSION. 
"Two can seek for hnppiness. Three would find misery" 
Old Grttk uyln!:. 
This chapter will examine the so-called Tripartite Conference in London, 
(29 August-7 September 1955), and its diplomatic results concerning the course of the 
Cypriot question. Additionally, it will evaluate the influence of the Conference on the 
diplomatic relations of Britain, Greece and Turkey. The main concern of this chapter is 
not to present an accurate chronological diary of the events during the Conference. On 
the contrary, it will attempt to approach the Conference by presenting and evaluating the 
arguments of the three powers concerning the nature and the fate of the Cypriot question 
on the basis of their foreign policies in the wider area of the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
will assess the diplomatic gains and losses of this conference for Britain, Greece and 
Turkey. 1 The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: What was the 
I The research in this chapter will be based, mainly, upon primary sources such as II.M Stationery Office: 
The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, Cmd. 9594, 1955, while diaries and 
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extent of the American influence on the Tripartite Conference? How can the Greek 
acceptance of the British invitation to London be justified? To what extent did the 
evacuation of the British military base from Suez and the protection of the Middle East 
oil resources influence British policy towards the Cypriot question? What were the 
main reasons for the failure of the Tripartite Conference? What were the main factors 
that influenced Turkish policy concerning Cyprus? 
As was presented in the previous chapter, on 30 June, 1955, the British government 
issued an official invitation to Greece and Turkey to attend a conference in London on 
political and defense questions which affect the Eastern Mediterranean, including 
Cyprus. Although the invitation was an exclusively British initiative, it was designed to 
please the American side as well. Since 1952 and the internationalization of the Cypriot 
question by the Greek Cypriot and the Greek side, the US had felt that the unity of 
NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean was under great risk. The State Department 
wanted to see a Conference that would include all the sides involved in the Cypriot 
question, instead of watching Britain, Turkey and Greece exchanging diplomatic insults 
in the UN, under the vigilant gaze of the Soviet Union and her satellites. American 
dissatisfaction at the lack of communication bctween Britain, Turkey and Greece 
concerning Cyprus can be revealed in the telegram of the Ambassador in Turkey, A.M 
Warren, to the Department of State in 30 March 1954: 
"/n light of existing strategic and political consideration, 
discussions this issue in UN can only serve weaken existing 
friendly relations and close co-operation between Greece, UK 
and Turkey, and thus further Soviet effort disrupt western 
unity. ,,] 
or in the remark of the Acting Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian 
Affairs, W.O. Baxter: 
"/t [the raising of the Cypriot question in the Ninth General 
Assembly of the UN] would give the Soviet Union and lis 
satellites a tailor-made opportunity to achieve one of their 
main present objectives, which is to create dissension among 
NATO partners in an attempt to destroy European unity. /t will 
also reverse the trend towards closer relationships in the 
memoirs of key figures who played an important role in the final outcome of the Conference will be used 
whenever appropriate to support any conclusion and assumption. 
2 Foreign Relations of the United States J 952-1954; Eastern Europe: SOviet Union: Eastern 
Mediterranean, ed. by W.Z. Slany, (Washington, 1988), vol. VIII, p. 683. 
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Aegean area which has been so encouraging to us in the past 
year. ,,3 
The American accusation was addressed equally to the three sides involved in the 
Cypriot riddle, however it mostly affected the British position. During that period 
Britain was struggling to keep American trust and remain the leading Western power in 
the Middle East. The Foreign Office desired to keep American involvement out of the 
political developments of the Middle East, an area that was still then regarded by 
London as its traditional sphere of influence. Nevertheless, the Grcek appeals to the UN 
and the resulting American unease were making the accomplishment of the British plans 
even harder. Therefore, London aimed to alter the gloomy atmosphere by organizing a 
Conference that would bring all the sides involved in the Cypriot question together to 
communicate without being exposed to the Soviets, in a Conference that would 
demonstrate the unity of NATO's Eastern flank and the British ability to influence the 
diplomatic equilibrium of this sensitive area of the globe. 
The Turkish side accepted the invitation almost immediately, while the Greek side 
expressed its reluctance to do the same. The main reason for the Greek hesitation to 
accept the British invitation was the firm opposition of the Greek Cypriot side to 
embrace any diplomatic negotiations about the Cypriot question, that would include 
Turkey. The Greek diplomats feared Makarios' reaction in the event of Greek 
acceptance of the invitation to London, given the fact that the Cypriot Archbishop had a 
great influence upon the Greek masses and could easily turn them against their 
government, generating vast social unrest. However, as Was argued earlier, Greece did 
not have the freedom to tum down the British invitation. The recent developments in 
Cyprus, EOKA's appearance and the commencement of its anti-colonial struggle left 
the Greek diplomacy with only two options: either to accept the invitation or reject it. 
In the first case the Greek government would have to face internal opposition and the 
fury of the public opinion that would have regarded it as an ultimate action of national 
submission to the wishes of 10 Downing St, while in the second case it would have to 
face the uneasiness of the international community and the diplomatic isolation of the 
country for a long period. As Akropolis wrote in a central article: 
3 Ope cit., p. 686. 
"Papagos and his officials are facing a crisis. Either they will 
try to appease the pro-Cypriot and anti-British sentiments of 
the Greek public, or they will have to accept the British 
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invitation and sit at the same table with Turkey. Either 
decision will displease one of the two sides. ,,4 
The Greek government decided that it was more aproppriate for the national interest to 
attend the Conference and therefore, on 8 July, informed London that a Greek 
delegation would represent the country in the Conference. The Greek decision 
displeased Makarios, therefore he sent to Athens his closest associate N. Kranidiotis in 
order to meet the Prime Minister and persuade him to alter his decision. On 10 July 
Kranidiotis met Papagos in his villa in Ekali. Despite his illness the Greek Premier 
accepted Kranidiotis in his residence and asked to be informed about the situation in 
Cyprus. Kranidiotis spoke about Makarios' views concerning the British invitation and 
he informed his interlocutor about EOKA's action. The Greek Premier did not say 
much. He just advised Kranidiotis that the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus should end.' 
According to Kranidiotis the Greek Premier tried to discourage the Greek Cypriots from 
the liberation struggle of Enosis, a typical policy of the officials in Athens, who wanted 
to control the political developments in the Cypriot island. Nevertheless, the weak old 
soldier, even in his last moments6, tried to justify his decision to send a delegation to 
London by confessing to Kranidiotis the responsibilities of the Greek Cypriot leadership 
for that development. Through his short advice to stop EOKA's action in Cyprus, it 
was obvious that he blamed Makarios for the negative tum of the Cypriot question. 
EOKA's appearance, and Makarios' passionate speeches about the need to revolt 
against the British oppression, had exposed the Greek state in the eyes of the 
international community and associated the official line of Greek foreign policy with the 
needless pomposity of Grivas and his associates. Papagos' admonition was the last and 
desperate attempt of an experienced soldier, who spent all his life fighting for his 
country, to put an end to the pointless bloodshed in Cyprus. His guidance, however, 
was misinterpreted by Kranidiotis, who later on accused Papagos of inflexibility and 
lack of consideration towards the Greek Cypriot demands for national vindication.' 
Kranidiotis returned to Nicosia without succeeding in his purpose and the Greek 
delegation prepared itself for the trip to Albion. 
The Conference opened at Lancaster House at 4 p.m. on 29 August, when questions 
of procedures were settled. The heads of the three delegations were H. Macmillan8 for 
" Akropolis, 6 July 1955. 
S N. Kranidiotis, Difficult Years, (Athens, 1981), pp. 96- 97. 
6 Papagos died after two months on 4 October 1955, 
7 For more concerning Kranidiotis' criticisms see: N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 240-69. 
8 The other members of the British delegation were: the under-secretary of the Colonies II. Hopkinson 
and the British ambassadors in Athens and Ankara. 
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Britain, F. Zorlu9 for Turkey, and S. Stefanopoulos1o for Greece. The first speaker was 
H. Macmillan, who referred to Cypriot history. Macmillan wanted to connect the 
strategic necessities that dictated the British arrival in Cyprus back in 1878 with those 
which still existed in the geostrategic equilibrium of the Eastern Mediterranean. He 
pointed out that Cyprus had been ceded to Britain by Turkey when the peace of the 
world seemed seriously threatened, and as a repayment Britain entered into a defensive 
alliance with the Sultan to protect his Asian empire from the Russian threat. Comparing 
that alliance with the post-war role of Turkey as a member of the North-Atlantic Treaty, 
Macmillan stated: 
"Now once again Great Britain is linked by treaty with Turkey, 
and with other nations, in defence of the free world. In 1878 it 
was necessary for Britain to occupy and administer Cyprus in 
order to execute her engagements towards Turkey. So it is 
again today; but with even greater force. Indeed, Britain's 
engagements and responsibilities have been multiplied and 
diviersified. ,,/ J 
Following that statement, Macmillan continued by reciting the responsibilities of his 
country in the Middle East, towards the Arab countries. 12 He also supported the view 
that Cyprus was the only location in the Eastern Mediterranean from which Britain 
could fulfill her diplomatic and military obligations towards NATO. 13 In the end of his 
speech, he confronted the idea that it was sufficient for the geostrategic interests of his 
country to control a military base in Cyprus, stating that the island was the heart of the 
British defense system in that part of the world and for that reason he regarded it as 
imperative that Britain should maintain the right to control Cyprus, not simply a small 
part of it. 14 Answering Macmillan's arguments, the head of the Greek delegation, S 
Stefanopoulos, said that his government was aware of the British diplomatic and 
9 The other members of the Turkish delegation were: the Minister of National Defense E. Menderes, the 
secretary-general of the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Dirgi and the ambassador in Athens I. Zetar. 
10 The other members ofthe Greek delegation were: the under-secretary of the Minister of National 
Defense D. Vourdoumpas, the diplomats G. Melas, D. Mostras, G. Koustas, and the General Dovas. 
11 Macmillan: The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, Cmd. 9594, August 
30, 1955, p. 8. 
IZ Apart from the North-Atlantic Treaty, Dritain's diplomatic commitments to which the secretary of 
Foreign Affairs referred were: I) The Daghdad Pact between Dritain, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran, see: 
W. L. Cleveland, A History of the Modem Middle East, (Oxford, 1994 ), p. 26 t. II) The Tripartite 
declaration for peace and stability in Middle East in 1950 from the governments of the United States, 
Dritain and France. III) The Special agreement with the government ofIraq, see: Cmd. 9544,1955. IV) 
The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Ilashimite Kingdom of Jordan, see: Cmd. 
7404, 1948. 
13 Macmillan: op. cit., p. 11, 
14 Macmillan, op. cit., p. 12. 
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military aims and obligations in the Middle East, therefore his government recognized 
the British right to maintain a military base in Cyprus, following the introduction of the 
principle of self-determination to the island. In addition, according to the Greek 
government in view of the withdrawal of the British forces from Suez, the necessity for 
such a base was more evident then than ever before. Stefanopoulos went even further to 
reassure his British counterpart that 
"In sponsoring the Cypriot people's demand for their right of 
self determination, Greece has never (and I emphasize never) 
for a single moment entertained the Idea of a withdrawal from 
Cyprus of the Britishforces. ,,/$ 
Nevertheless, in an attempt to clarify the Greek position, Stefanopoulos insisted that a 
territory essential to the security and defence of a given country need not necessarily live 
under the sovereignty of that country. In order to reinforce his argument, the Greek 
Minister used as an example NATO, whose system of collective defence necessitated the 
utilization of a territory belonging to one country for the defensive needs of another 
country, without raising any question of sovereignty. Stefanopoulos concluded by 
advising the rest of the delegates that it was in the British interest to satisfy the 
legitimate aspirations of the people of Cyprus, since a friendly population would 
strengthen the defensive value of a British military base and would enhance the strategic 
importance of the island.16 The third speaker of the Conference was the Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, F. Zorlu. In an attempt to analyse the Turkish position 
towards the Cypriot question, he declared that: 
" ... this is an island [Cyprus] which, above all things, is of 
vital importance for the defence of Turkey, to such an extent 
that it is impossible to calculate the defence potential and 
capacity of Turkey in case of war without taking Cyprus into 
consideration ,,17 
He also supported the view that Cyprus, geographically, was the extension of Anatolia, 
therefore, from the military point of view, the island should belong either to Turkey or to 
a country which would be as closely interested as Turkey in the fate of Eastern countries 
in the vicinity of Turkey. Additionally, Zorlu said that in a case of war, outside 
assistance to the war potential of Turkey could only come through her Western and 
Southern ports in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the Western ports of Turkey were 
., Stefanopoulos: Cmd, 9594, August 3 t, t 955, p. t 5. 
16 Stefanopoulos: ibid., p. 15. 
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within the effective operations area of the potential enemy and Turkey at war could only 
be supplied through her Southern ports, which were under the shadow of Cyprus. And 
he continued by saying that: 
"Whoever controls this island is in a position to control these 
Turkish ports. If the power that control this island is also in 
control of the Western Islands it will have effectively 
surrounded Turkey. No country should be allowed to leave its 
entire security at the mercy of anyone country, no matter how 
great afriend and ally the latter may be,,]8 
Nevertheless, despite the Turkish claims concerning Cyprus' vital role in the Turkish 
defensive structure, Zorlu presented no argument concerning the return of the island to 
Turkish influence. On the contrary, he declared that his government was fully satisfied 
with the existing status quo, and only if this was to be modified, should the island be 
brought under Turkish administration. 
Judging from Zorlu's speech, the researcher will inevitably come to the conclusion 
that Turkish foreign policy had traditionally been influenced by the "threat from the 
North", Russia. In case of war, during the Ottoman era, Turkey could be supplied by her 
Balkan or African dominions. However, the independence of those dominions and the 
demise of the Ottoman empire meant that the above possibility was no longer 
practicable, therefore Cyprus held a position of vital importance for the Turkish 
defensive system. In general the above argument is valid, though anachronistic. If it is 
examined within the Cold War framework then it looses its credibility. A possible 
confrontation between Turkey and the Soviet Union would automatically mean a general 
confrontation between the Western and the Eastern block. Therefore, in such a case, 
even if Cyprus was united with Greece it would be useful for Turkey's defensive line as 
a part of NATO. The above argument can be supported by the fact that in 1953 Greece 
allowed the establishment of air bases for the United States forces on her territory. They 
were designed to be fully used in case of Soviet aggression in the wide area of the 
Balkans (Yugoslavia) or in the Eastern Mediterranean, in conjunction with the American 
Atlas Thor Missile System that was installed in the US military bases in Turkey.19 Still, 
the explanation for the Turkish position can be found somewhere else. It is a fact that 
17 Zorlou: Cmd, 9594, September 1, 1955, p.20. 
18 Zorlu: op. cit., p. 23. 
19 T. Anthem, The US-Greek Agreement. (Contemporary Review, February 1954), no 1058, p.p. 83·89. 
For full text of the announcement of the signing on 12 October 1953 concerning the agreement between 
the American and the Greek side concerning the air bases see: Department of State Bulletin, (Washington, 
21 December 1953),p. 863. 
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both Turkey and Greece were equal members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
NATO, however, was an alliance among many countries and due to the short period of 
its existence, nobody could have predicted its development. History teaches the 
impermanence of every alliance, and that was the basic fear of the Turkish side. Greece 
was the traditional rival of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, therefore, since no one 
could reassure the latter of the chronological life time of NATO, Ankara was rightly 
motivated to encourage the maintenance of British control in Cyprus and confront the 
claims of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis with their main opponent in the area of the 
Eastern Mediterranean. As Sir T. Rapp quite rightly stated in a BBC programme 
concerning Turkish foreign policy: 
"Despite the fact that those countries [Greece and Turkey] are 
both members of NATO and the Balkan Alliance, due to the 
historic past there is a great rooted disbelief of Turkey for the 
future course of the Greekpolicy,,20 
It is a fact that Greco-Turkish relations have never been established on the grounds of 
sincere friendship and co-operation between the two countries. The Greeks have never 
forgotten the capture of Constantinople and four centuries of enslavement under the 
Ottoman yoke, while the Turkish have never forgotten the landing of the Greek Army in 
the Ionic coasts in 1919 and the occupation of a large part of Europcan Turkcy for 3 
years. The restoration of friendly relations after the defeat of the Greek army in Asia 
Minor (1922), with the common agreement betwccn Attaturk and Vcnizclos in Ankara 
in 10 June 1930, and their mutual entrance in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (1952) was political, forced by geostrntegic necessities, not trust or free 
will. Characteristically, a Greek minister speaking about Greco-Turkish relations had 
once stated that the Greco-Turkish friendship derives from the head and not from the 
heart.21 
On the other side of the table, Macmillan tried to persuade his interlocutors that 
Cyprus was a vital military base, that could reinforce the British defensive role in the 
Middle East. However, the basic question deriving from Macmillan's arguments is, 
against whom was the Middle East to be defended? The argument that in a possible 
Soviet attack the defensive system of the Middle East would be based in Cyprus is, at 
the least, preposterous, since in such a case NATO could made use of its military bases 
in Greece and Turkey in order to face Soviet aggression. Therefore, a British military 
20 Sir T. Rapp, The Real problem o(Cyprus, (The Listener, September 22, 1955), vol. LIV, no 1386, p. 
449. 
129 
base in Cyprus was more than sufficient for the defensive needs of Britain in the Middle 
East, especially since Britain was a member of NATO. Nevertheless, the official line of 
the Foreign Office was that nothing less than absolute administrative control of Cyprus 
and the exploitation of the whole of the territory of the island could allow Britain to 
fulfill her diplomatic commitments in the Middle East. The Egyptian experience and the 
hostility of the Greek Cypriots persuaded London that a military base in Cyprus would 
not have been permanent. The British fears had been reinforced by the strengthening of 
the political parties in the Greek interior that were asking for the withdrawal of the 
country from the North Atlantic Treaty and the adoption of a neutral policy towards the 
Western and Eastern block. Indeed, parties such as the Unified Democratic Left (EDA), 
under the leadership of I. Iliou, and the Liberal Party, under the leadership of O. 
Papandreou and S.Venizelos, were the two main factors that were forcing the 
government to put an end to the American control of the country. The two 
aforementioned parties, mainly due to their pro-trade unions economic manifestos and 
their liberal nature, were gaining in influence and power day by day. An electoral 
victory by one of those parties would bring to power politicians who would adopt a 
different approach to NATO, compared to Papagos' pro-NATO policies. As O. Farakos 
remembers: 
"II was a common secrel that during that period EDA had been 
controlled by the exiled leadership of the Communist party 
from the Eastern block I was then living in Czechoslovakia 
and I was responsible for drawing up the foreign policy of the 
party. Our main goal was to put obstacles before the official 
Greek line for absolute co-operation with the West, and 
eventually force the country out of NATO, It was a difficult 
task, since Greece was a vital pawn for the geostrategic 
interests of the US, however we then believed that the fragile 
political stability of the country was not able to survive 
continuous pressure from the Greek masses ... 22 
In fact, the British answer to the Greek offer of a British military base in Cyprus was 
that governments change.23 
In addition, apart from the argument for the fulfilment of British commitments in the 
Middle East, there were other more important reasons, outside the framework of British 
21 C. Foley, Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War, (London. 1964). p. 99. 
22 Personal interview with Mr. Farakos. June 1999.Athens. 
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international diplomatic commitments, that influenced the British policy towards the 
Cypriot question. Macmillan's argument that his country needed the Cypriot ground in 
order to protect the free world was just the one side of the coin. First of all, the 
Conservatives regarded Cyprus as a vast base which would allow London to maintain its 
influence in the Middle East, and more specifically to protect the national interests in the 
oil-producing countries of that area. Therefore, A. Eden, in a spontaneous statement in 
the House of Commons, tried to defend the decisions of his government concerning the 
Cypriot question by saying: 
"Her Majesty's Government must be concerned, as every other 
government is concerned, to protect the vital interests of its 
own citizens. The welfare and indeed the lives of our people 
depend on Cyprus as a protective guard and staging post to 
take care of those interests, oil above all. This is not 
imperialism. It should be the plain duty of any government, 
and we intend to discharge it. ,,24 
Without any doubt, Eden's statement was more sincere than Macmillan's during the 
London Conference. On the other hand, C.M. Woodhouse came to the conclusion that 
the main orientation of British foreign policy in the Middle East was to protect the 
country's interests from the newly established nationalist governments and chauvinist 
dictators who appeared in the area after the end of the Second World War. At the 
strategic level the above policy meant that Britain, unlike the US, regarded the 
possibility of a war with the Soviet Union in the Middle East as a secondary issue, 
compared to the danger coming from the local nationalist movements, such the cases of 
Egypt and Jordan that will be reviewed later on.25 
Undoubtedly, the issue of the Middle East oil resources was one of the greatest 
importance for the British and Western European industry. The British interest in these 
resources arose at the beginning of the century, but intensified after the end of the First 
World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. During the 30's and 40's, after a 
series of explorations in the subsoil of the Middle East, it was a common secret that the 
territory had the largest quantities of oil deposits in the world, while in 1955 the Middle 
East contributed 21 % of the global oil production.26 However, what is even more 
important than the above was the conclusion of the specialists that, of the global oil 
23 S. Lloyd: U.N. General Assembly, 9th Session, 47th Plenary Meeting, September 24, 1954. 
24 A. Eden: House ofConunons, March 14, 1956, vol. 550, col. 421. 
2.5 C.M Woodhouse, Britjsh Foreign Policy since the Second World War, (London, 1961), pp. 134.35. 
26 M. Patrick, Oil and the Middle East, (The Political Quarterly, 1957), vol. 28, p. 169. 
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stock, 60%-70% was in the Middle East. Therefore, British interests in that territory 
were immense. The Kuwait Oil Company, which had the monopoly in the Kuwait oil 
resources, belonged to the British Petroleum Company (54%) and the American Gulf 
Exploration Company.27 Additionally, Britain had equally high interests in Iran, as well. 
In 1954 the Iranian government signed a special economic pact with international oil 
companies, known as Iran Oil Participant Limited. The British Petroleum Company 
controlled 40% of the total share, while the Royal Dutch/Shell, of which 40% was in 
tum controlled by Britain, owned 14%. In neighbouring Iraq the situation was the same. 
In 1956 the British Petroleum Company and the Royal Dutch/Shell were each operating 
23.75% of the oil production of the country. Another fact that demonstrates the great 
importance of the Middle East for Britain, is that the British Petroleum Company had 
been supplied with oil exclusively from countries of that area. In 1956, for example, 
49,500,000 tons out of 50,000,000 tons of the company's crude oil supplies came from 
the countries of the Middle East.28 
The above figures should be studied with reference to the fact that the oil from the 
Middle East was transported through the Suez Canal. During the 50's, small tankers had 
been used for the transportation of oil, therefore a trip round Africa instead of Suez 
would have created a series of problems. Not only would the transportation cost have 
been doubled, but also at the same time it would not have been enough to cover the 
needs of Britain and the rest of Western Europe. According to The Economist, during 
that period, 8.5 million tonnes of oil had been transported to Europe from the Middle 
East every month. If the same number of tankers had used the African route instead of 
Suez, then Europe would have received over the same chronological period less than 4 
million tonnes.29 
From the above one can conclude that the Middle East oil resources were critical for 
the British economy. The evacuation of the British military base in Suez and the 
appearance of nationalist movements in the heart of the Middle East, made Britain 
regard Cyprus as the only secure ground for the defence of the national interest in the 
Middle East and of the transportation routes. Therefore, if Cyprus were united with 
Greece Britain could not be sure that her own national interests would be in accord with 
the policies and diplomatic obligations of Athens. 
27 The Kuwait Oil Company had been established in 1951 afier a special agreement with the Sheik who 
received 25% of the annual profit in American dollars. 
28 The Economist, Kings in Oil, May 11. 1957. 
29 The Economist, Oil is Critical, November 10, 1956. 
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Another argument that had been used by the three powers during the Conference in 
order to support their own approach towards the Cypriot question was the Treaty of 
Lausanne. The British and the Greek position towards that argument has been presented 
in a previous chapter, therefore I intend to dedicate more space to the Turkish position. 
The British position had not changed since the 9th Plenary Meeting of the United 
Nations. According to Macmillan, the annexation of Cyprus by Britain was recognized 
internationally by means of the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923 both by the 
Greek and the Turkish govemments.30 The Greek Foreign Minister avoided referring 
directly to the Lausanne Treaty, but he stated that the British control over Cyprus was 
unchangeable. Nevertheless, he stated that the Cypriot question was an international 
problem and not a crisis that had been provoked by the government of Athens, since the 
majority of the Cypriot people were asking for their self determination.31 The Turkish 
Minister, on the other hand, spoke about the Treaty of Lausanne in great detail. He 
admitted that according to article 20, the Turkish sovereignty upon Cyprus came to an 
end on November 1914, when the island passed under British rule. However, he added 
that according to article 21, the people of Cyprus had either Turkish or British 
nationality.32 Using article 21 as the base for his argument, Zorlu supported the view 
that the fate of Cyprus could only be determined between Turkey and Britain. He 
established his argument by stating that at the time of the signature of the Treaty of 
Lausanne the parties concerned in Cyprus were, exclusively, Turkey and Great Britain. 
Zorlu finished his speech by reminding the other powers that were present in the 
Lancaster House that: 
" ... the "abnegation" and "sacrifice" of Turkey in Ihe mailer of 
Cyprus was only in favour of Greal Brilain and under cerlain 
conditions, if there is any attempt to alter this situation, the 
Turkish Government will demand a return to the status prior to 
such abnegation. ,,33 
Even if Zorlu' s arguments have a certain degree of validity, they are not well based on 
the Treaty of Lausanne. A precise analysis of the Treaty can lead to entirely different 
conclusions. Starting from article 20, which recognizes the total domination of Britain 
over Cyprus without any objection from the Turkish side, one can clearly support the 
view that Britain had every legitimate right to alter the Cypriot status quo without 
30 Macmillan: Cmd. 9594, August 30, 1955, p. 9. 
31 Stefanopoulos: Cmd 9594, August 31, 1955, p. 17. 
32 Zorlu: Cmd. 9594, September 1, 1955, p. 20. 
33 Zorlu: op. cit., p. 21. 
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involving Ankara. This conclusion can be supported by article 16, which clearly states 
that Turkey abandoned every right upon the territories that were under her control but 
remained outside her national frontiers. Indeed, since the signature of the Treaty of 
Lausanne Turkey had not opposed changes to the status quo of other territories outside 
her national frontiers, such as the Dodecanese that passed under Greek control after the 
end of the Second World War. Therefore, if the Conference of London had recognized 
any right of Turkey over Cyprus, deriving from the Treaty of Lausanne, then the Turkish 
side would have had every legitimate right to preserve its rights upon every territory 
outside her national frontiers that had been under the control of the Ottoman Empire in 
the past. On the other hand, Zorlu's argument, that at the time of the signature of the 
Treaty of Lausanne the parties concerned in Cyprus were Britain and Turkey, can find 
many supporters. It is true that the Treaty of Lausanne had been signed by the Entente 
powers on the one hand, and Turkey on the other. Therefore, many articles of the Treaty 
have a bipartite nature. However, this argument could be used by the Greek side as a 
forceful diplomatic weapon. The Greek side could have claimed that since the signature 
of the Treaty of Lausanne concerning Cyprus did not involve her, then the international 
status quo of Cyprus was an agreement between Britain and Turkey, therefore she did 
not have any legal obligation to accept it. In such a case, the fragile peace in the Eastern 
Mediterranean would have been under threat, while every diplomatic agreement in the 
area would have been subject to reconsideration. Finally, the statement of the Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs that the concession of Cyprus to Britain was the result of a 
Turkish abnegation and sacrifice, is an exaggeration rather than a valid historic 
conclusion. In 1878, the Ottoman Empire gave Cyprus to Britain in return for British 
protection against the Russian threat, but typically it remained under the Sultan's 
control. However, during the First World War Britain and the Ottoman Empire were in 
different camps and as a result Cyprus had been annexed by Britain by a colonial decree 
in 1914, a development that was finally recognized by Kemal in the Lausanne Treaty of 
1923. In that way, Turkey abandoned every right of sovereignty upon Cyprus and 
recognized the de facto annexation of Cyprus by Britain, giving it a de jure stance 
through the signature of the Lausanne Treaty. 
Another issue discussed during the Conference in London was the topie of self-
determination and self-government. In spite of the fact that the three Ministers primarily 
appeared to agree concerning the principle of self-government, in essence their different 
approaches were totally opposite. Regarding the concept of self-detennination the 
disagreement among the three ministers was total. According to the British side, the 
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principle of self-detennination could have not been accepted as one of universal 
application. As Macmillan said: 
"We think that exceptions must be made in view of 
geographical, traditional, historical, strategical and other 
considerations. ,,34 
This time, however, the British side tried to avoid the consequences of a new "never" 
and for that reason it stated that there was no prospect of any change in the status quo of 
Cyprus in the foreseeable future. In an attempt to clarify the position of his government, 
Macmillan stated that: 
"We are a very empirical people. We try to deal withfacts as 
we see them. There is nothing permanent In the world and 
especially in the nuclear world, and in the long story of 
mankind, no-one knows it beller than the races and countries 
bordering the Mediterranean, there are many changes and 
permutations which take place,' but we face facts as they 
are. ,,3$ 
The Greek position, as expressed by Stefanopoulos, was in favour of the recognition of 
the right of self-detennination for the Cypriot people by London, which would be 
implemented in a democratic manner and within a reasonable period of time. Moreover, 
Stefanopoulos expressed his regrets, because the British government had chosen to 
pursue a policy of discrimination towards the people of Cyprus compared to other 
British colonies, but he concluded by offering the other sides an olive branch with the 
following words: 
"We have stated our position with complete frankness and 
much moderation despite the differences of point of view 
revealed, we shall part with the resolve to continue our joint 
effortfor the defense of the Free World and the preservation of 
peace. ,,36 
The Turkish side, on the other hand, adopted a solid and inflexible position, even 
reaching the point of threatening, indirectly, the fragile peace between Turkey and 
Greece. Zorlu demanded that his British colleague reassure him that the British 
government would not adopt any policy which could eventually lead to the 
independence of the island, or its unification with another country. The argument that 
34 Macmillan: Cmd. 9594, September 6, 1955, p. 37. 
35 Macmillan: op. cit., p. 36. 
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the Turkish Minister presented for his negative attitude towards any alteration to the 
Cypriot status quo, was that such a development would amount to a revision of the 
Treaty of Lausanne and would certainly impair Greek-Turkish friendship.37 Without 
any doubt, Zorlu's statement was a great antithesis compared with the statements of his 
colleagues who, even though they did not show any sign of reconsidering their positions, 
still tried to present a more flexible and moderate attitude. Concerning the principle of 
self-government, the British side appeared to be fervent supporters of such a scheme. In 
addition, Macmillan expressed his disappointment that such a scheme had not been 
implemented in the Cypriot case yet. Indeed, the British side presented at the 
Conference new constitutional proposals for Cyprus. The Greek Minister of Foreign 
Affairs agreed with the British proposals and denounced the British side for failing to 
implement that policy in the past.38 Nevertheless, for the Greek side the implementation 
of internal self-government should lead eventually to self-determination, within a 
reasonable period of time.39 It is obvious that the British side did not accept the Greek 
position. The Turkish Minister, on the other hand, was against an immediate 
implementation of the principle of self-government. According to ZorIu, the political 
situation in Cyprus was not ready to accept such an ambitious plan and for that reason 
any political development should be postponed until the return of absolute peace and 
quiet in Cyprus.40 Nevertheless, ZorIu went even further, revealing the Turkish position 
towards self-government and the political rights of the Turkish minority. Zorlu stated 
that: 
"Even when the circumstances change in Cyprus and the 
climate eventually becomes suitable for self-government as 
explained above, it must still be borne in mind that, on such a 
small parcel of land where two different communities live who 
vary in so many ways, the guiding principle should not be the 
consideration of majorities and minorilies, but rather the 
granting offull equality to the two groups ... 4/ 
36 Stefanopoulos: Cmd. 9594, September 7,1955, p. 36. 
37 Zorlu: Cmd. 9594, September 7, 1955, p. 38. 
38 It is important to note at this point that Stefanopoulos was wrong to accuse the British side of failing to 
implement the principle of self-government in Cyprus. As seen in a previous chapter, the British tried to 
negotiate with the Greek Cypriot community regarding self government but in almost every case they 
faced the inflexible position of the Church and the Greek Cypriot Right, on the one hand, and the political 
hesitation and lack of courage of AKEL, on the other. 
39 Stefanopoulos: Cmd. 9594, September 7, 1955, p. 36. 
40 Zorlu: Cmd. 9594, September I, 1955, p. 24. 
41 Zorlu: op. cit., p. 25. 
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On 6 September, when all the three Ministers had presented their views concerning 
the Cypriot question, Macmillan supplied the other two delegations with the 
constitutional proposals for Cyprus, which were in favour of internal self-government. 
The London government knew, even before the beginning of the Conference, that the 
Turkish and Greek positions towards the Cypriot question were uncompromisingly 
opposed. Therefore the tactic of the British side, inspired by Macmillan42, was to delay 
the announcement of the proposals until the point when the different approaches of 
Athens and Ankara would have been clearly stated and noted by the international 
community. This tactical move would have helped the Conservative government of 
London, by revealing to the international community that the British side was in the 
middle of a Greco-Turkish dispute and that the constitutional proposals were the last 
chance of peace and order in the Eastern Mediterranean. Characteristically, Eden in his 
memoirs wrote about Macmillan's method of presenting the British constitutional 
approaches: 
"He [Macmillan] did not put fonvard our proposals for the 
future at this stage, but said he would disclose them after the 
Greek and Turkish representatives had stated their views. We 
knew how wide the difference of opinion was between the 
Greeks and the Turks but the world did not. Too many thought 
our troubles due to old fashioned British colonialism. By 
securing a precise definition of these differences we hoped to 
show the true nature of the problem. The exact terms of our 
proposalsfor the future could then be presented. ,,43 
The constitutional proposals offered Cyprus an Assembly with an elected majority, 
while a proportionate quota of seats would have been reserved for the Turkish 
community. All Departments of the Cyprus government would have been progressively 
transferred to Cypriot Ministers, with the exception of Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Public Security, which would have been reserved to the Governor. Moreover, in order 
to safeguard the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority, a proportion of the Ministerial 
portfolios would have been reserved for that community.44 In addition, a Cypriot Chief 
Minister to head the new Cypriot administration would have been chosen by the 
Assembly with the approval of the Governor. It is more than obvious that the above 
constitutional proposals were formulated in vague terminology, leaving many points 
42 H. Macmillan, Tides of Fortune ,(London, 1969), p.p. 666-67. 
43 A. Eden, Full Circle, (London, 1960), p. 400. 
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unclear. For example, the British proposals did not specify the exact number of seats in 
the Assembly, and more specifically the number of elected and appointed ones. They 
did not specify how many seats would have been reserved for the Turkish community 
and how many of those seats would have been elected or appointed. This particular 
point was of vital importance to the Greek side, because if the reserved Turkish seats 
were included in the elected ones, then the Greek Cypriots were facing the possibility of 
being the minority in the Assembly, since the British establishment would have 
controlled the appointed seats with their own people. The clarification of all the dark 
comers of the constitutional proposals and the appropriate method of their 
implementation in the Cypriot political arena would have been the duty of a Tripartite 
Committee, which would have consisted of a British, a Turkish and a Greek 
representative. The formation of the Tripartite Committee was a British proposa1.4S In 
addition, after the completion of its initial task, the Tripartite Committee would be 
maintained in order to receive reports regarding the development of self-government in 
Cyprus, and to act as a centre for discussing problems or differences arising out of self-
government, which would have been impossible to resolve locally in Cyprus. 
Concerning the principle of self-determination, the British side stated that a 
divergence of view was apparent between the three delegations, therefore it should be set 
aside. However, according to the British side, the failure to settle this aspect of the 
problem should not be allowed to destroy the wide measure of agreement established in 
regard to the other main problem of internal self-government.46 The Turkish Minister 
had already stated in the Conference that his government was not able to accept the 
constitutional proposals of the British side. Zorlu had insisted that the British 
government had gone so far with their aspiration to establish internal self- government in 
Cyprus, that the Turkish side had some doubts as to the real purpose of London.47 On 
the other hand, the Greek side could not find the British proposals acceptable, since they 
excluded the possibility of the implementation of self-determination in 'Cyprus, while the 
proposal for the establishment of a Tripartite Committee would give Turkey the right to 
supervise and intervene in Cypriot political life, making Athens anxious about the 
possibile formation of an Anglo-Turkish alliance concerning the Cypriot question. For 
all those reasons it was impossible for the British proposals to be accepted by the Greek 
side. Despite the fact that Stefanopoulos did not give any definite answer concerning the 
44 Text of Proposals: Cmd. 9594, Appendix I, p. 42. 
4' ibid., p. 42. 
46 ibid., p. 42. 
47 Zorlu: Cmd. 9594, September 7, 1955, p. 39. 
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British constitutional proposals, he still expressed the opinion that the procedure for 
working out a constitution for Cyprus could not be described as democratic if Cypriots 
were not associated with that task. Moreover, he expressed his fears that the proposed 
Tripartite Conference was bound to interfere with the working of the freely elected 
Cypriot government and would conflict with the proper functioning of democracy in the 
island. Last but not least, the Greek representative asked his interlocutors why the 
traditional British principle, applied elsewhere in the Commonwealth, of allowing the 
ultimate exercise of self-determination by dependent territories, could not be applied in 
the case ofCyprus.48 As a result, the final answer of the Greek delegation regarding the 
British proposals was negative. The Greek side turned down the British proposals 
because they failed to satisfy the requests of the principle of self-determination and 
because the proposed constitution was of a type that could not be regarded as adequate 
for so highly developed and civilized people as the CypriotS.49 However, at this 
particular point extraneous factors influenced the final outcome of the Tripartite 
Conference. The same day (6 September) that H. Macmillan announced the British 
constitutional proposals, anti-Greek riots burst out in Smyrna (Jzmir) and 
Constantinople. The next day the negotiations broke down and the Conference was 
never able to re-convene. 
Despite the fact that the Conference had been interrupted due to the anti-Greek riots in 
Turkey, in reality, as The Economist stated: 
"The London Conference on Cyprus is officially said to stand 
suspended,' but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that has in 
fact failed. "so 
One of the major reasons for the failure of the Tripartite Conference was timing. The 
sectarian violence in Cyprus had been well established by then, and the relations 
between the two communities in the island were not at their highest point. As The 
Manchester Guardian observed in an article, the Conference should have taken place 
months earlier before the Turks run wild and the Greek government and the rest of the 
Greek parties succumbed to their feelings and allowed the Greek Cypriots to gain so 
much power.SI The wrong timing and the great divergence in the views of the three 
countries that participated in the Conference resulted in its failure. Another equally 
important factor in that failure was the fact that the Cypriots had not been invited to 
48 Stefanopoulos: Cmd. 9594, September 6, 1955, p. 35. 
49 Reply of the Greek Government: Cmd. 9594, Athens, September 17, 1955, p. 43. 
50 The Economist, No Progress on Cyprus, September 10, 1955. 
51 The Manchester Guardian, ~,September 8,1955. 
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London. As T. Driberg said in an article in Tribune "the Turkish presence and the 
Cypriot absence were the two main reasons for the failure of the London Conference ,,52 
Leaving aside the argument for the Turkish presence in the Conference, the observation 
regarding the absence of the Cypriots from the Conference is fully justified. As seen 
above, the discussions during the Conference concerned the future of Cyprus, so the 
absence of the Cypriot people was a major disadvantage, keeping them away from the 
negotiations for their own future. On the other hand, the non-invitation of the Cypriot 
people to the Conference meant that even if the delegations had reached an agreement, 
this would not have restored peace and order in the island if one of the two communities 
was not satisfied by it.53 Last but not least, another reason for the failure of the 
Conference lies in the uncompromising tactic of the three nations that participated in it. 
The British side, on the one hand, took the initiative to organize a Conference without 
being ready to alter any point of its traditional policy towards the Cypriot question. The 
new constitutional proposals were called "Hberal"s4, and it has to be said that they were 
more reformist than those proposed in the House of Commons by Hopkinson, a year 
earlier. However, if the proposals are evaluated in light of the establishment of a 
Tripartite Committee, then the Greek hesitations can be justified. Additionally, 
Macmillan's phrase "not in the foreseeable future", even if it sounded better, had the 
same meaning as Hopkinson's "never". The Greek side, on the other hand, given the 
fact that it accepted the invitation to the Conference would be expccted to show some 
signs of flexibility. On the contrary, the Greek delegation arrived in London in order to 
fulfill the maximum of the Greek Cypriot desires, and it proved weak and unwilling to 
accept any solution that would provoke the Cypriot Church and Makarios. According to 
The Times' correspondent in Athens, a month before the beginning of the Conference in 
London Makarios visited Athens and secured Papagos' promise that no solution would 
be accepted by the Greek delegation if it did not include the principle of self-
determination.55 The Greek delegation arrived in Cyprus dominated by n figure who 
was not present, Makarios, and this fact is one of the greatest historic responsibilities of 
Athens, both to the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot: that Greece designed its policy 
,;z The Herald Tribune The Talks That Were Bound to FAil, September 16, 1955. 
'3 The above argument applies more to the Greek Cypriots, since the fact that the Greek government, as 
seen in a previous chapter, had no authority over the Cypriot Orthodox Church and EOKA. 
Characteristically, Makarios in a Press statement in Athens on July 16, 1955, declared that "the people 0/ 
Cyprus will never accept any decision o/the London Conference which do not accord with their rights 
and aspirations even if those decisions are endorsed by the Greek government. " N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., 
£.89. See also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 27 August-3 September 1955 p. 14396. 
4 The Economist, No Progress on Cyprus. September 10, 1955. 
"The Times, August 29,1955, p. 7. 
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towards the Cypriot question according to domestic considerations, without considering 
the fragile status of the peace and order in the island. Therefore, Macmillan's words that 
"the Greeks are too weak to make a concession,,56 sound accurate and just. Fortified 
behind the forceful moral, but inflexible, argument that the Greeks were the absolute 
majority in Cyprus, the Greek delegation was determined to achieve the implementation 
of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, within a small period of time. 
Nevertheless, the inflexible position of the Turkish side was even more intensified and 
flamboyant. Even before the beginning of the Conference the Turkish government 
clearly stated that it would not accept any solution for the Cypriot question, except the 
maintenance of the existing status quo. As the Turkish Prime Minister Adan Menderes 
said in a statement on August 24, before the Turkish delegation left Istanbul for the 
London Conference: 
"the Turkish thesis which will be put forward at the London 
Conference is that the maintenance of the status quo is the 
minimum acceptable to Turkey. If a change occurs in the status 
of the island, it should revert to Turkey"j7 
Additionally, diplomatic circles in Athens insisted that some of the Turkish prominent 
politicians had unofficially stated that the Turkish army was ready to intervene in 
Cyprus, if necessary. 58 Under the spirit of non-negotiation, the Turkish officials began a 
convincing anti-Greek propaganda in Turkey, aiming to arouse public rage. As 
Macmillan quite rightly wrote in his memoirs, " the Turks are too tough to make a 
concession".59 A comment characteristic of the internal Turkish situation during that 
period can be found in C. Legoum's article in The Observer. As the reporter wrote: 
"According to official sources the most alarming side of the 
current situation in Cyprus is the hysterical propaganda 
especially in Turkey for the danger of slaughters in Cyprus. 
The Turkish side appears to believe a totally baseless rumour 
that EOKA is planning to hit the Turkish-Cypriots the following 
weekend. Rumors like that can cause a great distress among 
the masses in Cyprus and Turkey and the consequences will be 
felt in Greece, immediately. ,,60 
S6 H. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 669. 
S7 Keesing's: ibid. 
58 Akropolis, August 30,1955, p. 3. 
S9 H. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 669. 
60 The Observer, Conflicting Demands at Cyprus Talks. August 28. 1955. 
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The above words turned out to be prophetic, as a few days later on 6 September great 
anti-Greek riots broke out in Constantinople and Smyrna that resulted in the destruction 
of the property of a great number of the Greek minority in Turkey and the collapse of the 
Tripartite Conference in London. 
On the afternoon of 6 September serious anti-Greek riots occurred in Constantinople 
and Smyrna and to a lesser degree in Ankara, following incidents in Thessaloniki on the 
previous day in which the windows of the Turkish Consulate, and also of a house next to 
the Consulate, in which Kemal Ataturk was born, were smashed by the explosion of a 
stick of dynamite. Five persons were detained in connection with the Thessaloniki 
incident, which caused no casualties and only minor damage.61 When the news became 
known in Turkey, mobs of Turkish youths roamed the streets of Istanbul smashing and 
looting Greek-owned shops and houses and setting fire to Greek property, including a 
number of Greek Orthodox churches dating from the Byzantine era. Churches such as 
the st. Trinity, st. Athanasios, St. Dimitrios and St. Theodoron were looted and priceless 
icons destroyed, while the Greek cemetery of Sisla was despoiled. Many Greek 
shopkeepers and householders, with their families, were driven into the streets or were 
forced to hoist the Turkish flag above their premises, whilst attacks were also made on 
foreign-owned property of Annenian and Jewish citizens. In Smyrna (headquarters of 
the NATO South East European Command) mobs attacked houses occupied by Greek 
officers and wrecked a Greek paVilion at a trade fair, whilst in Ankara tear-gas was used 
to disperse several thousand demonstrators, who attempted to march on the Greek 
Embassy. The international community was outraged by the Turkish excesses, and 
Turkish officials felt the need to invent an excuse by accusing the Communists of the 
incidents. The Turkish Government issued a statement on 7 September, attributing 
responsibility for the riots to Communist agitators, and describing the disturbances as a 
Communist plot.62 However, the above argument is not valid since even today 
Communism is illegal in Turkey, and the illegal Communist organization does not have 
the power to organize incidents to such a great extent. A.H. Hanson, quite rightly, said 
that the influence of the Communist movement was limited even among the Turkish 
proletariat. He continues by stating that the anti-Greek riots were not spontaneous, but 
had been encouraged by the Turkish government.63 Moreover, Macmillan wrote about 
the role of the Turkish government that "the Turkish riots in Istanbul and Smyrna, were 
61 Keesing's: September 10-17 1955, p. 14424. 
61 ibid. 
63 A.H. Hanson, pemocracy Transplanted: ReOections on n Turkish Election, (Parliamentary Affairs, 
The Hansard Society, vol. IX, 1955-56).4 
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undoubtedly connived at if not promoted by the Government,,64 However, what the 
West failed to understand, quite naturally though, is that even the incident in the Turkish 
Consulate in Thessaloniki was caused by the Turkish Intelligence foHowing the personal 
instructions of Menderes. The role of the Turkish Prime Minister was revealed during 
his trial after the successful coup of General Cemal Gursel, on 27 May, 1960.6s Despite 
the fact that Menderes did not give any explanation for his actions concerning the 
incident in Thessaloniki, that fact demonstrates the willingness of the Turkish 
establishment to use any means in order to block any negotiations concerning the 
Cypriot status quo. 
Nevertheless, the question that both the British and Greek specialists dealing with the 
Cypriot question are failing to answer is the following one: Had the Turkish interest in 
Cyprus been provoked by the British government as a tactic to secure Turkey by its side 
and strengthen its position in Cyprus even further, or it was a genuine and purely Turkish 
decision? 
During the first years of the British presence in Cyprus, the Ottoman Empire did not 
show any particular interest in Cyprus, even though it was still an Ottoman province.66 
The first time that the Turkish side presented strong arguments against the Greek 
Cypriot demands was in the United Nations during the Greek appeal. The same 
principle applies to the Turkish Cypriots. Even if the Greek Cypriot demand for Enosis 
with Greece dates back to the 19th century, nothing showed that the relations between the 
two communities in Cyprus were hostile, with the exception of limited incidents that 
cannot be generalized. Nevertheless, the situation changed after the Greek appeal in the 
United Nations. It is quite interesting to refer to Eden's observation that dates the 
Turkish Cypriot psychological change to 1955. As Eden is said: 
" The Turkish-speaking Cypriots were strongly opposed to 
Union with Greece. In early 1955 their passions were not yet 
inflamed for the Turk is slow to anger, but once roused he is 
implacable ,,67 
In general, every time that British officials referred to the Cypriot case, they seemed 
either to promote the Turkish interests or to calculate the Turkish reactions in the case of 
64 H. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 672. 
65 E. AverofTositsas, A Story of Missed Opportunities: The Cypriot question 1950 - 1963 , (Athens, 
1982), vol. I, p. 72. For more concerning the coup in Turkey on 27 May 1960 see: W.L Cleveland, op. 
cit., pp. 264-65. 
66 For more concerning the Turkish attitude during the first period of Cyprus under British control see: S. 
Litsas, Turkey and Cyprus; When Apathy turns into Obsession, (Athens, 2000), Centre of Social and 
Economic Studies, vol. X, ser. 89, pp. 4-9 
67 Sir A. Eden, op. cit., p. 396. 
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a solution to the Cypriot question that would encourage the Enosis. While, the British 
officials were fault-finding towards every Greek demand, they seemed to regard the 
even more extremist Turkish positions as simply realistic. Therefore, it should not cause 
any surprises that the newly established Turkish interest in Cyprus persuaded not only 
the Greeks but many other observers, that this interest had been shaped not by Ankara 
but by London.68 
Nevertheless, the above argument by itself does not provide a complete answer to the 
basic question. It fails to present the whole picture of the situation. Beside the fact that 
the Conservative government of London can be held responsible for the shaping of 
Turkish interest towards the Cypriot question, there were other factors that should be 
mentioned, in order to give a full answer to the basic question. Apart from the military 
Turkish interests examined in a previous paragraph of this chapter, other factors that 
shaped the Turkish interest concerning the Cypriot question werc the internal difficulties 
that Menderes' government had to face in the economic and political spectrum. This 
argument can be based on a fundamental law of International Relations, that when a 
government is facing great internal problems then it becomes quite sensitive or even 
aggressive in its foreign policy. Characteristically, The Spectator's correspondent in 
Turkey, referring to the Turkish interest in Cyprus, wrote that the geostrategic 
importance of Cyprus was possibly not the main factor that shapcd the Turkish position, 
but the low position of the Turkish pound in the international monetary scale.69 
Moreover, concerning the above argument, it was the Labour MP Robinson that once 
stated inside the House of Commons that: 
"What is better in a situation like this than an external issue by 
which the government can divert the attention of the people 
from the problems which they are incapable of solving, an issue 
with a chauvinistic appeal such as this has for the Turks? It is 
68 This arguments is proven by the following speeches from the House of Commons: 
Mr. K. Robinson (Labour Party): "The Turkish position is a Frankenstein created by lIer Majesty's 
Government". House of Commons, March 14, 1956, vol. 550, col. 421. 
Mrs. Lena Jeger (Labour Party): "/ am sure that there has been gross exaggeration of Turkish objections 
and that a great deal of the trouble which we are now experiencing from the Turks In C)'Prus and Turkey 
itself has been created by the Government, who are now confronted with a sort of Frankenstein monster 
with which they do not know what to do" House of Commons, July 19, 1956, vol. 556, col. 1502. 
Mr. P. Noel-Baker (Labour Party): "/ believe that the difficulties about the Turks have been very much 
increased by speeches made on the Government benches andfrom the Government box, speeches 
expressing the Turks strong opposition before the Turks had spoken ofit themselves" House of 
Commons, September 14, 1956, vol. 558, col. 357. 
69 For more concerning the Turkish economic situation see: The Spectator, Cypriot nnd Turks. September 
20, 1957 
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the classic situation we have seen in Egypt, in Persia and in 
many other countries. ,,70 
On the other hand, an equally important factor for the shaping of the Turkish policy 
towards Cyprus was the position of the country in the international arena. It is widely 
accepted that Turkey did not present many arguments in the case of the Dodecanese and 
their union with Greece, after the end of the Second World War. Without any doubt, 
there are many differences between the two cases. However, no-one can deny the great 
geostrategic importance of the Dodecanese for Turkish security. Therefore, in order to 
identify the differences between Turkish policy in the Dodecanese and in the Cypriot 
question, one must evaluate the Turkish position in the global scale immediately after 
the end of the Second World War and during the 1950's. In the one case, Turkey had to 
face the unfriendliness of the Western world over its hesitation to declare war against the 
Axis power, while in the second case Turkey had been regarded by the West as the last 
frontier of democracy and their most valuable ally against Soviet expansionism in the 
Middle East. Without any doubt, Turkish influence had been reinforced since the end 
of the Second World War, and this was a factor that Turkish diplomacy had used 
successfully in many cases, in order to protect national interests or to secure new ones. 
Last but not least, another factor that played a decisive role in the Turkish position 
towards the Cypriot question was the method of Greek diplomacy. Despite the fact that 
this issue had been ignored by the Greek academia, nevertheless it played an important 
role concerning the shaping of the Turkish inflexible stance. In their attempt to promote 
Enosis, the Greeks seemed to ignore the Turkish reactions. As has been mentioned 
above, the Turkish and international political climate implied that a strong Turkish 
reaction towards Enosis was on the cards. Therefore, Greek diplomacy should first have 
approached the Turks in Cyprus and in Turkey, before taking the initiative for an open 
discussion of the Cypriot question in the United Nations. It is true that someone can 
argue against Makarios' role concerning the Greek appeal in the United Nations. As 
mentioned in a previous chapter, Makarios' pressure upon the Greek government was 
one of the major reasons for the Greek decision to appeal to the United Nations. 
However, this argument does not imply that the Greek government had no chance to 
negotiate with the Turkish side. Kyrou, the well-known Greek diplomat, argued that the 
Greek government had decided to approach Turkey about Cyprus during June 1954, 
when Papagos invited Menderes to visit Athens on his way back from Washington. 
Nevertheless, Kyrou reveals that the Turkish ambassador in Athens stated his worries 
70 K. Robinson: House of Commons, July 19, 1956, vol. 556, col. 1455. 
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that any mention of the Cypriot case would have threatened Greco-Turkish relations. 
Therefore, the Greek Prime Minister thought that it was best not to mention anything 
about Cyprus during Menderes' stay in the Greek capita!.7l Kyrou uses the above story 
as an excuse for the Greek failure to negotiate with Turkey, but it is an invalid excuse. It 
cannot be used as an excuse for a Prime Minister at Papagos' level for the fact that he 
decided not to speak about Cyprus when he met his Turkish colleague in a close and 
confidential environment, in order to protect Greco-Turkish relations, when two months 
later he raised the same issue in the United Nations. In this case, Greek foreign policy 
emulated the ostrich, however in international politics this tactic cannot bring any 
results. On the other hand, no one can say with certainty that the Turkish position would 
have been different even if the Greek side had informed them concerning their plans for 
the Cypriot question. However, in such a case the Greek side would have had the 
opportunity to measure the Turkish reaction and adjust her policy accordingly. 
During the Tripartite Conference and the anti-Greek riots in Turkey the political 
situation concerning the Cypriot question was more perplexing than ever before. As a 
result Greco-Turkish relations were seriously shaken. In both countries the political 
thermometer was extremely high. Greek air services to Istanbul were suspended until 
further notice, Greek ships were instructed not to call at Turkish ports for the time being, 
and the Greek government announced that it would not participate in joint Greco-
Turkish NATO exercises, which it had been planed to hold in the near future. Moreover, 
M. Kanelopoulos, the Minister of Finance, had informed the Turkish Charge d' Affaires 
on Sept. 7 that Greece would not participate in a meeting of the International Dank and 
Monetary Fund to be held in Istanbul during September of the same year.n Without any 
doubt, Greece was in the worst situation. The Greek diplomats began to comprehend 
that the Cypriot question was not as simple as they believed before, that the British 
invitation to the Conference did not mean the abandonment of "never", and that the 
initiative for the Conference was not an attempt to bridge the different approaches 
towards the Cypriot question, but an effort to manifest them and possibly intensify them. 
The outcome of the Tripartite Conference meant that from that time Greece would have 
to face Turkey at the negotiating table, concerning the Cypriot question. It was certainly 
true that after the failure of the Conference the relations among Athens, London and 
Ankara were getting worse and the road to Enosis was securely blocked. On the other 
hand, Turkey had improved her position significantly. Her participation in the London 
71 A. Kyrou, Greek Foreign Policy, (Athens, 1955), p. 279. 
72 Keesing's: op. cit., p. 14424. 
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Conference meant that the international community recognized her rights over Cyprus. 
The same can be said about the anti-Greek riots in Constantinople and Smyrna. 
Independently of the fact that the riots had been organized by the Turkish establishment, 
they persuaded and convinced the international community of the great importance of 
Cyprus in Turkish public opinion. 
The anti-Greek riots in Turkey had a great impact on Cyprus. There was valid 
evidence of the worsening of the relations between the two communities, while during 
those days pamphlets flooded the roads of the main Cypriot cities propagandizing for the 
establishment of a Turkish underground organization, which was named "VOLCAN". 
Those pamphlets informed the Turkish community that EOKA had prepared lists with 
the names of prominent members of the Turkish-Cypriot community and warned that if 
the organization were to attack any Turkish official or any Turkish policeman, then they 
would hit back.73 
Without any doubt, the British side was the one that had benefited the most from the 
outcome of the Conference and the riots in Turkey. Macmillan, in an attempt to evaluate 
the Conference, said: 
"It has at least proved that Cyprus is not a colonial problem 
but a great international issue. The Turkish posilion has never 
been understood. Most English people do not look at maps and 
few have realized lis key position bothfor us and/or the Turks. 
Whoever holds Cyprus, commands the port of Alexandretta and 
the back door o/Turkey. ,,74 
On the other hand, the news of the riots in Turkey had been welcomed by certain 
Conservative circles as a development which would have increased the diplomatic 
influence of Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean even further. According to the British 
Premier, the eruption of Turkish public feeling meant that the Cypriot question could be 
solved only through diplomatic negotiations among Britain, Greece and Turkey." 
Obviously such a development favoured Britain since it ensured the leading position of 
the country in every diplomatic negotiation concerning the Cypriot question, and on the 
other hand, it was a clear and sound proof to the rest of the international community that 
the British initiative for organizing the Conference was fully justified and necessary. In 
that way, Britain gained another diplomatic victory, proving herself a useful diplomatic 
negotiator in that stormy period. Therefore, the Conference was a successful move for 
73 N. Kranidiotis, Opt cit., p. lOS. 
74 H. Macmillan, Opt cit., p. 672. 
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the Conservative government, since Britain used Turkey as her defensive line, without 
provoking international public opinion as an inflexible colonialist power. It was Britain 
that organized the Conference but it was Turkey that insisted that the British status quo 
in Cyprus should be maintained as the only acceptable solution to the Cypriot question. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the basic Turkish demand was the preservation of 
the British establishment in Cyprus, therefore the Conservatives had every excuse to 
avoid any alteration to the Cypriot constitutional formula which could have granted a 
greater degree of self-government to the island, presenting it not as an inflexible and 
colonial policy but as an attempt to maintain the fragile peace and order in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the unity of NATO's southeastern flank. Undoubtedly, the nature of 
the Cypriot question had been altered. It was not a colonial problem any more that 
caused internal and external problems of public opinion to the Conservative government. 
It was an international dispute between two countries that had historic differences 
through the centuries. The Conference of London changed the balance of the Cypriot 
question. To public opinion, Britain before August was the colonial power that denied 
the legitimate right of self-determination to a small territory that had been tormented 
through the centuries, whilst after the collapse of the Conference Britain was the country 
that was trapped in the middle of a dispute between two traditional enemies. The 
Conference of London can be seen as the end of the obsolete 19th century-style British 
foreign policy, characterised by imperial arrogance, and the adoption of a modem and 
dynamic foreign line that learnt from the mistakes of the past and had been adjusted 
accordingly to the developments of the time. Through a series of successful diplomatic 
tactics Britain, in the eyes of the international community, was not the aggressor any 
more in Cyprus, but the negotiator and the peace-keeper in an area with a bloody past 
and a gloomy future. 
75 Sir A. Eden, op. cit., p. 401. 
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CHAPTER VII 
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN HARDING AND 
The Politics or Aristotle 
"Reaso"" o/Ihls nolUrI 
will serve to explain why 
democratic stales Institute 
Ihe rule 0/ ostracism ... 
and with that aim In view 
they used to pass a 
sentenCl 0/ ostracism on 
those wlrom Ihey regarded 
as having 100 much 
l'lf1uenCl owing 10 Ilrelr 
wealth or Ihe number 0/ 
,heir eonnexlons or any 
otlrer Jorm oj polllleal 
Slrtngth. " 
Aristotle. III: 15. 
This chapter is concerned with the period of the direct diplomatic negotiations 
between the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios and the governor of Cyprus, Sir J. 
Harding, until Makarios' arrest and exile in Seychelles, on 9 March 1956. Throughout 
the chapter a detailed analysis of the talks will be presented, examining the diplomatic 
arguments of the two sides, as well as their intentions concerning the determination of 
the Cypriot question, and the internal and external political developments that resulted 
in Makarios' arrest and exile. However, it would be a methodological mistake if the 
analysis remained totally focused upon the two personalities that led the discussions. 
Therefore, this chapter will attempt to present the role of external factors, such as the 
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government of Athens and the Kyrenia circles, and their contribution to the final 
outcome of the talks. l The main task of this chapter is to evaluate Harding's 
constitutional proposals and assess the reasons for the Greek Cypriot refusal to accept 
them. Secondary questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: How was the 
decision of Athens to appeal again to the UN justified within the framework of Greece's 
internal situation during that time? Why did the American position towards Harding's 
proposals change? Which were the main reasons that influenced London to order 
Makarios' arrest and exile? 
After the dramatic collapse of the Tripartite Conference in London, the Greek 
government decided to appeal again to the United Nations in favour of the Cypriot 
question. The Greek decision was a desperate diplomatic action that aimed not to 
accomplish a diplomatic victory in New York, but to elevate low Greek morale and put 
an end to the accusations of the opposition parties of governmental inability and 
hesitation to promote the Greek Cypriot demands and protect the Greek minority in 
Turkey.2 After the end of the anti-Greek riots in Constantinople and Smyrna, Greek 
public opinion towards Papagos' government was at its lowest point, while inside the 
Parliament the leaders of the opposition demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister 
and the announcement of general elections. Characteristically, the historic leader of the 
Liberals, G. Papandreou, accused the government over its position during the riots in 
Turkey by stating during an emotional meeting, inside the parliament: 
"The Greek citizens are aware of the great responsibilities of 
the government concerning the Turkish insults during the 
Tripartite Conference and the Turkish vandalism in 
Constantinople and Smyrna. This government is dangerous 
and the Greek people are demanding its resignation before it is 
too late ... 3 
In addition the Unified Democratic Left (EDA) did not waste such a brilliant opportunity 
to afflict Papagos' government. As Z. Argyros, one of the leading figures of EDA's 
student organization and now general manager of the Property Bank in Greece, 
remembers: 
1 Because much important information from the discussions has never been revealed, the author will 
make extended use of memoirs and diaries of the key factors of the talks as well as Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives and the official correspondence between I larding and Makarios. 
2 E. Averof-Tositsas, A Story of Missed Opportunities: The Cypriot Ouestion 1950-1963, (Athens, 
1982), vol. II, p. 86. 
3 P.B. Petridis, Georgios PapandreQu and the Cypriot Question 1954-1965, (Thessaloniki, 1998), pp. 19· 
20. 
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"We seized the opportunity to paralyze the nation. The tragic 
events in Constantinople outraged the absolute majority of the 
Greek population, who felt deeply insulted and threatened by 
the Turkish vulgarity. Therefore, EDA's anti-state actions 
became legitimate through the great public support. We had 
the power and we succeed in keeping the Universities of Athens 
and Thessaloniki locked up for 4 months, we organized 
enormous student demonstrations outside the parliament and 
we instructed the Trade Unions to announce continuous 
general strikes in every major Greek city. The government was 
in a very difficult position and we were pushing them even 
more. ,," 
Therefore, due to the crisis the government decided to appeal to the United Nations over 
the Cypriot question one more time, knowing the outcome of the appeal even before the 
commencement of the talks in New York. As a matter of fact, the Greek appeal was 
turned down by the General Assembly of the Tenth Session of UN (23 Sept. 1955), a 
result that was expected both by the Greek and the British side. On the one hand, it 
would have been irrational for the General Assembly to accept the Greek appeal, just a 
few weeks after the collapse of the Conference in London and the riots in Turkey. A 
possible acceptance of the Greek appeal would have created a new crisis in the already 
wounded Greco-Turkish relations and would have brought closer the possibility of a 
Greco-Turkish war with devastating consequences for the peace and order in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and in the Balkans. On the other hand, another reason for the rejection of 
the Greek appeal was the American diplomatic support for Britain. Despite the fact that 
the Tripartite Conference was a great British diplomatic triumph, still the continuous 
Greek appeals in the United Nations annoyed London. According to the British Prime 
Minister the Greek side would have been discouraged by a sound diplomatic defeat in 
the United Nations. However, for such a development Eden recognized the fact that 
American support was essential.' After explaining to the Americans that a new Greek 
appeal would have inflamed the situation on Cyprus, the British side obtained American 
backing. This resulted in the rejection of the Greek motion by a majority of the General 
Committee of the Assembly and subsequently by the Assembly itself.6 
4 Personal Interview with Mr. Z. Argyros, Athens, July 1999. 
5 A. Eden, Full Circle, (London, 1960), p. 401. 
6 A. Eden, op. cit., p. 402. See also: Gen. Ass., Tenth Session, 521 Plenary Meeting, September 23, 1955. 
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After securing an easy and convenient victory in the United Nations, the Conservative 
government concentrated its attention upon Cyprus, where the hostilities were expanding 
rapidly and were threatening the British diplomatic achievement. The ethnic unrest in 
the island alerted the international community and gave an opportunity to the Opposition 
in the House of Commons to commence a series of intense attacks against Eden and his 
Cabinet. As mentioned in a previous chapter, the main argument of London concerning 
the Cypriot question was that the existing establishment was the only means that 
guaranteed peace and order on the island. However, the internal situation in Cyprus was 
far from peaceful, therefore, the main task of the Conservative government was to 
restore peace and order in the island. However, this task was not simple. As mentioned 
in a previous chapter the British side had Grivas under close surveillance, but the 
situation had changed since the early days of EOKA. Grivas' guerilla movement had 
become strongly established in the Cypriot political spectrum, while the role of P. 
Papadopoulos, Grivas' closest associate and British informer, had been revealed and he 
left the island in the early days of 1956.7 Therefore, Eden decided to make use of larger 
quantities of the British military mechanism in order to eliminate Grivas and EOKA, 
while he was willing to offer the Greek Cypriot side direct negotiations concerning 
Macmillan's constitutional proposals, as they had been presented during the Tripartite 
Conference in London, for the final solution of the Cypriot question. However, Eden's 
plans required a skilful diplomat and an experienced soldier, therefore the British 
Premier decided to appoint Field-Marshall Sir John Harding as the new governor of 
Cyprus. Harding was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, while his qualities had 
been well proven in the Second World War as a commander of the i h Armored Division 
at Alamein, and during the uprising of the Mau-Mau in Kenya and its successful 
suppression. As Eden argued in his memoirs: 
"With such a programme in mind I began to consider the 
Governorship of the island Intelligent andfaithful service was 
being given by the present incumbent, Sir Robert Armitage, but 
the position seemed to call for a rare blend of military and 
diplomatic qualities. I thought I knew the man ... I had in mind 
Field-Marshal Sir John Harding ... ,,8 
7 Grivas' issued a warrant for Papadopoulos, therefore the latter had to abandon Cyprus in order to protect 
his life. With the assistance of the British Intelligence Papadopoulos established himself in London, 
where he died in 1996. 
8 A. Eden, op. cit., p. 402. 
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The new Governor arrived on the island on 3 October 1955 and after he was sworn in, he 
announced his three main objectives as Governor of Cyprus: i) the maintenance of law 
and order, so that people could go about their business in peace without fear of threats 
and oppression; ii) social and economic progress; and iii) a readiness at all times to 
discuss the constitutional developments of the island in the terms of the proposals 
already made by the British Government.9 
The new governor was not a man of pompous statements, therefore the very next day 
he met leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community at the Government House, while 
Makarios and Harding met in Nikosia's hotel, Ledra Palace, on 5 October. The Greek 
Cypriot delegation consisted of the Archbishop, P. Pashalidis, the deputy secretary of the 
Ethnarchy, and N. Kranidiotis, the secretary-general of the Ethnarchy. The British 
delegation consisted of the new governor and his special advisor J. Redaway.lo At the 
beginning of the meeting Sir John Harding proposed the same constitutional proposals 
that had been suggested by Macmillan during the Tripartite Conference in London. 
Makarios replied that the above constitutional proposals had been turned down, both by 
Athens and by the Ethnarchy, and in an attempt to gain the diplomatic advantage by 
surprising his interlocutor, he presented his own proposals: i) Recognition by the British 
Government of the right of the Cyprus people to self- determination constituted thc 
indispensable basis for the solution of the Cyprus question. ii) After the official 
recognition, the Archbishop would be willing to co-operate with the British Government 
in framing a constitution of self-government and putting it into immediate operation iii) 
The time of the application of the principle of self-determination should constitute a 
subject of discussion between the British Government and the representatives of the 
Cyprus people, who would be elected on the basis of the constitution. lI Makarios' 
proposals clearly show that the main obstacle for the adoption of an agreement between 
the British and the Greek Cypriot side was the principle of self-determination. On the 
one hand, the new Governor was not willing to search for a diplomatic solution outside 
of the framework of the Tripartite Conference, while the proposals of the Greek Cypriot 
Archbishop revealed the ever-lasting and uncompromising desire of the Greek Cypriot 
community for the application of the principle of self-determination on the island. 
However, it is important to note that for the first time since his appointment as an 
Archbishop, Makarios showed clear signs of a desire to find n common settlement with 
the British side concerning the Cypriot question. According to the aforementioned 
9 Keesing's Archives, November 5-12,1955, p. 14513. 
10 N. Kranidiotis, Pifficult Years, (Athens, 1981), p. 112. 
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proposals, Makarios abandoned, for the first time, the demand for immediate Enosis 
with Greece and he accepted the introduction of a transitional constitution of self-
government that would have led, eventually, to self-determination. Makarios, through 
his proposals, tried to oblige the Conservative government of London to recognize the 
principle of self-determination but he offered the olive-branch by not demanding a 
specific date for the application of it. Without any doubt, Makarios' proposals were not 
in complete opposition to the British constitutional proposals. However, in response 
Harding answered that he was not authorized by his government to discuss such 
solutions, but he promised the Archbishop that he would forward his proposals to 
London.12 Nevertheless, Makarios' propositions were not welcomed by the hard-liners 
of the Ethnarchy, Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos, and Grivas. Their inflexible position 
was well established and they accused Makarios of undermining the Greek Cypriot 
struggle for Enosis by negotiating with the British. As Kranidiotis writes: 
"Makarios' proposals, that surprised even liS. received a silent 
acceptance by the Greek Cypriot people, who supported Ihe 
Archbishop and regarded him as the leading figure of Ihe 
Enosis movement. The new line. however. caused the forceful 
criticisms of the intolerant circles of Ihe Elhnarchy, Kyrenlas' 
Bishop and General Grivas, who expressed the opinion that 
through the talks, Harding aimed to gain some lime in order to 
reinforce his powers and crush the liberation struggle. ,,13 
It was the first time that members of the Etharchy challenged the unquestionable 
leadership of Makarios, and this development was to play an important role in the final 
outcome of the talks. 
Harding and Makarios met again on 7 and 11 October in Ledra Palace. In the meeting 
of7 October, Harding insisted on Macmillan's constitutional proposals. As he explained 
to Makarios, the British diplomatic and military obligations did not allow any other 
development except the already proposed one. During the third meeting, on 11 October 
Makarios turned down the British proposals again and he repeated his demand for 
recognition from the British side of the principle of self-determination for Cyprus. Due 
to the different approaches of the two sides, the talks between Makarios and Harding 
ended on 11 October, but the experienced Governor stated that he was ready to meet 
Makarios again in the future, in an attempt to leave the door open for negotiations and 
II S. Mayes, Makarios: A Biography, (London, 1981), pp. 73-4. 
12 E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p. 89. 
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to prevent the international community from accusing London of inflexibility. However, 
Makarios, in order to justify his position to the international community, issued a 
statement on the breakdown of the discussions on 12 October, analyzing the Greek 
Cypriot perspective. 
"The Archbishop said that he had submitted to Sir John 
Harding a plan which declared the right of self determination 
to be the indispensable basis for a solution of the Cyprus 
question. After recognition of this principle, he continued that 
he would be ready to co-operate with the British government in 
framing a Constitution for Cyprus which would operate during 
the transitional period pending the application of the principle 
of self-determination. Sir John Harding had conveyed these 
views to London, and at their second meeting had informed the 
Archbishop that II.M Government rejected them and insisted 
on the Macmillan proposals. lie (the Archbishop) had replied 
that these proposals had already been rejected by the Greek 
government and by the people of Cyprus, and that In no 
circumstances should a solution to the question be sought 
within the framework of the tripartite conference, "the 
consequences of which have been so sad ", Continuing, 
Archbishop Makarios said that he had suggested to Sir John 
Harding that the question should be placed on a new basis, and 
in no circumstances on "implacable British plans which have 
already been tried and failed". After declaring that he could 
not discern in the "Macmillan plan II any possibility of 
development from a colonial constitution to self-government 
and self-determination, the Archbishop claimed that his views 
were fully supported by the Ethnarchy Council and by all 
Greek Cypriots. At his meeting with the Governor on the 
previous meeting [11 Oct] he had made it clear that new 
discussions would only be possible "on the basis of self-
determination ". The Archbishop expressed his sincere regrets 
at the breakdown of his talks with Sir John lIarding, and 
added: "We realize that the consequences will be unpleasant, 
\3 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 11 S. 
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both to HM Government and to the people of Cyprus, but our 
conscience remains clear." In reply to questions, he said that 
he would always be ready to meet the Governor if another 
basis for discussion could be found, but that the initiative 
would have to come from the Government. ,,14 
Makarios' statement was a successful attempt to expose British diplomacy, therefore the 
Foreign Office, on October 20, prepared an improved proposal that was closer to the 
Greek Cypriot demands. The new proposals included the following: 
"It is not their position [H.M. government] that the principle of 
self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is 
their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on 
account of the present strategic importance of the island and on 
account of the consequences on relations between NATO 
powers in the eastern Mediterranean. lIer Majesty's 
Government have offered a wide measure of self-government 
now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the 
constitutional development, lIer Afajesty's Government will be 
prepared to discuss the future of the Island with representatives 
of the people of Cyprus when sufficient progress had been 
made and self-government has proved itself a workable 
position capable of safeguarding the interests of all elements of 
the people of Cyprus. In view of the considerations set out in 
paragraph one, Her Majesty's Government consider that the 
Greek and Turkish Governments should also be associated with 
these discussions by whatever method seems most 
appropriate. ,,15 
However, before going any further with the analysis it will be useful to compare the 
views and the proposals of the British and the Greek Cypriot side. As indicated on all 
the previously mentioned issues, the two sides were in agreement for the introduction of 
the principle of self-government in the Cypriot case. On the other hand, the different 
approach of the two sides concerning the principle of self-determination was still the 
main obstacle preventing a possible agreement. While the new British proposal was 
substantially improved concerning that issue, it still did not give any definite promise to 
14 Keesing's Archives, ibid. 
15 A. Eden, op. cit.. pp. 403-04. 
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the Greek Cypriot side for the introduction of self-determination. In this point lies the 
main disagreement between the two sides. While Makarios requested a definite promise 
from the British side concerning the introduction of self-determination, London 
answered that self-determination could be established in Cyprus but for the moment it 
was not a practical proposition. Until this point the British and the Greek Cypriot views 
were in absolute agreement, since Makarios did not ask for a definite date for the 
establishment of self-determination in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the British side, by 
asserting the non-practicality of the introduction of self-determination in Cyprus, the 
strategic importance of Cyprus, and the negative consequences this would have brought 
to the relations of Greece and Turkey and to the equilibrium of NATO in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, triggered Greek Cypriot hesitation. By the way the explanation had 
been presented, there was not any difference between the new proposals and 
Macmillan's proposals during the Conference in London. Therefore, it was a clear 
indication to the Greek Cypriot side that the British would always object to the 
introduction of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus. The other main difference 
between the Greek Cypriot and the British side was the clear intention of the 
Conservative government to include the Greek and the Turkish government in 
discussions on the Cypriot future. However, the legacy of the Tripartite Conference was 
itself enough to provoke the Greek Cypriots' objection, especially when they were 
against the inclusion of Turkey in the Conference of London from the outset. l!owever, 
the Greek Cypriots' objection to the inclusion of Turkey in future talks concerning the 
Cypriot question could have not been accepted by the British side, since Turkey was the 
front line of the British defence in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. As Eden 
reveals in his memoirs: 
"/ consider it capital that we should carry the Turks with us in 
any new move. We had now to convince them that our purpose 
was not to abandon our interests or theirs in Cyprus, but to find 
a solution which would meet Western defense needs in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. ,,16 
The above differences played an important role for the outcome of the fourth meeting of 
Makarios and Harding. After the failure of the third meeting, the Ethnarchy Council 
asked, through the Labour M.P F. Noel-Baker, for a new secret meeting between 
Makarios and Harding in order to hold back the press and the internal criticisms from the 
16 A. Eden, op. cit., p. 404. 
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hard-liners of the Ethnarchy. The new meeting was to be held in Kranidiotis' residence 
in Nicosia,S Santaroza st.17 Kranidiotis gives a detailed analysis of the meeting: 
"Harding arrived ten minutes earlier than Makarios. As soon 
as Makarios entered the house Harding gave him an envelope 
saying "Your Beatitude I have very good news for you" 
Makarios took the envelope and read its content without 
expressing any view. After a while he gave me the envelope 
saying that he wanted my opinion. I took it and I immediately 
noticed that for the first time the British recognized the 
possibility of the introduction of the principle of self-
determination ... As soon as I read the text I said to Makarios 
with a low voice that its spirit was a clear progression of the 
British position. The Archbishop without hearing my comments 
said to Harding that " I am really sorry. I can not accept your 
proposals. I cannot link the self-determination of the Cypriot 
people with the strategic plans of Great Britain, and I cannot 
accept that any other developments or obligations of Great 
Britain may possibly influence the rightful demands of self-
determinationfor Cyprus. Harding, obviously shaken, stood up 
and answered: "I am really sorry for what you are doing", he 
saluted us and he left. In reply to my question to the 
Archbishop of why he had answered Harding immediately, 
Makarios said: "I turned it down in order to return the 
negative answer of the Governor to my own proposals. 
However, I believe that as a base the new proposal is good. Of 
course we can not accept It as It is but we can negotiate upon 
it. ,,18 
Many analysts accused Makarios of stubbornness and vanity because of his answer to 
Kranidiotis, and partly they are right. It is widely known that Makarios accepted 
criticisms from nobody, and he perceived the rejection of his proposals not as a 
diplomatic answer but as a personal insult. Nevertheless, at the same time Makarios just 
tried to gain some time in order to discuss the new British proposals with the other 
members of the Ethnarchy, while he used an old diplomatic trick to take the initiative 
17 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 133. 
18 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 133-35. 
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from Harding and gain the upper hand in the discussions. As a matter of fact, the next 
day he sent Kranidiotis to Kyrenia in order to meet the hard-liners and inform them 
about the new proposals. It is obvious that Makarios wanted to accept the new proposals 
and begin a series of new negotiations with Harding, but he had to notify the internal 
opposition, as well as get its approval. What the British side failed to comprehend, at 
this stage, was that the internal political situation in Cyprus had changed. Makarios was 
not the indisputable leader of the Greek Cypriots any more. His influence among the 
Greek Cypriot population was still at its highest point. Even members of AKEL 
regarded Makarios as the true leader. However, Kyprianos had managed to form a 
strong front inside the Ethnarchy against Makarios and above all he secured Grivas' 
support, a decisive factor for the political balance inside the Greek Cypriot community. 
Grivas had all the military power, therefore he could gain the support of prominent 
members of the Greek Cypriot community, either by persuasion or by force. Grivas' 
personality could not stand the fact that Makarios was superior to him and theoretically 
he was his subordinate. Therefore by uniting his powers with Kyprianos, Grivas 
believed that he could isolate Makarios and take the leadership of the Ethnarchy, a 
development that would allow him to organize a more extensive guerilla war against the 
British, while also satisfying his personal ambitions. When Kranidiotis arrived in 
Kyrenia, he met with Kyprianos and the secretary of the Bishopric P. Ioannides. Their 
reaction to what Kranidiotis said was negative, while Grivas' reply was that, if the 
Archbishop continued the talks with Harding he could no longer guarantee the safety of 
Makarios.19 It was obvious that Grivas' had reached the point of threatening the life of 
Makarios, while Kyprianos was not willing to accept any other solution than Enosis and 
nothing but Enosis. Makarios did not have any other choice but to stop any negotiations 
with the British side, in order to protect his life and position, as well as the internal unity 
of the Ethnarchy Council. In such a way a golden opportunity was lost for the Greek 
Cypriot side to enter into new negotiations with Harding, using as a diplomatic weapon 
the British recognition of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus. Yet again, the 
Church and the extreme nationalists of the Ethnarchic Council played their role 
successfully as the reactionary forces against any progress on the Cypriot question. 
Due to the recent developments, Britain decided to put pressure upon Makarios 
through diplomatic means. Eden decided to use American and Greek influence in order 
to persuade the Archbishop to alter his position and accept the recent British proposals. 
For that reason the American consul in Nicosia, Mr. Courtney, visited the Archbishop 
19 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 135. 
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twice to inform him that the State Department regarded the last British proposals as 
satisfactory enough, while Eden with a personal letter to the Greek Premier tried to 
persuade the Greek side to put more pressure upon Makarios in order to accept his 
proposals. 
"/ appeal to your Excellency to take a bold initiative and 
recommend our statement to the Archbishop. I believe that if 
you would do this, there would still be a chance of persuading 
the ethnarchy not to reject our offer. It would then be possible 
for Cyprus to take the first steps towards a happier future and 
for us to restore the friendly relations which have been 
traditional between our countries and which are Indispensable 
to the whole enterprise of Western 
defence. ,,20 
However, the British side failed to reconsider the internal political situation in Greece 
and to modify her policy accordingly. On 5 October, A. Papagos died. The very next 
morning King Pavlos appointed K. Karamanlis, then Minister of Development, Prime 
Minister. The days that followed caused an extended crisis in Greek political life, with 
all the parties of the opposition accusing the Greek monarch of favouritism and 
intervention in the democratic procedures of the state, while the newspaper of the 
opposition accused Karamanlis of accepting the intervention of the Anglophile King, in 
order to bring a favourable solution to the British side concerning the Cypriot question.21 
Great demonstrations had been organized by the left-wing student organizations, where 
35 students were killed, while the government declared a state of emergency that made 
all demonstrations illegal. Despite the measures, Karamanlis did not have the power to 
put an end to the crisis. Pavlos' intervention woke up old debates concerning the 
constitutional role of the monarch, dating from the Greek Civil War, while the M.Ps of 
EDA threatened that they would abandon their seats in Parliament, bringing the country 
closer to a new Civil War with catastrophic consequences not only for peace in the 
Balkans but for international law and order as well. During that time, Eden asked 
Karamanlis, a non-elected Prime Minister, to persuade Makarios to accept the British 
solution. However, Karamanlis did not have that power and even if he had, he would 
not have made use of it, since it would have resulted in the worsening of the internal 
situation in Greece and in his personal political demise. Without any doubt, the parties 
20 A. Eden, Ope cit., p. 406. 
21 E. Tositsas Averof, Ope cit., p. 85. 
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of the opposition would have used such a development as propaganda against 
Karamanlis, while the latter would have remained, in Greek history, as the non-elected 
Premier who had been appointed with one and only duty, to resolve the Cypriot question 
at any cost for the nation and without regarding the views of the Greek community in 
Cyprus. Karamanlis did not follow Eden's calls. However, the American side continued 
to put pressure upon Makarios until 4 December, when the State Department showed 
signs of changing its policy. As Eden confesses: 
"Then as so often happens, a new voice was heard from the 
American side. Their Ambassador in Athens began to see 
matters rather differently. He thought that Archbishop 
Makarios was a prisoner of the extremists and that it was 
important to extract him from that position. Accordingly, the 
Archbishop was to be helped, and the way to help him was for 
us to make further modifications in the formula which we had 
already put fonvard and which the United States Government 
had strongly approved ,,22 
The alteration of American policy towards the Cypriot question proves the argument that 
had already been presented above, that Makarios was a prisoner of the internal 
opposition. However, there is the other side of the coin that has not been examined by 
those who have dealt analytically with the Cypriot question. The sudden and unexpected 
American change was not an irrational thought of some romantic humanitarians inside 
the State Department, who ignored the political reality of that time. On the contrary it 
was a well planned decision, fully justified by the dominant political factor of that era, 
the Cold War. The political situation had not improved in Greece, and Karamanlis' 
position was in clear danger. If the Americans had allowed the British to continue with 
their political and diplomatic pressure upon Makarios, then the Archbishop would have 
been forced to accept their proposals, but Karamanlis would have lost his position. The 
internal situation in Greece was so intense that the masses, in the event of a negative 
development for the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis and self-determination, would 
have demanded the overthrow of Karamanlis and the announcement of new elections. It 
was more than certain that in the case of new elections the pro-Western Right would 
have been beaten by the anti-NATO Liberal party or the pro-Communist Democratic 
Left. In both situations, the fragile political and military balance in the Balkans and the 
Eastern Mediterranean, a balance that the West was anxious to maintain as a bulwark 
22 A. Eden, op. cit., p. 407. 
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against Soviet expansion, would have been overturned, while all the American dollars 
from the introduction of the Truman Doctrine in Greece, a scheme that aimed to 
strengthen the pro-Western parties and weaken the pro-Left ones, would have been spent 
in vain. The State Department quite rightly believed, that a possible radical political 
alteration in the political system of Greece would have meant the loss of the existing 
status quo in the Mediterranean and the possible application of the well-known 
"Domino Theory" in the countries of the Mediterranean. Therefore, their decision to put 
an end to the British pressure upon Makarios and begin to apply pressure on Eden for the 
adoption of new proposals was a helping hand to Karrunanlis and his government, in 
order to survive the political stonn and safeguard the Western route of the country 
against the Eastern bloc. The American spirit can be fully revealed in a letter from the 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, R.D. Murphy, to the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, G. Gray, on 25 November 1955. According to the fonner, the 
Greco-American relations during that time were strained over the Cyprus question, 
therefore he suggested that Washington should support the newly elected Greek 
government over the political developments in Cyprus. As he said: 
"The present friendly Karamanlis government is in effect a 
"caretaker" which... is anxious to subdue the anti-American 
emotions in Greece, and to begin rebuilding Greek-Turkish 
relations. It deserves our full support. ,,23 
Eden followed the American instruction, therefore after a few days a new text 
appeared that stated: 
"Her Majesty's Government adhere to the principles embodied 
in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter and 
the Pacific Charter to which they have subscribed It is not 
therefore their position that the principle of self-determination 
can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is 
not now a practical proposition on account of the present 
situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. lIer Afajesty's 
Government have offered a wide measure of self-government 
now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the 
constitutional development, it is the intention of lIer Majesty's 
Government to work for a final solution which will satisfy the 
23 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955·1957: Soviet Union·Eastern Mediterranean. ed. by J. P. 
Glennon, (Washington, 1989), vol. XXIV, p. 558. 
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wishes of the people of Cyprus, be consistent with the strategic 
interests of Her Majesty's Government and their allies and 
have regard to the existing treaties to which Her Majesty's 
Government are a party. Her Majesty's Government will be 
prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives 
of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself 
capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the 
community. ,,201 
At first glance, the above statement does not contain any substantial alterations to the 
previous ones, however the researcher should concentrate not on the content of the text 
but on what is missing. The fact that this text did not include an invitation to the Turkish 
and the Greek government to participate in the talks for the future of the Cypriot case 
was a goodwill gesture to Makarios, who as already mentioned, opposed such a 
development. In addition, the terminology of the text was less vague than any of the 
previous ones. "The final solution which will satisfy the wishes of the people of C)prus" 
was a definite pledge of the British side of its commitment towards the finding of an 
acceptable solution for the Cypriot question, and it was even stronger than the vague 
promises for a solution "in the future" of the previous British text. With the new text, 
Harding sent a letter to Makarios, asking the Archbishop to accept the new statement as 
a base for co-operation and to make use of his influence, in order to put an end to 
violence. As the letter continues: 
"I need not point out to you the grave consequences of afai/ure 
to reach agreement on the basis now proposed lIer Majesty's 
Government consider that they have now taken every possible 
step to meet the views you have expressed during our 
conversations regarding the form which their statement should 
take. It is in the interest of everyone, and not least of the 
people of Cyprus, that the uncertainty which has surrounded 
the question of our reaching an agreement should not be 
prolonged. Her Majesty's Government are of the opinion that 
without any undue delay, an announcement of their position in 
this matter must be made so that opinion here and abroad can 
judge the efforts which they have made to reach an agreement-
24 Correspondence exchanged between the Governor, Sir J.lIarding and Archbishop Makarios, Cmd. 
9708, 1956. See also A. Eden, op. cit., p. 408. 
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efforts which, they feel sure, will commend themselves to fair 
minded people everywhere. ,,25 
Makarios approached the new statement in a positive way. He believed that for the first 
time since 1878, there was potential to finally resolve the Cypriot question. However, 
he knew that he had to fight a great battle in the Ethnarchy in order to persuade the 
opposition to modify its position of Enosis and nothing but Enosis and accept the 
negotiations. As Makarios confessed to his closest associate N. Kranidiotis: 
"I believe that the new statement should be accepted by the 
Ethnarchy. It is time to sit once again at the negotialing table, 
before the British get tired and return back to the old days. 
However, in this long and painful road I do not have to face 
only Harding. Kyprianos is the main obstacle for the finding of 
a solution in Cyprus and I have to move quickly. There is little 
time left. ,,26 
The Greek Cypriot Archbishop realized that it would have been difficult for Kyprianos 
to change his views concerning the negotiations with the British side. For Kyprianos, an 
ambitious priest with strong nationalist beliefs, every other development except the 
Enosis was a simple failure, an act of treason to the high ideals of Hellenism. Therefore, 
Makarios recognized that the only possibility for persuading the Ethnarchic Council to 
accept Harding's proposals was to approach Grivas, who was the key-figure in the 
internal Cypriot political scene. If Makarios succeeded in securing Grivas' support, then 
he would have the lUxury of proceeding with the negotiations without fearing the 
internal opposition. Grivas had under his control the military power and he could 
influence other members of the Council. Therefore, Makarios asked for a meeting with 
the leader of EOKA, hoping that he could persuade the latter to support him. The 
meeting took place in Kyko monastery, with great precautions. Makarios examined the 
outcome of the negotiations between him and Harding, and he strongly supported the 
view that with the latest proposals of the British side Cyprus could have enjoyed the 
principle of self-determination, the main step to Enosis, within a short period. Grivas 
argued that the British proposals were still written in a vague way, therefore the British 
side could have insisted in turning down the demand for the introduction of self-
determination for the Cypriot case in the future, as they had done during the past. 
Makarios' reply to Grivas was that there was no other solution apart from negotiating 
2' Sir J. Harding's letter to Makarios, 28 January 1956, Cmd 9708. 
26 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 156. 
164 
with Harding, and he supported his view by saying that the Greek Cypriots were getting 
tired of the uncertainty of the situation around the Cypriot question and the danger of 
losing their support was greater than ever. Grivas remained immovable and warned 
Makarios that, should he accept Harding's proposals, he (Grivas) would fulfil his 
previous threats to inform the Greek Cypriot population of Makarios' treacherous role 
against the Enosis struggle.27 It is convenient for the specialists who are dealing with the 
Cypriot question to accuse Grivas of inflexibility, however they fail to be into account 
with Makarios' role. Grivas' obstacle to any developments concerning the Cypriot 
question was a personal creation of the Archbishop, a Frankenstein that became stronger 
than his creator and threatened, not only the course of the negotiations, but the whole of 
the Cypriot structure as well. 
Makarios was left with no other solution but to ask Harding, with a new letter on 2 
February, for detailed clarifications concerning the constitutional proposals. Dy that, 
Makarios believed that he could gain more time in order to regularize the internal 
situation in the Ethnarchic Council. Makarios wrote to Harding that the new statements 
were not satisfactory enough for the Greek Cypriot side, since the principle of sclf-
determination was the only reliable and acceptable solution for the Cypriot question. 
According to Makarios a new constitution should have included the following 
principles: 
"J)All Legislalive Executive and Judicial powers, with the 
exception of those expressly exempted, will originate from the 
people of Cyprus and will be exercised by them through their 
elected representatives and other organs. 2)Respons/bi/Uy for 
the defence and external political relations of the island will be 
excepted from the above principle and will be vested in the 
Governor in his capacity as representative of lIer Britannic 
Majesty's Government. 3)The Governor, beyond the powers 
mentioned in the previous paragraph /i)will exercise the 
normal duties of a constitutional head of State; thus he will 
sign, without having the right of veto, laws which are enacted 
by the Assembly within the framework of the Constitution, 
including the budget, and will sign the decrees which are 
lawfully issued by the Government. lie will entrust the duty of 
forming the Government to the person enjoying the confidence 
27 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 157.58. 
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of the House, and will dissolve the House on his advice. 
Ministers will be chosen by the Prime Afinister and wil/, like 
him, be responsible only to the Assembly. 4)Representation;n 
the Assembly will be proportional to the composition of the 
population. Otherwise there will be absolute equality of all 
citizens and everyone will be eligible to any public Office. 
Exceptions to this rule may be provided for only in the case of 
special offices which are exclusively connected with the 
religious and educational rights of the island's communities. 
Such rights will be fully safeguarded and protected by the 
Constitution. 5)A procedure will be defined for the impartial 
settlement of any difference arising out of the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions, in particular on questions of disputed 
authority between the Governor on the one hand and the 
Assembly or the Government on the other. ,,28 
Harding replied it was impossible for his government to be committed to any of 
Makarios' proposals before the commencement of the talks. However, in an attempt not 
to jeopardize diplomacy, Harding suggested some new elements that could form bases 
of future negotiations. According to Harding: 
" a) Her Afajesty's Government offer a wide measure of 
democratic self-government now. To this end a new and 
liberal constitution would be drawn lip in consultation with all 
sections of the community. b) The constitution would enable 
the people of Cyprus through responsible Cypriot Ministers to 
assume control by a suitably phased process over the 
departments of Government except those relating to foreign 
affairs and defence which would be reserved to the Governor 
for as long as he deems necessary. c) The constitution would 
provide for an Assembly with an elected majority. d) A Cypriot 
Premier to head the new administration would be chosen by the 
Assembly with the approval of the Governor. Ministerial 
portfolios would be allocated by the Premier. e) The 
constitution would provide for Turkish membership in the 
Council of Ministers. j) There would be proper safeguards for 
28 Makarios'letter to Sir J. Harding, 2 February 1956, Cmd 9708. 
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the rights of individual citizens, the interests of all sections of 
the community, and the integrity and independence of the 
public service. ,,29 
Despite the fact that the new text was even closer to Makarios' proposals, the 
Archbishop still hesitated to accept it. The main reason was that he still did not have the 
approval of Kyprianos and Grivas. In addition, in the light of the previous experience of 
the Colonial Assembly in Cyprus, Makarios feared that the appointed members in the 
Assembly together with the Turkish Cypriots would fonn the clear majority once again, 
isolating the Greek Cypriots. Moreover, Makarios could not have accepted a 
constitution where the internal security of the state would have remained under the 
Governor. Makarios had justified fears concerning the last detail, mainly due to the fact 
that since the appearance of EOKA in Cyprus, the structure of the Cypriot police had 
been modified in favour of the Turkish Cypriot community. In an attempt to secure the 
pro-British nature of the police force, the ex-governor had dismissed hundreds of Greek 
Cypriot policemen, hiring Turkish Cypriots instead, who saw in EOKA the main threat 
to the survival of their community. According to a survey of the Greek government, this 
resulted in the fact that, in early 1956, 87% of the entire Cypriot police force was 
Turkish.3o Makarios sent a new letter to Harding, asking him to modify again all the 
points of the new proposal that could cause controversy, but the British side did not 
agree this time. Concerning the concept of public security, Eden was particularly 
unprepared to make any compromise. As he wrote in his memoirs "we could not agree 
that the security of the island should depend on the Archbishop IS timing. ,,31 
During that difficult time for the survival of the talks between Makarios and Harding, 
the Colonial Secretary, A. Lennox-Boyd, arrived in Cyprus. As soon as the arrival of 
the Colonial Secretary became known to Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader asked for a 
meeting. The meeting was held on the night of 29th February, at the residence of the 
Archdeacon of the Anglican Church in Cyprus. N. Kranidiotis was present and provides 
a detailed narration of that night in his memoirs: 
"/ remember when Lennox-Boyd, with his high and captivating 
presence, entered the room together wilh Sir J. Martin. He 
gave a typical handshake to A/alearios, while /larding was 
watching the scene with a strict/oolc. The atmosphere on that 
29 Sir J.llarding's letter to Makarios. 14 February 1956. Cmd 9708. 
30 The Statistics Service of the Parliament of the I1ellens. The Cypriot Public Sector, (Athens, 1956). vol. 
I, no. 345. 
31 A. Eden, op. cit., p. 411. 
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night, the last day of February of the leap year 1956, was 
electric. Lennox-Boyd, after a short speech concerning the 
course of the talks between Harding and Makarios, read a 
statement that he was to announce in the House of Commons 
few days later, defining the British policy towards the Cypriot 
question. According to the statement, the British government 
was to recognize the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, 
that would have followed after the establishment of a self-
government constitution. Makarios accepted Lennox-Boyds' 
statement but he asked the British government to clarify with an 
official statement that the Greek Cypriots would form the 
majority in the new Assembly. He also asked the Colonial 
Secretary to define the period under which the Governor would 
have the control of the internal security of the island, and for 
the first time he required the Conservative government to 
define the chronological period of the transitional constitution 
of self-government until the introduction of the principle of self-
determination. Lennox-Boyd refused to discllss from the 
beginning any issue and he clearly stated that he was not 
willing to modify even one wordfrom the statement that he had 
just read. Makarios then said that he had no other choice than 
to insist on his position. Lennox-Boyd gave him a strict look 
without giving him an answer. For some seconds nobody 
dared to break the deadly silence. Then the Colonial Secretary 
stood up and said to Makarios "God save your people ". Then 
he left the room. ,,32 
It was the final collapse of the discussions. Without any doubt, Lennox-Boyds' 
statement was the closest to Makarios' aspirations. For the researcher, the lack of 
flexibility and diplomatic tolerance that Makarios showed during that critical moment 
for the future of the Cypriot question is really suprising. However, the explanation for 
Makarios' poor performance during that night can be found again in the Greek Cypriot 
Ethnarchy. The night before the meeting, Kyprianos arrived in the Archbishopric palace 
in Nicosia. Makarios received him immediately in his office, excluding Kranidiotis. 
After the end of the meeting with Kyprianos he looked exhausted and the only words 
32 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 170-71. 
168 
that he said to Kranidiotis were "Go to your home and rest because tomorrow a dark day 
is coming for Cyprus and we have to be strong. ,,33 From Makarios' words it is easy to 
understand that Kyprianos, once again, played a crucial role in the inflexible position 
that the Archbishop presented the following night. As soon as Lennox-Boyd returned to 
London, he informed his colleagues in the House of Commons, as well as the 
international community, of the final collapse of the talks in Cyprus. As he said: 
"The government's view has been forward over the last five 
months, and we have made a series of concessions to the 
Archbishop's point of view. I must confess with distress that, 
as soon as one obstacle is out of the way, another one, unheard 
of until a week or two before, rears its head. ,,34 
On the other side of the fence, Makarios tried to clear his position as well. On 5 March 
he issued a statement declaring that the British side had shown no signs of goodwill. He 
also added that: 
"In short the Cypriots were called upon to accept a 
regime under which it would be doubtful whether they 
would control their own Assembly, and on a basis in 
which a colonial ruling power would be able to interfere 
indefinitely in everything under the pretext of public 
security,,35 
The collapse of the talks between Makarios and llarding was the final blow in the 
diplomatic effort concerning the finding of an acceptable solution for the Cypriot 
question. Nevertheless, the crisis escalated even further. Makarios was planning to visit 
Athens, in order to ask Karamanlis to apply once again to the United Nations concerning 
the Cypriot question. The Archbishop did not hide his positive feelings for the new 
Greek Premier. Unlike Papagos, Karamanlis had adopted a pro-Cypriot stance that 
encouraged the Archbishop to visit him and ask for official Greek support for the Greek 
Cypriot struggle. However, there were more reasons for that trip to Athens. Makarios 
was really disappointed with the internal war against his authority and had already 
decided to resolve the problems inside the Ethnarchy by attacking Kyprianos and 
approaching Grivas. Therefore, he planned to demand that the Greek Premier put 
pressure upon the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople, traditionally strongly linked 
33 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 168. 
34 Lennox-Boyd: House of Commons, March 5, 1956, vol. 549, col. 1723. For full text of Lennox-Boyd's 
statement concerning the collapse of the discussions see: op. cit. col. 1715·719. 
3' Keesing's: March 17.24, 1956, pp. 14757.758. 
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with the Greek state, either to replace Kyprianos as Bishop of Kyrenia or to appoint him 
to another post away from Cyprus. Makarios hoped that if Kyprianos were removed 
from his duties, then the internal opposition would be fatally wounded and Grivas would 
have been left with no other choice than to co-operate with the Archbishop. However, 
all those plans were never realized because Makarios never arrived in Athens. On 9 
March, while Makarios was ready to enter the plane to Athens in Nicosia's airport, he 
was arrested by the British authorities. Along with the Archbishop, Kyprianos, P. 
Papagathagelos, and P. Ioannides were arrested and were all exiled to the tropical island 
of the Indian Ocean, Seychelles. The news of Makarios arrest became known almost 
immediately, all over the world. In an attempt to justify his decision, Harding presented 
a secret report that linked Makarios with Grivas and EOKA. As Harding said, Makarios 
was the main obstacle facing the establishment of peace and order in Cyprus, therefore 
he had "to be removed from the island in the Interest of promoting peace, order and 
good government. ,,36 On the other hand, the Conservative government in London tried to 
justify Makarios' arrest by commenting upon his inflexible position during the talks and 
his close links with the EOKA organization. As Eden said inside the House of 
Commons: 
"After months of watching these negotiatlons[Makarios-
Harding] and seeing their course, that my own impression was 
that had we been able to yield on these points other demands 
would have followed upon them ... For some time past we had 
recognised that it might become necessary, in the interests of 
restoring law and order to remove the Archbishop and the 
Bishop of Kyrenia from the island. The Government, however, 
were determined to make every effort to reach an agreed 
settlement. That is why we continued to negotiate with the 
Archbishop in the hope that he might be persuaded at some 
time to condemn the use of violence. While these negotiations 
were going on, more and more evidence came to hand about 
the extent of the Archbishop'S own activity in connection with 
some of these organisations. At any rate, it became clear-all 
too clear-that so long as the Archbishop would not condemn 
36 Keesing's: op. cit., pp. 14759.760. 
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violence in any way, order could not be restored in the island 
while he was at large there. ,,37 
However, despite the explanations of the government, the opposition accused Eden and 
his associates regarding the collapse of the talks. As Mr. Bevan stated: 
"I should have thought that hon. Members ... would agree that a 
classic assumption underlying the beginning of negotiations of 
that sort is that there would be Cypriot self-government with a 
military base on Cyprus. Or are we to understand that one of 
the reasons why agreement was not rcached was because it was 
always in the mind of the Government that they wished to have 
Cyprus as a base and never seriously intended carrying the 
negotiations to a successful conclusion? ,,38 
while referring to the claims of the Conservatives concerning the collapse of the talks 
due to Makarios' links with EOKA and his inflexibility, A. Bevan stated: 
"Furthermore, it had been known to Sir John Harding-he said 
so in the statement he made when Archbishop Makarios was 
arrested and deported-that Archbishop Makarios had been 
engaged in close association with those responsible for 
disorder on the island. He knew that,' he said so. He did not, 
therefore, break off negotiations because of the Archbishop's 
alleged illegal conduct, because he knew all about that 
before... The main point I am making is that it Is always 
essential, in matters of this sorl, for us to remember that the 
persons whom we look upon here as terrorists are looked upon 
by their fellow nationals as patriots. It really is not good 
enough to use language of that sort, because we always have to 
swallow it afterwards ... I hope thai the Colonial Secretary, In 
particular, will tell us what he meant by his statement that after 
one point had been settled the Archbishop always raised olhers. 
I can see no evidence of thai in the letters that have passed 
between them. I went through this correspondence vcry closely 
37 A. Eden: House of Commons, March 14. 1956, vol. 550. col. 415-16. 
38 A. Bevan: House of Commons. March 14. 1956. vol. 550. col. 392. 
171 
and tried to find what sort of case the Government had, but it is 
very hard to find it in these leiters ... ,,39 
Another member of the Labour Party, commenting on Makarios' arrest said: 
"It is almost unprecedented for a Government to enter into 
negotiations, to conduct them for five months with a man whom 
they acknowledge as the representative leader and spokesman 
of his people, and then, when negotiations are broken off, 
presumably because of an impression which the Prime Afinister 
had that further difficulties would arise, brand him as a 
criminal and arrest and deport him. ,,10 
Without any doubt the Opposition tried to benefit from the decision of the 
Conservative government, to arrest and deport Makarios. It has to be noted here that the 
above verbal attacks, coming from the Labour party, were unjust and prejudiced, aiming 
not to resolve the crisis but to incapacitate the government in the eyes of the British 
electorate body. As mentioned above, the Conservative government genuinely 
committed itself during the talks to the finding of a solution that would have been 
accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, but every proposal that had been presented had been 
turned down by Makarios. Nevertheless, the tragic mistake of the British side can be 
found in the arrest of Makarios. During the talks between Makarios and Harding, the 
Archbishop was the only leading figure of the Ethnarchy that really wished to find a 
settlement concerning the Cypriot question. However, his attempts had been strongly 
opposed by the internal opposition, leaving Makarios with only two options: either to 
dissolve the Council or to accept the views of the internal opposition in favour of the 
unity of the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial front. Makarios was extremely sensitive about 
his public image and without any doubt he did not want his name to be linked with the 
disintegration of the Ethnarchic Council and face the outrage of his compatriots. The 
British establishment had been informed about the internal situation in the Ethnarchy, 
but instead of assisting Makarios with his plans to regularize the internal situation in the 
Greek Cypriot political scene, they exiled him to Seychelles isolating him from the 
Cypriot developments. 
At this point it is essential to ask the following question: Why did the Conservative 
party decide to isolate Makarios on Seychelles? The answer can be found in the internal 
situation of the Conservative Party. As mentioned in a previous chapter, Britain focused 
39 A. Bevan: op. cit.. col. 393-95. 
40 K. Robinson: House of Commons, March 14. 1956, vol. 550. co1.424. 
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on the geopolitical area of the Middle East as her main preoccupation concerning her 
foreign policy. Therefore, during the late months of 1955, London intensified its 
attempts to link Jordan with the Baghdad Pact.41 According to the London government, 
such a development would have reinforced the role of the Baghdad Pact, forming a 
strong front of pro-Western nations in the heart of the Middle East and in Asia able to 
withstand Soviet expansionism, as well as her own role in that area, that had been put 
under strong question by the American officials, who wanted to take the leading political 
role in the Middle East. However, Jordan had tuned down the British proposals. As 
Eden said, King Hussein was ready to join the Pact but eventually he did not because of 
Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money.42 The situation in Jordan worsened when, on 1 
March, 1956, Hussein decided to discharge General Glubb, the commander of the Arab 
Legion, as well as other British officials from the Jordan army and the public sector of 
the state.43 According to The Observer, the right wing of the Conservative party found 
an opportunity to commence a series of new attacks against Eden and the role that he 
played as Secretary of the Foreign Office during the signature of the Suez Treaty.44 
Eden was confronted with a crisis within his party, whilst also facing attacks from the 
Opposition concerning his policy in Cyprus. The Conservative press and the hard-liners 
inside the party believed that the way that Hussein behaved towards Glubb was an 
outcome of the defensive policy of the Government to evacuate the military base of 
Suez.4S It was obvious that Eden was in the eye of the storm because of his personal role 
in the signature of the Treaty of Suez, and now more than ever the internal opposition 
demanded from him an act that would persuade them that the Prime Minister was able to 
safeguard the interests of Britain. Two days after the end of the talks in the House of 
Commons concerning the situation in Jordan, Makarios was arrested and exiled to 
Seychelles. According to The Observer, this was Eden's first tough move and Tory 
criticism was immediately silenced.,,46 
41 C. Foley, Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from RebeJljon to Civil War, (London, 1964), p. 48. 
42 A. Eden, OPt cit., p. 341. King Hussein was anxious to repair the wounded economy of his country, 
therefore he decided that it was in the nalional interest to stay out of the Pact, since he secured the 
economic assistance of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia who opposed Dritish dominance in the Middle 
East. For more concerning the internal political situation in Jordan and the foreign policy of the nation 
see: W. L. Cleveland, A llistory of the Middle East, (Oxford, 1994), p.p. 311·13. 
43 The Arab Legion had been founded after the end of the First World War with the military and 
economic assistance of Dritain. In 1950 the importance of the Arab Legion had increased, since it was 
regarded as the only reliable military force in the Arab World, while the man who commanded it had such 
f.reat political power that in reality was the true governor of the country. 
4 The Observer, How it Happened, 13 January, 1957. 
45 For more concerning the accusations against Eden's government see: Middle East Debate: House of 
Commons, March 7,1956, vol. 549. 
46 The Observer op cit. 
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Without any doubt, Makarios, arrest was the biggest mistake of Eden, sacrificing the 
only key factor of the Greek Cypriot side who could have ensured the solution of the 
Cypriot question, to silence the internal criticisms of the hard-liners of the Conservative 
party concerning a situation that had no connection with the Cypriot question. 
Makarios' exile gave extremists inside the Greek Cypriot community the excuse to 
intensify their struggle against the British establishment in Cyprus, while on the other 
hand it put an end to any possible negotiation concerning the fate of the island, since 
Makarios was the only personality who had wide support of the Greek Cypriots. As a 
matter of fact, a few weeks after Makarios' arrest all the elected Greek Cypriot mayors 
in Cyprus issued a statement, which made clear to the British side that every negotiation 
concerning the Cypriot question without the release and return of Makarios would be out 
of the question. According to the statement: 
"We declare that we will never participate in any negotiations 
concerning the island's political future and rcaffirm that thcre 
can be no possibility for the solution of the problcm so long as 
His Beatitude is held down [sic] inforced conjincment"n 
Once again external factors played a decisive role in the final outcome of the talks 
between Makarios and Harding, putting an end to an ambitious effort to resolve the 
Cypriot question without the loss of any more lives. Once again, a golden opportunity 
had been lost for Cyprus, and the island returned back to the days of sectarian attacks, 
blood and violence, a dark tunnel where the exit was not visible yet. 
47 The Statement of the Greek Cypriot Mayors of Cyprus, quoted by Mr. Robinson: House of Commons, 
July 19, 1956, vo1. 556,co1.1458. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE OPENING OF PANDORA'S BOX: TilE SUEZ CRISIS, LORn 
RADCLIFFE'S PROPOSALS AND THE IDEA OF PARTITION. 
The rolltlca or Aristotle 
"Ordinary men cannol se, 
1111 beginning 0/ troublu 
ahead; It rlqulru till 
genuine 'Ialtlman." 
Aristotle, VIII: 9. 
This chapter will examine the constitutional proposals of Lord Radcliffe concerning 
the Cypriot question. It will analyse the diplomatic background that led to Lord 
Radcliffe's dispatch to Cyprus and the constitutional proposals of the Dritish side. It 
will also present the political and diplomatic situation in the Middle East during that 
time, and will attempt to link it with internal developments in Cyprus. Finally, this 
chapter will evaluate the outcome of Lord Radcliffe's proposals. Lord Radcliffe's 
proposals have aroused a great academic debate among the researchers who dealt with 
the Cypriot question. While some argue that the proposals were n genuine Dritish 
attempt to find of a eompromise1, other argue that they were n diplomatic trick of 
London in order to reverse the negative climate that had been cstablished against it aftcr 
Makarios' arrest and exile to Seychelles. 2 In an attempt to contribute to the academic 
debate, the main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Was London truly 
motivated to resolve the Cypriot crisis by sending Lord Radcliffe to the island? Why 
did Athens decide to tum down Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals? Secondary 
questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Why did London turn down 
Averofs proposals concerning the Cypriot question? What was the Greek role during 
1 N. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Reyolt: An Account of the StrUGGle for Unjon with Greec~, (London, 1978), 
f· 208. 
E. Hatzivasileiou, The Cypriot Question. 1878·1960: The Constitutional Side, (Athens, 1998), p. 83. 
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the Suez crisis and how did this influence the British attitude towards the Cypriot 
question? Why was the idea of partition negative for the peace and unity of Cyprus? 
After Makarios' arrest and his exile to Seychelles, the Conservative government of 
London had to face two fronts. The first one was in the House of Commons, where the 
Opposition commenced a great attack against Eden and the members of his cabinet, 
over their decision to isolate Makarios in Seychelles, while the second one was on 
Cyprus, where law and order were threatened with total collapse, due to the increasing 
attacks against the establishment by EOKA, and the worsening of relations between the 
Greek and the Turkish communities. The Labour party accused Eden of jeopardizing all 
previous attempts to resolve the Cypriot question by arresting Mnkarios. According to 
the Labour party, Makarios' arrest was the main proof that the Conservative 
government was not ready to commit itself to any serious negotiations concerning the 
fate of Cyprus, while Eden's decision to arrest Makarios was a serious blow to British 
credibility at the international level as well as to the internal balance of Cyprus. A 
characteristic statement came from J. Griffiths during n stormy session in the House of 
Commons. According to the Labour MP due to the policies of the Conservative 
government: 
"We have created between ourselves and the Greek people 0/ 
Cyprus a feeling 0/ deep billerness and resentment which may 
take many years to erase. A friendly people have been 
transformed into a hostile people who day by day in every way 
are showing ever greater hatred o/us. What are we to gain by 
creating amongst those friendly people a hostile population 
who are coming to hate us by creating this deep well 0/ 
bitterness which may last, who knows how long? It is quile 
clear that there is scarcely anyone -/ know 0/ no one- among 
the Greek community in Cyprus who is friendly towards us. 
Not one... We have created billerness between those two 
communities [Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot]... We have 
seriously impaired the relations between ourselves and the 
friendly ally and country of Greece... We have gravely 
weakened the position o/NATO in a vital part of the world.,,3 
On the other hand, the Labour opposition was not the only source of criticism 
concerning the methods of the Conservative government in Cyprus. A large part of the 
3 J. Griffiths: House of Commons, May 14, 1956, vol. 552, col. 1656-657. 
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British press attacked the Prime Minister and his cabinet severely. In an ironic article 
The Manchester Guardian wrote: 
"It is not always possible to agree with Afr. Bevan, but on 
Cyprus he is right. The Tories are becoming "bloody-minded" 
and are reverting to the eighteenth-century type ",I 
while the Spectator in a bitter article emphasized that: 
"The rapidly worsening situation brought about by the British 
policy in Cyprus, could not see any alternative other than the 
return of Afalearios to resume negotiations."s 
This was not a political argument that was intended to discredit the Conservatives in the 
eyes of the British public, but a reference to everyday reality in Cyprus. During March, 
EOKA committed twenty-five attacks against military targets, killing seven and injuring 
twenty British soldiers, while on 21 March an explosive device had been found inside 
Harding's bedroom.6 The British authorities were unable to control the situation, and 
this became even more obvious on 10 May, 1956, when in an attempt to put an end to 
the social unrest in the island, the British Crown Court condemned two young fighters of 
EOKA, M. Karaolis and A. Dimitriou, to be hanged, charged with conspiracy against the 
Crown. As was expected this act outraged the international community and put Eden in 
an even more difficult position. The Anglican Church made an official complaint to the 
British Premier, while in the American Senate 18 Senators condemned British violence 
in Cyprus and asked for intervention in the White House for the implementation of the 
principle of self-determination in the island. The execution of the two young men in 
Cyprus outraged the American government as well. Through an official letter of the 
American Ambassador in Athens to Kararnanlis, the following day of the execution, the 
State Department expressed its anger concerning the British methods in Cyprus and 
promised the Greek Premier that the American establishment was ready and willing to 
commence a series of diplomatic actions in order to establish peace and order on the 
island.' The conclusion that follows from the above is that the Conservative government 
faced a serious diplomatic crisis, that affected not only law and order in Cyprus, but also 
its public image in Britain and diplomatic relations with its main ally, the United States. 
As seen in previous chapters, the main British argument concerning the maintenance of 
the Cypriot status quo was that Britain was the only factor of stability on the island. 
4 The Manchester Guardian, Bloody Minded, May 29. 1956. 
, The Spectator, A Policy for Cyprus, June 1, 1956. 
6 For more concerning EOKA's action during that period see: The Memojrs of General Griyas, ed. by C. 
Foley, (London, 1964), pp. 66-87. 
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However, Makarios' arrest discredited this argument, therefore Eden and the Foreign 
Office had to take a diplomatic initiative in order to prove to the rest of the international 
community that they had still the power and the influence to re-establish peace and order 
in the island. 
On 19 June, "The Times" published the information that the British government was 
ready to take a new diplomatic initiative over the Cypriot question.8 According to the 
article the Conservative government was ready to set a specific day for the 
implementation of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, therefore it was the 
government's intention to approach the Turkish and Greek governments for a series of 
negotiations through a new Tripartite Conference. However, on 30 June the Turkish 
Premier, during a meeting with the international press in Ankara, clearly stated that his 
country opposed the alteration of the international status quo of Cyprus. He continued 
by analyzing the main reasons for the objection of his country towards such a 
development and he concluded by stating that a possible withdrawal of Britain from 
Cyprus would result in Soviet expansion in the Middle East.9 Although it seemed that 
Menderes' interview was a continuation of the traditional position of Turkey concerning 
the Cypriot question, it was still a direct warning to the British government not to pursue 
its plans to implement the principle of self-determination in Cyprus. Dy stating that the 
British withdrawal would have opened the way to Soviet expansionism in the Middle 
East, the Turkish Premier gave a direct warning to Britain that his country was ready to 
create problems concerning the unity of the Baghdad Pact, during a difficult period for 
the region due to the political developments in Jordan. As mentioned earlier, the 
Baghdad Pact was one of the most important strategic and diplomatic assets of British 
foreign policy, safeguarding the British presence in the Middle East. Eden was not 
ready to sacrifice the British presence in the region and access to the valuable oil 
resources for the national economy. As a result, after a few days he announced in the 
House of Commons that his government had abandoned this initiative. According to 
Mr. Eden: 
"It has become plain that steps to create conditions which 
might lead to the application of self-determination for Cyprus 
would raise far wider issues for our Turkish allies as parties to 
the Lausanne Treaty settlement ... Her Majesty's Government 
7 K. Karamanlis, Archive: Facts and Documents, (Athens, 1993), vol. II, p p. 26-27. 
8 The Times, June 19, 1956, p. 10. 
9 Keesing's Archives: September 1-8, 1956, pp. 15065-066. 
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have to accept that for the present progress by this means 
cannot be realised."lo 
It was the first time in the constitutional history of Britain that a Prime Minister had 
adopted such a pro-Turkish position and had declared it in a such obvious way inside the 
House of Commons. The admission that the Conservative government had abandoned 
its diplomatic plans because Ankara had objected to them, gave the Opposition the 
opportunity to commence a new series of bitter attacks against Eden and his cabinet. As 
Mrs. L. Jeger stated ironically: 
"The Prime Minister showed a great tenderness in his 
statement for our parvenu al/y, Turkey. ,,} I 
while R. Churchill wrote in a bitter article in the Spectator that "The man in charge of 
British foreign policy is a Turkish gentleman, Mr. Menderes ,,12 A careful examination 
of all the facts leads to only one conclusion. The diplomatic initiative of the 
Conservative government was just a tactical decision in order to satisfy public opinion 
and not a genuine attempt to put an end in the bloodshed in Cyprus. As Eden admitted, 
the British side only approached the Turkish government. The plan had not been 
presented to the Greeks, most likely because London feared that Athens would have 
accepted it. Instead, London approached Ankara because it was sure that Turkey would 
again have rejected any proposal concerning the alteration of the status quo in Cyprus, 
giving Britain the opportunity to claim that although she was genuinely committed to 
resolving the Cypriot question, other forces were not allowing that. As Churchill 
argued: 
"Jf the British Government was sure Ihal the Turks would 
repudiate the plan, and ifit meant 10 subject ilselfto a Turkish 
veto, what on earth was the point ofpropounding the plan ... JfIt 
was done with the knowledge that the Turks would spit on It 
and the prior conviction that a Turkish veto would be accepted 
as mandatory, then the British Government faces a charge of 
duplicity and hypocrisy. "IJ 
Eden had planned everything well. He aimed to reverse the negative climate against his 
government, internally and externally, and continue with his policy in Cyprus. 
10 Eden: House of Commons, July 12, 1956, vol. 556, col. 596. 
II L. Jeger: House Of Commons, July 12, 1956, vol. 556, col. 600. 
12 The Spectator, Our Turkish Foreign Secretary, July 13, 1956 
13 ibid. 
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However, a new initiative meant to change the established diplomatic scenery 
concerning the Cypriot question. 
From Makarios' arrest until the early days of the summer of 1956, Athens observed 
the situation in Cyprus with great anxiety. The new Prime Minister was decisive that 
Greece had to lead the diplomatic initiatives for the finding of a solution to the Cypriot 
question, therefore he strengthened the links of the Greek state with the Greek Cypriot 
Ethnarchy. Karamanlis wanted to open a new page for Greek involvement in the 
Cypriot question, therefore he decided to appoint E. Averof-Tositsas as the new Foreign 
Affairs Minister in the place of S. Theotokis, an experienced politician but with little or 
no sympathies among the Greek Cypriots, mainly due to his pro-British views.14 
Averof-Tositsas arrived in office during the last days of June and began to work towards 
a new scheme that would allow Greece to playa greater role in the Cypriot question. On 
12 July, Karamanlis invited the American ambassador in Athens, K. Cannon, to the 
Premier's residence in order to inform him of the new initiatives of the Grcck state 
concerning the Cypriot question. At the end of the meeting Karamanlis gave Cannon a 
memorandum entitled "The Cyprus Question. What can be done?". The memorandum 
was a personal creation of Averof-Tositsas which aimed to take the British Foreign 
Office by suprise and form the new basis for the settlement of the Cypriot question. The 
proposals that were presented in the memorandum can be summarized in the following 
points: 
"a) Recognition of the principle of self-determination for 
Cyprus. b)Introduclion of a liberal constilution based upon the 
democratic principles of the Free World c)The introduction 0/ 
a general amnesty in order to impose and preserve the internal 
peace and order in Cyprus. d)Concerning the selling of a 
definite date for the introduction of the principle of self 
determination in C)-prus, either 1)/1 will be decided by the 
NATO's Council or 2)it will be a subject of special negotiations 
between the British Government and the Cypriot Government, 
which will be appointed by the Legislalive Council of the 
island. e)/n both cases, the British military interests, the 
14 Theotokis had been portrayed by the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy as a Dritish figure, who played 11 
decisive role to the arrest of Makarios. Despite the fact that those accusations were unfounded, it has to 
be noted that Theotokis came from an old Greek family with close links with the Dritish state. His great-
grand father, G. Theotokis, was one of the leaders of the pro-Dritish fraction during the Greek War of 
Independence, while S.Theotokis, educated in Oxford University, played I1n important role during the 
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minority issues, the public security and the Turkish trade rights 
will be safeguarded through official treaties, which will remain 
inforce during and after the implementation of the principle of 
self-determination in Cyprus. j)Any solution concerning the 
Cypriot question would be accepted by the majority of the 
island, only if Archbishop Makarios supports it. As far as the 
Greek government knows, Archbishop Makarios is ready to 
agree to the above proposals, therefore his release and return 
from Seychelles is a mailer of great importance. 
The above proposals give Britain the opportunity to maintain 
its control upon Cyprusfor a long period of time, during which 
Britain can safeguard its geostrategic interests in the island. 
On the other hand, the Turkish security and the rights of the 
Turkish minority will be safeguarded by treaties and 
concessions, in many cases incompatible with the existing 
ones. ,,]S 
A careful examination of the Greek proposals indicates that the Greek plan did not 
differ greatly some ofthe British proposals of the recent past. According to the plan, the 
British side would have had a substantial period of time to adjust her foreign policy in 
the region of the Eastern Mediterranean according to the new status quo, while the 
agreement for the maintenance of a British military base on Cypriot territory would have 
been monitored and safeguarded by NATO and not by the Greek state.16 In addition, it 
was the first time that the Greek side recognized the importance of the Turkish factor in 
the Cypriot question. The Greek plan was structured in such a way that secured the 
political rights of the Turkish minority in Cyprus, while it offered an olive branch to 
Ankara by speaking about the protection of Turkish trade routes in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Although the Greek proposals seemed promising enough to establish a 
final settlement concerning the Cypriot question, they were nevertheless turned down by 
London on the basis that the Greek scheme could not safeguard the maintenance of 
British interests in Cyprus. It was an uncompromising position of the Foreign Office, 
that British interests could not be safeguarded only through a military base in Cypriot 
Greek Civil War as a British agent. For more concerning the Greek Cypriot accusations against S. 
Theotokis, see: N. Kranidiotis. Difficult Years. (Athens. 1981). pp.190·19S. 
15 K. Karamanlis. Opt cit., pp. 129·30. 
16 As already mentioned in previous chapters, the main objection of the British side concerning the 
maintenance of a military base in Cyprus was that this agreement could have not been followed by an 
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territory, therefore the Greek proposals were unsatisfactory. However, the true reasons 
for the British rejection of the Greek plan can be found in the diplomatic relations, 
during that time, between London and Cairo concerning Suez. 
After the coup of 1952, Nasser and his economic planners committed themselves to 
stabilizing the Egyptian economy. Nasser's greatest aspiration was to increase the 
political and military influence of Egypt among the rest of the Arab nations, therefore a 
strong and flourishing economy was essential. Since ancient times the economic 
prosperity of Egypt had been based upon the river Nile and agriculture. Egypt did not 
have the oil resources of the Gulf states, while the long subjection of the country to the 
control of the Ottoman Empire had shielded it from the influence of the Industrial 
Revolution, resulting in a lack of heavy industry. Nasser concluded that the country 
urgently needed a second dam across the Nile at Aswan. With such an ambitious plan 
Nasser aimed to enhance the new regime's prestige among the Egyptian population, and 
it would also have very real economic benefits by increasing the amount of land that 
could be irrigated and by providing enough hydroelectric power to supply the needs of 
the entire country. However, the estimated construction costs of at least $ 1 billion were 
well beyond Egypt's financial ability, therefore the country applied to the World Bank 
for a loan package. The US and Britain were among the leading nations in the World 
Bank, and seized the opportunity to put pressure upon Nasser in order to put an end in 
his political and diplomatic relations with the USSR. 17 Nasser hesitated to accept the 
Western terms. As a result, in an attempt to increase the pressure upon him, on 17 July 
1956, the Secretary General of the State Department, J.F.Dalles, informed the Egyptian 
ambassador in Washington that his country had decided to reject Nasser's loan request. 
However, this had the opposite effect to that intended by the Americans. Nasser 
regarded it as a hostile action, and on 26 July, the anniversary of his revolution, he 
announced the nationalization of the Suez canal. The revenue from it was to fund the 
development projects that the West refused to sponsor. IS Nasser's decision was a 
tremendous blow to Western economy and security. As mentioned in previous chapters, 
anti·NATO Greek government. However, with the new proposals this argument was groundless, since 
NATO had the political and military influence to safeguard this agreement. 
17 In September 1955 Egypt concluded an agreement with Czechoslovakia to purchase $200 million 
worth of advanced Soviet military equipment (50 MiG 15 fighters, 45 Illyushin bombers and 115 heavy 
tanks) in exchange for Egyptian cotton, while in early February, Moscow agreed to help build an atomic 
energy station in Egypt. See: B. 0' MaUey& I. Craig, The Cyprys Conspirncy: America. Espionjl~e nnd 
the Turkish Inyasion. (London. 1999). pp. 25·29. 
18 There is a vast bibliography concerning the nationalization of the Suez Canal, however a good 
introductory overview can be found in D. Hopwood, E~ypt; Politics nnd Society. 1945-1984, (London, 
1985). while a more detailed analysis of Nasser's era can be found in P.J. Vatikiotis, Nasser nnd his 
generation, (New York, 1978), and P. Woodward, ~, (London, 1992). 
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the Suez Canal was the main route for oil tankers from the Middle Eastern oil resources 
to the West. With the Suez canal under Egyptian or, even worse, Soviet control, 
Western oil tankers would be forced to change their route, taking a substantially longer 
trip around Africa and causing a considerable rise to oil prices in the Western countries. 
The Western world was facing a great economic threat, a danger that affected the 
European countries most, since the US had the oil resources of Alaska and Texas to limit 
the economic consequences of Nasser's action. While efforts to reach a negotiated 
settlement of the crisis were under way, Britain, France and Israel concluded a secret 
agreement for joint military action against Egypt under the code name "Operation 
Musketeer". Their agreement was activated on 29 October, with an Israel strike into 
Sinai, while on 31 October, the British air force began heavy bombing raids on military 
targets near Cairo and along the canal zone and Anglo-French paratroopers landed at the 
north end of the canal and began to advance on Suez city. As was expected, the 
tripartite attack was condemned by the Soviet Union which threatened to strike London 
and Paris if the Israeli-Anglo-French troops were not withdrawn from Egypt. The 
fragile peaceful co-existence between the Western and the Eastern camp was under an 
unequivocal threat and desperate diplomatic initiatives from the American camp aimed 
to resolve the crisis. 
The crisis of the Suez Canal played a decisive role in the British response towards the 
Greek proposals for the resolution of the Cypriot question. On the one hand, the British 
mentality was strongly influenced by Nasser's action to nationalize the Suez canal. 
According to the treaty of 1954, Britain had agreed to evacuate the military base in 
Suez, but retained the right to reoccupy the base in the event of an attack by an outside 
power on an Arab League state or Turkey. However, Nasser's interference in the canal's 
international status quo had invalidated the above agreement. On top of that, the 
American attitude concerning the Suez crisis deeply wounded the British conscience. 
London approached Nasser's operation as a hostile action against the country and 
expected the US to support any military action against Egypt, on the basis of articles 4 
and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.19 However, the US decided not to be militarily 
involved in the Suez crisis, a decision which was interpreted as a deep insult by the 
officials in the Foreign Office. Following this, London did not want to create a new 
19 According to Article 4 "The Parties will consult logether whenever. In the opinion of any of them. the 
territorial integrity. political independence or security of any of the Parties Is threatened", nnd Article 6 
"For the purpose 0/ Article 5 an armed attack on one or more o/the Parties Is deemed to include an 
armed attack ... on the/orees. vessels or aircraft 0/ any of the Parties. when In or over these territories or 
any area 0/ Europe in which occupation/orees of any o/the Parties were stationed on the date when the 
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Suez, this time in Cyprus. Nasser's action was a bitter lesson to the Foreign Office, that 
international agreements can be easily forgotten, while the American attitude towards 
Suez undermined the Greek proposals concerning the safeguarding by NATO of an 
agreement between Britain and Greece about Cyprus. On the other hand, due to the 
Suez crisis Eden was not in a position to accept the Greek initiative. As already 
mentioned the hard-liners inside the Conservative party held the British Premier 
responsible for the signature of the Suez treaty. The political developments in Egypt 
justified the attacks of the extreme right-wingers against Eden, allowing the 
Conservative government no room for new negotiations concerning a territory that was 
vital for British strategic interests. Eden could not afford a new diplomatic defeat and 
was unwilling to offer new arguments against the internal opposition of the Conservative 
party towards his leadership. Nevertheless, there is another reason why the British 
government turned down the Greek proposals, which has never been raised by the 
specialists who have dealt with the Cypriot question. After the nationalization of the 
Suez canal, all the Western technicians assigned to the preservation and the operation of 
the canal were retired, either forcibly or voluntarily. However, almost 85%f those 
technicians were either Greek or Greek Egyptians.2o Therefore, it is no exaggeration to 
propose that the fate of the Suez canal was placed in Greek hands. If the Greek 
technicians decided to abandon the canal then Nasser's plans would have been sabotaged 
and the canal would have been non-operational for months or even years, since Nasser 
would have been obliged to take a long time to train and assign Egyptians to the Suez 
canal. However, Athens decided to assist Nasser, by instructing the Greek technicians 
through the Greek embassy in Cairo to continue with their duties under the new status 
quO.21 The Greek decision should puzzle the specialists, since it is one of the main anti-
Western actions in Greek history. Since the end of the Greek Civil War, the main 
doctrine of Greek foreign policy was that "Greece belongs to the West". So, was 
Karamanlis an anti-Westerner and a secret admirer of the Soviet Union? There is only 
one answer to this question and it is a direct no. Karamanlis was a committed pro-
Westerner and a fervent opponent of Communism, not only at an internationallevcl but 
in the internal politics of the country as well.22 By this decision the Greek Premier 
Treaty entered into force or in the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of 
Cancer". 
20 E. Averof-Tositsas, A Story of Missed Opportunities: The Cypriot Ouestion 1950-1963 • (Athens, 
1982), vol. II, p.l37. 
21 K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 147. 
22 During Kararnanlis' era the prosecution of the supporters of the illegal Greek Communist Party was as 
systematic as ever, while Karamanlis was held responsible by the international community for the 
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simply tried to accomplish two targets. On the one hand, he tried to protect the rights of 
the Greek minority in Egypt. The Greek presence in Egypt was well established through 
the centuries, since the arrival of Alexander the Great and the later Byzantine 
expansionism during the Dark Years. The Greek minority in Egypt was extremely 
wealthy and had Egyptian trade under its control. In cities like Alexandria Egyptians 
were the minority, and the Greek influence was so powerful, politically and 
economically, that the Greek community in Egypt was like a state within a state. Due to 
its great wealth and influence the Greek community managed to survive through the 
centuries and numerous different regimes, however, the arrival of Nasser threatened to 
alter this fact. The revolutionary ideology of the new regime, the attempt to modify 
Egypt's social and economic profile, and the nationalist orientation of Nasser, embodied 
within slogans such as "Egypt for the Egyptians", threatened the Greek minority and its 
survival within the new Egyptian framework. Karamanlis, by instructing his 
compatriots to continue with their duties in the Suez canal, hoped to shield the Greek 
minority by securing the gratitude of the Egyptian leader. On the other hand, 
Karamanlis was aware of Arab solidarity. By standing by the side of an Arab nation, the 
Greek Premier hoped to safeguard the sympathy of the Arab world concerning the 
Cypriot question and the anti-colonial struggle of the Greek Cypriots against Britain, a 
sympathy that could be translated into extra votes in favour of Greece in a future 
assembly of the United Nations. For those reasons, Karamanlis turned down the 
invitation of the British government to a conference in London concerning the Suez 
crisis that was to be held on 16 August, by issuing the following response: 
"The Greek government, after a careful review of all the 
relevant subjects concerning her parllcipallon in the 
Conference in London, decided not to be represented. Due to 
international circumstances and their Implicallons for the 
Greek interests, the Greek governmenl decided 11,al the arrival 
of a Greek delegation in the Conference would be a negative 
development for the finding of a peaceful solution In Suez. ,,23 
From the above analysis it can be concluded that the Greek role during the Suez crisis 
was decisively anti-British, providing Nasser with all the moral and actual support 
required to achieve his goals. Eden was deeply offended and the crisis in diplomatic 
relations between Greece and Britain escalated, therefore the rejection of the Greek plan 
assassination ofG. Lambrakis. a member ofthe Greek parliament and of the Greek Democratic Left 
(EDA). in 1964. 
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for the resolution of the Cypriot question was, to a great extent, a categorical and explicit 
expression of British displeasure regarding Greek foreign policy. 
Although the British officials in the Foreign Office were occupied with the crisis in 
the Suez canal, the political and diplomatic developments concerning the Cypriot 
question had not been de-activated. Although London had to divide its attention 
between two different, though equally important diplomatic fronts, the Foreign Office 
officials had no other choice but to follow, at the same time, the political course in both 
Suez and Cyprus. This was because of the Greek proposals concerning the Cypriot 
question. As mentioned earlier, one of the main arguments concerning the continuation 
of the British presence in Cyprus, was that Britain was the only involved power that was 
unequivocally committed to the finding of a satisfactory solution to the Cypriot question, 
a solution that could safeguard peace and order in the wide area of the Eastern 
Mediterranean. However, the Greek initiative threatened to discredit the above 
argument, especially since it had been turned down by the British side. In the eyes of 
the international community, the Greeks offered an escape from the Cypriot deadlock, 
therefore Britain ought to respond and take certain diplomatic action towards the 
resolution ofthe Cypriot question. Therefore, London decided to send Lord Radcliffe, a 
specialist in the constitutional questions, to Cyprus in order to formulate a liberal 
constitution that would re-impose peace and order on the island. However, the Dritish 
government showed no signs of goodwill in order to assist Lord Radcliffe in this 
strenuous task. On the contrary, London seemed to put obstacles in the path of its 
representative by imposing the following terms on the Dritish expert. Lord Radcliffe 
was not authorised to propose any alteration to the sovereignty status quo of Cyprus. 
His duties were limited to proposing modifications concerning the internal Cypriot 
administration. All the issues concerning foreign affairs, defence and the security of 
Cyprus were to remain under the jurisdiction of the governor. In general, all the 
requirements that had been imposed on Lord Radcliffe, even before he arrived in 
Cyprus, are as follows: 
"a)During the period of the Constitution Cyprus is to remain 
under British sovereignty. b)The lise of C>prus as a base is 
necessary for the fulfillment by lIer Afajesty's Government of 
their international obligations and for the defense of Drillsh 
interests in the Middle East and the interests of other Powers 
allied or associated with the United Kingdom. c)AII mailers 
23 K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 148. 
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relating to external affairs, defence and internal security arc 
retained in the hands of lIer Afajesty's Government or the 
Governor. d)Subject to this, the Constitution is to be based on 
the principles of liberal democracy and is to confcr a wide 
measure of responsible se!f-governmelJl on elected 
representatives of the people of Cyprus, but Is atlhe same time 
to contain such reservations, provisions and guarantees as may 
be necessary 10 give a just protection to the special in/crests of 
the various communilies, religions and races in the island. ,,14 
In addition, Lord Radcliffe's duties were made even harder by the fact that the Greek 
Cypriot community stood by its decision not to discuss any proposals concerning the 
Cypriot political status quo before the return of Makarios to the island. However, 
London was not ready to reconsider Makarios' exile in Seychelles. Without any doubt, 
Radcliffe's involvement in the Cypriot question began with the worst omens, which 
raises various questions about the sincerity of London's willingness to see Lord 
Radcliffe's success in his assigned duty. 
However, despite all the aforementioned difficulties, Lord Radcliffe provided his 
government in London with his proposals for the introduction of a new constitution in 
Cyprus. His proposals were presented to the House of Commons on 19 December 1956 
by Lennox- Boyd, who had also visited Athens and Ankara in order to inform the two 
governments concerning the new developments in the Cypriot question. It is widcly 
accepted that Lord Radcliffe proposed the most complete constitutional scheme of the 
British side during the 1950's concerning the Cypriot question. The proposed 
constitution would have given the Greek Cypriots a sufficient majority in the Legislative 
Assembly, although for matters affecting Turkish commumll affairs the consent of two-
thirds of the Turkish Cypriot members in the Chamber would be required.2s The 
Assembly would consist of a Speaker, a Deputy Speaker and 36 other members. Six 
members of the Assembly would be nominated by the Governor at his discretion. Six 
other members would be elected by vote on a Turkish Cypriot communal roll. The other 
24 members would be elected by vote on a general roll, that it is to say, on the Greek 
Cypriot roll, for the Turks would be excluded from the general roll.26 In the executive 
department there would be a Cypriot Prime Minister as the head of the Government in 
self-governing matters. He would be appointed by the Governor, but it would be the 
24 Lord Radcliffe: Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus, Cmnd. 42. p. 6. 
25 Lord Radcliffe: op. cit. pp. 14. &34. 
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duty of the Governor to select the person who seemed to have the general support of the 
Assembly. The Governor, on the recommendations of the Prime Minister, would also 
appoint the other ministers. There would also be a Turkish minister in the cabinet "ex 
officio". He was to be the head of an office for Turkish Cypriot affairs, with its own 
budget.27 To the authority of the Governor would be reserved matters dealing with 
external affairs, the defence of Cyprus (either directly or indirectly, as involved in the 
fulfilment by the British government of their international obligations and the defence of 
British interests in the Middle East or the interests of other powers allied or associated 
with Britain), and internal security. In all the above matters, the Governor would retnin 
the power of law-making and the conduct of all aspects of the executive 
administration.28 In addition, no bill pnssed by the Legislntive Assembly could be valid 
as law unless the Governor hnd signified his assent.29 In all other matters lying within 
the field of self-governing mntters, the Governor would have the duty of a constitutional 
head of government.30 The constitutional proposals included the establishment of a 
Supreme Court in Cyprus, having jurisdiction in all proceedings in which the validity of 
any law of the Assembly was called into question as violating the provisions of the 
constitution which restricted its legislative power. The Supreme Court would comprise 
a president (Chief Justice) and two other judges-one Greek and one Turkish. The Chief 
Justice, who must not be a Cypriot citizen, would be appointed by the Governor at his 
discretion but after consultation with the Prime Minister. The other two judges would 
also be appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Chief Justice.3l In case the 
Legislative Assembly increased the number of judges, it was provided that there would 
always be an equal number of Greeks and Turks. Another court called the "Tribunal of 
Guarantees" would also be established, mainly in order to protect individual rights 
guaranteed by the constitution. The members of this court would also be nppointed by 
the Governor after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice.32 TIle 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal of Guarantees would not extend to laws enacted by the 
Assembly or to Ordinances made by the Governor, but only to orders and regulations 
26 Lord Radcliffe: op. cit., p. 31. 
27 Lord Radcliffe: op. cit., pp. 14,34 & 35. 
28 Lord Radcliffe: op. cit., p. 29. 
29 The categories of legislation in which the Governor wns to be free to reserve his assent were Dills that 
sought to alter the constitution, Dills affecting currency, coinage or foreign exchange, Dills affecting the 
Royal prerogative, and Dills affecting the trustee status of Cyprus government stock. Sec: Lord Radcliffe: 
Of. cit., p. 39. 
3 ibid., p. 39. 
31 Lord Radcliffe: op. cit., pp. 39-40. 
31 Lord Radcliffe: op. cit., pp. 43-44. 
188 
having the force of law, and to executive acts. The Tribunal of Guarantees was a 
reflection of the "Conseil d' Etat" in France.33 
From the above analysis, it can be argued that Lord Radcliffe's constitutional 
proposals were more progressive than any previous ones. The Greek Cypriots were 
guaranteed to hold a substantial majority in the Legislative Assembly, therefore one of 
the main obstacles during the talks between Harding and Makarios was to be removed. 
However, many Greek scholars dealing with the Cypriot question support the view that 
Lord Radcliffe's proposals would have created a constitutional dictatorship in Cyprus, 
by granting unlimited constitutional powers to the Governor.34 As a matter of fact, the 
Governor would control the internal security of the island and he would have a veto for 
every proposed Bill. Nevertheless, it cannot be forgotten that the new proposals were a 
great step closer to the application of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, and 
that the proposed constitution was a transitional one, imposing no permanent restrictions 
on the political fate of the island. 
Nevertheless, the Greek government rejected Lord Radcliffe's proposals. The reason 
for the reaction of Athens to the British initiative cannot be detected in the Greek 
inflexibility concerning the resolution of the Cypriot question, but in the British desire to 
block any diplomatic development concerning the Cypriot question. The Greek 
government was forced to reject Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals, mainly due to 
the attitude of Lennox Boyd during the presentation of those constitutional proposals 
inside the House of Commons. Despite the fact that Lord Radcliffe's constitutional 
proposals dealt only with the internal Cypriot status quo, the Secretary of Colonies spoke 
about the international status quo of the island in such a way that the Greek government 
was left with no other decision but to declare its opposition to such a scheme. During 
his speech, Lennox-Boyd introduced the idea of partition. It was the first time since 
1878 that a British official had spoken about such a matter. In his speech, the Secretary 
of the Colonies said that the principle of self-determination had been recognized by his 
government, but he added that when the time for its application came, the Turkish 
Cypriots should also be free to decide for themselves their own future status. As Lennox 
Boyd said: 
"When the international and strategic situation permits, and 
provided that self-government is lVorking satisfactorily, Iler 
Majesty's Government will be ready to review the question of 
33 A comparable court exists in Greece and is called the "Council ofStatc". 
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the application of self-determination. When the time comes/or 
this review, that is, when these conditions have been/ulfilled, it 
will be the purpose o/ller Afajesty's Government to ensure that 
any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a 
manner that the Turkish C}priot community, no less than the 
Greek Cypriot community shall, in the special circumstances 0/ 
Cyprus, be given freedom to decide lor themsel\-'es their future 
status. In other words, lIer Afajesty's Government recognize 
thaI Ihe exercise 0/ self-determination in such a mixed 
population must include partition among the eventual 
options. ,,35 
Lennox-Boyd's speech provoked a bitter response from the Opposition. TIle Labour 
M.P J. Callaghan called the Radcliffe constitution "built-in guarantees" for the Turkish 
Cypriots and asked the Colonial Secretary why he considered it necessary to introduce at 
this stage-"to throw inlo the pot"-this "Irritant of partition". J6 Devan regarded it as 
dangerous, poisoning the atmosphere and once more preventing a settlement of the 
question.37 After Lennox-Boyd's speech in the House of Commons the Greek 
government, as predicted, issued the following declaration: 
"The Greek government, due to the poWlcal and diplomatic 
background of Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals, 
declares that it not her Intention to accept the British 
proposals. The Greek governmentlVould also like 10 in/arm all 
the powers involved in the Cypriot question, thai the 
introduction 0/ partition lor C>prus w/l/ esccllate the already 
tense situation in the island and will destabilize the region of 
the Eastern Mediterranean. ,,38 
On the other hand, Lennox Doyd's speech in the House of Commons had been 
welcomed by Ankara. In an official statement, the Turkish Prime Minister declared that 
his Government regarded Lord Radcliffe's report, together with the Colonial Secretary's 
statement, as "a reasonable basis lor discussion", and he reserved the right to make 
some suggestions after detailed study of the whole matter. In addition, referring 
34 For more concerning this academic approach see: N. Psiroukis, The CYQriot Drama. (Athens, 1987), 
fr 78-90. 
Lennox-Boyd: House of Commons, December 19, 1956, vol. 562, col. 1268. 
36 Callaghan: House of Commons, December 19, 1956, vol. 562, col. 1269. 
37 Bevan: House of Commons, December 19, 1956, vol. 562, col. 1271. 
38 K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 244 
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specifically to Lennox-Boyd's statement on Cyprus' future status, Menderes stated that 
it contained ''points of departure which could lead to afinal settlement" of the problem, 
and that Turkey would continue her discussions with Britain on this basis.l9 A few days 
latter, however, during a speech in the Turkish Parliament, Menderes declared that only 
partition or the continuation of the existing status quo was acceptable to his government 
and therefore Lord Radcliffe's proposals, providing for a unitary state, were 
unacceptable. As he said: 
"Partition of Cyprus half and half, is a self-sacrifice for Turkey 
and we will never consent to a greater sacrifice than that. ,,"'0 
Without any doubt, Lennox-Boyd's statement inside the House of Commons was 
catastrophic for the finding of a valid solution for the Cypriot question. On the one 
hand, it validated the Greek fears of a secret and unofficial alliance between Britain and 
Turkey concerning the Cypriot question, resulting in a diplomatic deadlock between 
Athens and London. On the other hand, it just offered official recognition of the Turkish 
desire to obtain Cyprus, at least in part, in the future. In addition, Lennox-Boyd's 
proposal for partition could not safeguard peace and order in Cyprus. If such a plan was 
to be implemented in Cyprus, it could only have been achieved through an exchange of 
the population, since the Greek and Turkish communities were living in the same 
territories all over the island.41 Therefore, the idea of partition would have caused an 
extended civil war, a great number of refugees from both sides, and the breakdown of 
diplomatic relations between Turkey and Greece. As a matter of fact, all this occurred in 
1974, when Turkey invaded the north part of the island, creating great tumloil in her 
39 Keesing's Archive: April 6-13. 1957. p. 15472. 
40 Keesing's: op. cit., p. 15473. 
41 According to a survey prepared by the Department of Lands nnd Surveys of Cyprus. on the basis of the 
1960 census of population: 
To'MlS and yjllages in Cyprus <total number> 
Purely or predominantly Greek: 393 (63.35 %) 
Purely or predominantly Turkish: 120 (19.40%) 
Mixed (Greek and Turkish): 106 (17.15) 
Total number of towns and villages: 619. 
Population oftoWIls and yjlJaces Ootid numbed 
Purely or predominantly Greek: 50.30% 
Purely or predominantly Turkish: 6.70% 
Mixed (Greek or Turkish): 43%. 
Total number of population: 573.566. 
Population of mixed (Greek and Turkish) tovros nnd yjllaces (Mixed population only) 
Greeks: 71.80% 
Turks: 28.20% 
As the statistical data show. there are local centres where one ethnic group or the other predominates. Dut 
they also reveal that those villages and towns where the population is purely Greek or purely Turkish nre 
rather small local concentrations. 
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relations with Greece until the present day. It is more than clear that the British side did 
not desire the alteration of the Cypriot status quo. The sending of Lord Radcliffe to 
Cyprus was just a diversion, in order to justify the rejection of the Greek proposals to the 
international community. Therefore, in order to secure the Greek refusal to the new 
constitutional proposals, London decided to introduce the idea of partition. In such a 
way, Turkey would have been used as a shield against Greek diplomatic activities, the 
international community would have been satisfied by the new British proposal, and the 
Cypriot status quo would have remained unaltered, serving British geostrategic interests 
in the region. Nevertheless, the British side, in their attempt to secure their interests in 
the region, opened the Pandora's box, allowing the spirit of partition to escape and be 
established in the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot mentality, nnd further destabilising the 
Cypriot political spectrum, with grave consequences for the future unity of the island. 
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CIIAPTERIX 
THE OPENING OF THE LAST ACT IN TilE CYPRIOT DIlAMA: 
MAKARIOS' LIBERATION AND TilE FOOT· MACMILLAN PLAN. 
The I'olllln or Aristotle 
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Aristotle, VII&. 
This chapter will examine the period from Makarios' liberation from Seychelles to 
the introduction of Foot's and Macmillan's proposals, for a solution to the Cypriot 
question. It will present the diplomatic background to Makarios' liberation from the 
place of his exile, attempting to analyse the reasons that forced London to modify its 
policy towards Makarios' isolation from the Cypriot political arena. In addition, it will 
consider the Foot and Macmillan plans concerning the Cypriot question, by evaluating 
their context, as well as their final outcome and influence upon the internal political 
scene of Cyprus. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer nrc: llow can 
the researcher evaluate the Foot-Macmillan plan? How can Athens' attitude towards 
Foot's proposals be justified? Under what circumstances did London decide to prescnt 
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Macmillan's proposals concerning the Cypriot question? Secondary questions that will 
be presented in this chapter are: Under what circumstances did London decide to release 
Makarios from Seychelles? Why did the United States support the Greek initiative that 
resulted in Makarios' release? What was the political significance of Harding's 
replacement by Foot in Cyprus? 
As already mentioned in previous chapters, the arrest and exile of the Archbishop 
Makarios had been imposed upon Eden's cabinet by the hard-liners of the Conservative 
party. Makarios' exile was Eden's ultimate action to raise his popularity in the internal 
politics of his party, after the negative political developments for British geostrategic 
interests in Jordan.1 Eden, however, in his attempt to unify his party, destabilized the 
Cypriot political scene beyond every expectation. Makarios' isolation in Seychelles 
resulted in the strengthening of the position of the hard-liners inside the Ethnarchic 
Council, while many of the moderate figures inside the Ethnarchy were prompted to 
unite their forces with Grivas, since after the departure of Makarios, the Greek Cypriot 
warlord found the opportunity to fill the leadership gap that had appeared in the Enosis 
movement. Eden's decision to remove Makarios from the political developments in 
Cyprus brought the Cypriot question to a diplomatic deadlock and was a severe blow to 
Anglo-Greek relations, since the Greek Cypriot community had refuscd to recognize 
any negotiations concerning the fate of the Cypriot question and the Greek government 
had recalled her ambassador from London as an act of high protest. Despite this, and 
although Eden's cabinet had to face the calls of the Labour party and the international 
community concerning the release of Maknrios, Eden showed no signs of reconsidering 
the Archbishop'S return to the island. For Eden, Makarios' stay in Seychelles was the 
last opportunity for the old politician to impose his will upon the Conservative party, the 
last chance of the British Premier to safeguard his political survival. lIowever, it is of 
course impossible to predict the unexpected, and chance played a decisive role in the 
course of the Cypriot question. 
The British militarily involvement in Suez caused the biggest financial crisis in 
Britain since 1945. Britain lost on balance $400 million during the last quarter of 1956; 
withdrawals were probably half as much again but were partly offset by one or two 
exceptional influxes which were credited during the quarter.2 Sterling was healthy and 
the reserves more than adequate for ordinary purposes, but losses of this magnitude 
could only be borne for a number of weeks without external aid to preserve the 
I The Observer.lIow it Happened. 13 January 1957. 
2 P. Calvocoresi, World pQlitics Since 1945. (London, 1991), sixth ed .• p.308. 
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exchange value of the pound. It became clear that Britain would have to borrow to save 
the pound and that neither the United States nor the International Monetary Fund would 
lend the necessary sums until the fighting in Suez was called off. The United States was 
anxious to preserve the fragile peaceful co-existence between the Western and the 
Eastern block, however, Soviet support for Nasser's regime was the main American 
preoccupation. Nevertheless, after a series of diplomatic negotiations among 
Washington, London, Paris and Tel Aviv, Britain and France withdrew their forces in 
December, and the Israelis finally evacuated Sinai in March 1957. The Suez crisis was 
ended, yet Eden was the only figure who emerged defeated from the sands of Suez. The 
final outcome of the Suez crisis gave all the political opponents of the British Premier 
the opportunity to commence a series of bitter political attacks against him. The 
internal opposition reminded people once again of Eden's role during the signature of 
the Suez treaty; the Labour party questioned his political abilities to govern the nation 
and safeguard British interests at international level; while even the pro-Conservative 
press dedicated sharp articles to Eden's personal role before and during the crisis. 
Characteristically, the most bitter anathema for Britain in Suez was provided in the 
Observers' description of the effect of Eden's decision upon the nation's profile to 
invade Egypt. According to the editorial: 
"Never since 1873 has Great Brl/aln made herself so 
universally disliked"J 
while Lord Carrington in October 1956 said about Eden that he "was ncr\.'olls ami Ills 
manner neurotic. It was easy to see he was a sick man ,,4 
As a result of this chaotic situation Eden resigned on 9 January 1957 on medical 
advice.s At the final Cabinet meeting he broke down in tears and cried: "You Clrc all 
deserting me, deserting me.,,6 On 10 January 1957, Macmillan became the new resident 
of 10 Downing St. The new Prime Minister had little in common with the previous one. 
While Eden was strongly attached to the 19th century foreign policy style, Macmillan 
was more realistic and willing to respond to the newtimes. llis arrival in 10 Downing St 
brought a change to the established political scenery of the Cypriot question. 
The consequences of the political developments in London affected not only Britain 
but also Greece. Averof, as an experienced politician, realized that the arrival of 
3 The Observer, 4 November 1956, p.7. 
4 Lord Carrington, Reflect on ThinGS Past: The Memoirs of Lord Cnrrio~toD. (London, 1988), p. 119. 
, As quoted from A. Sked & C. Cook, Post-War Britain: A Po1iticnl JIistQQ'. (London, 1993). p. 137: 
"This at least was the official version. Eden's latest biographer. however, has suggested that Eisenhower 
demanded the Prime Minister's resignation and that Macmillan. Butler and Churchill dutifully helped 10 
engineer it . .. 
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Macmillan in 10 Downing St would affect political developments in Cyprus. Therefore, 
the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs decided that it was in the Greek interest to 
commence a new diplomatic initiative about the Cypriot case. As Averof admits in his 
memoirs: 
"Eden's resignation and Macmillan 's arri~'al worried a lot of 
associates. However, I have to admit that I welcomed this 
change. I knew Macmillan and I believed that he had more 
moderate views than Eden. who belonged to the old 
Conservative school of thought. Nevertheless, I came to the 
conclusion that if we wanted to contribute to the resolving of 
the Cypriot question, now was the right time for liS. One of the 
main rules in diplomacy is to take your opponent by surprise in 
order to prevent any negative developments, and this was what 
I intended 10 do. ,,'1 
What the Greek politician intended to do was to use EOKA, in order to force the British 
government to allow Makarios' return to Cyprus. One of the main British arguments, 
quite rightly, was that EOKA was the principal obstacle to a permanent solution for the 
Cypriot question. According to the British side, the continuation of violence in Cyprus 
prevented the establishment of any diplomatic initiative for the island, therefore Averof 
decided to use his influence and his connections with Grivas, in order to put pressure on 
the latter to declare a cease-fire. The importance of Averors plan can be sufficiently 
revealed only if it linked to the political agenda of Macmillan. According to 
Macmillan's agenda, the new Prime Minister planned to meet President Eisenhower in 
Bermuda on 14 March. What the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs wanted, was to 
obtain Grivas' declaration of cease-fire during this meeting in order to leave no other 
option to the British Premier than to accept it, since the latter would have been in a 
vulnerable position to do the opposite in front of the American President. Therefore, on 
20 February Averof sent two senior diplomats to Cyprus, A. Vlachos and A. Frydas, in 
order to persuade Grivas that it was in the interest of the Enosis movement to declare a 
general cease-fire. Averofknew that it was a hard task to achieve, but he also knew that 
during this particular time Grivas was in a vulnerable position because Harding had 
achieved some successes against EOKA. As Grivas writes in his memoirs: 
6 J. Margach. The Abuse of Power, (London, 1978), pp. 113·14. 
7 E.Averof. Tositsas, A Story ofMjssed OpPQrtunities , (Athens, 1982), vol. I, p. 186. 
196 
"So far Harding had concentrated on destroying our guerilla 
army, but at the start of February 1957 several leading 
members of my Nicosia groups were arrested, among them the 
town commander, A. Chartas, the execution group leader, N. 
Sampson, and the head of the courier network, a young 
theologian called P. Kareolemos. Harding was throwing 
everything into this attack on every sector oftheJront. Afy own 
headquarters in Limassol were endangered on 7 February, 
when the area was searchedfor several hours. ,,8 
Averof knew that Grivas had no other choice than to accept his proposal, therefore on 14 
March, the same day that Macmillan met with Eisenhower in Dermudas, Grivas issued 
the following declaration: 
" ... in order to facilitate the resumption of negotiations between 
the British Government and the only representalive of the 
Cypriot people, Archbishop Afakarios, our Organization 
declares that it is willing to order the suspension of operations 
as soon as the Ethnarch Makarlos is released. ,,9 
Grivas' declaration highlights that the proposed cease-fire was based upon two 
preconditions. The release of Makarios from Seychelles, and the commencement of new 
negotiations between the Greek Cypriot community and the Dritish government 
concerning the Cypriot question. The Conservative government had been trapped by 
AveroPs tactic. Grivas' offer created a new diplomatic predicament that could not be 
ignored by London, since if Macmillan's government had rejected the offer, it would 
have been accused by the international community and especially the United States of 
inflexibility and opportunism concerning the Cypriot case. As a matter of fact, as soon 
as Eisenhower had been informed about the proposed cease-fire, he sent n confidential 
message to Karamanlis declaring his approval of the Greek initiative. As Eisenhower 
wrote: 
"/ would like to reassure your excellency that my government is 
sincerely committed to assist the Involved governments and the 
people to find a suitable method of approach concerning the 
Cypriot question. I would also like to reassure you that we will 
8 The Memoirs of General Griyas, ed. by C. Foley, (London, 1964), p. 110. For more concerning the 
military success of liar ding against E.O.K.A see also: C. Foley, Lel:ilcy of Strife: CYDrus from Rebellioo 
to Ciyil War, (London, 1964), pp. 90-99. 
9The Memoirs of General Griyas, op. cit., p. liS. 
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take into account your proposals about Archbishop 
Makarios. ,,10 
Moreover, Grivas' offer was welcomed not only by the American government but by 
the majority of the British press, increasing the pressure upon Macmillan's government. 
Characteristically, "The Times", a newspaper that in the past bitterly criticized Eden nnd 
his cabinet for their hesitation to aet drastically against EOKA, dedicated a full article 
under the title "No further delay" that urged the Conservative government to act bravely 
and release Makarios from Seychelles. I I 
Under those circumstances, six days after Grivas' proposed cease-fire, Lennox-Boyd 
declared inside the House of Commons that it was the intention of his government to 
ask Makarios to issue an official statement, denouncing EOKA's violent actions. If 
Makarios were willing to make such a statement the Conservative government would be 
prepared to end his exile in Seychelles, return him to Athens, and later return him to 
CypruS. 12 It was an obvious trick of the Conservative government that aimed to lin the 
pressure from its shoulders, since in the past Makarios had been asked to issue such a 
declaration and had refused firmly. Macmillan and the members of his cabinet expected 
that Makarios would refuse once again to denounce EOKAts actions, so they could 
jeopardize the Greek initiative and at the same time blame the Greek Cypriot Ethnarch 
for inflexibility and lack of co-operation, justifying the continuation of his exile in 
Seychelles. However, this time Makarios proved that his period of isolation in 
Seychelles had influenced his political personality drastically. Eight days after his first 
statement inside the House of Commons, Lennox-Boyd stated that Makarios had issued 
a statement: 
"While Her Afajesty's government cannot regard this 
statement ... as the clear appeal/or which they asked, 
nevertheless they considered that in present circumstances it Is 
no longer necessary 10 conlinue the Archbishop's detention "U 
Lennox-Boyd, perhaps deliberately, did not announce the text of Makariost statement, 
for fear of Conservative back-benchers' reactions. He simply said: 
"The Archbishop has now made a statement, copies 0/ which 
will be available in the Vote Office when I sit down. "II 
10 K. Karamanlis, Archive: Facts and Papers. (Athens, 1993 ), vol. II, p. 310. 
11 The Times, March IS, 1957. p. 7. 
12 Lennox Boyd: House of Commons, March 20, 1957. vol. 567, col. 39S. 
13 Lennox Boyd: House of Commons, March 28, 1957, vol. 567, col. 13S5-3S6. 
14 ibid. 
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Lennox-Boyd was right not to announce Makarios' statement inside the House of 
Commons. Even if the statement spoke about the necessity of ending EOKA's actions, 
it still spoke about the necessity of goodwill gestures from the Dritish side as well. 
Despite the fact that the declaration was not what London wanted, the Conservative 
government still had no other choice but to accept it without further consideration. The 
American side supported the idea of Makarios' release, and the financial stagnation of 
Britain and its economic subjugation to the United States, a result of the Suez crisis, 
played a catalytic role in Makarios' release. As the full text of the statement said: 
"/ invite EOKA to declare a general cease-:fire, taking into 
account the Jact that the British government will show a /zigh 
spirit oj understanding and co-operation by lifling the state of 
high emergency in Cyprus. EOKA had declared that she is 
ready to stop her actions If am released. This statement is 
opening the road to the restoration of peace. The Secretary of 
the Colonies stated that if I were to call upon EOKA to end her 
violent actions, I would be free to go wherever I want, except 
Cyprus. My personal Iiberalion will not be a subject for 
bargaining. If the British government believes II can find any 
Greek Cypriot that will be wil/ing to lead any negotiations 
during my absence, then II is mistaken. 1M 
The release of Makarios from Seychelles was the first important gesture of Macmillan's 
government towards the Cypriot question. However, this gesture had its dramatic side. 
Lord Salisbury, the Lord President of the Council and Conservative leader in the IIouse 
of Lords, resigned from the cabinet, protesting that Makarios had deliberately refrained 
from making the appeal for which he had been asked and which was regarded as the 
essential prerequisite for his release:6 Turkey also reacted bitterly. A teiegranl 
protesting against Makarios' release was sent to the Turkish Prime Minister by the 
Turkish Cypriot leader Kutchuk, while the Turkish Press and official circles expressed 
their uneasiness about the action of the Dritish Government. The official Anatolian 
News Agency said that the Archbishop'S release was less important in itself than its 
eventual repercussions for the Cyprus problem. The statement added that Turkey was 
following developments in Cyprus with keen interest,17 
UN. Kranidiotis, Pifficult vears • (Athens, 1981), p. 252. 
16 For more concerning this issue and the reactions of the other members of the I louse of Lords see: 
House of Lords Debates. 2 April 1957, vol. 202. col. 953·59. 
17 Keesing's Archive: April 6·13, 1957. p. 15475. 
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The news of Makarios' release brought great exhilaration to the Greek Cypriot 
community. Thousands of people packed the roads of Nicosia and other Cypriot cities, 
celebrating the release oftheir leader. N. Kranidiotis gives his account of that day: 
"It was a wet afternoon and a cold wind cleared the grey sky 
over Nicosia. From the balcony of my house I heard a great 
uproar coming from the centre of the city. Suddenly an 
enormous wave of women, children and men with flags and 
Makarios' pictures arrived infront of my balcony and began to 
cheer and applaud. It was a festival of enjoyment and hope. A 
peculiar thrill was in the air. ,,18 
Makarios left Seychelles on one of Onasis' tankers, and arrived in Athens on 17 April. 
In the Greek capital thousands of people were gathered in Syntagma square, and in front 
of the Greek Parliament Makarios praised the Greek Cypriot struggle and the sacrifices 
of his people. However, he did not mention or express thanks for the role of the Greek 
government and especially the contribution of Averof and Karamanlis in his release, a 
fact that passed unnoticed by the gathered crowd, but did not escape the attention of the 
Greek officials. Without any doubt, Makarios' deliberate amnesia had to do with the 
personality of the Greek Cypriot Archbishop. Makarios, even if he were the central 
figure of the Greek Cypriot question, wanted history to portray him as the only decisive 
actor in the Cypriot case. On the other hand, it was a direct expression of his 
disappointment towards the Greek political establishment that, according to Makarios, 
did not do whatever was possible to protect him and his people from the British tactics. 
Nevertheless, it would have been a great methodological mistake not to mention 
Averofs great role in Makarios' release. It was n personal triumph of the Greek 
politician, that in a short period of time he transformed the Greek foreign policy from an 
unorganized, and in a many cases irresponsible, expression of personal beliefs into a 
modem and accurate approach to the national foreign interests. At the same time, it 
would be a great omission not to mention the decisive role of the American factor in 
Makarios' release from Seychelles. During that period, the majority of the pro-right 
wing Greek press dedicated many leading articles to the humanitarian role of the United 
States, and spoke in favour of the so-called champion of liberal democratic values, 
Eisenhower. 19 However, the American support for the Greek initiative that resulted in 
18 N.Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 253. 
19 Characteristic titles: Eleftheria: The United States versus the Colonial Ghosts of the Past. April 2. 
1957. Akropolis: It was a Victory of the Free World, April 8, 1957. Estia: Presjdent Ejsenhower: The 
new Lloyd George, April 24, 1957. 
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Makarios' release had nothing to do with the humanitarian values of the American 
political scene, but concerned the geostrategic interests of the leading nation of the 
Western World. From early 1954, the United States planed to expand its influence in the 
Middle East, a traditional British sphere of influence, while the State Department 
objected to the continuation of British colonialism in Cyprus. Characteristically, in a 
secret letter from the State Department to the British Embassy in Washington, on 12 July 
1954, American officials stated that they were unable to confirm that there would be "no 
change in sovereignty over Cyprus "20, while during the same period, Eisenhower wrote 
to Churchill personally to voice his concern about the effects of Britain's Cyprus policy 
on the American people, who believed Greece and Cyprus "were ready 10 be reasonable 
and conciliatory".21 However, after the Suez crisis the Americans had come to the 
conclusion that it was essential for their geostrategic interests to limit the leading British 
role in the area and control it by themselves. As far as Cyprus was concerned, the State 
Department did not want to see the island put to use in ways which interfered with their 
own interests, as at Suez.22 The American interest concerning Cyprus can be supported 
by the classified memorandum handed by G. Allen, the American ambassador in Athens, 
to Karamanlis on 17 January 1957. According to the memorandum, the American side 
informed Karamanlis that the Cypriot question would be solved only if the Greek side 
openly invited the United States to intervene. As the memorandum continued, Cyprus 
would have been proclaimed an independent state under NATO's protection and specific 
areas of the island were to be used as "advanced military settlements" for the protection 
of the Free World.23 Nevertheless, the Americans did not want to commit London's 
mistakes in Cyprus by opposing the Greek Cypriot sentiments. Dy putting pressure upon 
Britain concerning Makarios' release, Washington tried to strengthen its diplomatic links 
with the Greek Cypriot Archbishop, a valuable asset for the future judging from 
Makarios' personal appeal among his compatriots. Nevertheless, despite the decisive 
American involvement, Makarios' release was Averors great personal victory. Through 
his finesse, he managed to end the period of stagnation for the Cypriot question, 
persuading Britain and the international community that only diplomacy could re-
establish peace and order on the island. Makarios' release was the first step towards a 
20 Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952-54. Eastern Europe: Soy jet Unjon: Eastern Mediterranean, 
(Washington, 1988), vol. VIII, p. 695. 
21 op. cit., p. 709. 
22 British Colonial Office Papers: CO 926/626,13.2.1957. 
23 "To Virna", May 24, 1996. The weekly newspaper published some classified documents form 
Karamanlis correspondence with O. Allen concerning the Cypriot question. 
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new approach to the Cypriot question, a development that played a momentous role for 
the opening of the last chapter of the Cypriot question. 
Makarios' release from Seychelles generated much optimism in Cyprus. However, 
soon enough it became obvious that it was just a brief spell of peace and quiet, a 
welcome but temporary calm before the stonn. Grivas continued to provoke the British 
establishment on the island, though only through pamphlets that were thrown during the 
early hours in the streets of the Cypriot cities and villages, while Harding extended his 
activities for the capture of EOKA's leader and the final annihilation of the organization. 
As the Cypriot governor had announced on Empire Day, 24 May, "while Grivas and his 
few remaining associates remain at large we cannot lower our guard. ,,24 Nevertheless, 
Harding's stance was not in accord with the new spirit of governing that Macmillan 
wanted to adopt in Cyprus. Despite his failure, until this point, to overcome EOKA's 
guerilla movement, Harding still believed that Cyprus should be governed with an iron 
fist. Macmillan, on the other hand, strongly believed that it was time to re-approach the 
Cypriot question, this time from a different diplomatic perspective. Macmillan knew 
that despite the unquestionable qualities of the Cypriot governor, he was not the right 
figure to implement a more moderate policy on the island. Harding, for the Greek 
Cypriot community, was a hated and tyrannical figure, responsible for the hanging and 
the imprisonment of many Greek Cypriots and the arrest and exile of the Archbishop 
Makarios. As Foley writes: 
"Harding. who hated injustice. repression and brulalily, was 
now identified with all three in Greek Cypriot minds, and tlzere 
could be no change of mood while he remained in charge,,2S 
As long as Harding was present on the island, diplomacy was condemned to failure and 
Macmillan's plans to re-approach the Cypriot question would have rcmained 
incomplete. Therefore, on 22 October 1957, the Colonial Office issued a statement 
announcing the appointment of a new Governor in Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot. Foot was the 
governor of Jamaica and his appointment signalled the new approach that Macmillan 
wanted to introduce in Cyprus. The new governor was a successful diplomat with 
moderate views and methods, and not an experienced soldier such as I larding. The news 
of Foot's appointment was welcomed by the Greek Cypriot community as a sign of 
reconciliation from the British side. The Bishop of Kition welcomed the change of 
Governor, if "his arrival heralds a change in Drillsh Government policy towards the 
24 The Memoirs of General Griyas, op. cit., p. 119. 
25 C. Foley, op. cit., p. 97. 
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Cyprus problem", while the Turkish Cypriot side greeted Foot's appointment if"/t does 
not indicate a change in the policies carried out by Sir John Harding. ,,]6 As became 
clear, the new governor had before him an extremely difficult and controversial task. He 
had to win back the Greek Cypriot trust, but at the same time he had to preserve the 
good relations between the Cypriot establishment and the Turkish Cypriot community in 
a way that would not provoke Greek Cypriot sentiments. 
The new Governor arrived in Nicosia on 3 December 1957. During his first press 
conference, Foot appealed for a new start and added that it was his belief that an 
overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people would wish to accept the offer of 
friendship, understanding and co-operation which he made. lIe also stated his readiness 
to meet any Cypriot who wanted to see him and expressed his intention to make a tour of 
the island to see things for himself.27 It was apparent that the new Governor, from his 
first official statement, was offering an olive branch to Grivas and his organization. 
However, Grivas did not share the optimism of the other Greek Cypriots towards the 
arrival of Foot. He firmly believed that the arrival of a new face in the governor's post 
was just another political trick of London in order to trap him and jeopardize the Enosis 
movement. As he reveals in his memoirs: 
"The advent of a new civilian governor was widely forecast as 
the start of a new era for Cyprus and politlcialls both in and 
out of the island declared that a permanent peace would soon 
be achieved... f was less optimistic... Harding, a blunt and 
forthright man, had failed: and in his place the British were 
putting a diplomat whose task would be to lead the people 
astray with fine words and trick their leaders wllh lying 
promises ... From the outset of our conflict flacked respect/or 
Foot and regarded the self-created aura 0/ liberalism 
surrounding him with distaste: I was sure II was/raudulent,,]8 
According to many specialists in the Cypriot question, Grivas' approach to the arrival of 
Foot in Cyprus can be justified by the deep hostility between EOKA's leader and 
Harding. According to their view, Grivas had lost his trust and respect for the Dritish 
establishment, due to the hard and sometimes inhumane methods of the previous 
governor to beat the Greek Cypriot Enosis movement.29 However, the truth is more 
26 E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p. 269. 
27 Keesing's: June 7-14,1958, p. 16219. 
28 The Memoirs of General Griyas, Opt cit., p. 129. 
29 For more concerning this view see: N. Kranidiotis, Opt cit., pp. 316-321. 
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complicated. In reality Grivas had a deep respect for Harding. He regarded him as an 
equal opponent, since the latter was an experienced soldier with great experience in 
warfare.3o On the other hand, Grivas lacked respect for Foot mainly because he did not 
regard him as an equal. Since it is a common secret worldwide that the relations 
between the military and the diplomatic service are based upon a lack of trust and 
respect for each other, Grivas' opinion of Foot is therefore simply the re-confirmation of 
that rule. Grivas' obsession concerning his fame after death led him to react so bitterly 
towards the arrival of a diplomat in Cyprus. He regarded it as a personal offence, since 
his romantic military nature could not have accepted that his opponent from now on 
would not be a soldier but a civil servant. And this bitterness was to playa great role in 
the future course of the Cypriot question. 
The new Governor, from the first week in office, decided to show his strong 
commitment towards the gradual return of Cyprus to peace and order. lIe began a tour 
around the island in order to asses the situation and speak with ordinary people, and he 
organized meetings with the local leaders of the Greek and the Turkish community, 
trying to establish an equal approach between the two sides. Ilowever, soon enough the 
new governor underwent his baptism of fire in the Cypriot question. During the second 
week of December the Cypriot question was to be discussed in the United Nations. On 
this occasion, EOKA organized a 24-hour general strike and demonstrations in every 
Cypriot city, despite the fact that this kind of protest was still illegal. In Nicosia the 
demonstrators clashed with the police and the disturbances cnded with the death of a 
Turkish Cypriot policeman. The Turkish community regarded that as a direct 
provocation that needed to be answered, therefore hundreds of outraged young Turks 
entered the Greek sector of the Cypriot capital, looting and burning houses and shops. 
An interesting and vivid description of the disturbances inside Nicosia's Greek sector 
can be found inside C. Foley's Legacy and Strife31 , plus an interesting point that needs 
further analysis. According to Foley, the Turkish Cypriot policeman had been killed 
accidentally during the Greek Cypriot demonstration by another policeman, but the 
British authorities did not officially recognise that event.32 The explanation for that 
comes from the new status that Foot wanted to impose in Cyprus. A peaceful island 
would have offered the new governor the opportunity to approach the two communities 
for direct negotiations. Until that point the difficult task was to approach the Greek 
30 For more concerning Grivas' opinion of lIar ding see: The memoirs QfGenernl Griyas, op. cit., pp. 125-
26. 
31 C. Foley, op. cit., pp. IOS-108. 
32 C. Foley, op. cit., pp. 106-07. 
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Cypriots, therefore it was not in Foot's intentions to distance the approachable Turkish 
community by admitting responsibility for the death of a Turkish Cypriot, even by 
accident. This method, as will be reviewed later on, became the main strategy of the 
new Governor in his attempt to resolve the Cypriot question. 
Despite the worsening of the relations between the two communities, Foot did not try 
to resolve the crisis by further strengthening military measures in the island. On the 
contrary, he continued his tour of Cyprus and during a broadcasting message on New 
Year's Eve he announced the liberation of 100 political prisoners and the end of the 
restriction law for 600 Cypriots, as a goodwill gesture. In an attempt to justify his nct, 
Foot added, in his broadcast: 
"You may say that these actions do not solve anything, 
Certainly, they don't. I do notfor a moment suggest that what I 
have already decided solves any of our problems. I do, 
however, believe that these decisions give an indication of my 
desire to re-establish confidence and trust, and I hope and 
believe that these gestures will be received by the people of 
Cyprus in a spirit of goodwill. "JJ 
As became obvious, Foot and his associates knew that all these actions were not enough 
to offer a reliable solution to the Cypriot question. Maybe the Cypriot people, in 
general, liked the new Governor more, and maybe Foot's popularity was increasing. 
especially among the Greek Cypriots, however more radical solutions were needed in 
order to heal the wounds from Harding's era. A new diplomatic initiative was more than 
necessary and the experienced Governor knew that. 
On New Year's Day Foot left the island to go to London, in order to inform 
Macmillan and the Foreign Office of his first impression, concerning the Cypriot 
question. According to his memoirs, after ten days of endless negotiations and talks 
with the officials in London he managed to persuade them to approve his proposals 
concerning the Cypriot question.34 The main points of his recommendations were: n)the 
requirement for an interval of five or seven years before any final decision, b)an 
assertion that no final decision would be taken at the end of the five or seven year period 
which was not acceptable to Greeks and Turks alike, e)an immediate abolition of the 
Emergency and the return of Archbishop Makarios to the island, and d)thc opening of 
negotiations in Cyprus with the leaders of the two communities to deVelop n system of 
33 H. Foot, A Start in Freedom, (London, 1964), p. 161. 
34 H. Foot, Ope cit., p. 163. 
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self-government.3s Foley, attempting to justify Foot's proposals, stated that the above 
recommendations derived from Foot's theory that the best way to exit a deadlock was to 
reduce temperatures and work on whatever was practicable, leaving an ultimate solution 
until political passions were spent.36 Therefore Foot's suggestions should and could not 
be regarded as a proposition for the final solution of the Cypriot question, but as a 
scheme attempting to regularize the Cypriot political and social climate in order, after a 
transitional period, to lead to the final settlement. Indeed, it was an ambitious plan that 
could have reconciled the two communities, afier a period of three violent years that had 
influenced the fragile peaceful co-existence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in a 
negative way, and re-establish the integrity of the British establishment in the eyes of the 
local population, especially the Greek Cypriots, giving London the opportunity and the 
time to search for an acceptable and reliable final solution according to its geostrategic 
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The new Governor was extremely optimistic 
about the outcome of his proposals. He considered that both Greece and Turkey would 
accept them, and as a consequence those two countries would put pressure upon their 
compatriots in Cyprus to accept his suggestions. As he argues in his memoirs, Foot 
believed that Ankara would have disagreed with some aspects of his proposals but he 
sustained the speculation that giving them the absolute veto on long term policy would 
have outweighed their objections.37 Foot thought that it would have been a more 
difficult task to persuade Athens to accept his proposals, but again he was convinced that 
the immediate advantages that he was prepared to offer the Greek officials, such as 
permission for the Archbishop'S return to Cyprus, would have satisfied them.38 
However, Foot's calculations were wrong and, as future diplomatic developments 
showed, his optimism proved to be totally unfounded. London decided to approach 
Ankara first, in order to inform the Turkish side about Foot's proposals, but when the 
British ambassador in the Turkish capital visited Menderes he received a sharp and 
arrogant "No" as an answer. As Foot writes in his memoirs concerning the Turkish 
response to his plans: 
"On that day of the first Turkish reply everything. all our hopes 
and all our plans, collapsed ,,39 
Nevertheless, Foot together with S. Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister, decided to visit 
Ankara in a desperate attempt to persuade the Turkish side to re-consider its position. 
3' H. Foot, op. cit., p. 159. 
36 C.Foley, op. cit., p. 111. 
37 H. Foot, op. cit., p. 163. 
38 ibid. 
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However, as soon as the talks began, it became obvious that a common agreement was 
unattainable. The Turkish side was not prepared to discuss any change concerning the 
Cypriot status quo, and in addition they asked the British side to work towards the 
preparation of a plan about the partition of the island. In an attcmpt to fortify this 
demand, the Turkish side spoke about the hostile relations bctwccn the two 
communities, and it also spoke about the possibility of the creation of n Turkish 
equivalent of EOKA.4o. In order to persuade the British side of the validity of their 
arguments, the Turkish side decided to re-activate an unmistakable mcthod that had 
proven extremely useful in the past. Therefore, during the British stay in the Turkish 
capital (24-30 January 1958), violent disturbances were caused by the Turkish Cypriots 
in Nicosia. The intensity of these disturbances was such that the British nnny had to 
intervene, and as a result five Turks were killed. The disturbances alanncd the British 
side, and the deputy Governor of Cyprus, Sinclair, expressed in a broadcast his: 
"intense grief that the security forces, in the discharge of their 
duty, should have caused the deaths of members of the Turkish 
community. ,,41 
Due to the violent incidents in the Cypriot capital, a well-organized operation by the 
Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu42, the British side decided to withdraw its plan and 
leave Ankara. The same result had been achieved in 1955, during the Tripartite 
Conference in London, when the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul, well-organizcd by Ankara, 
had forced London to abandon its diplomatic initiative due to the importance of Turkey 
as an ally for British geostrategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle 
East. From Ankara, the British delegation arrived in Athens. Ilowcver, the talks there 
had a completely different nature. The British side had already decided not to proceed 
with Foot's plan, however it tried to negotiate with the Greek side by another diplomatic 
route. Foot and Lloyd expressed their concerns to Karamanlis that Turkey was ready to 
invade Cyprus, in the event of an alteration to the Cypriot status quo. The British 
officials told Karamanlis that such a development would be catastrophic for the survival 
of the North Atlantic Treaty in the Eastern Mediterranean, therefore the finding of a 
settlement between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus was more necessary than ever. The 
British officials proposed to Karamanlis to accept n Turkish military base in Cyprus, and 
39 H. Foot: Opt cit., p. 164. 
40 C. Foley, op. cit., p. 111. 
41 C. Foley, Opt cit., p. 112. For more concerning the disturbances in Nicosia see: II. Foot, OPt cit., p. 166. 
Keesing's: June 7-14 1958, p. 16220. 
42 For more concerning Zorlu's involvement in Nicosia's disturbances sec: E. Averof-Tositslls, op. cit., p. 
21. 
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in return London was ready to offer, after a short period of self-government, the right of 
self-determination to the people of Cyprus. The response of the Greek side was 
immediate. As Averof said to Foot, the Greek government was unable to accept a 
Turkish military base in Cyprus for obvious reasons.4J Once again the Cypriot question 
reached a stalemate and the British officials left the Greek capital greatly frustrated, 
realizing for the first time that the situation concerning the Cypriot question was not 
controlled by them any more. 
The main questions that should be answered at this point arc: Ilow can the researcher 
evaluate Foot's plan? What are the main conclusions that derive from the British 
diplomatic initiative? Was there any deeper reason that forced the Greek government to 
immediately reject the British proposals? First of all, Foot's plan established a new 
approach of British diplomacy towards the Cypriot question. During Eden's era, the 
main approach of the Foreign Office was that Cyprus should remain, at any cost, under 
British control. During Macmillan's era Cyprus was an undesirable asset that had to be 
liquidated as soon as possible. As already mentioned, Macmillan's view of llritain's 
position in the global political arena was different to Eden's. Macmillan wanted to give 
to his country a new start, placing Britain in the middle of current developments, lining 
the country up from the dusty colonial mentality of the 19th century. In order to nchieve 
such a difficult task, he had to erase Britain's attachment to its colonial past and adopt a 
new political and geostrategic role for the ex-ruler of the wnves. Therefore, the Cypriot 
question had to be solved. Cyprus was one of the main reasons that Britain was accused 
by the international community of inflexibility, violation of human rightsU and 
maintenance of an archaic colonial image that did not promote the liberal values of the 
Western World. However, even if the Cypriot case had to be resolved, Macmillan was 
committed to safeguarding British geostrategie rights, by firstly re-establishing peace 
and order on the island and maintaining the unity of the southeastern flank of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. On the one hand, the Cypriot case had to be resolved in a way that 
would safeguard British geo-strategic interests in the wide area of the Eastern 
Mediterranean, through the establishment of British military bases in the island. 
Macmillan did not want to share the same political fate as his predecessor, therefore he 
knew that he had to satisfy the hard-liners inside the party by proving to the Tory back-
benchers that he was able to safeguard British interests and end a crisis at the same time. 
43 E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., pp. 22·23. 
44 The hanging of young EOKA fighters and lI:lJ'ding's draconian laws of public order attracted attacks 
not only from Western nations, but from the USSR as well. In many sessions of the United Nations the 
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On the other hand, before the final settlement of the Cypriot question, the Dritish side 
had the ethical and political obligation to work towards the disarmament of the Greek 
and the Turkish guerilla organizations (EOKA and VOLCAN), in an attempt to prevent 
the outbreak of a civil war on the island. Civil bloodshed in Cyprus would have counted 
as a political and diplomatic defeat for the Conservative government, jeopardizing the 
leading role that Britain wanted to play in international relations. Last but not least, 
Britain had a responsibility towards NATO and the United States to resolve the Cypriot 
question in such a way that the unity of the Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean would 
not have been under threat. Doth Greece and Turkey were placing Cyprus in the front 
line of their national policies. Therefore, a vague and unreliable solution would have 
created such an explosive situation between the two nations that a war would have been 
unavoidable. Even if Foot's plan, as already mentioned, was not a final proposal for the 
solution of the Cypriot case, it was still a brilliant beginning towards finding a final 
settlement. From the first moment Foot, unlike Harding, realized the complexity of the 
Cypriot issue and had concluded that it would be impossible for the Cypriot question to 
be resolved within a short period of time. The experienced diplomat knew that only 
through small but secure steps would the Cypriot wound be healed, and his proposals 
were definitely a small but decisive step in that direction. However, Foot's initiative 
was jeopardized by the country that, until the early days of 1958, was the closest oily of 
Britain in the Cypriot question: Turkey. For many years and on various occasions 
Turkey had been used by the Foreign Office officials as an effective shield ogainst Greek 
and Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis and self·determination in Cyprus. Turkey played 
its role with great success and zeal, seizing the golden opportunity to be involved once 
again in Cyprus, even if this involvement contradicted treaties of the past. Without any 
doubt, in many cases Turkey's assistance and support to the llritish establishment in 
Cyprus proved to be valuable for London, but this development had a negative aspect as 
well. Since 1955, Britain had to carry out its policies concerning the Cypriot question in 
such a way that would not have left Turkey feeling threatened or left out of future 
developments. Until Macmillan's arrival in Downing St. the British and Turkish 
interests in Cyprus were parallel. The British establishment in Cyprus enjoyed high 
popularity among the Turkish Cypriot community on the island, while Turkey felt 
absolute security from London's commitment to preserve Cyprus under its control, at 
any cost concerning Anglo-Greek relations at international level. Nevertheless, this 
USSR cited British methods in Cyprus in order to face Western criticism concerning its own violations of 
human rights, in the Soviet Union or the countries of the Warsaw Pact. 
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unofficial diplomatic pact ended with Eden's resignation and the modification of the 
British approach concerning the Cypriot question. Turkey was not willing to follow the 
new British foreign line, even if this new approach was still structured in such a way that 
it would not have threatened Turkish geostrategic interests, and demanded the partition 
of the island as a reward for its services during the past. Eden's pro-Turkish feelings, 
and Lennox-Boyd's irresponsible statements inside the House of Commons about the 
possibility of partition in Cyprus, had had such an impact in Turkey that Foot's 
proposals sounded empty in Menderes' ears. The past plays great importance in politics, 
and because of previous miscalculations Britain found herself trapped in a labyrinth in 
which the Minotaur was Cyprus and Ariadne (i.e. Turkey, in this case) was unwilling to 
help. Last but not least, at this point it is essential to assess the Greek response towards 
Foot's and Lloyd's proposition. According to some specialists, Greece had lost a golden 
opportunity to come closer to Macmillan's government and manipulate future 
developments on Aphrodite's island.45 At first sight the above argument sounds logical 
and well founded. However, if this argument is linked with the developments of this 
particular period on the Greek domestic agenda, which have until now been ignored by 
the previous specialists that have dealt analytically with the Cypriot question, then a 
final conclusion can be drawn concerning the Greek response to the British proposal. 
Despite Karamanlis' careful and responsible approach to the Cypriot question, an 
attitude that had been characterized by realism and moderation, the extreme nationalist 
circles, even inside his government, were most displeased with his role. The fact that 
Makarios had been released from Seychelles, a great success of Karamanlis' cabinet, 
was of no importance to the extreme nationalists, since only Enosis would have becn 
sufficient for them, but it had not been achieved yet. Therefore, according to the 
extreme nationalists, the only solution for the absolute success of the Cypriot question 
was to overthrow Karamanlis and welcome the arrival of a new figure in the post, who 
would be dynamic and popular among the Greek people. And there was no other 
suitable person for this post than the Cypriot Archbishop, Maknrios. Makarios was the 
leader of the Enosis movement in Cyprus, an excellent orator and extremely popular 
among the Greek people, mainly due to his exile in Seychelles that gave him the title of 
"the national martyr", even if the conditions of his stay in the tropical island of the 
Indian Ocean had resembled a luxury holiday more than a miserable incarceration. TIle 
popularity issue was of great importance to the nationalist circles because it was literally 
45 For more concerning this view see: F. Papagathagelos, A Study of Knrnmanlis' Foreign Policy: The 
Early Years, ("K" Journal of Political and Social Intervention of the Len. Athens 1983). vol. X, pp. 89· 
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impossible to overthrow Karamanlis violently. Greece was an Americnn protectorate 
and Karamanlis was extremely popular with the State Department and the CIA, therefore 
the Americans would never have agreed to such a solution. Therefore, the only possible 
option was to overthrow Karamanlis politically nnd replace him legitimately with 
Makarios. The first approach between the conspirators nnd the Cypriot Archbishop was 
effected through Makarios' close associate, N. Krnnidiotis. As he writes in his memoirs 
concerning this meeting: 
96. 
"As I recall. it was a warm July afternoon [1957] when A. 
Bodosakii6 called me and invited me to his office. I went to his 
luxury office ;n K Palamas SI. and I saw Bodosakls and S. 
Venizelos waiting anxiously for me. We Invited you, Bodosakls 
said almosl immediately, because we are aware of how much 
you love your country and of your desire 10 see it unified with 
Greece. Bul there is only one way to realise Ihat possibility ... 
Makarios to be the Greek Premier and unify Cyprus wilh 
Greece as E. Venizelos did with Crete. 
-Cranidiotis: I did not understand you 
-Venizelos: Yes. The existing government had lost Its support 
inside the Parliament. 7\vo hundred fifly members of the 
Parliament from all the parties and especially the governing 
party are ready 10 support Afakarios, in the event that he w(mts 
to be the nexi Prime Alinlstcr. 
-Cranidiotis (with great astonishment): Afakarios is 1101 a 
politician. Makarios;s a national fighter. After all he is a 
clergyman and a British citizen. 
-Venizelos (with great nnnoyance): All these are minor dClalls. 
We can easily offer A/akarios Greek citizenship. 0" the other 
hand, regarding the fact that Makarios is a clergyman. we had 
a similar case during the recent past wizen Damasklnos became 
the Vicegerent of the Greek throne. 4' Your duty /s to inform 
46 A. Bodosakis was a well known businessman with close links with EOKA as one oCthe main economic 
contributors to Grivas' organization. 
47 Damaskinos was the Archbishop of Greece who after the liberation oCthe country from the Axis 
powers, became the Vicegerent of the Greek throne, Churchill's invention, until the fate of the monarchy 
was decided by a plebiscite on September 1946. 
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Makarios of our conversation and give us his answer as soon 
as possible" 
And he continues: 
"I left from Bodosakis' office with mixed feelings. I went back 
to Makarios' hotel, where I found thc Archbishop wailing. As 
soon as I informed him of Vcnizelos' offer, he, with a sarcastic 
smile and a lookfull of confidencc, turncd down the offcr. ,.4S 
Nevertheless, despite the secretive ways of the plotters, Karamanlis was aware of 
Venizelos' offer to Makarios. According to a classified letter sent to Averof on the eve 
of Kranidiotis' meeting with Bodosakis and Venizelos, Karamanlis informed his 
Minister of Foreign Affairs about what would happen and also predicted that Makarios 
"will turn down the offer, mainly because hc will consider it as 
a well organized set-up designed to lower his popularity and 
credibility in the eyes of Greek public opinion ,,49 
As a matter of fact Karamanlis predicted Makarios' response correctly but it did not 
make him forget about the incident. The Greek Premier knew that his enemies were 
waiting for his first wrong move, in order to overthrow him from his post, and he also 
knew that even if Makarios were to deny the offer, his greed for power was so strong 
that at the first opportunity he would have changed his mind and turned against the 
existing political establishment. A possible acceptance of the British proposals would 
have given to his opponents the opportunity to tum the people against him and eliminate 
his political future, a catastrophic development for the fragile political eqUilibrium of the 
state since the Civil War ended just eight years ago, and for the Cypriot question as well. 
As the aforementioned issues illustrate, Karamanlis rejected the British offer, increasing 
Foot's despair, but he was left with no other choice than to react in such a way that 
would give him the opportunity to win valuable time in order to rally his forces and 
eliminate his political opponents once and for all. Nevertheless, once again external 
factors played their influential role in the continuation of an explosive situation in 
Cyprus, leaving no space for a proposal that had all the potential to alter the political 
scenery on the island. 
Despite Karamanlis' careful moves in order not to provoke his political enemies, the 
latter decided to question his authority openly inside Parliament. According to 
Karamanlis' opponents the time for such a move was right, because the Greek electorate 
48 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 278-280. 
49 E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p. 28. 
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was most displeased with Karamanlis' economic refonns and the inability of the Greek 
government to modernize the nation's industry according to Western standards.so 
Therefore, on 1 March 1958, two of Karamanlis' closest associates in the cabinet, P. 
Papaligouras and G. Ralis, resigned from their posts, while 15 M.Ps from Karamanlis' 
party, with an official statement in the Greek Press, declared their lack of trust 
concerning the existing government and the Prime Minister as well. Karamanlis' 
opponents believed that the Greek Premier would be unable to survive such a well-
organized attack. It is true that Karamanlis was surprised by the events, mainly because 
the two Ministers were personal friends of his, but after the first shock he rallied his 
powers in order to commence his counter-attack. On 3 March, Karamanlis visited the 
Palace and informed King Pavlos that it was his intention to resign as Prime Minister. 
Karamanlis' resignation was a highly political decision intended to answer his political 
opponents and to prove, that he was still in control of the developments in the political 
background ofthe country and on the other hand, to prove to the Greek electorate that he 
respected the procedures of parliamentary democracy.'l The King had no choice but to 
dissolve the Parliament and lead the country towards new elections. At this point, it is 
essential to refer to an extremely delicate point that Greek historiography fails to deal 
with or still does not dare to deal with, successfully. According to all the key actors of 
that period, Karamanlis, Averof, IliOU52, as well as great Greek historians such as 
Psiroukis and Tsoukalas, the political crisis had been caused mainly by American and 
British involvement. The Foreign Office and the State Department wanted to isolate 
Karamanlis because he was the main obstaele to the final settlement of the Cypriot 
question. However, this view is totally wrong and it reveals the weakest point of the 
Greek mentality, which had developed after the defeat of the Greek army in the Ionian 
coast in 1922, that external forces had to be blamed for every negative development in 
the Greek political spectrum. Characteristically, Karamanlis wrote in his memoirs: 
"The crisis in 1958 was a result of a plot, organized by the 
Palace, the British, the Americans and some of my closest 
associates. Each of the above Jactors aimed to the fail of my 
50 For more concerning the socio-economic situation in Greece during this particular erll see: A. 
Dimitriadis, The Incurable Trauma: Greece after the end o(the Civil War. (Thessalonikl, (978). pp. 120· 
29. 
51 Karamanlis' political opponents accused him of governing the nation os an Asian dictator. Statements 
like this had a big impact on the nation's public opinion, therefore Karamanlis had to prove his 
attachment to democracy by following the correct procedure. even ifhe had the choice of continuing to 
govern the nation by forming a wide coalition with the other parties of the Right and Centre-Right 
spectrum. 
5 The leader of the Unified Democratic Left. 
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Cabinet for different reasons. Foreign elements wanted to 
force. me to co-operate with other parties [it is obvious that 
Karamanlis is speaking about O. Papandreou's party, the 
Liberal Party] in order to close the Cypriot quest/on. The other 
factors, wanted to decrease my strength in order to put me 
under their control. ,,53 
Averof, on the other hand, gives a similar explanation for the crisis of 1958 in his own 
memoirs: 
"The British side wanted to get rid 0/ Karamanlls. A lVeak 
government would have been easier for London to 
manipulate... The American embassy in Athens also played a 
great role in the crisis, as well. "j/ 
However, the above approach is inaccurate and can easily lead to wrong conclusions. 
On the one hand, London did not welcome Karamanlis' resignation and the 
announcement of new elections. The British officials knew that Knramanlis was a 
responsible and moderate politician with modem and accurate views concerning the 
Cypriot question. London had nothing to gain from Karamanlis' fall, particularly while 
it was trying to modify its policies and adopt n more modcrate approach concerning the 
Cypriot question, and was extremely concerned that n possible defeat of Karamanlis 
would lead to great political instability in Greece with grave consequences for the 
Cypriot question as well. London was aware of the fact that Karamanlis' dominance 
inside the Parliament was the only secure factor that was able to keep the extreme 
nationalists and the hard-liners away from the highest posts of the national 
administration. In order to fortify the above argument it is necessary to present some 
articles from the British pro-Conservative press, that defended Karanlanlis passionately 
during the political crisis in Athens. "The Times" in an thorough article praised 
Karamanlis' government j5, while the Observer wrote: 
"During the 2.5 years of Karamanlis government Greece 
enjoyed the unusual luxury o/politieal stabilily to such a great 
extenl that even Ihe Greeks forgot Ihal they are living in a 
country famous/or its po/Weal earthquakes. ,,56 
53 K. Karamanlis, Archiye: Facts and Papers. (Athens, 1994), vol. III. p. 86. 
54 E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p. 28. 
55 The Times, 3 March 1958, p. 10. 
56 The Observer, 3 March 1958, p. 7. 
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On the other hand, neither did Washington welcome the possibility for political 
instability in Greece. As seen in previous chapters, Washington had supported 
Karamanlis from his first steps as the Greek Premier. For the American side Karamanlis 
was the only figure in the Greek political arena who was able to limit the Communist 
influence and at the same time control the extreme right in such a way that, on the one 
hand, Greece would have continued to be the only bastion of free economy in the 
Balkans, and on the other hand, would have maintained a tolerable level of Greco-
Turkish relations in order to preserve the unity of NATO's south eastern flank. As a 
matter of fact the CIA and its director A. Dulles decided to influence the electoral result 
in favour of Karamanlis by buying off some of Karamanlis' opponents.57 From all the 
above facts, the only conclusion that follows, is that the political crisis of 1958 was an 
internal Greek issue and that the role of the external factors, especially the United States, 
was anything but hostile to Karamanlis. However, how and to what extent had the 
course of the Cypriot question been influenced by the result of the general elections of 
1958? 
The day of the national elections was set for II May, and the electoral result was a 
great surprise for the international community. Karamanlis won an impressive majority 
inside the Parliament, showing his opponents and his supporters that he was still in 
charge of political developments in the country. However, the great winner of the 
national elections was EDA, which managed to increase its electoral power to such a 
great extent that it became the second party in the national political arena. The result of 
h . I I' S8 t e natlOna e ectlOns was: 
ERE 1,583,85 (41.16 %) 171 scats 
EDA 939,902 (24.42 %) 79 scats 
KF 795,445 (20.67 %) 36 scats 
PADE 408,787 (10.62 %) 10 scats 
The above result was a great shock for every political analyst with even relatively little 
knowledge of the political situation in Greece. EDA, as has already been mentioned, 
was the only legal party of the Left that had not been obliged to disband by the 
57 There is a document proving that the CIA managed to bribe some Greek politicians, however the names 
and the amounts are still classified. See: A. Dulles Papers, 26 February 1953·29 November 1961, 
(Princeton University), Vol. III, pp. 97·98. See also A. Papahelas, The rope o(Qrcek DemocrQcy: The 
American Factor 1947-1967, (Athens, 1997), p. 60. 
58 For full data of the national elections of 11 May 1958 see: K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 125. 
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draconian anti-communist laws of that time. Despite its relatively moderate manifest059, 
it was a common secret that EDA was the fifth column of the International Communist 
movement inside Greece. The party's policies had been decided by the exiled leadership 
of the Greek Communist Party from Moscow, while the absolute majority of its electoral 
support had participated in the Civil War fighting against the restoration of the 
monarchy and the old bourgeois Greek class. Nevertheless, it cannot be suggested that 
939,902 Greeks were fervent supporters of Marxism Leninism and Moscow. The real 
power of Greek Marxists never exceeded 300,000, even during the Second World War 
and the Axis occupation in the country, when KKE was the dominant in the political 
arena. Therefore, the reasons for this impressive electoral increase should be sought 
elsewhere. One of the main reasons was the economic repression of the lower classes 
during Karamanlis' first two and a half years in power. American financial nid, the so-
called Truman Doctrine, was not enough by itself to heal the destroyed national 
economy, therefore heavy taxation was placed upon the lower classes creating an 
explosive social situation in the country. In order to illustrate the deep social problems 
that Greece was facing during this particular era, it is useful to refer to Q characteristic 
passage of a Canadian Travel Guide of 1957 about Athens. According to the author of 
the guide: 
"Athens is the most surprising European capital I have c~'er 
visited. Within a short drive from Kolonakl [the area behind the 
old palace] to Kokinia [a traditional Communist stronghold and 
the old industrialized area of Athens] the ~Iisllor ca" experience 
the luxury of a wealthy modern Wester" capital and the misery 
and abandonment of aforgollcn African town. ,,60 
However, another major reason for the impressive electoral result of EDA was the 
Cypriot question. As already mentioned, EDA was one of the most fervent supporters of 
the Enosis movement concerning the struggle of the Greek Cypriots nnd their natiomll 
dream. On many occasions the party's youth had organized violent rallies outside the 
British and American embassies, while quite frequently, during the pre-election period, 
EDA raised the political thermometer by accusing Karamanlis of collaboration with the 
Western powers concerning the Cypriot question. In an interview, Mr. G. Fnrakos, ex 
secretary-general of the Communist Party, confessed: 
'9 EDNs manifesto was characterized by its careful terminology In order not to provoke the 
establishment. It was a combination of political ideas coming from the theoretical filed of Social 
Democracy and of the Italian Euro-Communism, avoiding nny reference to the Mnrxist-Leninist Ideology, 
60 R. Worthing, A Long Trayel to the Cradle Q(Cjyi1il .. 1tjon ,(Toronto, 1957), p. 39. 
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"-Farakos: EDA 's leadership followed, almost blindly. ollr 
instructions from exile concerning the party's approach 
towards the Cypriot question. We were against Grivas and his 
so-called liberation struggle, but we were supporting the 
national aspirations of the Greek Cypriotsfor Enosis. 
-Author: However, Mr. Farakos, I have to notice Ihat ),ollr 
approach concerning the Cypriot question was coming into 
conflict with the Marxist preaching of Internationalism and was 
approaching the political manl/estos of the national/st parties 
of that time. 
-Farakos: Mr. Litsas you have to understand that the Cypriot 
question was our golden opportunity to increase our political 
influence. / am not suggesting thai the Communist lemlersllip 
acted in an opportunistic way. After all, the Greek COl1llmmist 
Party was always in the front line of the national aspirations of 
our race, however we knew that the people were disappointed 
with Karamanlis and his efforts to negotiate rathcr tlu1II to 
impose a satisfactory solution for the Cypriot question. After 
al/, as history is showing, a Greek can stand a lot of things but 
you can not ignore his deep patriotic feelings. 
-Author: Can we justify your policy towards Ihe Cypriot 
question by MoscolV 's intenlion to cause conslanl problems lor 
NATO's unity in the Eastern Afedilerranean? 
-Farakos: Mr. Litsas it is lime, once and for all, to clarify Ihls 
issue. For sure MoscolV wanted to create problems for NATO 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, howe\'cr II will be a 
methodological mistake to support the erroneous view tlwl the 
Soviet Union wanted to expand its presence In Cyprus, Greece 
or Turkey. The above areas belonged to the West according 10 
the secret agreement of Yalta, and during this partlclIlClr time 
the Soviet leadership had great problems to face in Central alld 
Eastern Europe and in the frontiers wilh the olher great 
Communist power, China. The Soviet Union had /lelther the 
intention nor the power to open another front I" the Eastern 
Mediterranean. After all, II Is common knowledge thai the 
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Soviet interest in Cyprus had been established in the mld·60's 
until the Turkish invasion in 1974 .• .61 
Judging from the result, EDA's approach towards the Cypriot question was extremely 
beneficial for the party's electoral appeal. However, this success nnnoyed certain 
reactionary circles in the internal political spectrum of Greece. Those circles on the 
extreme right received the news of ED A's impressive electoral strengthening as the final 
proof of a supposed Red plot aiming to overthrow the establishment through 
parliamentary procedures. Therefore, they began to speak about the overthrow of 
Karamanlis from power and the endowment of a coup with the support of the Pnlace.62 
As Mr. I. Tsiligirakis, an ex-service Brigadier in the 4th Armored Kilkis Brigade, admits 
in a private interview: 
" We had no other choice than to ol'crthrow KClramanl/s. Ills 
policies. and especially his allilude towards the Cypriot 
question, gave EVA the opportunily to bccome the sccond party 
in the Greek political scale. We wanted to impose a military 
regime with the King's approval in order to finish once elI"l/or 
all with the Red threat. ,,4' 
However, the CIA in Athens, as expected, had been infonncd of the plot and did not 
agree with Karamanlis' overthrow. Mr. Tsiligirakis explains the reasons for the 
American attitude: 
"-Tsiligirakis: ... /lolYever, the mal" rcasoll lor tile 
postponement of our plans was the American/actor. 
-Author: Why do you bel/eve such all Intcrventlon occurred? 
-Tsiligirakis: Because Karamanl/s was the figure that the CIA 
wanted at this particular period of lime. rhe Amerlct"'.r were 
afraid to allow the rcal patriots to seize powcr becclllse tlU!y 
knew that we would have achlevcd the Enosls of Cyprus willi 
Greece. Karamanlis was not willing to aI/ow something like 
that, therefore he was the right person/or the Americans ... We 
did not have any other choice than to obey the American 
orders, however we demanded that they react ago/list EDA's 
electoral strengthening,. ,,61 
61 Personal interview with Mr.O. Farakos., Athens, June 1999. 
62 K. Karamanlis, Opt cit., p. 139. 
45 Personal interview with Mr. I. Tsiligirakis. Athens, June 1999. 
63 ibid. 
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From Tsiligirakis' words it follows that the Americans did not want to allow the extreme 
nationalists to seize power, mainly because they were afraid of the latter's aggressive 
policies concerning the Cypriot question and the Turkish response towards them. The 
Americans realized that it was time for another diplomatic initiative about Cyprus, in 
order to satisfy Greek public opinion and at the same time to jeopardize EDA's political 
thesis about the diplomatic stagnation of the Cypriot question. 
Therefore, the United States began a new series of negotiations with London, urging 
the finding of a final solution concerning the Cypriot dispute.64 London was convinced 
that a new plan was more than necessary. On the one hand the American involvement, 
and on the other hand the escalation of violent events between the two communities, 
influenced 10 Downing St. and the officials in Foreign Office to oct with no more delay. 
A characteristic event occurred in Nicosia during the late hours of 7111 June, when a bomb 
exploded outside the Press Office of the Turkish Consulate. Almost immediately, large 
groups of young Turks entered Nicosia's Greek sector looting and burning houses and 
shops. During the disturbances two Greek Cypriots were killcd.65 TIle tension in the 
island was increasing and the British authorities were forced, in order to prevent a Greek 
Cypriot retaliation, to re-introduce the state of emergency on the island. It was clear that 
Cyprus was in danger of turning back to the dark years of I larding's administration, 
unless something drastic happened. However, as in every Greek tragedy a God was 
appearing from above in order to offer the final solution. Macmillan decided to play the 
role of the deus ex machina, in order to assist the plot of the Cypriot tragedy. 
On 19 June, the British Premier announced inside the House of Commons his plan for 
Cyprus, euphemistically known as "the Partnership Plan". The main points of this plnn 
were as follows: 
"a) There will be a separate /louse 0/ Reprcscnl'lli~'cs lor cach 
o/the two communities, and these llollscs \V/II IIm'e fllUll 
legis/alive authority in communal affairs. 
b)Authority lor internal administralion, other Illall communal 
affairs and internal security, will be wu/crlClkclI by a COllncll 
presided over by the GOl-'ernor and inclllding tire 
representatives o/Ihe Greek and Turkish Go~'er"",ellts emt! six 
64 For more concerning the American pressure upon Macmillan's government sec: Forel~n Relations of 
the United States: 1958-1960, Eastern Europe Re~ion: Soviet Union: Cyprus. (Wnshington. 1993), part 
1, vol. X, p.p. 605-24. 
65 E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
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elected Ministers drawn from the House of Representatives, 
four being Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots. 
c) The Governor, acting after consultation wilh the 
representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments, will 
have reserve powers to ensure that the intcrests of both 
communities are protected 
d)External affairs, defense and internal sccurity will be mailers 
specifically reserved to the Governor, acl/ng aftcr consultalioll 
with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish 
Governments. 
e)The representatives of the Grcek and Turkish Governments 
will have the right to require any Icgislatlon which they 
consider to be discriminatory to be reserved for consicleral/on 
by an impartial tribunal. ,,66 
As far as the future status of Cyprus was concerned, Macmillan stated that it would not 
be altered for seven years. However, Macmillan nvoided nny reference to the Cypriot 
status quo after the end of the seven years. As he stated: 
"Her Majesty's Government trust that this imaginati\'e plan 
will be welcomed by all concerncd in the splril I" which it Is 
put forward, and for their part thcy will bend all efforts to 
ensuring its success. Indeed, if the Greek emel Turkish 
Governments were willing to extend their experiment In 
partnership and co-operation, Iler Afajesty's Go\'ernment 
would be prepared, at the appropriatc time, to go IlIrther Wit/, 
subject to the reservation to the United Kingdom of SlIch bases 
and facilities as might be necessary lor the discharge 01 her 
international obligations, to share the sovereignty o/the Island 
with their Greek and Turkish Allies as their contrlbullon /() a 
lasting settlement. ,,67 
An overall evaluation of Macmillan's plan is that it was more complicated nnd 
radically different to any of the previous ones. Macmillan by itself described it as U,m 
adventure in partnership between the two communities in thc Island ami also betwecn 
the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey." The idea of partnership 
66 Macmillan: House of Commons, June 19, 1958. vol. 589. col. 1317. 
67 Macmillan, op. cit., col. 1318. 
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was the main characteristic of the new plan, allowing Turkey and Greece the right to be 
formally and actively involved in the Cypriot problem. However, despite the fact that at 
a theoretical level the above plan had many positive aspects, in reality it was doomed to 
failure. First of all, the idea of partnership included the idea of partition, that both 
Athens and the Greek Cypriot leadership were strongly against. On the one hand, 
Macmillan's plan tried to bring together the two communities and the three governments 
in the Administrative Council. On the other hand, however, it contributed to the 
separation of the two communities with the two Houses of Representatives and with the 
provision for dual citizenship. As a matter of fact the Labour Party leader, Callaghan, 
spoke about the emphasis of Macmillan's plan upon the nationality of the two 
communities, while he criticized the fact that the new plan did nothing to emphasize the 
common identity of the Cypriot population. As he stated: 
"All this is an emphasis on divis/on, and not (if IInlly. It is an 
emphasis on the Greek nature o/the people and the Turkish 
nature o/the people. Where is there, In this plan, any emphasis 
on the/act that these people are Cypriots? ,,6S 
In addition, Macmillan's plan offered Ankara the opportunity to establish herself, 
officially, in the island's political future. With the introduction of the Administrative 
Council, even if the Greek Cypriots were to hold the majority, Ankara would have had 
the opportunity to interfere in the island's administration, jeopardizing the Greek 
argument that Turkey, according to international law and treaties, had no adrninistrntive 
right upon Cyprus.69 Furthermore, with the provision for the creation of the two separate 
Houses, Turkey would have had the opportunity to achieve her main goal, the theoretical 
and practical political separation of the two communities, a development that would 
have led with mathematical certainty to the definite partition of the island. As a malter 
of fact, The Times said about the creation of two separate I louses that "lIlm·ol,'c.' what 
is virtually a system of non-territorial partition. ,,70 
Macmillan sent his proposals to Ankara and Athens, suggesting a Tripartite meeting 
as well, for further discussions and negotiations. As it was expected, Karrunanlis and his 
cabinet rejected Macmillan's plan and clearly stated that he did not intend to tlttend a 
Tripartite meeting but he was willing to meet the Dritish Premier alone. As the Greek 
Premier continued: 
68 Callaghan: House of Commons, June 26, 1958, vol. 590, col. 623. 
69 As mentioned in a previous chapter the officialline of Athens WIlS that Turkcy haJ every rl~ht to 
demand satisfactory guarantees for the Turkish community in Cyprus, but it rejected the idea of 
recognizing any right of Ankara to demand an administrative role on the IsI.md. 
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"Examining the outline of your plan from a practical point of 
view, it is apparent that the whole system Is based on an 
entirely ephemeral situation, I.e. on the tension In the relations 
between the Greeks and the Turkish Cypriots. who hal'e l/\'ed 
for centuries in peace on a united and indivisible territory. I 
sincerely believe that this tension has been artij1cially created 
during the last months, and therefore, can be brought to an 
end. Consequently, the administrative machinery which the 
plan is setting up is unjustified, and, owing to its intricate 
nature and to the friction which it is bound to calise, will pro\'c 
. t·,,71 
",opera lve. 
Makarios rejected Macmillan's plan as well. In n letter to the Cypriot governor the 
Cypriot Archbishop criticised: 
"the idea o/partnership whichforms the basis ollhe plall, alld 
which in substance imposes a triple condom/n/u", Oil Cyprus 
unavoidably leading to antagonism and strife and crcallng Cl 
focus of permanent unrest and a threat to peace /n Ihe whole 
area. ,,72 
On the other side of the Aegean Sea, Macmillan's plan received the same reception 
Menderes' government rejected the British proposal on the basis that the partition of 
Cyprus was the only acceptable solution for Ankara.73 
Despite the rejection of Macmillan's plan, the British side did not follow her 
traditional policy of abandoning the initiative. After all, this time London was seriously 
committed, to her allies (NATO and the US) and to the British people, who were getting 
tired of the long-established dispute in a distant island on the far side of the map, to 
resolving the Cypriot question. Macmillan's plan was the final recognition of the British 
side that its presence on the island had to be tcmlinated. This decision had been 
influenced by a combination of events and facts that affected the llritish foreign line. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Suez crisis turned out be no economic \Vnterloo 
for Britain. Financial collapse had been avoided, however, immediate economic 
measures had to be taken in order to regularize the situation. In January 1957, the new 
70 Quoted by Mr. Callaghan's statement in the Bouse of Commons, June 26, 1958, vol. 590, col. 623. 
71 Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Cyprus Question: CQrrespondence s:xcbnnl:.tll between 
Karamanlis and Macmillan. June 10 to Au~yst 19. 1958, (Knrnmanlis' letter to Macmillan of June 21, 
1958). 
72 Keesing's: October 18-25, 1958, p. 16451. 
73 ibid. 
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Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, began concocting plans for a far-reaching 
overhaul of strategy and expenditure. This resulted in the production of a White Paper, 
on 5 May 1957, which promised to end conscription by 1960 and to reduce the MllY to 
165,000 professionals by 1962, while defence expenditure would be held at 7% of the 
GNP.74 The alteration to British defence plans simply meant that Dritain was no longer 
in a position to continue her costly presence in Cyprus, while the cnd of conscription 
persuaded the British officials that they could not continue to risk the lives of British 
soldiers at any cost. Another fact that impelled the British decision to resolve the 
Cypriot question through the application of Macmillan's plan was the manufacture orthe 
first British thermo-nuclear bomb. In May 1957, the first British thenno-nuclear bomb 
explosion occurred on Christmas Island in the Western Pacific." TIle manufacture of n 
nuclear arsenal was, in a sense, the expression of Dritish bitterness townnls the 
American role during the Suez War. The diplomatic events during the Suez episode nnd 
the American refusal to stand by the British side, urged London to limit the Americnn 
influence over the country's defence. Nevertheless, the manufacture of the thermo-
nuclear bomb meant that Britain could now control Soviet expansionism in the Middle 
East from military bases in Cyprus. Control over the whole Cypriot territory was no 
longer necessary. In the whole of the British empire a new wind of change was blowing. 
In 1957, Malaysia and the Gold Coast (Ghana) gained independence, Nigerin and Sierrn 
Leone were to be next. In 1956, a new liberal constitution was introduced in Kenya in 
order to pacify the Mau-Mau, and serious procedures for the independence of \Vest 
Indies had began. Cyprus could not be excluded from the process of dc-eolonil.t1tion. 
Therefore in August the British Premier visited Athens and Ankara in order to persuade 
the two governments to reconcile their views. Macmillan arrived in Athens on 7 August 
and the next morning he met with Karamanlis and Averor in the political office of the 
Greek Premier. During the talks Macmillan attempted to reassure the Greek side that his 
plan was not an Anglo-Turkish plot against the Greek Cypriots and Greece but n serious 
diplomatic effort that aimed to offer an acceptable solution to two sides with completely 
different approaches to the same issue. Howevcr, Knrrunnnlis and Averor supported the 
Greek refusal by claiming that Athens was opposed to the existence of two different 
Houses, and they suggested the cstablishment of a common Legislative Assembly with 
authority extending to all matters, except those remaining in the Govcnlorts power. and 
that the composition of the Administrative Council should be modified in order to 
74 A. Sked & C. Cook, Post War Britain: A PQliticalllistor)'. (London. 1993). fourth edition. pp. 141- 42. 
75 J. Lawrence, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. (London, 1998). p. 593. 
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correspond to the proportions of Greeks and Turks.76 The talks ended the next day and 
Macmillan flew to Ankara, where he met with Menderes nnd Zorlu. There nrc no 
official records of this meeting except a brief statement that was published aner the end 
of the discussions which said that there had been "a frank and friendly exchange 01 
views It, that the British Prime Minister had "explained the nature ami purposes 01 the 
partnership plan It and that Menderes had "set out the point 01 view 01 his 
Government"n. Despite the vagueness of the statement, it was obvious that the Turkish 
government was more positive than the Greek concerning Macmillan's plan. Aner the 
end of his tour, Macmillan returned to London were he declared that the decision of his 
government was to proceed with his plan and also suggested some changes to his 
proposals, in order to please Athens. According to those changes, the representatives of 
Greece and Turkey would not sit as members of the Governor's [administrative] 
Council, but, while they were to be granted direct access to the Governor, they would 
maintain their functions. In addition, the provision for dual nationality was dropped 
because of legal complications, and a new provision provided for the establishment of 
separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipal councils. TIlis time, the Turkish side 
accepted the plan. The Turkish Foreign Minister stated that his government decided to 
support it "so as to prove Turkey's goodwill 112 the lace of the posllil'e efforts mad(! by 
Britain ,,78 Athens, on the other hand, maintained its previous stance, following the 
political developments concerning the Cypriot question with n critical eye. 
It has to be said that Macmillan's plan, even if it tried hard not to show it, displayed n 
clear pro-Turkish view concerning the Cypriot question. It was the final recognition that 
the two communities could not live together and it was the first step towards the 
partition of the island. Furthermore, it gave de jure recognition to Turkey's involvement 
in Cyprus, a development that conflicted with international legality. Therefore, the 
attitude of the Greek government was fully expected and justified. On the one hand, 
Karamanlis was not in the position to permit the Turkish diplomatic triumph over the 
Cypriot dispute by accepting Macmillan's proposals, since the principle of partition was 
one of the main Turkish arguments and it was convenient for the Turkish plans for full 
dominance in the wide area of the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, 
Karamanlis could not have allowed Turkey to gain n de jure stance in Cyprus, because 
such a development would give the legitimate right to Turkey to move towun.ls the re-
negotiations of the frontiers concerning the Dodeeancse and the Western TIu3ce. 
76 K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p.p. 187·202. 
77 K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 203. 
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Nevertheless, it would be a methodological mistake if Macmillan's plan were to be 
judged by history as an exclusively negative proposal. First of aU, after a long period of 
time, it was the first sincere British plan towards the final resolution of the Cypriot 
question. As has been shown, in many previous eases the British side proposed a plan 
simply in order to lift the diplomatic pressure from its shoulders. However, that was not 
the case with Macmillan's proposals. As for the pro-Turkish nature of the plan, it shoulc.l 
be kept in mind that Turkey was for Britain the most valuable ally in a region, the 
Middle East, which London regarded as its traditional sphere of influence. Wllite 
Greece, after the end of the Civil War, had developed closer relations with the United 
States, Turkey remained the closest ally of Britain, either within NATO or within the 
Baghdad Pact. Therefore, it would have becn extremely hannful to the Dritish interests 
to neglect the Turkish factor and displease it in the Cypriot case. Aftcr all, it was 
extremely difficult for Macmillan to reverse, within the short period that he was in 
power, the well established policy of his predecessor concerning Turkey and Cyprus. 
Macmillan's plan was a sincere effort to resolve the Cypriot question, an nHempt that 
can be compared to the desperate efforts of an acrobat to balance on a thin rope without 
a safety net under his feet. After so many years of diplomatic stagnation, it was the first 
attempt to resolve a dispute that had been transfonned into a thorn in the side of the 
imperial lion, the first firm step, no matter what its result, towards the re-establishment 
of peace on the deeply-traumatized Aphrodite'S island. 
78 Keesing's: October 18-25.1958, p. 16453. 
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CHAPTER X 
CYPRUS AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY: TilE ENO OF HIUTISII 
DOMINANCE ON APHRODITE'S ISLAND. 
The 1'01111", or ArblUlle 
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Arlatotl., \'15. 
This chapter will examine the period from the announcement of Mnknrios' plnn 
concerning the independence of Cyprus until the final ogreement of 011 the sides 
involved, as embodied in the Zurich-London ogreement. It will examine the diplomatic 
background of the complicated negotiations concerning the future of Cyprus, ond will 
assess the context of the Zurich-London agreement. The main questions that this 
chapter will seek to answer arc: What was the diplomatic importance of Makarios' 
proposal concerning an independent Cyprus? What were the reasons that persuaded 
both Athens and Ankara to negotiate concerning the Cypriot question? \Vhich were the 
reasons that made Makarios hesitate to recognize the Zurich-London ogreement and 
how were those hesitations bypassed? What was the Zurich-London ogreement? 
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Despite the fact Greece had rejected Macmillan's plan, the British side still showed 
no sign of accepting this. As mentioned in a previous chapter, London had already 
decided to close the Cypriot case at any cost, therefore the Greek objection was not 
enough by itself to stop the British initiative. In reality, the officials in the Foreign 
Office knew that, this time, Athens had neither the power nor the means to interrupt the 
realization of Macmillan's plan for Cyprus. As a matter of fact, Athens found herself 
isolated from the rest of the Western world that, after a long and disruptive period of 
turmoil in the fragile area of the Eastern Mediterranean, and an endless series of 
fruitless diplomatic negotiations concerning the Cypriot question, considered 
Macmillan's plan as the only reliable solution that could stabilize the severely shaken 
internal balance of the island. All NATO countries, except Greece, accepted the 
validity of the British plant, while even the political opposition inside the House of 
Commons maintained a positive approach to Macmillan's plan.2 As seen in previous 
chapters, since 1955, the Labour party had adopted a clear and, on many oeensions, 
passionate pro-Greek and Greek Cypriot position inside the Ilouse of Commons, 
concerning the Cypriot question.3 However, this time the climate in the Lnbour party 
was different. Labour leaders acknowledged Macmillan's efforts to find n way out of 
the political deadlock, therefore, to nobody's surprise, Callaghan's speech inside the 
House of Commons stated that: 
"/ want to make this clear: Ihe situatioll ilZ Ihe Islaml Is of Slich 
a character, and in the Aliddle Easl generally II Is of SIIch Cl 
nature, that we would welcome any agreement that the parl/es 
to this dispute can come 10. We sholiid wellli to sec II TllII Its 
course. We would nol seek to overlllrn It. We say to all 'he 
parties to this dispute: if/lis your duty allhe present time 10 go 
into negotiations and discussion." We beg 0/ )'011 to do so 
wherever you may be and whoever YOIl are, to sce whctllt:r tills 
situation can be brought 10 an end! ",I 
In this turning point for the fate of Cyprus, Athens lost its most vnluable olly within the 
British political scene and every day that passed brought Turkey closer to Cyprus. The 
Greek side was faced with a great dilemma. Either, she had to agree with Macmillan'S 
I Lennox-Boyd: House of Commons, June 26,1958, vol. 590, co1.618. 
2 For more concerning the attitude of the Labour party see: House of Commons Debates, June 26, 1958, 
vol. 590, co1.618-731 
3 Traditionally since the Greek War ofIndependencc and Lord Dyron's contribution nnd support to the 
Greek struggle. the Liberal and Labour parties supported the Greek side while the Conservutivcs 
supported the Turkish. 
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plan and allow Turkey to gain the same political rights as her in Cyprus, a possibility 
that would have created an explosive situation in Greece, or to maintain her negative 
attitude towards the British proposal, isolating herself from the political developments in 
Cyprus, at the same time offering Turkey the opportunity to strengthen her profile and 
position in the Western camp. 
However, Makarios' political instinct was to try to modify the negative political scene 
in favour of the Greek side. On 22 September, during an interview with D. Castle. then 
Vice Chairman of the Labour Party, he introduced the idea of an independent Cyprus. 
According to Makarios' proposal, after a period of self-government Cyprus would 
become an independent state "linked neither to Greece nor to Turkey". The status of 
Cyprus would be guaranteed by the United Nations and would not be changed "either by 
union with Greece, ,by partition, or by any other way", unless such a change were 
approved by the United Nations. The status of independence "would trot be 
incompatible" with Cyprus' membership of the Dritish Commonwealth. Mnkarios also 
re-assured Mrs Castle that the Turkish community would enjoy full safeguards under his 
plan. In addition, the Archbishop stated that the Dritish government, together with the 
Cypriot peoples' representatives, would frame a constitution for internal self-
government. This would operate for a fixed period, after which Cyprus would becomc 
independent. S The idea of an independent Cyprus was not new. Athens, during the 
summer of 1957, attempted to persuade the Greek Cypriot Archbishop to npprove the 
realization of such a plan. However, this plan was soon abandoned, mainly because of 
the severe reactions among the officials in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in 
the major parties of the opposition and the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy, who regarded such 
a development as the defeat of the Enosis movement.6 Nevertheless, this time Mnknrios 
surprised all sides, by officially stating that he was ready to nbandon every demand 
concerning the Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, in order to nchieve the end of the British 
presence in the island and avoid the involvement of Turkey in the internal politics of 
Cyprus. Makarios knew that he was playing with fire, since it would have been 
impossible for the Archbishop to silence the critical voices of the hard-liners inside the 
Ethnarchic Council, whose main slogan was Enosis und nothing but Enosis, but, on thc 
other hand, he knew that he could have easily sidestepped this obstacle, since his 
political influence, after his exile in Seychelles, was so high that he had nn ndvantngc. 
4 Callaghan: House of Commons, June 26,1958, vol. 590, <:01.626. 
'Keesing's: October 18-25, 1958, 16454. 
6 For more concerning this see: E. Averof- Tositsas, A Story QfMjssed Ot't'ortunitjes t (Athens, 1982), 
vol. I, p. 192. 
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As a matter of fact, Grivas, as soon as he was informed of Maknrios' statement, 
expressed his deep distress concerning the Archbishop's plan. As he says in his 
memoirs: 
"It was a complete surprise to me, and I confess to being upset 
and shocked The Archbishop had no mandate to depart from 
our basic claimfor self-determination - the right 10 choose ollr 
ownfuture andjoin our Greek motherland. ,,7 
Despite Grivas' reaction, both the Greek and the Greek Cypriot side agreed with 
Makarios' plan about independence. On 29 September, the Greek Premic:r announced 
that his government was ready to accept Makarios' proposals, while the nc:xt day the 
mayors of Paphos, Limassol, Larnaca, Frunagusta, Kyrenia and Nicosia, in a common 
statement, expressed their full support for Maknrios' plan.s Nevertheless, London's 
reaction was not in the same spirit. In a letter to Karrunanlis, Macmillan described 
Makarios' position as: 
''falling outside the scope of the immediate problem 0/ setting 
up interim arrangements for restoring order alld del'eloplng 
representative institutions,,9 
London's refusal to accept Makarios' proposal was expected. Despite the fuct that it 
was the first time that the Greek Cypriot side had abandoned hc:r demands concerning 
Enosis of the island with Greece, still the possibility of an eventual cnosis remained. If 
Makarios' plan had been accepted, Cyprus would have gained its independence aftcr a 
fixed period of self-government. The Cypriot status of independence was not to be 
modified, unless the United Nations agreed to such an alteration. Ilowevcr. no one 
could guarantee to the British and Turkish side that Nicosia or even Athens would have 
not commenced a new diplomatic struggle, after a suflicient period of an illllcpendcnt 
Cyprus, inside the United Nations, in order to achieve the long-desired Enosis. London 
and Ankara also had other reasons that justified their negative reaction towards 
Makarios' plan. Under the Archbishop's proposals, the Greek Cypriot side would have 
kept political power under its control, since Athens and Ankara would have had no 
political authority over the Cypriot administration. In addition, Makruios' proposal did 
not mention anything about the establishment of Dritish military basc:s on Cypriot 
territory, which alarmed London. Nevertheless, it must be said that despite all the 
7 The Memoirs of General Griyas , ed. by C. Foley, (London, 1964), p. 162. 
8 On Karamanlis' statement, see: Keesing's: October 18-25, 1958, p. 16454. On the statement oftlle 
Cypriot mayors, see: N. Kranidiotis, Difficult Years, (Athens, 1981), p. 344. 
9 Keesing's: ibid. 
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disadvantages of Makarios' plan, it still offered the Greek Cypriots the chance to 
abandon the inflexible policy of Enosis and approach Macmillan's plan from a different 
position. As soon as the leaders of the Labour Party were infonned about Makarios' 
interview their response was immediate. On 26 September. only four days aficr 
Makarios' interview, the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party issued a 
statement calling upon the Government to suspend the implementation of Macmillan's 
plan by postponing the arrival in Cyprus of Turkey's representative. No lasting 
settlement, the statement said, was possible without the conscnt of the people, and the 
plan was rejected by an overwhelming majority of the island's population. The attempt 
to put it into operation was therefore unwise and dangerous. TIle statement suggested 
that recent declarations by the Archbishop and other Greek Cypriot leaders held out new 
hopes of settlement by agreement. Finally, it urged that negotiations should be re-
opened with Cypriot representatives. 1o Without any doubt, Makarios' proposal gave 
increased vitality to the Greek diplomatic efforts to suspend the implementation of the 
British plan in Cyprus. It was the first time that London could not claim that the: 
inflexible policy of Enosis was the main obstacle to the establishment of peace ami order 
in the island, and Karamanlis and his associates were detcnnined not to throwaway such 
a brilliant opportunity. 
However, at this particular time the US decided, once again, to intervene in order to 
regularize the situation in the southeastern flank of the Atlantic Alliance. TIle 
Americans recognized the sentimental value that Cyprus held for Greece nnd they were 
anxious about the Greek response had Macmillan's plan been implemcnted in the island. 
Characteristically, the estimate of the American Nationallntelligcnce, on 23 September 
1958, stated that: 
"If the UK goes ahead with the plan-as now Clppcars /lAdy-
Greece's reaction might include at least tl pllrl/ill 
disengagement from its NATO obligations. There woulcl climosl 
certainly be critical strains in Greek-Turkish rclatlollS If 1I0t Cl 
complete disruption, and the danger of wide-spread 'violence Oil 
Cyprus itself would be great. If the US publicly supported the 
British plan. American influence in Greece would be seriously 
affected ... The growth of nelltral/st sentiment, howel'er, ami 
particularly Greece's sense of disenchantment with Its Western 
allies over the Cyprus issue will probably impel Greece to take 
10 The Times, June 27,1958, p.4. 
230 
a more independent line in NATO and the UN affairs affecting 
Greek interests. This tendency would be modified thoug" not 
entirely offset by increased US economic aid or markedly 
greater US sympathy and support for Greece on the Cyprus 
question. ,,11 
From this time onwards, the US began a great diplomatic effort in order to prevent the 
implementation of Macmillan's plan in Cyprus. The first step was to send Paul-Henri 
Spaak, newly appointed NATO Secretary-General and former Prime Minister of 
Belgium, to Athens for talks with Karamanlis. Spaak arrived in the Greek cnpital on 23 
September and met Karamanlis, on the same day, in the latter's oflice in Parliament. 
Karamanlis expressed his dissatisfaction to Spaak concerning the Dritish aUitude, while 
the latter reassured the Greek Premier that he was ready to commit himself to find a 
satisfactory settlement for the three countries concerned with the Cypriot queslion. 11 
The next day the Secretary-General, immediately aner his return to Paris, submitted to 
the NATO Council a plan that became known as the Spaak plan. In submitting his plnn, 
the Secretary General also suggested that a conference should take place as soon as 
possible between the Governments of Dritain, Greece and Turkey and representatives of 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Spaak plan, which would serve as n basis for 
discussions at the proposed conference, suggested a provisional solution based on the 
following principles: 
"a)Crealion of a House of Representatives for cac" of Ihe Iwo 
communities having competence in all communal affairs. 
b)Creation of a representative institution having compctcnce 
over questions of joint interest. 
c)A governmental council presided over by the GOl'crnor with Cl 
Greek Cypriot majority. 
d)Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security will remain wlt/,/" the 
competence of the Governor. JJ 
The Spaak plan tried to transform some of the main points of Macmillan p13n, in order to 
make it more attractive to the Greek side, according to the American wishes. The new 
plan did not mention anything about the involvement of either Turkey or Greece 
concerning the administration of the island. Another point th:.t was closer to the Oreek 
11 Foreign Relations of the United States: 1958-1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Orec:~e; Turkey, 
(Washington, 1993), part 2, vol. X, p. 635. 
12 For more concerning Spaak's visit see: K. Karamanlis, Archiye: Facts ond l'oPW, (Athens, 1994), vol. 
III, pp. 236-243. 
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stance was that, instead of the creation of two separate communal Ilouses, another 
common House was to be created for all the people of Cyprus, a clear attempt to 
strengthen the political unity of the island. As expected, the Turkish officials were so 
outraged with the proposals of the Secretary-General that M. Sarper, the Turkish 
representative at the NATO Council, personally attacked Spaak by stating that his plan 
was a knife in the back of Turkey. 14 The British reaction, on the other hand, Was more 
moderate, however it was clear that London was not prepared to abandon its plan and 
adopt Spaak's proposals. As a matter of fact, while the NATO Council was trying to 
find an acceptable settlement for the three concerned sides, the British administration in 
Cyprus continued its efforts to implement Macmillan's plan on the island. Therefore. on 
1 October 1958, the Turkish representative in Cyprus officially resumed his duties, while 
Foot personally supervised the preparation of separate electoral rolls, and a three-man 
commission arrived on the island to examine the question of establishing separate 
Turkish municipalities. ls The British attitude outraged Grivas and gave lhe hard-liners 
inside the Ethnarchic Council the opportunity to demand more violent actions, as n sign 
of protest of the Greek Cypriot people against the British policy. As n result, October 
was one of the most violent months for the island since 1955. EOKA began a new series 
of sabotage actions against British targets; even attacking unanncd British civilians. 
while the British establishment reacted to the provocation with the same lenl and 
efficiency. 16 
In this negative climate for the final resolution of the Cypriot question, Athens 
decided, once again, to appeal to the United Nation in New York. At this particular time 
the United Nations was the only reliable hope for the Greek side, since no other method 
that Karamanlis and his associates had employed in order to jeopardize the renlil .. 1tion of 
Macmillan's plan, had addressed the British determination to close the Cypriot question 
once and for all. The Commission dealt with the Greek appeal from 25 November until 
4 December. Unlike every previous Greek appeal, when Athens had asked for the 
implementation of the principle of self detennination in the island, lhis appeal was based 
upon the principle of independence. Therefore, a Greek resolution submitted at the 996th 
meeting of the First Committee invited the General Assembly to consider that "'he 
13 Discussion of Cyprus in N.A.T.O, Sept-Oct. 1958. Cmd.566. London. 1958. pp. 4-5. 
14 K. Karamanlis, op. cit., vol. III, p. 244. 
I~ Keesing's, ibid. 
16 For more concerning E.O.K.A's actions and the attitude oCthe British establishment durin!: this 
particular period see: C. Foley, Leeacy and Strife: Cyprus from Rebelljon to CiVil Wor. (London, 19(4). 
pp. 141-46. H. Foot, A Start in Freedom. (London, 1964), pp. 174-5. 
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political status and the future of Cyprus should mainly depend on the Cypriots" and 
invited: 
"the Government of the United Kingdom to assist the C)1Jrlols 
towards instituting the status of independence, following a 
period of genuine and democratic self-government. ,,/1 
The resolution of the British side, on the other hand, called on the General Assembly to 
consider the Cypriot question, to invite the British government "10 conlin lie its efforts to 
arrive" at a solution acceptable to all the parties concerned, and to "Invite the other 
parties to co-operate to this end. ,,18 Last but not least, the Turkish resolution called on 
the General Assembly to recommend: 
"that the three Governments directly concerned resume Clnd 
continue efforts in a spirit of co-operation with a view 10 
reaching a friendly solution in the application o/the principle 
of equal 'rights and self-determlnal/on according 10 the 
particular circumstances of Cyprus and its people. /" 
conformity with the purposes and principles o/the United 
Nations Charter. ,,19 
The main points of the discussions in the First Committee were, on the British side, that 
its government was prepared to commence negotiations with Greece and Turkey and the 
two communities in Cyprus for a provisional solution, which would not prejudice the 
final solution. The Greek delegation insisted on the independence orthe island, and was 
ready to give all the necessary guarantees for the protection of the Turkish-Cypriot 
minority in the island. The Turkish side, on the other hand, tried to establish its 
proposals for the partition of the island by arguing that Cypms was not n political entity 
but was divided into two distinct ethnic groups with different national loyalties. The 
Turkish delegation argued that the Turkish Cypriot community should not be treated as a 
minority but as a national entity, sharing equal political rights with the Greek Cypriots. 
Nevertheless, Britain, Greece and Turkey were not the only countries that submitted 
resolutions to the first committee concerning the Cypriot question. Colombia, Dclgium 
and Iran also submitted resolutions, which was not surprising, since the Cypriot question 
was an international issue of great interest and at the forefront of public concem. At the 
end, after many changes and modifications, the Iranian resolution was adopted by tho 
17 Gen. Ass, 13th Session, Agenda item 68, Annexes, Document N4029. Resolution NC. IlL. 222. 
18 Gen. Ass, op. cit., 221. 
19 Gen. Ass, Opt cit., 223. 
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First Committee by 31 votes to 22, with 28 abstentions. The Iranian resolution, as 
adopted, reads as follows: 
"The General Assembly, 
Having considered the question of Cyprus, 
Recalling its resolution 1013 (Xl) of26 February 1957, 
Believing that a conference between the three Governments 
directly concerned and representatives of the C}priots at which 
there would be discussion not only of the inlerim arrangements 
for the administration of Cyprus but also of a final solut/on , 
with assistance if desired of Governments ami personalities 
acceptable to the interested parties, offers the best hope of 
peaceful progress towards an agreed solution of the C}1JrIlS 
problem, . 
Considering that self-government and free instilulions shollid 
be developed in accordance with the CharIer of the Uniled 
Nations to meet the legitimate aspirations of the C}priots, 
Urges that such a conference should be convened emt! tlwt all 
concerned should cooperate to ensure a sllcces.iful outcome I" 
accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter (if 
the United Nations. ,,20 
The Iranian resolution came closer to the British and Turkish views, therefore the two 
sides voted in favour of it while the Greek side voted against. However, it was clear that 
it would have been impossible for the Iranian resolution to attrnct the required two-thirds 
majority in the General Assembly, in order to be officinlly adoptcd by the United 
Nations. Once again the Cypriot question was faced with a diplomatic dendlock; 
however, this time secret diplomacy was destined to playa catalytic role in the finnl 
solution. 
When the voting ended late at night, all the dclegntions gnthcred in a spccinlly 
designed lounge outside the conference room. There, the Greek and Turkish sides had 
the opportunity to speak away from the microphones and isolated from the other 
delegations. Averof and Zorlu had an interesting dialogue thnt sct the bases for the 
future developments of the Cypriot question. Zorlu approached Averar and 
congratulated him over his diplomatic struggle during the meeting. The rest of the 
dialogue went as follows: 
20 Gen. Ass., 13 th Session, Agenda item 68, Annexes, Document N4029. 
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-Averof: "You won, therefore you can easily treat yourself to 
the luxury of congratulating me. " 
-Zorlu: . "I came with a positive feeling to congratulate you 
because your speech was wonderful and your arguments 
exceptional . . I did not come here to be insulted" 
-Averof: "I apologize. I did not want to offend you. After all 
you were a difficult opponent and you gave an excellent baltic. 
However, we both gave a bailie by using dishonorable 
methods. ", 
-Zorlu: . "What do you mean?" 
-Averof: "That our countries were enemies for Imporl,mt 
reasons and two great politicians succeeded in re-establlshlng 
friendly relations. [It is obvious that Averof refers to Vcnizclos 
and Attaturk and the dispute over Asia Minor]. That ollr 
nations are, underdeveloped, they are bolh al Ihe Sllllle 
dangerous crossroads, and we arc cultivating the hale belween 
our people because we do not want 10 co-operate over ,m Issue 
that is simple and minor compared with other Issues of the netlr 
or far past. " 
-Zorlu: "I agree with you. I am alarmed by the commo" 
threats to which we are exposed. [It is clear that the Turkish 
Foreign Minister refers to the Soviet threat] J lowe~'cr, )'()lIr 
failure to understand that Cyprus Is a vital faclor for Tu,klsh 
security is the main obstacle to Ihe beginning of negotiations . .. 
-Averof: "We are aware of that, thcrc/ore we arc rcady 10 
propose a de-militarized Cyprus. " 
-Zorlu: A de-militarized Cyprus means that ",hell tile British 
leave the island, it would be an easy prey for au' encmles. In 
addition, you insist on the fact thai in C>1}rlIS there is il 
majority that surrounds a small minority. You reilise to (leerpl 
the existence oltwo different communities. " 
-Avero! I can accept that, but YOIl have 10 accept the fileltlUlt 
80 is four times more than 20. [Averof speaks about the 
percentage of the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot community.]" 
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-Zorlu: "I can accept that, therefore I propose tomorrow, after 
the end of the meeting to meet again a/one In oreler 10 see ifwe 
can reach a common agreement. ,,21, \ 
As follows from the above, dialogue, the two sides had a common understanding 
concerning the Cypriot, question and were ready to' co-operate regarding its final 
solution. However, what was the main reason that forced the two countries to put aside 
their deep historic differences and come closer concerning the Cypriot question? 
On the one hand, the Greek side was ready to negotiate with the Turkish side for only 
one reason. Since' 1955,'Athens had avoided any direct negotiations with Ankara 
concerning the Cypriot question because this would mean accepting the Turkish right to 
be involved. However~ after three years of fruitless negotiations with the Dritish side, 
Athens found itself isolated before a unified Anglo-Turkish front. Therefore, the 
commencement of direct negotiations with Ankara was the last opportunity for Athens to 
infiltrate the unofficial Anglo-Turkish pact and prevent the catastrophic break up of the 
unity of the island. Turkey, on the other hand, was alarmed by the American 
speculations that Greece was ready to distance itself from NATO. Ilowcvcr 
contradictory to the Turkish geostrategic interests in Cyprus, it was still not in Ankara's 
interest to see Greece keep its distance from NATO, even if this would have meant that 
Turkey's policy over Cyprus would have turned out to be n triumph. Turkey's interest in 
preserving the unity of the southeastern flank of the Atlantic Alliance was bused on 
recent events in the Middle East, in particular Iraq. From the end of Second \Vorld War, 
Iraq remained firmly under the control of the I1ashimite monarchy with clear pro-
Western and pro-British' orientations in the exercising of nation's foreign policy. 
However, the Iraqi governments of the post-war era had a limited base of Slipport, 
mainly due to the failure of the establishment to introduce any social refonns. As a 
result of this, in July 1958, Brigadier Abd ai-Karim Qasim overthrew the regime in a 
bloody military coup, in which King Faysal II and Prince Abd al·llah were killed. As 
soon as the new dictator was establis~ed in power, he withdraw Iraq from the Baghdau 
Pact and established close ties with the Soviet Union and the Eastern block states, 
reaching an agreement with the USSR for military and economic assistance.ll 
According to the new developments in the Middle East, Turkey was surrounded by 
hostile nations such as the Soviet Union, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt that were influencing the 
21 E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., pp. 135·36. 
22 For more concerning the dramatic developments in Iraq during July 1958 ond about Qaslm'l regime 
see: M. Farouk-Sluglett & P. Sluglett, Irag Since 1958: From Reyolutjon to Dictntorsbja. (London. 
1990). 
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rest of the Arab world against Kemal's nation, due to the latter's close links with the 
West.23 If Greece's relations with NATO were about to change, then Turkey was in 
danger of being totally surrounded by hostile nations, with no geographical links to its 
lifeline, the West.· Additionally, once again, American involvement was crucial to the 
Greek-Turkish negotiations. During that time, the Turkish economy was at its lowest 
point since the end of the Second World War. In the first months of 1958 the black 
market of the Turkish lira had fallen by one third, while during the first months of the 
same year the credit of the Turkish Central Bank had expanded 4.2%.24 Turkey asked 
the US for financial aid, and the latter had promised $234 million. TIle only American 
term was that Turkey should show more flexibility concerning the Cypriot qucstion.2' 
On the other hand, the US promised Karamanlis greater assistance in military cquipment 
in the event that Greece was ready to co-operatc with Turkey and Dritain over the 
Cypriot question. As a matter of fact, after the signature of the Zurich treaty Greece 
signed a deal in which the U.S would supply Greece with nuclear weapons, ballistic 
missiles and training: the warheads, however,26 would remain under American control. 
Macmillan's plan was not on the cards any more and the US had succeeded in 
preserving the unity of the southeastern flank of NATO at a reasonable price. 
On the morning of 6 December, Averof and Zorlu met in the building of the United 
Nations. From the first moment, it appeared that Turkish side was prepared to abandon 
Macmillan's plan, and negotiate the plan for an independent Cyprus. Ilowcver, Zorlu 
explained the Turkish position to his interlocutor. First of all, in order to achieve 
Cypriot independence the Greek and the Greek Cypriot leadership had to accept the 
establishment of one or two British military bases on the island. Such a deVelopment 
would be beneficial for both communities.27 Another point that the Turkish I:orcisn 
Minister discussed was the nature of independence. Due to the existence of two 
communities in the island, issues such as education, religion, and legal disputes between 
members of the same community, should all be controlled separately by each 
23 Since the formation of modem Turkey and Kemal's endeavor to limit Islam within the Turkish 
framework, the Arab world accused Ankara ofa high act of treason towards the sacre~ principles orlhe 
Koran. However, the close links that Ankara developed with the mo~ern state or Israel afier 1949 played 
a significant role in shaping the Arab mentality, as well. For more see: M.C,lludson, Arab Politics: The 
Search for Legitimacy, (New Haven, 1977). 
24 Department of State, Operations Coordinating Doard Files: Lot 62 0430, Turkey, (Washington, 1990). 
2' Foreign Relations of the United States:1958-1960, Eastern Europe: Finland: Greece: Turley, part 2, 
vol. X, pp. 747, 753. See also: B. 0' Malley&I. Craig, The Cyprus CQnspirncYi America. ESpio03,CJUlIl 
the Turkish Invasion, (London, 1999), p. 70. 
26 B. O'Malley&1. Craig, op. cit., pp. 75-76. 
27 According to Zorlu, the British presence in the island would have guaranteed the peaceful co-existence 
of the two communities. On a theoretical level that was right, however future events, especially during 
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community. In addition, Zorlu proposed that in the main Cypriot cities the Greek and 
the Turkish communities should have the right to elect their own mayors. Zorlu also 
spoke about the establishment of' one or two Turkish military bases in the island, 
however A verof opposed that. . As the Greek Minister said, such a development would 
not have been accepted either by Athens or by the Ethnarchic Council, and he continued 
by saying that Greece could not be a threat to Turkey due to its small population, 
however he was ready to propose: a de jure neutralization of Cyprus, following the 
Austrian model, under the supervision of NATO or even the United Nations. Averof 
continued by saying that he was ready to support his proposals concerning separate 
education and religion,' but he had no choice than to oppose the administrative division 
inside the Cypriot cities,' mainly due to the fact that such a scheme would set the 
foundations for the de facto and de jure partition of Cyprus aner some years.28 It was 
obvious that it would have been impossible for the two men to agree at such on early 
stage, therefore they ended the meeting by setting' a new dote, aner a week, for the 
meeting of NATO Council in Paris. Despite the fact that the two men did not agree 
about almost anything, it was still a progressive step towards the final resolution of the 
Cypriot question. After all, one week was not such a long period compared with 80 
years of fruitless negotiations, inflexible ideas, and opportunistic and irresponsible 
proposals. 
As soon as Averof returned to Athens, he infonned both Knramanlis and Maknrios of 
his meeting with his Turkish counterpart. Both men were satisfied with the context of 
the meeting and Karamanils instructed Averof to continue the discussions in Paris. The 
Greek and Turkish delegations met again in Paris on 16 December, where Avcrof and 
Zorlu began a new series of discussions. In Paris the Greek and Turkish Ministers found 
the opportunity to infonn S. Lloyd, their British counterpart, about their discussions. 
The British side was satisfied by the approach of the two Ministers, and os Macmillan 
stated later on, London was prepared to accept any agreement reached by the Greeks and 
the Turks, even if it implied the transfer of sovereignty, provided that such on agrcement 
satisfied and safeguarded the British military requirements.29 \Vith llritish approval, the 
two sides continued the discussions during 18-20 January 1959, again in Paris, in the 
course of a meeting connected with the European Common Market. These talks were 
described by the Hellenic News Agency as "unusually long and cordial" nnd with 
the Turkish invasion in July 1974, showed that the Dritish army had no the desire to be Involved In II 
Greco-Turkish dispute as long as its presence on the island was to continue. 
28 E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p.p. 139-145. 
29 Macmillan: House of Commons, February 19, 1959, vol. 600. 
238 
"indications that some progress has been made during these meetings. ,.JO After further 
diplomatic negotiations and endless diplomatic tricks from both sides, it wus announced, 
on 5 February, that the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers nod Fordgn Ministers had 
started negotiations in Zurich, with a view to finding a bilateral solution to the island's 
problems. The discussions were held in DodIer llotel, a few kilometres outside the 
Swiss capital, and lasted for 6 days. Despite the great obstacles that appeared during the 
talks, from both sides, finally the two delegations reached a common agreement nnd 
issued a common statement that said: · 
"the question of Cyprus was discussed al lenglll I" " spirit of 
mutual understanding. A compromise agreement wCU' jltwll)' 
reached, in spite of considerable dljJlclllllcs which this 
problems presents. . The cause of the "lilly am/ \l'e/fizrc (if 
C . . t I "Jl yprus emerg~s VIC or ous. 
After the discussions, Averof and Zorlu flew to London in order to infonn th<! British 
side about the precise terms of the agreement. However, the problems for the Greek side 
were not over yet. The Turkish government had the lUXUry of total contml ()f the 
Cypriot question, however Athens had to persuade the Greek Cypriot leadership ami in 
particular Makarios. As soon as Karamanlis rcturned back to Athens, on the night of II 
February, he invited Makarios to a meeting in order to infonn hint personally about wh:1t 
had been agreed in Zurich. Makarios was satisfied with the final agreement, nnd nsked 
Karamanlis only to negotiate about the territory to be given to Britain for military 
bases.32 After Makarios' agreement the path was wide open for the final signnture uflh<! 
Zurich agreement, an historic event that was to take place in London. On 17 Fcbrunry, 
the negotiations in London began with the arrival of Makarios nnd Kutchuk, th(! Turkish 
Cypriot leader. However, the same night a new problem appeared backslng(!. Inside lh(! 
Greek embassy building in Park Lane, the Greek and Greek Cypriot delc:galions mel in 
order to co-ordinate their actions and adopt a common line. Ilowcvcr, It! is apparent 
from the conversation between Karamanlis and Makarios, the latter hesitated to Sl\'<! his 
final approval to the Zurich agreement. The following dialogue followed between on 
outraged Greek Premier and a puzzled Archbishop. 
-KaramanIis: "/low it Is possible. ell tl,ls pain/ 10 hm'e! 
objections, since in Greece }'0I1 agreed 10 ,,(ccpl Ihe nrlllsll 
30 Keesing's: February 14-21 1959. p. 16644. 
31 ibid. 
3l E. Averof-Tositsas. op. cit.. p. 192. 
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proposal and come in London in order to speak about tlte 
Zurich agreement? 
-Makarios: "You are right. But my conscience is not allow/llg 
me to acceptfurther responsibilities. 
-Karamanlis [addressed to the rest of the people that were 
witnessing the scene]: "In order not to embarass Greece I will 
participate in the meeting, whatever }.{akarios will (fcelt/e. 11111 
from this point I terminate the C>priot policy of tlte Greek 
government. If Makarios wants to continue the struggle, thell 
he has to find another supporter. "JJ 
Once again the Cypriot question was at a turning point, however the crisis this time was 
deeper, because all the conflicting sides had exposed themselves at intcmalionallevel by 
admitting the fact that a solution was closer than ever. l11<:rcfore, why had Mnktlrios 
changed his mind? The answer comes from two directions, the Archbishop's 
psychological profile and the role of MIG. Without any doubt, Makorios wns n Gillet! 
political leader with great abilities and enormous popularity among his compatriots. At 
this particular moment, no one inside the Ethnarchic Council could question his 
authority, therefore the view that Makarios refused to recognise the Zurich ngn:ernent 
under the pressure of the hard-liners inside the Ethnarchic Council is simply not vnlld.J~ 
Makarios' first preoccupation was his position in history nncr his denth. Iii! cducntion, 
concerning the greatness of the Byzantine Empire and the heroic figures of the \Vur of 
Independence of 1821, his nationalist political ideas nnd his belief lhat lhe Oreat iden, 
the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire, was not n distant dream, and his 
determination to preserve his popUlarity in Cyprus, all made Maknrios hesitate at the 
final moment to put his signature to a paper that would Iiternlly have recognized the cnll 
of the Enosis movement. However, Makarios' reaction oulroged not only the Oreek 
delegation but also the Greek Cypriots. They were aware that London was the Inst 
chance Cyprus had, in order to remain unified, nnd on lhe other hand they wen: nlnnncd 
by Karamanlis' threat to stop any activity concerning the Cypriot question. So, the other 
members of the Greek Cypriot delegation npplied consideroblc pressun: on Mnkurios, 
and even suggested that he should resign rather than renounce the Zurich ng,n:cmcnt.lS 
However, an ambitious person such as Makarios wus not oble to withdrow from the front 
33 N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 370. See also Keesing's: ibid. 
34 For more concerning this view see: N. Fotopoulos, The OrtillDeftDt In Zurl,lund.LJm~Qll, (Mllnlhly 
Review ofPoliticalllistory, Athens, November 1984). 
35 E. Averof-Tositsas, opt. cit., p. 208. 
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line of public life, therefore on 19 February, he infonned the other dcJeg:1tions th:1t he 
was prepared to recognize the Zurich agreement aner "0 night's praycr omi reflcctlon on 
the agonizing dilemma" which faced him.36 Another explanation concerning Maknrios' 
change of mind comes from the Intelligence writer Nigel West (the pen-name of the 
fonner MP Rupert Allason). According to West the Cypriot Archbishop wos 
blackmailed by British security services. Makarios was threatened by MIG with 
disclosure of his alleged homosexuality unless he recognised the vnlidity of the 
agreements.37 Sir Dick White, head of MI6 at that time, claimed in his biography th:!t 
this particular blackmail was used to secure Makarios' agreement to Dritnin retaining 
two sovereign bases.38 No matter which of the above theories approach the truth, 
Makarios changed his attitude. On the same day, the agreements were signed by nil the 
delegations. One and a half year later, on 16 August 1960, Dritish control over C)'pna! 
ended and the island was declared an independent nation. 
Nevertheless, what was' the Zurich-London agreement? 111e first p~lrt of the 
agreement reached by the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in the Swiss eapitnl set 
down the basic structure of the state of Cyprus. According to this part, Cyprus wos to he 
a Republic with a presidential regime, the President bcing Greek nnd the Vice-President 
Turkish, elected by the island's Greek and Turkish communities respectively, 111e 
President and the Vice-President were to be invested by the I louse of Reprcsentntlve5, In 
which they were to take an oath of loyalty and respect for the Constitution. I!xccutive 
authority was to be exercised by the President and the Vice-President. For this plll'J'Ose 
they were to have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers nrul three 
Turkish Ministers.39 This Council would adopt decisions by absolute majority, 
Legislative powers would be vested in the House of Reprcsentatives hm! in the two 
Communal Chambers, one for each community, TIle Bouse of Representativcs would 
be elected every five years by universal suffrage of each community scptlcutdy in the 
proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek community and 30 rer cent for the Turkish 
community. This House would have authority in all matters other th:ltl those expressly 
reserved to the Communal Chambers. The House of Representativcs would decide by II 
simple majority of the members present, but any law modifying the electocul Inw or 
36 Keesing's: ibid. 
37 At this point it is essential to point out that West's theory cannot be aurrMteJ by primary IOUrtetl, 
therefore in a sense it is problematic. However, I consider that is the duty of the rcsclU'Cher to rrovlJc oil 
existing evidence in order to support the academic objectivity oflhe thesis. N. West, Ihillitnlh, 
(London, 1988), p. 75. 
38 T. Bower. The Perfect English Spy, (London, 1995), p. 231. 
39 It was stated that one of the main ministries foreign affairs, defence or fin.1nce ahoulJ be fntrul4teJ to 1& 
Turk. 
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relating to the municipalities or imposing duties and taxes, would require n simple 
majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House. Two separate chambers 
would exist, one for each community. These Communal Chambers would have the right 
to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for their needs 
and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision. In addition they 
would exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural nnd teaching questions nnd 
questions of personal status. Their authority would also be extended to interests ami 
institutions of a purely communal nature. Finally, the Communal Chambers would have 
authority in matters' indicated by municipalities which were composed of one 
community only. There would be a Supreme Constitutional Court with competence over 
conflicts of authority [between the House of Representatives nnd the Communal 
Chambers] and on questions of discrimination. This Court would be composed of one 
Greek, one Turk and one neutral president Llppointed jointly by the President and the 
Vice President. There would also be a High Court of Justice, composed of two Greeks, 
one Turk and a neutral president (appointed jointly by the President nnd Vice President). 
who would have two votes. This Court would be the highest organ of the judicature. 
dealing with appointments, promotions of judges, etc. Civil disputes in which both the: 
plaintiff and the defendant were from the same community, or disputes relating to 
questions of personal status and to religious matters, would be tried by trlbunnl:; 
composed of judges belonging to the same community. If the plaintiff ami defendant 
were from different communities, the composition of the tribunal would 00 mixed nnd 
would be determined by the High Court of Justice. 
A very interesting feature concerned the checks and balances provided fur In the: 
Agreement between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. and olso between 
the President and the Vice President. Firstly, the President nnd the Vice-Pn:sident 
separately and conjointly would have the right of final vcto on Dny Inw or decision 
concerning foreign affairs. An exception to this rule would 00 the r~lrticiration or 
Cyprus in international organizations nnd pacts of allinJlce in which both Oreece: tuHI 
Turkey were participants. Also subject to veto would be aU important questions relnting 
to defence and security, expressly defined. According to the agrecment such '1uestlon5 
were: 
"a)the composition and size 0/ 'he armet/forces cmti cree/Its /e" 
them. 
b)appointments and promol/on. 
c)imporls a/warlike stores and alll<lnclr of cXI'/oslw:s. 
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d)the granting of bases and other facilities to allied cOllntries." 
Security questions were: i,:". ;', , l ;:; 
"a) appointments and promotions. ' 
b)the allocation and stationing offorces. 
c)emergency measures and martial law . . :. 
d)Police laws." '. ,,' : , ' . 
Secondly, it was previously pointed out that the House or Representativcs would adopt 
decisions by a simple majority of the members present. Ilowever, the President und the 
Vice-President separately and conjointly would have the right to return (within IS days) 
all laws and decisions to the House for reconsideration. If the llouse mnintnincd its 
decision, then the President and the Vice President would promulgate the low or decision 
in question. In addition, if the President or the Vice President considered n law or 
decision of the House to be discriminatory against either of the two communities, they 
could appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which could nonul or conlinn the law 
or decision, or return it to the House of Representatives for reconsiderntion, in whole or 
in part. The rights of the President and the Vice President to return a low to the I louse 
for reconsideration or appeal to the Constitutional Court, would olso be vnlid in the case 
of the budget. Thirdly, as shown above,' the Council orMinisters (with seven Orc:c:k nnd 
three Turkish members) would adopt decisions by absolute majority. Out the President 
and the Viee-President,would have the right of flnal veto over nil mnin decisions, 
concerning foreign affairs, defence, and security. In oddition, they would hove the right 
to return the decisions of the Council for reconsideration under the some conditlmls us 
those mentioned above for decisions of the House of Representatives. In ndc.litlon, the 
Civil Service would employ the ratio of 70 per ccnt Orecks to 30 per cent Turks. 
Attempts would be made to apply this ratio to nil grades of the Civil Service. One of the 
heads of the armed forces, the police and thc gcndanncrie would be Turkish. nnd the 
head and the deputy head would belong to different communities. 'nU! stnte of Cyprus 
would have an army of 2,000 men, 60 per cent Oreek nod 40 per cent Turkish. 11u:re 
would also be a security force of 2,000, of which 70 per cent would be Oreek and 30 pcr 
cent Turkish. Separate municipalities would be cstablished in the five I11nln town:r& of the 
island, but in each of these towns n co-ordinating body would be crcntcd for motters 
requiring joint action. The Constitution could only be revised by Q majority. comprising 
two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of the Turkish members of the I louse of 
Representatives. However, the basic articles could not be modified. 
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The second part of the agreement set down the international status of Cyprus. A 
treaty between the Republic of Cyprus and Britain~ Greece nnd Turkey wns included in 
the Zurich-London Agreement: it was called the Treaty of Guarantee. According to 
article 1 of this treaty, the state of Cyprus undertook to ensure the maintenance of its 
independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It 
also set out that the new-born Republic would not participate, in whole or in part, in any 
political or economic union with any state whatsoever. This was intended to prohibit 
any attempt at Enosis or Taxim (partition, in Turkish) .. Article 2 laid dO\\11 that, Oritain, 
Greece and Turkey would recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity 
and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the provisions of the basic articles ofils 
Constitution. They also undertook to prohibit nny activity promoting Enosis or Tn.'dm. 
Article 3 of the Treaty declared that in the event of nny breach of the provisions of the 
present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, nnd Turkey could undertake to consult 
together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps tll ensure 
observance of those provisions. If common action proved to be impossible, ends of 
three guaranteeing Powers reserved the right to take action with the sole uim of re-
establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty. Desidcs the Trenty of 
Guarantee, a Treaty of Alliance was concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece 
and Turkey. Under this Treaty, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were to co-opcmtc for their 
common defence, and the High Contracting Powers undertook to resist uny ottack or 
aggression against Cyprus. In order to fulfill these undertakings, n Tripartite 
Headquarters was to be established on the island's territory Greece having 950 unicers 
and Turkey 650 officers. The President nnd the Vice-President of Cyprus, octing In 
agreement, could ask for the increase or reduction of these contingents. Lost but not 
least, under the Zurich-London agreement the Dritish government undertook to trnmlrcr 
sovereignty over the island to the Republic of Cyprus, with the exception of two orens, 
namely, a)Akrotiri-Episkopi-Paramali, and b)Dhekelia-Pcrgnmos-Aglos NikohlOS-
Xylophagou, which were to be used by Dritain as military bases. nH~ State of Cypru:s, 
Greece and Turkey undertook to respect and gunrnntee the integrity of these orcu!I 
. d dB" h . t 40 retame un er ntis sovereIgn y. 
The finalization of the Zurich-London agreement and its recognition by nil the 
involved sides marked the end of the Cypriot question. In n pnmdoxicnl wny, the 
Zurich-London agreement ended the Dritish colonial ern, however the British side 
40 For a full text of the Zurich-London Agreement see: Zurich·London Al:rtcment, rIMIl>ocumenls. 
Cmd. 679, (London, 1959). 
------------___ ·_T-~~~ 
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retained two military bases on the island~ In that way, the Dritish presence on the island 
was continued and legitimized.; On the other hand, itended the Enosis movement and 
. ;\ \ i" '.' 'I <-. 
the Turkish Cypriot de~and~ for partition, nevertheless nationalism and ethnic divisions 
within the Cypriot framework were not eradicated. On the contrary, they were enlarged 
by the agreement itself. In the next and final chapter of this thesis I will give Q full 
account of the Zurich-London agreement. However, nt this point I would like to point 
out that it was an agreement that had been imposed on the Cypriots by external octors 
(USA, Britain, Greece, Turkey) in the Cypriot question, whose mnin preoccupation wns 
to stabilize the situation in the. Eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, this did not 
necessarily mean the stabilization of the situation on Cyprus itself. 
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CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSION: THE END OF THE CYPIUOT QUESTION TllnOUrar TIII~ I 
ZURICH-LONDON AGREEMENT 
" " 
"Such ""ff Il" '''''''J ronM(~J ..-,,11 Illt pl.11I"" 
. and 1114 IInt4J Wff ltd'" In.1NJ, "-/llt 1fIt" ~'In' 
InJ/~ II", til)! and 1111 I.utJ OWJl.u Iotln, "'" 
.. 'as" . .. 
Thuc:ydld ••• 1 h !~. $04. 
The historic narrative appears to show that the Cypriot question. ns it u~\'eloJleu from 
1878 until 1959, was the product of fervent nationalism, colonial intle:dbility. secret 
diplomacy, and political immaturity. This conclusion will seek to assc:ss lhe enosis 
movement in Cyprus, the British, Greek and Turkish methods of uenting with the 
Cypriot question, as well as the American intervention and its role us un external fnctor 
of influence in the emergence of Cyprus as an independent entity. In other worus, this 
conclusion will seek to assess the contribution of internal and extenml factors which 
influenced the course of the Cypriot question, in order to answer the b~\sie question of 
this thesis: What were the factors that brought about the Zurich-London ngrcemcnt Dml 
signalled the end of the Enosis movement in Cyprus? In addition, lhis chapter will 
assess the importance of the Zurich-London agreement and will nnswer the rollowing 
questions: Which side benefited the most from the Zurich-London ngreement nnd did 
the Zurich-London agreement have the capacity to last pcmlanentiy? 
At midnight on 15 August 1960, the Union Jack was lowered for the Inst time in the 
Government House of Nicosia. Colonialism was temlinatcl1 and the Cypriot st~te 
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emerged from the :ashes of: the. old regime, like Phoenix,. the mythological bird. 
However, despite the fact that British . era, was. concluded on the island, the Enosis 
movement had nevertheless been defeated. In order to understand this fact it is essenti:ll 
to answer the following questions. . What was the' Enosis movement, and what was its 
main aim? 
As mentioned in. chaptec II, ; the first signs of the Enosis movement in Cyprus 
appeared immediately after the commencement of the War of Indcpcndence (1821) in 
continental Greece. The emergence of Greek nationalism within the Cypriot framework 
was a combination of· the. Ottoman' administration and the social ond economic 
prosperity of. the', Christian, population on· the island" compared to the deeply 
conservative and backward Muslim community •. The combinntion of the above fuctors 
set the basis for the spread of the Enosis movement on the island. The main nim of the 
Greek Cypriot nationalists was to liberate the island from the Ottoman yoke and then 
unify it with the metropolitan center of Hellenism, Athens. Ilowevcr, Cyprus fuiled to 
follow the course' of the' revolution in continentnl, Greece, mainly because of the 
immediate Ottoman response, which resulted in the brutalities of 9121 July 1821. By 
this, the Ottomans succeeded in keeping the outbreak of lhe revolution owny from 
Cyprus, but at the same time traumatized the Greek Cypriot mentality and creuted n 
deep gap between the Christian and the Muslim communities, n psychoiogicul burrier 
that had not previously; existed .. The arrival of Britain in Cyprus during 1878 wus 
welcomed by the Greek Cypriots as the final step townrds the Enosis of the island with 
Greece. The end of the Ottoman era and the pro-Greek role that Britain plnyed during 
the War of Independence and during the first period of the emergence of the Modem 
Greek state, convinced the Greek Cypriots that soon enough they would foUow the fute 
of their compatriots in the Ionian islands, which were unified with Greece under the 
Treaty of London (March 1864). During the early period of the Dritish odministrntion 
in Cyprus, the Enosis movement gained: considernble strength and became the mnln 
political demand of the Greek Cypriots. . The British administration did nothing to 
regularize the situation. On the contrary, it encouraged Md welcomed lhe ethnienl 
division between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in on attempt to establish itselr in the 
island through the well-known policy of ~,'divide Md rule". Nevertheless, the British 
establishment failed to comprehend that the concept of Enosis wns not a trend of the 
time but the main national aim of,the Greek Cypriots. TIlerefol'C, Lonllon nnll the 
British governor of the island were alarmed when in 1931 the Greek Cypriots, for the 
first time since 1878, decided to adopt n violent approach in order to flrotest for the 
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cause of Enosis. It was· the first sign that the Enosis movement was not only n 
theoretical club of prominent Greek Cypriot figures but an established reality in the 
hearts of the majority of the Cypriot population .. The Greek Orthodox Church in CypnJs 
became, during that period, the leading figure of the Enosis movement. Its economic 
prosperity, its double role as a: religious as well as political body, and the Dritish 
hesitation to limit its role in the social and political spectrum of the island, enabled the 
Church to stand in the front line of the Enosis movement and propagandize the cause to 
the Greek Cypriot masses. The upper Greek Cypriot class, soon enough, united its 
forces with the Church, therefore in, 1899 the first Ethnarchic Council was established, 
adopting as its slogan "Enosis and nothing but Enosis". The pure nation:tHst character 
of the Ethnarchy as well as its social. composition transfonned the anti-colonial 
movement in Cyprus. into a reactionary group with inflexible ideas concerning the 
Cypriot question. It is important to note here that the pure natiomllist nature of the 
Ethnarchy, at the end of the 19th century and during the first decodes of the 20lh century, 
was in complete harmonization with the rise of nationalism in Greece. In 18·' I. 1858, 
1866 and 1867, the Christian population in Crete revolted against the Ottomans, 
demanding Enosis with Greece, in 1878 the Greeks of Macedonia revolted ogainst the 
Ottomans demanding Enosis with Greece, the flame of revolution soon enough spread 
in Thrace and in Epirus, while from 1912 until 1922, the Dalkan peninSUla and the 
Ionian coast of Asia Minor witnessed two· Dalkan wars nnd the arrival of the Greek 
army in Smyrna. Nevertheless, while after 1922 the situation was regularized In all the 
above regions, Cyprus still remained under Dritish control and the Ethnnrchlc C\)uncil 
remained loyal to its nationalist nature and slogans for "E,4"OS/S ami nothing bill Enos/s". 
Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to show the catalytic role of the Enos!s 
movement in the course of the Cypriot question. Without nny doubt, the Enosls 
movement, as developed by the Greek Cypriot Ethnnrchy, was the major Intenl31 ructor 
which influenced the Cypriot question and led it towards the Zurich-London ngreement. 
However, in order to establish this verdict it is important to examine the Ilollcics of the 
Enosis movement throughout the Cypriot question. 
From the end of the Second World War until the sign3ture of the London-Zurich 
agreement, the Enosis movement maintained an inflexible stnnce that wus ehnmclerized 
by political immaturity and fruitless nationalist romanticism, and resulted In the derent 
of the Enosis cause and the establishment of the Zurich-London agreemcnt in the Island. 
The first signs ofits negative role and influence can be seen in 1948. As mentioned In 
Chapter III, in 1948 the British side fonned a Consultative Assembly rur the 
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introduction of a constitution \ in Cyprus. . The Greek-Cypriot Etlm:u-chy refused to 
participate and forcedAKEL to withdraw f~om the negotiations, as well. Dy the 
inflexible position of the Ethnarchy; which demanded "Enos is and nothing bill Enosis" 
and refused any negotiations with the British side, a golden opportunity was lost for the 
formation of a Greek-Cypriot administration 'that would have been able to manipulate 
the situation and apply pressure'to London from within the Cypriot establishment. No-
I ' 
one can deny that AKEL' must also be blamed for lacking courage to withstand the 
pressure coming 'from the reactionary: Ethnarchic circles. However it was the 
Ethnarchy, under the Enosis banner," that pulled the strings for the failure of the 
Consultative Assembly. ,Another great opportunity for the settlement of the Cypriot 
question, with advantageous terms' for the Greek Cypriot side, wns wasted during the 
talks between Harding and Makarios (1955-1956)., Again, the Dritish establislunent 
seemed ready to propose a constitution with' favourable tenns for the Greek Cypriot 
side. Even if Harding's proposals were not as pro-Greek as the proposals of 1948, 
Makarios' refusal to accept them was a great mistake. However, os seen in chnpter VII, 
Makarios' refused had been imposed by the extreme Nationalists inside the Ethnnrchlc 
Council (Kyrenia clique 'and Grivas), a fact that was catalytic for the final outeome of 
the discussions and 'the' arrest and· exile of the Archbishop to the tropical island of 
Seychelles. Another negative contribution of the Etlmarchic Council to the Cypriot 
question was the considerable pressure applied to Papugos' government in order to 
persuade Athens to refer to the United Nations concerning the Cypriot question. As 
seen in chapter V, Papagos' decision to appeal to the United Nations save Turkey the 
opportunity, for the first time at an international level, to express her views nnd plnns 
concerning the Cypriot question and legitimize its claims nnd views for the fute or the 
island. Despite the fact, that the Greek-Cypriot Etlmarchy was not the only nctor 
responsible for the Greek appeal to the United Nations, she yet asnin man:'l:tcd to piny n 
negative role in the course of the Cypriot question. Another negative contribution of the 
Ethnarchy was the formation of EOKA. As seen in chapter VI. EOKA became lhe 
military part of the Etlmarchy which aimed to organize a military resistance tntlVcmcnt 
against the British establishment in Cyprus. Nevertheless, that was n unfortunate 
decision for the course of the Cypriot question. The Greek state declared, from the first 
moment, that she was not willing to support the Greek Cypriot endeavour either momlly 
or economically. The Greek official line towards the Cypriot question wns thal n 
diplomatic solution should be reached through bipartite negotiations with London. In 
other words, Athens recognized only political pressure as on effective method of 
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resolving the Cypriot question and objected to a military confrontation with Britain. 
However, the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy ignored the suggestions of the Athenian 
government and persisted in her decision to form a guerilla group to challenge the 
British presence in the island. However, at this particular period the British military 
presence in Cyprus was strengthened due to the evacuation of the military base in Suez 
and the transfer of the Middle East Land Forces and Middle East Air Forces to Cyprus. 
Therefore, EOKA due to its small number and limited military capacity, was not able to 
threaten the British presence in the island in an effective way. The majority of Greek 
analysts suggest l that one of the main successes of EOKA was that it forced London to 
spend a vast amount of money in order to face its guerilla resistance. As a matter of 
fact, from 1955 until 1959, London's expenditure for military purposes in Cyprus 
touched $60 million yearly.2 Nevertheless, those who suggest that this was a great 
success for EOKA simply fail to comprehend the whole picture of the Cypriot question. 
As mentioned in chapter VI, the British Intelligence managed to manipulate the 
appearance of EOKA for its own interests in Cyprus. Until 1955, London had to face a 
unified anti-colonial front in Cyprus, composed of the Church, right-wingers nnd the 
Communist Greek Cypriots. As was analytically presented in this thesis, until 1955 
AKEL was in the front line of the Enosis movement, and due to its great influence over 
the Greek Cypriot masses its anti-colonial dynamism and nction was catalytic for the 
Cypriot question. However, immediately after the appearance of EOKA, AKEL, 
voluntarily, assumed a negative stance towards the Enosis movement and EOKA in 
particular.3 By allowing EOKA's formation and establishment in Cyprus, the British 
Intelligence finally succeeded in jeopardizing the Enosis unified front nnd limiting the 
anti-colonial action of AKEL. At the same time, EOKA gave the British establishment 
a brilliant excuse to intensify and legitimize its policy of divide and rule in Cyprus. The 
appearance of EOKA alarmed the Turkish Cypriot community whieh responded with 
the formation of VOLCAN, a secret guerilla organization that sought to protect the 
Turkish community from EOKA's attackss, while the British establishment took the 
opportunity, using EOKA as an excuse, to transform the Cypriot police into an almost 
exclusively Turkish Cypriot group.4 The social unrest created in Cyprus nfter the 
I For more concerning the above view see, M. Moutsaras, The Le\:acy ofEOKA in Cyprus, (Monthly 
Review of Political History, Athens, January 1987), pp. 92-99. 
2 A.J. Meyer, The Economy of Cyprus, (Harvard, 1962), p. 16. 
3 General Grivas, EOKA's leader, was a fervent anti-Communist and a figure oChatred for AKEL mainly 
because of its leading role with the Royal Forces during the Greek Civil War. 
4 According to a survey held by the Government of Cyprus (July 1958) the racial composition ofthe 
Police Force was: 
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appearance of EOKA, was another positive fact for London. As was analytically 
explained throughout this thesis, London, in order to justify its Cypriot policy to the 
international community, argued that the British presence in Cyprus was the only factor 
of security that could prevent the outbreak of a civil war. EOKA succeeded in giving 
credence to the British argument and gave London the moral and practical opportunity 
to present itself as the guardian of stability on the island. All the above suggest that the 
contribution of EOKA to the Cypriot question was only negative. It managed to 
jeopardize the unified Enosis front, greatly polarized the relationship between the Greek 
and Turkish communities in the island, and greatly assisted the British side in 
manipulating developments concerning the Cypriot question for its own geostrategic 
benefits. Unfortunately, EOKA's main contribution to the Cypriot question can be 
found in the following table of the casualties caused by Grivas' fighters from 1 April 
until December 19585, of which surprisingly enough the Greek Cypriots, most of them 
left-wingers, are the majority: 
1955 British (12) Greek -Cypriots Turkish-Cypriots 
(12) (0) 
1956 British (81) Greek-Cypriots Turkish-Cypriots 
(115) (12) 
1957 British (10) Greek -Cypriots Turkish-Cypriots 
(21) (3) 
1958 British (40) Greek-Cypriots Turkish-Cypriots 
(74) (15) 
. The final judgment of EnOSlS' contrIbutIon to the Cypriot question follows the 
conclusive outcome of the Zurich-London agreement, which signalled the end of the 
British dominance in Cyprus. On 1 March 1959, Makarios, from the Archbishopric 
Palace of Nicosia told thousands of Greek Cypriots who came to welcome him back to 
the island after 3 years of exile: "People of Cyprus, we won" 6 However, how can 
anybody claim that the Zurich-London agreement was a victory of the Enosis 
movement, since its established aim was "Enosis and nothing but Enosis"? The Zurich-
London agreement was the gravestone upon the Enosis idea, a clear and sound proof 
that the actions and policies of the Enosis movement were based upon unrealistic ideas 
and unfortunate methods. The Enosis movement was established upon policies that 
failed to comprehend political developments in the rest of the world and to associate 
Auxiliary Police and Special Greeks Turks 
Constables 
70 1,700 
The Mobile Reserve - 542 
S The Official Archives ofthe Republic of Cyprus, Casualty list 1955-1958, box 3, ser. II, col. 47-51. 
6 N. Kranidiotis, Difficult Years, (Athens, 1981), p. 386. 
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them with the Cypriot question; remained stubbornly attached to ideas and doctrines 
that belonged to another era; and was represented by figures, such as Makarios and 
Grivas, who, instead of working patiently towards the accomplishment of Enosis by 
analyzing the facts and adopting feasible policies, behaved with great irresponsibility 
and opportunistic romanticism, refusing to see reality, and living inside an imaginary 
world of nationalist bravado and so-called historic duty towards the principles of 
Hellenism. What would have been the fate of Cyprus if the Enosis movement had 
adopted realistic policies according to the spirit of the era? What would have been the 
fate of Cyprus if the Enosis movement had not decided to make use of Grivas' military 
calibre? What would have been the fate of Cyprus if the Enosis movement had applied 
political pressure to the British side and waited passionately for the moment that Cyprus 
was no longer useful to London? It would be a great methodological mistake to make 
any attempt to answer the above hypothetical questions, nevertheless the overall 
conclusion of this thesis is that the Enosis movement in Cyprus failed to represent 
successfully the demand of the Greek Cypriot people for Enosis with Greece, and its 
dynamism proved to be self-destructive for the objective of Enosis of Cyprus with 
Greece, since its attitude led the Cypriot question to the Zurich-London agreement. 
In addition, the Zurich-London agreement was not merely a product of the Enosis 
movement in Cyprus. On the contrary, the Cypriot fate had been influenced by the role 
of external factors as well. In order to support this, it is important to review the policies 
of Britain, Greece, Turkey and the USA towards the Cypriot question. The British 
policy towards that question can be divided into two periods. During the first period 
(1878-1939), British policy was influenced by London's commitment to establish itself 
on the island by effecting its administrative and economic transformation, but at the 
same time London used Cyprus as a post in order to safeguard its naval superiority in the 
Mediterranean, as a power base in order to protect the trade routes of her Asian colonies, 
and as a diplomatic card in order to safeguard her alliance with either Greece or Turkey.' 
However, after the end of the Second World War, London began to approach Cyprus 
with another point of view. After the end of the Second World War the demise of the 
British Empire began, and Britain had to accept a secondary role in the global 
confrontation of the two superpowers, the USA. and the USSR. The Jewel of the 
Empire, India, gained its independence, the British forces withdrew from Suez, and 
British influence in the Middle East was threatened by the emergence of Arab 
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nationalism and Soviet involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. Cyprus, aftcr the Sccond 
World War and until 1957, held a special place in the British "super-ego". A Freudian 
analysis would have showed that during that time Britain was in the stage of recovering 
from the "post-Imperial trauma". The demise of the British empire; the social and 
economic wounds from the Second World War; and the secondary role that the nation 
had to play in the Cold War era, compared to the USA and USSR, after centuries of 
political and military superiority in the global spectrum: all those factors deeply scarred 
the British mentality and lacerated the pride of its citizens. Despite the fact that the 
demise of the Empire did not have the same traumatic effect on the British public as for 
example in France8, Cyprus was still the last British holding in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, the remnant of an era that had lapsed, the last emblem of the Imperial 
past destined to remind the British people of their glorious history. TIlerefore, because 
Cyprus held such great psychological importance, quite often, as was presented in this 
thesis, London's attitude towards the Cypriot question derived from the heart and not 
from the head. Hopkinson's "never" concerning the independence of Cyprus, and 
Makarios' arrest and exile were cases that can justify the above argument. However, 
Cyprus did not only have sentimental value for London. It was also used quite 
successfully by the Foreign Office in order to strengthen the political bonds between 
London and Ankara. On 21 February 1947, the British ambassador to the United States 
informed the State Department that London would no longer provide economic aid to 
Greece, and that the British army, which was assisting the Royal side against the 
Communist guerillas, would pull out by the end of March.9 This decision of the Labour 
government was the turning point for Anglo-Greek relations. Since the fonl1ation of the 
modem Greek state, the diplomatic relations between London and Greece had been 
extremely close. However, after 1947 and the introduction of the Truman doctrine in 
7 Characteristically, Britain used Cyprus in order to prevent Turkey from entering the first World Wnr on 
the side of the Central Powers, while it was promised to Greece as a "gin" in the event that the I:llter were 
to abandon her neutral policy during the First World War and join the Entente. 
8 The violent de-colonization of the French colonies deeply polarised the French society nnd was one of 
the main reasons for the student and labour uprising during May 1968. According to J. Lnwrc:ncc, ~ 
Rise and Fall of the British Empire, (London, 1998). pp. 588-89: ..... the Algerian war brought about the 
downfall of the Fourth Republic in 1958, a large-scale mutiny by the Frcnch army In 1961. tum lilts In 
Paris, and a spate of terrorist outrages undertaken by the Algerian settlers movcmellt, the OAS 
(Organisation Armee Secrete) during 1961-62. Portugal'sfarewellto empire was eqllally tllrbulent and 
bloody: between 1960 and 1976 135,000 Portuguese troops were deployed against nationalll,t partlsalls 
in Mozambique and Angola. There were also repercussions at home wltJr a revoilltion whlc" o\'cr-threw 
the right-wing regime of President Caetano in April 1974. Within a montJr of Dc/glum granting 
independence to the Congo (Zaire) in June 1960, the new state Jrad disintegrated Illto anarc"y and eMI 
war with massacres o/white settlers." For more concerning this issue see: S. Litsas. The: End QCtbe 
Colonial Era: A comparative analysis of Britain and France, (Ilellenic Institute of Politics, Alhens 2000), 
vol. XXV, pp. 14-19. 
9 Foreign Office Papers, F.O to Washington, 21-2-1947. 371167032 R:1900 
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Greece, Anglo-Greek relations loosened and Greece, from a British "protectorate", 
became an American power-base in the Balkans. However, the same thing did not 
happen with Ankara. After the end of the First World War Anglo-Turkish relations 
passed a crisis. However, after 1945 the two sides forgot the past and strengthened their 
diplomatic relations. Turkey was for Britain the most valuable ally in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The Turkish geostrategic place in the Middle East, close to the oil-
producing Arab states, and its prestigious place in the Baghdad Pact, where Britain held 
the leading role, made London consider Ankara a valuable asset for the protection of her 
economic and military interests in the Middle East. Therefore, Britain used Cyprus, an 
island of great geostrategic interest to the Turkish defence structure, in a way that 
strengthened the diplomatic bonds between the two nations by opposing the Enosis 
demands of the Greek Cypriots and preserving the island's neutrality towards the Greco-
Turkish antagonism in the Eastern Mediterranean. As was presented throughout this 
thesis, Britain placed Turkey in the centre of the Cypriot issue, even if according to the 
Lausanne Treaty the latter had no right of claim upon the island. No matter what moral 
accusations Britain faces concerning this decision, it was a brilliant diplomatic move that 
aimed to reinforce her relations with Ankara, and on the other hand to discourage the 
appeals of Athens for bipartite talks concerning the finding of a common settlement for 
Cyprus. However, Britain has a great moral and political responsibility for introducing 
the idea of partition. This idea, as introduced by Lennox-Boyd and legitimized by 
Macmillan's plan, was a British attempt to find a permanent solution for the Cypriot 
question that could please Ankara, at a time when London wanted to spare herself from 
the perplexities of the Cypriot question. After 1957, the Dri tish attitude towards Cyprus 
changed and the British desire was to get out of the Cypriot labyrinth. It is important to 
remember here that the end of National Service, the substantial cuts in defence spending, 
and the manufacture of the H-bomb, made Britain re-eonsider her position towards her 
colonies and their geostrategic importance and hasten the process of dc-colonizing 
Cyprus. However, the idea of partition was irresponsible, since Greeks and Turks were 
living together all over the island in mixed villages, and the development of such a 
scheme would have led to a long and destructive civil war that could also have affected 
military relations between Athens and Ankara. In general, I strongly disagree with the 
view of many Greek and Greek Cypriot analysts, who accuse Britain over hcr attitude 
towards the Cypriot question. I firmly accept the view that every country has to pull 
every available string in order to promote and protect her interests. Nonetheless, I 
oppose the introduction of the idea of partition, which became established in the 
.... 
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Turkish-Cypriot mentality, was perilous for the fragile unity of the island, and was fully 
realized by the Turkish army during July-August 1974. I will not attempt to answer the 
hypothetical question of whether Ankara would still have aimed to partition the island 
with or without the introduction of the aforementioned idea ~y the Dritish side. 
However, I do believe that Lennox-Boyd was the spiritual godfather of the prescnt 
partitioned Cyprus. Nevertheless, as contradictory as it sounds, the idea of partition 
assisted the arrival of the Zurich-London agreement, which signalled the final resolution 
of the Cypriot question. Greece and the Greek Cypriots, almned at the possibility of a 
partitioned Cyprus, were forced to re-consider their stance, while the American side 
intervened in a catalytic way in order to block the implementation of the idea of partition 
in the island. 
The Cypriot question is still taboo in Greece. Only popular singers and left-wing 
intellectuals tend to speak about it in great detail, attacking the previous Greek 
governments concerned because of their attitude towards the Greek-Cypriot demands 
for Enosis, and for signing the Zurich-London agreement. However, their philosophical 
approaches fail to comprehend the perplexities of the subject. All Greek governments 
from 1878 until 1959 tried to maintain a moderate attitude towards the Cypriot question, 
mainly because of the fact that Cyprus was a secondary issue compared to others, such 
as the Macedonian issue, the unification of Crete, the Dodecanese question, the Ionian 
question, the Greek minority in Constantinople, the defeat of Greek Communism. the 
social and economic problems that the country faced after the end of the Greek Civil 
War, the admission of the country to the North Atlantic Treaty organizntion and the new 
responsibilities that followed for Greece in the Cold War era. It is a fact that since the 
formation of the modem Greek state, Cyprus has held a moral value for Greece, but its 
geostrategic importance for Athens was small in comparison to other territories 
containing a large Greek population which were still outside the Greek framework 
(Macedonia, Crete). The reason for this attitude can be justified by the geographical 
position of Cyprus. The island is very close to the Turkish coast but at the same time 
far from continental Greece, therefore it was not included in the immediate political and 
military plans of the Greek officials for the enlargement of the nation. Another reason 
for the lack of interest of Athens towards Cyprus was the fact that the island was under 
British control. Due to the close links of Athens with London, at least until 1947, the 
former did not want to upset her closest ally and champion and hoped that one day 
Cyprus would be granted to Greece as had happened with the Ionian islands nnd the 
Dodecanese. The only grave mistake that a Greek government committed during the 
2SS 
early period of the Cypriot question was in 1915, when London offered Cyprus to 
Greece on condition that the latter joined the Entente. Zaimis' government refused the 
offer and a golden opportunity was lost for the Greek side to gain Cyprus, an historic 
irony, since two years later Greece finally joined the Entente but the British offer had 
lapsed. The post-Second World War Greek governments remained loyal to the 
moderate policy of Athens towards the Cypriot question, but they were onen 
embarrassed by the reactions of their Cypriot compatriots and by the attitude of the 
opposition parties. During the final and most important stage of the Cypriot question 
(1950-1959), Papagos' and Karamanlis' governments tried to negotiate with London for 
the final resolution of the Cypriot question, but they had to face the irresponsibility of 
the Greek-Cypriot leadership and the political opportunism of the opposition parties. 
The Liberals and EDA sabotaged any attempt of Athens to work towards the finding of 
a satisfactory settlement with London for the Cypriot question, by creating a deep social 
and political instability in the country and by antagonizing the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy 
with unrealistic nationalist slogans. Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties it has to be 
said that both Papagos' and Karamanlis' governments, especially the latter, moved quite 
successfully through the perplexities of the issue and the final outcome of the Cypriot 
question was the best result that could feasibly have been achieved, both for Cyprus and 
for Greece. A large number of Greek scholars1o accuse Athens ofeausing the demise of 
the Greek minority in Constantinople, and for the defeat of the Enosis movement in 
Cyprus by signing the Zurich-London agreement. However, as is argued in this thesis, 
in both cases Athens had no responsibility whatsoever. The Greek minority in 
Constantinople was attacked during the Tripartite Conference in London and it was a 
Turkish official plot to put a violent end to the negotiations. If some argue that a refusal 
of Athens to attend the Conference would have protected the Greeks in Constantinople, 
then they simply fail to understand the puzzle of the Cypriot question. Athens could not 
have refused to attend the Conference, since in that period EOKA made its appearance 
in Cyprus and Athens, by its presence in the Conference, wished to disprove British 
accusations that it was assisting Grivas' guerillas. Additionally, even if I accept the 
view that the Greeks in Constantinople would not have been harmed by the Turkish 
mob had Greece not participated in the Conference, I cannot accept the fact that Ankara 
would not have reacted in the same way towards a similar situation in the future. The 
Zurich-London agreement, on the other hand, was not the best settlement either for 
10 For more concerning the above views see: T. Tsekouras, The Death Qf Hellenism in the City, (Lnrissa, 
1988). pp. 24S-S9. See also: E. Annaniadis. Turkey and Minority Issues: The Armenian,. Greeks Dod 
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Cyprus or Greece. The aim of Enosis had to be forgotten forever, while the Turks 
gained considerable political rights relative to their numerical composition inside the 
Cypriot framework. However, the question that must be answered is, what would have 
happened had Athens not worked towards the realization of the Zurich-London 
agreement? The immediate response to this question is that Macmillan's plan would 
have been introduced in the island and would have authorized the de facto and de jure 
partition of Cyprus, a development that would have resulted in the out·break of a Civil 
War between the two communities and a possible Greco-Turkish war, as well. I entirely 
accept the fact that the Zurich-London agreement was a negative development for the 
Cypriot question, from the Greek perspective, but I also support the view that it was the 
only possible solution offering the least harm, compared to Macmillan's plan, to both 
Athens and Nicosia. In many cases in diplomacy, the "least harm" is much bcttcr than 
the theoretical and vague "best". Karamanlis had the political maturity to accept the 
above rule and deny the calls of the nationalist Sirens, who were thirsty for more blood 
and destruction. 
The Turkish attitude towards the Cypriot question can also be divided into two parts. 
In the first part (1878-1955), Turkey seemed completely disinterested in Cyprus and the 
Muslim population there. From 1878 until 1920 the declining Ottoman Empire had 
neither the power nor the will to deal with Cyprus. According to the Sultan, Cyprus 
belonged to Britain, while the Ottoman defeat in the First World War and the 
occupation of the country by the forces of the Entente (Dritain-France-Italy-Orcccc) 
posed more important issues for the officials in Constantinople than dealing with the 
island. The Turkish apathy towards Cyprus continued with the rise of Kemal to power 
and the emergence of the modern state of Turkey. Catalytic factors for this attitude 
were the Treaty of Lausanne, and the foreign policy of the Kcmalist movement. 
According to the Lausanne Treaty Turkey abandoned every right upon thc cx-Ottoman 
dominions that remained outside the new Turkish borders, as set by the Treaty. On the 
other hand, Kemal's policies set a new framework for the new state. The Ottoman 
expansionism in the Balkans and the Middle East was abandoned and great 
concentration was given to the internal affairs of the state, sueh as the strengthening of 
the new regime, the creation of a racially pure Turkey by thc cxtirpation of the cthnic 
minorities [Armenians, Greeks, Kurdish], and the limitation of Islam's influencc by the 
Kurds in the Turkish Framework, (Athens, 1990), pp. 130·143. 
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secularization of the state. I I The same attitude towards Cyprus continued after the cnd 
of the Second World War, however, this state of apathy came to an end after 1955, for 
various reasons. The most important was the new geostrategic plans adopted by Ankara 
because of the new global political reality, the Cold War. Traditionally, the Ottoman 
and Turkish foreign line was influenced by the fear of Russian expansionism and by the 
lack of trust towards Greece. After the granting of the Dodecanese to Greece (1946) 
and the Soviet penetration in Middle Eastern affairs, Turkey felt she was surrounded by 
nations traditionally hostile to her existence. The Aegean Sea became a Greek lake, the 
Black Sea was under the Soviet shadow, while the Middle East began to tum her back 
to Ankara establishing close links with Moscow and the rest of the European communist 
states. Therefore, Ankara began to review her policies towards Cyprus, realizing that 
the island could have been used as a power-base in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
safeguarding an exit to the sea except the Straits. However, it must be noted here that 
Turkey never tried to question the British presence on the island. On the contrary, she 
seemed to be satisfied by the prospect of Cyprus remaining under British control, 
because London was Ankara's closest ally in the region and at the same time it meant 
that the Enosis question with Greece would have remained an unfulfilled dream. The 
main preoccupation for Ankara was not to regain Cyprus but to safeguard the island 
from Greece. Even though both Greece and Turkey belonged to NATO, the antagonism 
between the two states was still great and a short-or long-scale war could not have been 
ignored as an standing possibility. For that reason, Turkey strongly opposed the 
possibility of Cypriot unification with Greece, because in the case of war Cyprus would 
have been used by Greece as the first and main line of attack against Turkish targets, 
together with the Dodecanese. A characteristic account of the Turkish policy 
concerning the Cypriot question comes from the American side. On 12 July 1956, 
Nixon briefed the National Security Council on his trip to the Far East. During the 
discussion he referred to his visit to Turkey: 
"Apropos of his visit to Turkey, the vice-president said thai he 
was amazed to find that the Turks had a positively pathological 
attitude on the Cyprus problem. The Prime Alinlsler had el'e" 
gone so far as 10 suggest that if Cyprus was joined 10 Greece, 
the Turks would go to war to prevenl it... The reason for 
Turkish alarm over Cyprus, said the Vice President, 'was rather 
11 Kemal's policies can be compared to Stalin's policies concerning the strengthening of Dolshevism In 
the USSR, abandoning Lenin's and Trotsky's revolutionary expansionist ideals. 
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the closeness of the island to the Turkish mainland than 
concernfor the Turkish minority living on Cyprus. ,,12 
With British encouragement and protection Ankara entered with great dynamism into 
the Cypriot question and played a catalytic role in the final outcome of it. As a 
researcher I have to declare my deepest admiration for the Turkish side, that managed to 
play her diplomatic cards in an excellent way and, finally, to sign the Zurich-London 
agreement, which gave her more rights upon Cyprus than even the most optimistic 
Turkish diplomat would have expected a few years earlier. 
Last but not least; the Cypriot question was a source of great embarrassment for the 
American side. The three countries involved in the Cypriot question were closely 
linked with the United States, however they were crossing their swords at an 
internationalleve1~ questioning the unity of the Atlantic Treaty. It is a common idea in 
Greece that the American side played an anti-Greek role. However, I object to that 
view. This thesis clearly shows that the American side maintained an extremely 
cautious attitude towards all the countries involved. The greatest concern of the Stnle 
Department was to preserve the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty and avoid a possible 
Greco-Turkish war over Cyprus. Therefore, the American attitude varied according to 
the circumstances. While it clearly supported Dritnin and Turkey during the Ninth 
Session of the General Assembly, when Athens applied to the United Nations on 
Cyprus behalf, it also applied considerable pressure upon London to modify its 
inflexible position towards the- Cypriot question when Karamanlis thrcntencd that he 
was ready to withdraw Greece from NATO, and also pulled the strings for the liberation 
of Makarios from Seychelles. It has to be understood that Washington was anxious for 
the final resolution of the Cypriot question, no matter whnt this would have been, 
wishing the return of peace and tranquility in the southeastern flnnk of NATO. In 
general, the US was the deus-ex-machina of the Cypriot question. It watched the 
political and diplomatic developments of the issue with grent attention but from n 
distance, ready to intervene and give solutions every time the plot of the Cypriot drama 
reached a deadlock. 
As follows, the Zurich-London agreement resulted from a combination of internal 
and external factors influencing the Cypriot question. It was an attempt to resolve a 
situation that threatened both to de-stabilize peace and order in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and to discredit the unity of the southeastern flank of the Atlantic 
12 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955·1957: Soviet Union: Enstern Mediterrnnean. edt by J.P. 
Glennon, (Washington, 1989), vol. XXIV, pp. 378·79. 
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Alliance in an international level. It signalled the end of colonialism as well as the 
termination of the Enosis movement in Cyprus. Both internal and external factors 
played their historic part in the course of the Cypriot question and influenced the final 
outcome of it, as expressed by the Zurich-London agreement. This thesis was based 
upon the research of primary sources, both Greek, British and American, while I also 
interviewed important personalities form Greece and Cyprus in an attempt to give a 
complete picture of the Cypriot question. It is important to note here, that I faced great 
difficulties in persuading people to talk about their experiences and conclusions 
concerning the Cypriot question .. In many cases they seemed unsure whether they had 
to be absolutely honest, and in others they simply tried to enlarge their role and their 
position. For example, after a series of failed attempts I managed to persuade the ex-
Greek Premier, Mr. Konstantinos Mitsotakis, to give me an interview. The interview 
was booked for late August 1999 and I arrived in his country villa in Akrotiri expecting 
an hour, the time' that I had been given, of interesting discussion and important 
revelations. However, soon enough I discovered that the ex-Premier was more 
interested in his public image than serving historiography. During that period I was 
extremely concerned about EOKA's financial links with Greece, therefore one of my 
first questions was whether he knew of any important evident concerning this issue. llis 
answer irritated and displeased me. "Mr. Litsas, I am glad that YOII ask me this 
question, because I have never revealed that I financed EOKA's struggle "./J For 
obvious reasons I regarded this statement as preposterous, therefore I did not use it in 
my thesis. On this point it is essential to clarify that I did not have a set questionnaire 
for all the people that I interviewed. My questions varied according to the personality 
of my interlocutor, his position, and his role in the Cypriot question. l11erefore, While 
my interview with the former secretary-general of KKE, Mr. Grigoris Farakos, was 
focused upon the Soviet factor and EDA, my interview with the ex-service brigadier of 
the 4th Armored Kilkis Brigade, loannis Tsiligirakis, was focused upon the sentiments 
and the role of the Greek army in the Cypriot question. For reasons that I mention in 
the Introduction, I did not make use of Turkish primary or secondary sources, however, 
whenever necessary I was assisted by the British and American archives. On occasions, 
I faced some problems due to the fact that the majority of the Greek archives concerning 
Cyprus are still closed, however I overcame this by using memoirs and diaries, as well 
as, interviews. I strongly believe that the writing of an historical thesis, whenever 
possible, should be based upon archives, memoirs, diaries, and interviews. It is 
13 Personal interview with Mr. Mitsotakis, August 1999. 
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!, essential for the researcher to combine the information that derives from the primary 
sources with the evidence of key actors during interviews, in an attempt to link facts 
with empirical knowledge and observation. Only then can historic evidences be cross-
examined and epistemological truth be approached, as much as possible. Only then can 
an historic thesis "bring order out of chronological chaos, truth out of human accounts, 
and knowledge out of oblivious unawareness ", as the Ancient Greek historian Kalikratis 
the Corinthian urged his students in "Parabolas" [x, 67]. 
In the last part of the conclusion I will make a general evaluation of the Zurich-
London agreement and I will answer the following questions: Which side benefited the 
most from the Zurich-London agreement? Did the Zurich-London agreement have the 
capacity to last permanently? First of all, as mentioned in chapter X, the Zurich-London 
agreement was the last opportunity for the Greek side to keep Cyprus unified. The 
agreement was the official recognition of the Greek and the Greek Cypriot side that the 
Enosis struggle had to come to an end, without achieving its goal. Without any doubt, 
the final agreement was a defeat for Greek diplomacy, but at the same time, according to 
the political climate surrounding the Cypriot question, it was the only available solution 
for Athens, in order to prevent the implementation of Macmillan's plan and the de facto 
partition of the island. Britain, on the other hand, accepted the transfer of sovereignty 
over Cyprus, however, ,it also preserved the continuation of its presence in Cyprus 
through the establishment of two military bases on the island. In addition, London 
managed not to be deeply involved with the Zurich-London agreement, leaving the stage 
to Turkey and Greece, a development that would have protected her international image 
in the event of failure of the agreement. With little effort, London managed to safeguard 
its geostrategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and at the same time end its costly 
engagement in Cyprus. Nevertheless, Turkey appeared to be the true winner. She 
succeeded in not allowing Cyprus to be unified with Greece, she improved her national 
image at an international level by playing a major role in the finding of the final solution 
about Cyprus; and at the same time she managed to improve her diplomatic relations 
with Greece, a vital nation for her political and military survival at this particular point. 
Continuing with the second question, the main disadvantage of the agreement was that 
it was set up by the Greek and the Turkish governments in Zurich. Immediately 
afterwards, Britain agreed to it. It is important to note that the agreement had been 
reached between these three Governments in the total absence of the Cypriots. When 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot delegations came to London, they were faced with the 
complete text of the Agreement and they had either to accept or reject it. They were not 
" 
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given the opportunity to negotiate the text point by point. It may be assumed that 
Greece and Turkey' represented · the standpoints of the two communities at the 
Conference, but this was not the case. While it is a fact that the people of Cyprus nrc 
Greeks and Turks, it is' also a fact that the governments in Athens and Anknra nrc not 
Cypriots. Therefore, the Zurich-London Agreement was formed by two nations outside 
the daily Cypriot reality, which could not understand, in spite of their national links with 
the inhabitants of the island, the political and sociological mentality of the two Cypriot 
communities as shaped by centuries of antagonistic co-existence. Greece, Turkey, and 
to a lesser extent Britain, behaved like 19th century colonial powers, shaping the future 
of the people of Cyprus without even asking them first. However, it can be claimed that 
there was not sufficient time for such a development and that Athens and Anknra had to 
move fast in order to close the, Cypriot question. Nevertheless, it would not be an 
exaggeration to claim that both Greece and Turkey agreed in Zurich, taking into account 
their national interests and not the complexities of the Cypriot question, behaving like an 
immature child, who "tidies" his room by placing all his toys and clothes under his bed, 
instead of making a real. effort to place them into the closet. The Zurich-London 
agreement was a solution that had been imposed upon the Cypriot people and, as was 
proven during the 60's, neither the Greek nor the Turkish communities felt the need to 
respect it, since for them it was something artificial and involved no contribution from 
them. It was a diplomatic effort that was less concentrated upon the re-establishment of 
peace and order on the island and more focused upon the disengagement of Athens, 
Ankara and London from the labyrinth of the Cypriot question. Ilowever, on the other 
hand, the Cypriot leadership is not without its responsibilities, as well. With its attitude 
during the past, both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot leaderships proved to the 
international community, including Greece and Turkey, that they had neither the courage 
nor the patience to overcome their traditional differences and reach a common 
settlement. Both sides behaved as if the Cypriot question was the only diplomatic issue 
that Athens and Ankara had to deal with, and this attitude persuaded their metropolitan 
centres that they had neither the political maturity nor the desire to playa leading role 
towards the final solution of the Cypriot question. 
In addition, the Zurich-London agreement did not succeed in distributing the powers 
in Cyprus fairly, according to the composition of the popUlation. It was the first time in 
history, that 18% of the population had the same political powers and authority as the 
other 80%. The Turkish side succeeded in securing the representation of the Turkish 
Cypriots at the extraordinary levels of 30% in the island's public sector and 40% in the 
, 
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army, while Turkish forces were to be stationed on the island. As N. Erim, the well-
known Turkish academic, told the Turkish Press at the end of the London conference: 
"Cyprus' did' not return to Turkey. However, it is almost 
impossible' to find another country in the world where such a 
small proportion of the population seized so many rights, as the 
Turkish Cypriots seized with the Zurich-London agreement. "/,, 
It will not be an exaggeration to claim that the Zurich-London agreement was a 
Frankenstein of international diplomacy, an agreement that violated one of the basic 
principles of liberal international morality: the legitimate right of the majority to hold 
more power than the minority.:- If the verification of this argument is linked with the 
Greek and Greek Cypriot mentality, then future generations will realize why the Zurich-
London Agreement was doomed to failure.' Following the disaster of the Greek army in 
the Asia Minor campaign in 1922, and the violent eviction of thc Greek popUlation from 
the Ionian coasts by Kemal's army, the Greek people lost their trust in the Western 
Powers. With great simplicity and lack of true knowledge concerning the actual facts of 
the Asia Minor campaign, the Greek people held the powers of Entente exclusively 
responsible for the sound defeat of. the Greek army in the Ionian coasts and the 
bankruptcy of the Great Idea. . The years that followed did nothing to improve the 
situation. Despite the fact that Greece, from the early days of the Second World War, 
united its forces with Britain against the Axis power, London seemed to regard the 
Greek territory as its protectorate. Britain, together with the Ottoman Empire back in the 
War of Independence (1821-1830); was the only nation that bombarded Athens during 
the battle of December 1944 against the Greek Communist forces; while despite its 
promises during the Second World War it did not allow Cyprus to be unified with 
Greece, adopting a clear pro-Turkish position, especially after the appearance of EOKA 
in the Cypriot spectrum. The combination of all these factors gave the extreme 
nationalist circles inside the Greek establishment the opportunity to speak about another 
plot of the West against Greece, with the signature of the Zurich-London agreement. It 
is characteristic that as soon as the Zurich-London agreement became known to the 
Greek public, the secret organization inside the army, IDEA', famous for its nationalist 
ideas, issued the following statement: 
14 M. Drousiotis, E.O.K.A: The Dark Side. (Athens, 1998). p. 238. 
• IDEA was a secret organization formed by young nationalist officers immediately afier the end orlhe 
Second World War. Its members fought during the Civil War against the Communists and were loyallo 
the King but hostile towards the Greek political establishment, and their main aspiration WllS the abolition 
of democracy in Greece and the establishment of military rule. headed by the King. as in Metnxns' regime 
back in 1936. 
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"We, the protectors' of the; national /rontiers and the 
defenders of the Hellenic values would like to re-assure 
all the true patriots that the Cypriot question cannot be 
closed with the signature of the treacherous Zurlch-
London agreement. > -, Hellenes" Cyprus will be a pari of 
our beloved country. Have faith in the bravery of the 
Greek Royal Army"J5 
Those prophetic words were intended to be realized with the establishment of the 
military junta in Greece of Papadopoulos, Patakos, and Ioannides, the spiritual leaders of 
IDEA, and the attempt to overthrow Makarios in 14 July 1974, a development that gave 
, .' ", ~ ~ ,~ , , 
Turkey the right to invade Cyprus in order to protect the Zurich-London Agreement and 
led to the final partition of the island and the creation of the so-called Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus, unrecognized by the international community (except Turkey). As 
this thesis has demonstrated, the Cypriot question was an apotheosis of colonialism and 
, ~ "" ~ 
nationalism, a problem that involved the Cypriot population, Britain, Greece, Turkey 
and the USA. It was a complicated issue that divided the Cypriots, worsened Anglo-
, "",' ... ',.' < 
Greek relations, brought Greece and Turkey close to a military confrontation and 
. . 
obliged the US to commit its forces in order to regularize the situation and pacify the 
island. The Zurich-Lond0D:: agre~ment officially closed the Cypriot question, a 
diplomatic thorn in t~e Britishside since 1878, allowing the Cypriot people to enjoy the 
right to independence~ However, due to its context, the signature of the agreement was 
not the end of the Cypriot adventures but the opening of a new dramatic chapter for the 
history of the stormed-tossed i island, the commencement of the Cypriot Odyssey 
> 'l" 
destined to end in the port of oblivion, instead of Ithaca. 
u I.D.E.A statement to the Greek Press, Eleihteria, 22 February 1959. 
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